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Foreword to the second edition
More than ten years ago, the World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) and 
its Member States, along with their technical partners, adopted a strategy for developing and 
implementing comprehensive public health surveillance and response systems in African 
countries. The strategy was called Integrated Disease Surveillance (IDS). To highlight the 
essential link between surveillance and response, subsequent documents referred to Integrated 
Disease Surveillance and Response (or IDSR). The first edition o f the IDSR Technical 
Guidelines (2002) was widely adopted and adapted throughout the African region. Progress 
towards coordinated, integrated surveillance systems has been mixed, but almost every country 
in the region and their partners has invested human and material resources in strengthening 
capacities for public health systems in order to detect, confirm and respond to public health 
threats in time to prevent unnecessary illness, death, and disability.
As a result, the second edition o f the IDSR Technical Guidelines was developed in response to 
several factors relevant to the last decade. During the last ten years, many changes have 
occurred in Africa’s health, social, economic, environmental and technical environment.
Between 2000 and 2010, the emergence o f new diseases, conditions and events resulted in the 
need to review the recommendations for evolving public health priorities for surveillance and 
response. For example, while the initial goal o f IDSR was to address communicable diseases, 
many countries have begun to include non-communicable diseases in their IDSR program. Also, 
the emergence o f pandemic influenza (avian and H1N1) emphasized the importance of 
community surveillance for linking detection to rapid confirmation and response. Disease- 
specific programs have refocused their objectives to address broader system strengthening 
objectives. As well, countries continue to work towards achievement o f the Millennium 
Development Goals. The changes are not only in the disease landscape but also are seen in a 
broader context with events such as:
• Increased migration to cities with subsequent increases in traffic injuries, rates o f non- 
communicable diseases, and health conditions related to crowded housing
• Wider access to wireless technologies such as cellular phones and internet
• Impact o f climate change on shifting disease patterns
• Increased recognition o f the need for better coordination between human and animal
health surveillance
• Increased interest from donor and technical partners to support surveillance and disease- 
reduction strategies, and
• Heightened awareness o f the importance o f national core capacities for surveillance and 
response demonstrated by adoption o f the International Health Regulations (2005).
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In light o f these changes over the last ten years, WHO-AFRO and its technical partners engaged 
in a review o f the first edition o f the Technical Guidelines and developed updated 
recommendations to address the current situation and needs. These recommendations are 
presented in this second edition o f the IDSR Technical Guidelines.
C u rre n t  status o f  I D S R  in  cou n tries
In June o f 2010, a self-assessment questionnaire was administered to the 46 Member States in 
the African Region to determine progress with implementing the IDSR strategy. The findings 
indicated that 43 out o f the 45 responding countries were at different levels o f IDSR 
implementation. A ll the countries had designated national surveillance structure and had 
identified IDSR priority diseases or conditions. In relation to emergency preparedness and 
response, only 24 o f the 45 countries reported having an operations command and control center 
to coordinate and monitor outbreaks and other public health emergencies. O f the 4,386 districts 
present in the 45 countries, 3,801 (86%) were implementing IDSR strategy to some extent in the 
12 months preceding the assessment. Several countries have already begun including 
surveillance for non-communicable diseases.
This assessment highlighted critical gaps in district level implementation o f IDSR namely:
• Absence o f IDSR dedicated data staff at district level in 30% of the countries surveyed
• Lack o f epidemic management committees in over 80% of districts
• Absence o f rapid response teams in over 50% of districts
• Lack o f logistic and communication capacities in a significant numbers o f districts in the 
45 countries
• Lack o f consistency in the use o f IDSR core indicators in monitoring and evaluating 
performance at all levels
M a jo r  actions f o r  stren g th en in g  su rve illa n ce  in  the A fr ic a n  reg ion
In the last decade, two major actions have demonstrated global and regional attention on 
improving disease surveillance systems in Africa. The first was the adoption o f integrated 
disease surveillance and response (IDSR) in September 1998 when the 48t World Health 
Organization Regional Committee for Africa met in Harare, Zimbabwe and Member States 
adopted resolution AFR/RC48/R2 for improving the availability and use o f data for public health 
action at all levels o f national systems. The vision o f this strategy was to improve the ability of 
all levels o f the health system to detect, confirm, and respond to diseases and other public health 
events in order to reduce high levels o f death, illness and disability in African communities.
The second major action was the adoption of the International Health Regulations (IHR) on 23 
May 2005 by the Fifty-eighth World Health Assembly in Geneva, Switzerland through 
Resolution WHA58.3. The IHR entered into force on June 15, 2007. The Regulations are a
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legally binding instrument designed to help protect all States from the international spread o f 
disease without interfering with international traffic and trade. The IHR (2005) address the 
threat to international public health security and trade caused by emerging and re-emerging 
diseases including public health emergencies o f international concern. Most importantly to these 
guidelines, the IHR (2005) call for strengthening national core capacities for surveillance and 
response throughout national health systems.
C u rre n t  p u b lic  hea lth  p rio ritie s
Both communicable and non-communicable diseases remain among the leading causes o f death, 
illness and disability in African communities. While much progress has been made in the last 
decade towards improving national and regional capacity for effective surveillance and response, 
communicable diseases such as cholera, viral hemorrhagic fevers, malaria, severe acute 
respiratory illness, diarrhoeal diseases, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis remain high priorities for 
national public health programs. Additionally, non-communicable diseases such as hypertension 
and diabetes are emerging threats in the Africa Region. As well, conditions and events such as 
malnutrition and maternal deaths are critical targets for national public health programs. While 
these diseases present a threat to the well-being o f African communities, there are well-known 
interventions that are available for detecting, controlling and preventing them. By strengthening 
the availability o f surveillance information, supported by laboratory confirmation when 
indicated, these diseases, conditions and events can be detected and investigated in time to take 
action to lim it their impact on the health o f affected communities.
It is clear that much has been achieved in the last 10 years and we hope that this second edition 
o f the IDSR Technical Guidelines gives evidence for the high level o f commitment shared by 
WHO AFRO, the Member States, and their technical partners for stronger, better public health 
systems that can contribute to healthier African communities.
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INTRODUCTION
The following pages introduce the concepts of disease surveillance and integrated surveillance 
and response. How integrated disease surveillance works and the objectives of IDSR will also be 
discussed as well as how the International Health Regulations can be implemented through 
IDSR. Next, an explanation of how surveillance functions are described in these guidelines is 
given and how districts can use these guidelines, with support from WHO in the African region, 
strengthen surveillance and response. Finally, the reader is introduced to the priority diseases 
recommended for IDSR.
What is d isease  surveillance?
Surveillance is the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of health data. It 
includes the timely dissemination of the resulting information to those who need them for action. 
Surveillance is also essential for planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health 
practice.
Several types of surveillance are used in national programs. The choice of method depends on 
the purpose of the surveillance action. In general, types of surveillance methods describe:
• A focused location for surveillance (such as health facility-based surveillance or 
community-based surveillance).
• A designated or representative health facility or reporting site for early warning of 
epidemic or pandemic events (sentinel surveillance).
• Surveillance conducted at laboratories for detecting events or trends not necessarily 
evident at other sites.
• Disease-specific surveillance involving activities aimed at targeted health data for a 
specific disease.
Regardless of the type of surveillance, the important issue is that the health data is used for 
public health action.
What is Integrated Disease Surveillance and R esponse?
Disease control and prevention programs have been successful when resources were dedicated to 
detecting a targeted disease, obtaining laboratory confirmation of the disease, and using 
thresholds to initiate action at the district level. Accordingly, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) proposed an Integrated Disease Surveillance and
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Response (IDSR) approach for improving public health surveillance and response in the African 
Region linking community, health facility, district and national levels.
IDSR promotes rational use of resources by integrating and streamlining common surveillance 
activities. Surveillance activities for different diseases involve similar functions (detection, 
reporting, analysis and interpretation, feedback, action) and often use the same structures, 
processes and personnel. Additionally, IDSR takes into account the One World-One Health 
perspective which is a strategy that addresses events at the intersection of human, domestic 
animal, wildlife, and ecosystem health. For example, 75% of recently emerging and re-emerging 
diseases affecting human health are of animal origin (HIV/AIDS and avian influenza, for 
example).
One World-One Health is an interdisciplinary, holistic and integrated approach to health 
problems. Diseases and other threats resulting from climate change, food safety, and chemical 
hazards constitute a complex set of challenging events involving human, animal and 
environmental health. The One World-One Health strategy promotes the integration and 
coordination within and across sectors for disease surveillance, outbreak investigation and 
response activities undertaken by professionals from various fields. It is a strategy that ensures 
the strengthening of each sector and enhances intersectoral linkages to facilitate efficient 
utilization of scarce resources, effective and prompt leveraging of various sectors capabilities for 
a better disease prevention and control.
We hope that these guidelines provide professionals from related sectors with a better 
understanding of the structure, functioning, methods and mechanisms that form the basis of 
disease surveillance including outbreak investigation and response from the human health 
perspective and lead to better intersectoral integration.
What takes place in an integrated sy stem ?
• All surveillance activities are coordinated and streamlined. Rather than using scarce 
resources to maintain separate vertical activities, resources are combined to collect 
information from a single focal point at each level.
• Several activities are combined into one integrated activity and take advantage of similar 
surveillance functions, skills, resources and target populations. For example, surveillance 
activities for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) often address surveillance for neonatal tetanus, 
measles and other diseases or unusual events. Thus, health workers who routinely visit health 
facilities to supervise AFP cases also review district and health facility records for 
information about other priority diseases in the area.
• The district level is the focus for integrating surveillance functions. This is because the 
district is the first level in the health system with staff dedicated to all aspects of public
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health such as monitoring health events in the community, mobilizing community action, 
encouraging national assistance and accessing regional resources to protect the district’s 
health.
• Surveillance focal points at the district, regional and national levels collaborate with 
epidemic response committees at each level to plan relevant public health response actions 
and actively seek opportunities for combining resources.
• The focus is on the creation of an overall public health surveillance system with sufficient 
capacity for detecting, confirming and responding to communicable and non-communicable 
disease threats.
Integration refers to harmonizing different methods, software, data collection forms, standards 
and case definitions in order to prevent inconsistent information and maximize efforts among all 
disease prevention and control programmes and stakeholders. Where possible, countries use a 
common reporting form, a single data entry system for multiple diseases, and common 
communication channels. Training and supervision are integrated, a common feedback bulletin is 
used, and other resources such as computers and vehicles are shared. IDSR involves nearly full 
time coordination of surveillance activities and joint action (planning, implementation, 
monitoring, evaluation) whenever it is possible and useful.
Coordination refers to working or acting together effectively for the rational and efficient use of 
available but limited resources such as Health Management Information System (HMIS) and 
various disease programs. Coordination involves information sharing, joint planning, monitoring 
and evaluation in order to provide accurate, consistent and relevant data and information to 
policy-makers and stakeholders at regional, inter-country and national levels.
To facilitate coordination and collaboration, a national, provincial and district multisectoral, 
multidisciplinary co-ordination body or committee is constituted. It is responsible for 
coordination of surveillance activities in close collaboration or synergy with the committee set 
up for epidemic response (please see Section 5.0 of these guidelines).
Objectives of Integrated D isease Surveillance and R esponse
The specific objectives of IDSR are to:
• Strengthen the capacity of countries to conduct effective surveillance activities: train 
personnel at all levels; develop and carry out plans of action; and advocate and mobilize 
resources.
• Integrate multiple surveillance systems so that forms, personnel and resources can be used 
more efficiently.
• Improve the use o f information to detect changes in time in order to conduct a rapid response 
to suspect epidemics and outbreaks; monitor the impact of interventions: for example,
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declining incidence, spread, case fatality, and to facilitate evidence-based response to public 
health events; health policy design; planning; and management
• Improve the flow o f surveillance information between and within levels of the health system.
• Strengthen laboratory capacity and involvement in confirmation of pathogens and 
monitoring of drug sensitivity.
• Increase involvement o f clinicians in the surveillance system.
• Emphasize community participation in detection and response to public health problems 
including event based surveillance and response in line with IHR
• Trigger epidemiological investigations in detection, investigation and reporting of public 
health problems, and in the implementation of effective public health interventions.
IDSR and IHR (2005)
The purpose of the International Health Regulations (IHR) is to prevent, protect against, control 
and provide public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are relevant 
and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international 
traffic and trade.
The scope of IHR has been expanded from cholera, plague and yellow fever to all public health 
emergencies of international concern. They include those caused by infectious diseases, chemical 
agents, radioactive materials and contaminated food. Since the goal of IDSR is to strengthen the 
overall national system for the surveillance of diseases particularly at district level and aims to 
ensure a continuous and timely provision and use of information for public health decision 
making, IDSR offers to the implementation of IHR:
• An infrastructure and resources for surveillance, investigation, confirmation, reporting 
and response
• Experienced human resources
• Defined implementation process (sensitization, assessment, plan of action, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation)
• Generic guides for assessment; Plan of action development; Technical guidelines; 
training materials; tools and Standard Operating Procedures that incorporate IHR 
components.
Thus, IDSR is a system with the potential to ensure a reliable supply of information to the 
national level in order to fulfill IHR requirements. The IHR provide an opportunity to address 
the threat to international public health security and trade caused by reemerging and emerging 
infectious diseases including public health emergencies of international concern (PHEIC). They 
also provide an excellent opportunity to strengthen surveillance and response systems, and to act 
as a potent driver for IDSR implementation.
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Importantly, Member States in the African Region recommended that IHR (2005) should be 
implemented in the context of IDSR. IHR is a binding and legal instrument. It calls for 
strengthening of national capacity for surveillance and control, including sites such as points of 
entry (i.e. ports, airports and ground crossings); prevention, alert and response to international 
public health emergencies; global partnerships and international collaboration; and highlights 
rights, obligations, procedures and monitoring of progress. Since the IHR (2005) came into 
force, some progress has already been noted, namely that all member states have designated an 
IHR national focal point and are in different stages of implementing IHR.
IHR (2005) is not a separate surveillance system but requires a “sensitive and flexible 
surveillance system that meets international standards”. IHR (2005) affects cross-border 
collaboration for particular key events and can easily be achieved when IDSR works. IHR 
(2005) has introduced the notion of “event-based” surveillance to IDSR in order to address 
rumors of “unexplained illness or clusters” as an event category for reporting from lower levels 
to national level. IDSR and IHR share common functions as described in the diagram below 
(detection, reporting, confirmation and verification, notification and reporting and timely 
response).
The IHR have practical implications for IDSR. In the IHR (2005), all public health conditions 
and events of international concern (PHEIC) should be detected, assessed and responded to 
timely, using an adapted response rather than preset measures. The IHR (2005) include the 
control of borders (ports, ground crossing Points of Entry) and containment at source of public 
health events. Because of the major role it plays for timely detection and verification of 
suspected public health emergencies, event-based surveillance is now part of IDSR and the IHR.
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Note: The process of notifying WHO of events under the IHR calls upon the use of the “decision 
instrument” that involves the implementation of core IDSR functions: case definition, laboratory 
confirmation, data analysis, interpretation of the findings and reporting (please see Annex 2C in 
Section 2). A summary of the events required by the IHR for reporting is included in the 
following box:
The three main categories o f  events that require to be notified under the IH R  are:
• Four conditions that must be notified to WHO: smallpox, poliomyelitis due to wild-type poliovirus, human influenza caused by a new subtype, and SARS (see next paragraph and algorithm in Annex in Section 2). This notification will normally be conducted at district level or above, as decided by national authorities. The four diseases are fully covered in these Technical Guidelines.
• Other diseases and events may require notification if they are considered to be events of potential international public health concern. This assessment will normally be conducted at district level or above as decided by national authorities (by using the IHR decision instrument in Annex of Section 2). The diseases referred to in this category by the IHR include the following: cholera, plague, yellow fever, VHF, other diseases that are of special national or regional concern e.g. dengue fever. These conditions are fully dealt with in these Technical Guidelines.
• “Any event of potential international public health concern including those of unknown cause or source, and those involving other events or diseases” than those listed in the above two bullet points (by using the IHR decision instrument in Annex of Section 2). A list of such events is provided in Section 2. These events are NOT specifically dealt with in these Technical Guidelines and more details can be obtained in environmental control literature1.
The development of event based surveillance calls upon community participation and the use of 
information technology products (e.g.; Promed, GIPHIN, IRIN, and WHO-EMS software). The 
relevant IDSR data collection forms designed for use at all levels are now customized to capture 
PHEIC (including diseases). IDSR calls for a surveillance coordination body at all levels of the 
health system. The national IHR focal point goes beyond the health sector, by including all 
hazards of concern in the national coordination body. Please refer to Annex B for detailed 
information about IHR (2005).
1A  guide fo r  assessment teams. International Health Regulations (2005): Protocol fo r  assessing national surveillance and response capacities fo r  the International Health Regulations (IHR) in accordance with A nnex 1A o f  the regulations. February 2009.
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How are surveillance functions described in th ese  guidelines?
These guidelines assume that all levels of the health system are involved in conducting 
surveillance activities for detecting and responding to priority diseases and conditions (even 
though the different levels do not perform identical functions). These activities include the 
following core functions:
Step 1 - Identify cases and events. Use standard case definitions, identifying priority diseases, 
conditions and events.
Step 2 - Report suspected cases or conditions or events to the next level. If this is an epidemic 
prone disease or a potential Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), or a 
disease targeted for elimination or eradication, respond immediately by investigating the case or 
event and submit a detailed report. For events to be notified under IHR use the decision 
instrument (Annex 2 of IHR) to identify any potential PHEIC.
Step 3 - Analyze and interpret findings. Compile the data, and analyze it for trends. Compare 
information with previous periods and summarize the results.
Step 4 - Investigate and confirm suspected cases, outbreaks or events. Take action to ensure 
that the case, outbreak or event is confirmed including laboratory confirmation wherever it is 
feasible. Gather evidence about what may have caused the outbreak or event and use it to select 
appropriate control and prevention strategies.
Step 5 -  Prepare. Take steps in advance of outbreaks or public health events so that teams may 
respond quickly and essential supplies and equipment are available for immediate action.
Step 6 Respond. Coordinate and mobilize resources and personnel to implement the appropriate 
public health response.
Step 7 - Provide feedback. Encourage future cooperation by communicating with levels that 
provided data, reported outbreaks, cases and events about the investigation outcome and success 
of response efforts.
Step 8 - Evaluate and improve the system. Assess the effectiveness of the surveillance and 
response systems, in terms of timeliness, quality of information, preparedness, thresholds, case 
management and overall performance. Take action to correct problems and make improvements.
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There is a role fo r each surveillance function at each level of the health system. The levels are 
defined as follows:
Community: Represented by basic village-level services such as trained birth attendants, 
community or village health agents, or similar care providers, village leaders (religious, 
traditional or political) or school teachers, veterinaries or health extension workers, pharmacists, 
and traditional healers.
Health facility: Defined by each country. For surveillance purposes, all institutions (public, 
private, NGOs or others governmental) with outpatient and/or in-patient facilities are defined as 
a “health facility.”
District, region, or province: The intermediate administrative unit generally serves a population 
of between 100,000 and 300,000 people. Countries may have two intermediate levels, for 
example, the district and the region or province.
National level: In many countries this is the central level where policies are set and resources 
are allocated. In relation to surveillance, this level reports on priority diseases and uses the 
decision instrument in Section 2 to report events of public health concern to WHO.
In an integrated system, some laboratory services are available at each level described above. A 
description of laboratory functions by level is in Section 1.0.
How can districts strengthen  surveillance and re sp on se?
Most countries have assessed their surveillance systems using a standard tool developed by 
WHO-AFRO (checklist provided in Annex 1 at the end of this section).
Districts can also use a matrix of surveillance functions and skills to describe their role in the 
surveillance system. Such a matrix describes a complete system in which all the skills and 
activities are in place. Each level supports activities at other levels and reinforces the opportunity 
for successful decision-making at corresponding levels and functions. In an IDSR system under 
development, the matrix provides a systematic framework for improving and strengthening the 
system.
2
2 These guidelines focus on improving surveillance for public facilities. In districts or regions where reporting from public facilities is of good quality, integrate private and non-governmental organizations into the system.
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Practical uses of the matrix include:
• Ensuring that all necessary functions and capacities have been identified
• Establishing accountability to provide a basis for assigning functions to appropriate levels 
and determining what capacities should be present
• Developing activities and training for human resource development
• Managing and monitoring programs
• Planning for surveillance and laboratory personnel, supplies and materials.
Moreover, the matrix illustrates several key assumptions about surveillance systems If one or 
more of the elements at each level is not present or is being performed poorly, the risk of failure 
increases for achieving surveillance and control objectives. An effective system will be 
supported at each level from the levels above and below. A complete system minimizes any 
delay in taking public health actions.
The functions of detection, analysis, investigation, response, feedback and evaluation are 
interdependent and should always be linked.
T h e  m atrix  on  the n ext two p a g e s defines the su rv e illa n ce  fu n c t io n s  a n d  h ow  they a re  
a ch ieved  at ea ch  level o f  the health  system  in c lu d in g  the ro le  o f  W H O  in  rela tion  to I D S R  co re  
fu n c tio n s .
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IDSR C O R E  FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES BY HEALTH SYSTEM LEVEL
Identify Report Analyze and Interpret Investigate 
and Confirm
Community
•U se  sim ple case definitions to  identify 
p riority dseases, events, co nd tio n s or 
o ther hazards r  the  com m unty
•R eport essential inform ation on 
pnonty dseases, events, conditions, 
o r hazards to  health facikty and 
appropriate authorities
•h v d v e  local leaders in  observing, describing 
and n te rp re tn g  dsease patterns, events and 
trends in the  com m unrty 
•U ndertake verbal autopsies on causes 
o f deaths
•S upport event investigation activities
Health Facility
•U se  standard case definitions to  detect, 
confirm  and record pnonty diseases or 
o o rd tio n s
•C a le c t and transport specim ens fo r 
laboratory confirm ation
•U se  local laboratory capacity to  o o rf rm
cases or to initiate c o n in ra tio n  o f cases 
if possible
•R eport case-based inform ation for 
m m edaety notifiable dseases
•R eport sum m ary data  to  next level 
•R eport laboratory results from  screenng 
o f sentinel populations 
•R eport laboratory results to  next level
•FVepare and p e rio d ic a l update graphs, tables 
and charts to  desenbe tim e, person and place 
fo r reported diseases and co nd tions 
•F rom  the  analysis, report m m ed atd y any 
disease or condition that:
(1) ecceeds an action threshold
(2) o c c u s  in locations w here it was 
previously absent
(3) presents unusual trends o r patterns
♦In te rp re t results Initiate possfcte p u b ic  health 
actions w ith local authorities
•Take part n  investigation o f reported 
outbreaks
•C d le c t, package, store and transport 
specm ens fo r laboratory confirm ation
District, State, 
Province
•C a le c t surve lance data from  reporting 
sites including designated p a rts  o f 
entry on tim e and review  the quafcy
•E nsure re iab le  supply of data co le ction  
and reporting too ls are available at 
reportng  sates
•C a le c t and transport specim ens fo r 
laboratory confirm ation
•U se  local laboratory capacity to  o orfirm  
cases if possible
•M ake s u e  health facilities know  
and use standard case definitions 
fo r reporting pnonty diseases and 
conditions
•M ake s u e  health facility s ta ff know 
v^ien  and how  to  report priority 
dseases and cond tions.
•R eport data  on tim e to  the next level
•R eport laboratory results to  next level
•R eriodica ly conduct risk assessm ent 
fo r priority diseases events, oenditions 
o r hazards
♦D efine  denom inators and ensure the ir accuracy 
•A ggregate data from  health fa d ity  reports 
♦Analyze data b y tim e, place and person
•P eriod ica lly update graphs, tables, and charts 
to  desenbe reported dseases, events and 
cond tions
♦C alcu la te  rates and thresholds 
♦C om pare cu re n t data  w ith  previous periods 
♦M ake  ccndusjons aboU  trends, thresholds 
and analyse results
♦D escribe  risk factors fo r priority diseases or 
oondtions
•A rrange and lead investigation o f reported 
dseases o r outbreaks
•A ssist health fa d ity  n  safe o d e c te n . pack 
agng storage and transport o f laboratory 
specm ens fo r confirm atory testing
•R ecer/e  and interpret laboratory results
•D ecide i the  reported outbreak s  
confirm ed
•R eport the  confirm ed outbreak to  the 
next level
•D istribute  specm en co le ction  tots fo r 
specsal surveilance activities
National
•D efine, update and e n su e  com pliance 
w ith  national p o icy  and g udeines
•S e t pokcies and procedures fo r the 
national laboratory netw orks ire in in g  
quality assurance system s
•U se national laboratories far confirm atory 
and speoakzed testing if neoessary
•C o llect and transport specim ens for 
additional analysis at W HO C olaboratng 
Centres as necessary
•R eport the  im m ediately notifiable 
dseases and events to  the appropriate 
authorities on tim e 
•R eport o ther priority dseases and 
events on tim e
•k ic lu d e  all relevant laboratories in the 
reporting netw ork
•U se  IhR  Decision Instrum ent (Annex 2) 
to  determ ine risks fo r p riority dseases, 
events, conditions o r hazards 
•W o rm  W HO as rd c a te d  by H R  (2005)
♦S e t p d io es and procedures fo r analyzing and 
nterpreting data
♦Anafyze and interpret oata from a national 
perspectwe
♦R sgJa ry conscne a  m eetng erf the technical 
coordinating ccrnm ttee to  rewew the analyzed 
and irterpreced data before w aer dissemination
♦C arry out special analyse to  forecast m agntude 
and trends o f priority dsease everts
•E n su e  guidelines and standard operating 
p ro oe d jre s fo r outbreak investigations are 
scalable a t a l sites
•C oordnate and colaborate w ith international 
a jn cm e s as needed duing  investigators
•A lert and support laboratory participation
•P rovide log stic  support: supplies, equp- 
ment, reagents, specim en transport m eda, 
health prom otion budget
•Share inform ation w ith re^onal and ntem a- 
tional networks about confirm ed outbreak
•U se  the decision instrum ent to  deade  
w hether the outbreak s  a potenbal RHEIC
•FVooess speam ens from  in s tig a tio n  and 
send tim ely results as required to  each leva
•R equest addtional specim ens as needed
•Take part in e prie m ic response team
National WHO
Representative,
WHO
Regional Office
•Develop and dissem inate generic 
g u d d n e s fo r s jve rta n ce  
•Docum ent and share IDSR best practices
•Provide techncal support to  the national 
eve! tier detection and confirm ation of 
pnonty aiseases, condtions and events 
•W arm  countries aoaut problems that may 
cross borders
•C oordinate in te rn atio na l reference 
laboratory network support induding 
centres o f excellence
•C o lle ct and com pile reports o f 
outbreaks and international notifiable 
dseases and events
•P roduce annual regional profiles or 
situation reports by pnonty dseases, 
conditions and events
♦D eve lop  and dEsem inate standard gudelines 
fo r analyss d  data fo r each pnonty dsease 
♦P rovide technical support to  national level to 
im prove capacity fo r analysis
•Ftow de support to  countries fo r rrvestigaticn 
or assessm ent upon re q je st 
•P iw o e  support fo r the ooordnation of 
laboratory p arc ip a to n  cxrn g  rrvesagafcons 
•P iw o e  support fo r risk assessm ent uang 
HR deoston instrument
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IDSR C O R E  FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES BY HEALTH SYSTEM LEVEL
PREPARE R espond C o m m u n ic a te
(F e e d b a c k )
Evaluate
Community
•P articp ate  in  d isaster o r em ergency 
preparedness and m aragm ert com m ittees
•P a rto p a te  in  risk m apping o f potential 
hazards
•C onduct com m unty based surve lance
•M anage eventual contingency em ergency 
stock
•P artiapa te  n  tra n in g  including sim Jabcn 
exercise
•A s s s t local authorities r  selecting 
response actw ties
•E nsure com m unity seeks care m m ediately 
in case o f em ergency and danger sagns of 
dsease events and co nd tions 
•P a rtcp a te  in response activities ind u dn g  
hom e based care
•M obifee resources appropriate fo r the actw ty 
•C any out com m unity health education fo r 
behavxx change
•G ive feedback to  com m unity m em bers 
about reported cases,events and 
prevention activities
•Venfy if p u b ic  health n terventions took 
place as planned
•V erify the  com m unity response to  the 
public health action
Health Facility
•P artiapa te  in  d isaster o r em ergency 
preparedness and m anagm ert com m ittees 
•P artiapa te  n  Rapid Response tra m g  
•C onduct nsk m appng o f p o te rta i hazards 
•C onduct tra im g  o f com m unity 
•P artiapa te  n  sim ulation exercises
•M anage cases and contacts accordh g  
to  standard case m anagem ent guideines
•Take relevant add tional contro l m easures
•C om m unicate w ith o c rrrn u rrty  m em bers 
about outcom e o f reported cases and 
prevention acirvrbes
•A ssess com m unity parbcipabon
•C onduct se lf assessm ent on the 
surveilanoe and response actM ties
•M o n ito r and  e va lu a te  program m e ta rg ets 
and incfccators fo r rn e a s j"n g  q uahy o f the  
S LT /e ilanoe  system
•M e n to r and evaluate program m e tim e ness 
and oom pieieness o f reporting from  health 
tacikies n  the d istrict
•M e n to r and evaluate tm e lre s s  o f response 
to outbreaks
•M on ito r and evaluate prevention activities 
and m odify them  as needed
District. State. 
Province
•P articipate  in  d saste r o r em ergency 
preparedness and m anagm ent com m ittees
•C onduct tra im g  and sim ulation exercees 
fo r staff
•C onduct risk m appng o f potental hazards
•S upport and conduct health fa d  ity-based 
surveillance
•D evelop and m anage conbgency plans
•O rganize and support Rapid Response 
Team
•D ocum ent response activities
•S ele ct and im plem ent appropriate p ub ic  
health response (lo r exam ple depending 
on the dsease plan to  strengthen case 
m anagem ent, conduct rnm unizaton 
activity, im prove contro l and prevention 
activities)
•C onvene epidem ic response com m ittee 
and plan respcnse
•C onduct tra inng  fo r em ergency activities
•P lan tim ely com m unty nform ation and 
education a ctiv ités
•A lert nearby areas and d is tric ts  about the 
confirm ed outbreak
•A lert nearby areas and cfetricts abcut 
outbreaks
•G ive health fa c ib e s re g iia r. penodc 
feedback about rou tne  contro l and 
prevention activities
•G ive fe ecb ack on  S L ive illano e  and data  
q u a ity  Sndngs
•M on ito r and evaluate program m e targets 
and n d ca to rs  fo r m easum g quahy o f 
the surve lance system  
•C onduct regular supervisory v s ts
National
•S e t p o lices, procedures and tra inng 
stra teges fo r reporting p riority dseases, 
conditions and events at each level
•A dapt and d istribute  risk m appng 
guideSnes
•A dapt and d istribute  gudeènes fo r d isaster 
o r em ergency preparedness plans
•D evelop m essages fo r com m unty 
education
•D evelop and m anage contingency plans
•Q rganze and support ra tional R apd 
Respcnse Teams
•D evelop and organize sim ulation 
exercises
•E stablish and m aintain a national p ub ic  
health em ergency com m and and 
o p e ra to rs  center
•S e t pofccies and procedures fo r respond­
ing to  cases and outbreaks o f priority 
dseases and conditions 
•S upport epidem ic response and 
preparedness activities including 
deploym ent o f rapid response team s 
•R eport and dssem nate  re sd ts of 
outbreak response in bulletins, m eda. 
press releases and briefings
•D evelop and penodealy d istribute  
regcnal bulebn fo r e pd em do g y a rd  
p u b ic  health
•G ive d is tric ts  regular, penodc feedback 
about routine o o rtro l and prevention 
activities
•R elease inform ation qucW y in  a 
transparent m anner and fcsten to 
the  a ffected com m unity
•D ocum ent p ro vson  o f appropriate 
and tim ely feedback
•M on ito r DSR and laboratory core 
indca to rs regularly
•C onduct outbreak investigation a fte r 
action review
•S upport annual m onitoring o f H R  core 
capacibes
•C onduct D SR regular review m eetings
•C onduct regular supervisory v s ts
National WHO
Representative,
WHO
Regional Office
•M obltze resouces fo r trainng, logistics 
and supervision
•D evelcp. update c r rev se gudeines for 
disaster o r nsk management 
•M antain and update a roster o f experts 
for rapd response teams 
•Develcp, update or revse trainng far 
DSR and hR  implementation
•M antain a pub ic health emergency 
command and operations center
•C oordnate and support response activités 
( Strategic Health Operations Centre, 
techncal experts, virtual rapd response 
teams, gudeJines. SCPs, etc.)
•V o b ls e  resources and facilitate partnershps
•P rcvde feedback to  collaboration w th  
ra tional and regional levés 
•D issem irate nsk communcabon 
guidelines
•Share information w ith partners and 
stakeholders
•U se reports from countries to  assess IDSR 
systems and advocate tdt improvements 
•D evelop, update or revse g jide lines and 
tools for CGR/1HR ncm tom g and e vauarcr 
•FYomote, gude and support operational 
research
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How does WHO in the African Region support efforts to strengthen IDSR?
WHO-AFRO provides support for implementation of surveillance and response at every level of 
the health system, including:
• The development of comprehensive technical guidelines for each level
• A framework for adapting guidelines to each level within each country
• Training of human resources involved in surveillance and response system
• Advocacy for resources and resource mobilization
• Coordinating the monitoring, detection and control of diseases, epidemics and public 
health emergencies across countries
• Sharing public health information
What is contained in th e se  guidelines?
These guidelines have been revised from the previous edition in order to incorporate priority 
emerging and re-emerging communicable and non-communicable disease threats. The revised 
guidelines also aim to address how to implement the IHR 2005 requirements and capacities for 
surveillance and response. These guidelines should be adapted to reflect national priorities, 
policies and public health structures.
The guidelines are intended for use as:
• A general reference for surveillance activities across all levels
• A set of definitions for thresholds that trigger some action for responding to specific 
diseases
• A stand-alone reference for level-specific guidelines
• A resource for developing training, supervision and evaluation of surveillance activities
• A guide for improving early detection and preparedness for outbreak response
Who are the guidelines for?
The information and recommendations in this manual are intended for use by the following:
• Disease surveillance managers and officers
• IHR National Focal Points
• Health Authority at Point of Entry (PoE)
• Hospital managers, clinicians and infection control officers
• Veterinary and wildlife health officers
• Environmental health officers and sanitarians
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• District health management teams
• Nursing officers
• Health facility managers
• Medical and nursing educators
• Communication officers
• Logisticians
• Laboratory personnel
• Community leaders
• Other public health experts
• Other health partners including NGOs
What are the priority d isea se s  for IDSR?
The WHO Regional Office for Africa suggests the following communicable and non- 
communicable diseases and conditions or events as priorities for integrated disease surveillance 
in the African Region. The diseases are recommended because they are:
• R e q u ire d  in ternationa lly  u n d e r  I H R  (for example, smallpox, poliomyelitis due to wild-type 
poliovirus, human influenza caused by a new subtype, SARS);
• D isea ses  w ith  h igh ly  ep idem ic p o te n tia l to cause serious public health impact due to their 
ability to spread rapidly internationally (for example, cholera, plague, yellow fever, viral 
haemorrhagic fever);
• P rin c ip a l cau ses o f  m orbidity a n d  m ortality in the African Region (for example, malaria, 
pneumonia, diarrhoeal diseases, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, maternal deaths and injuries)
• N o n -co m m u n ica b le  p rio rit ie s  in  the reg io n  (high blood pressure, diabetes mellitus, mental 
health and malnutrition)
• Effective control and prevention in tervention s a re  available for addressing the public health 
problems they pose (for example onchocerciasis, trypanosomiasis);
• In te rv e n tio n  p ro g ra m s su p p o rted  by W H O  for prevention and control, eradication or 
elimination of the diseases exists. For example, the Expanded Program on Immunizations 
(EPI), the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI).
The list of priority diseases may vary from country to country depending on the local 
epidemiological situation, needs and health system. Countries are encouraged to keep the list to 
the minimum possible to ensure that adequate resources are available to carry out a response and 
the list is manageable by the system. Table 1 below shows the priority list of diseases and 
conditions under IDSR.
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Table 1: Priority d iseases, conditions an Integrated Disease Surveillance and Res d events for ponse - 2010
Epidemic prone diseases Diseases targeted for eradication or elimination
Other major diseases, events or conditions of public health importance
Acute haemorrhagic fever 
syndrome*
Anthrax
Chikungunya
Cholera
Dengue
Diarrhoea with blood (Shigella) 
Measles
Meningococcal meningitis
Plague
SARI**
Typhoid fever 
Yellow fever
*Ebola, Marburg, Rift Valley, Lassa, 
Crimean Congo, West Nile Fever
"National programmes may wish to 
add Influenza-like illnesses to their 
priority disease list
Buruli ulcer
Dracunculiasis
Leprosy
Lymphatic filariasis 
Neonatal tetanus 
Noma
Onchocerciasis
Poliomyelitis1
1Disease specified by IHR (2005) for 
immediate notification
Acute viral hepatitis 
Adverse events following 
immunization (AEFI)
Diabetes mellitus 
Diarrhoea with dehydration 
less than 5 years of age 
HIV/AIDS (new cases) 
Hypertension 
Injuries (Road traffic 
Accidents)
Malaria
Malnutrition in children under 5 
years of age 
Maternal deaths 
Mental health (Epilepsy) 
Rabies
Severe pneumonia less than 5
years of age
STIs
Trachoma
Trypanosomiasis
Tuberculosis
Diseases or events of international concern
Human influenza due to a new subtype1
SARS1
Smallpox
Any public health event of international or national concern 
(infectious, zoonotic, food borne, chemical, radio nuclear, or 
due to unknown condition.
''Disease specified by IHR (2005) for immediate notification
Note: It is important to remember that countries may select from this list according to national priorities and the epidemiologic situation. Disease-specific summary pages are available in Section 9.0 of this guide.
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ANNEX C
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Potential events of international health concern requiring reporting to 
WHO under the International Health Regulations (2005)
Required surveillance and response core capacities as described in 
the IHR (2005)
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ANNEX A Prepare  to  conduct surveillance and resp on se  at the district level
Most countries have used an assessment tool developed by WHO/AFRO to assess their national 
surveillance, epidemic preparedness and response systems and to identify where improvements 
are needed. The assessment provides results that can be used to solve problems with resources, 
the quality and timeliness of surveillance data, and how the information is used. The national 
strategic plan could also be used as reference while preparing a district specific action plan.
The integrated disease surveillance and response (IDSR) is not proposing establishment of a new 
system, but is providing guidance on how to prepare to conduct surveillance and response 
activities. However, if the district has the resources and skills to conduct an assessment of the 
district to document the situation of surveillance and response activities within the district or 
wishes to update the district profile, it may use the checklist below after adapting it to the local 
context. This tool could help to identify where districts can identify activities to improve their 
performance and capacity for disease surveillance and response.
Case and event identification:
1. Determine availability and knowledge of standard case definitions for reporting suspected 
priority diseases and conditions including events of public health concern.
2. Define the sources of information about health events in the district, including points of 
contact the community has with health services. For example, list the following sources 
on a list of district reporting sites
a. Health facilities and hospitals
b. Point of Entry
c. Community health workers
d. Birth attendants
e. Traditional healers
f. Rural community leaders who have knowledge of health events in the community 
(for example, the village elders, traditional healer, school teacher, leaders of faith- 
based communities, etc.)
g. Public health officers
h. Private sector practitioners
i. Public safety officers such as fire, rescue or police departments 
j. Animal health and veterinary structures and services
k. Industry, food safety and environmental health laboratories
l. Mass media, web sites and health news search applications 
m. Others including NGOs
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3. Identify surveillance focal points for each source of information. Identify and specify the 
opportunities for community involvement in surveillance of health events.
Reporting
4. Specify the priority events, diseases and conditions for surveillance within the district and 
those directed by national policy. List diseases that are:
a. Epidemic-prone
b. Diseases targeted for eradication and elimination
c. Other diseases of public health importance including non-communicable diseases
5. For each priority event, disease or condition, review the minimum data element that 
health facilities and other sources should report. State when it should be reported, to 
whom and how. State the information that should be reported from in-patient sources 
and outpatient sources. For example, a minimum requirement would be to report all cases 
and deaths for the selected diseases and conditions
a. State the diseases or conditions that require immediate reporting and 
communicate the list to health facilities in the district.
b. Define the means for reporting data to the district (by phone, by form, by voice).
If there is electronic reporting, do all facilities have access to computers and 
modems?
c. Define how often the required data should be reported.
6. Define the data management tools available in the district and how they should be used in 
an integrated system
a. Case-based surveillance reporting forms
b. Lab-specimen-based surveillance reporting forms
c. Line lists for use in outbreaks
d. Tables for recording summary totals
i. Routine weekly reporting forms
ii. Routine monthly reporting forms
iii. Routine quarterly reporting forms
iv. Graphs for time analysis of data
v. Maps for place analysis of data
vi. Charts for person analysis of data
7. Periodically update the availability of relevant supplies at each reporting site for 
conducting surveillance. (Note: If a reporting site has the capacity for electronic 
reporting, there should be an electronic format that is compatible with the methods used
22
at the district, region and national levels. (If electronic reporting is not available, ensure 
that the focal points who are required to manage data have a reliable supply of data 
collection forms, paper, coloured pencils, graph paper, and log books).
Data analysis
8. Define the data management requirement for each reporting site. For example, develop 
and disseminate the procedures including deadlines so that reporting sites know that they 
must report each reporting period (e.g., month).
a. Tally, compile and report summary totals
b. Check data quality and eventually clean them
c. Analyze data: produce weekly/monthly/Quarterly/Annual summaries in tables, 
graphs or maps
d. Provide some interpretation to the next higher level
e. Submit data to the next level (SMS, e-mail, fax/case-based forms, and line-list).
f. File and secure back-up copies of the data
g. Provide feedback to the community and to all relevant Reporting Sites
9. Decide if current forms address the priorities of integrated disease surveillance and 
response. For example, do current forms provide the information necessary for detecting 
problems and signalling a response to the priority integrated disease surveillance 
diseases?
10. Gather and present relevant data about your district that can be used to advocate for 
additional resources for improving surveillance and response activities. (Example: Health 
workers are able to document an increase in malaria cases; they know that an effective 
response is available with insecticide-treated bed nets. The district surveillance officer 
used data to show the expected reduction in malaria cases if some of the community’s 
bed net cost could be supported by local businesses).
Investigation and confirmation of suspected cases, outbreaks or events:
11. Describe the laboratory referral network for confirming priority diseases and conditions 
in the district. For example, list the following:
a. Public, private or NGO district facilities with reliable laboratory services for 
confirming priority diseases.
b. Prevention, control or special surveillance activities in the district with laboratory 
access (for example, any HIV sentinel surveillance sites in the district).
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Preparation for response and Response to outbreaks and other public health 
events
12. Update the policies of the district rapid epidemic response team so that assessing 
preparedness is a routine agenda item of the team. Specify and disseminate schedules for:
a. Meeting to routinely assess preparedness for response and discuss current 
problems or activities
b. Outbreak response meetings
13. For each priority event, disease or condition selected, state the available public response 
activity.
14. For each disease or condition that the district can respond to, specify the target, alert 
threshold or analysis results that would trigger an action.
Communication and Feedback
15. Define methods for informing and supporting health workers in the implementation of 
integrated disease surveillance. For example:
a. List the current opportunities for training health workers in surveillance, response 
or data management in the district.
b. Coordinate training opportunities between disease programs that take advantage 
of overlapping skills between programs such as supervision, report writing, 
budgeting, data analysis, and using data to set priorities.
c. Define the training needs for each category of health workers for either initial 
training in surveillance and response skills or refresher training in how to 
integrate surveillance activities.
16. Describe how communication about surveillance and response takes place between the 
district and the surveillance focal points. Include methods such as monthly meetings, 
newsletters, telephone calls and so on. Update the description periodically.
17. Review and update feedback procedures and methods between the district, health 
facilities and community as well as between the district and higher levels. Specify the 
feedback methods and update as necessary:
a. Bulletins summarizing data reported by health facilities to the district
b. Periodic meetings to discuss public health problems and recent activities
c. Supervisory visits
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18. Describe the communication links between the community and health facilities with the 
epidemic management committee that can be activated during an outbreak and for routine 
activities.
Evaluation and improvement of the surveillance system
19. Decide if additional indicators will be evaluated and plan how to monitor and evaluate 
timeliness and completeness of reporting.
20. State three or more objectives you would like to achieve for improving surveillance in 
your district over the next year.
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ANNEX B Events of potential international health concern  requiring reporting to  WHO under the International Health Regulations 2005
Surveillance on specific risks
The control or containment of known risks to public health is one of the most powerful ways to 
improve international public health security. The threat posed by known risks constitutes the vast 
majority of events with a potential to cause public health emergencies which fall within the 
scope of the International Health Regulations (2005). There are already existing control 
programmes which address infectious diseases as well as food and environmental safety and 
contribute significantly to WHO global alert and response system.
The environmental hazards include but are not limited to:
• Chemical
• Food
• Ionizing radiation
• Non-ionizing radiation
Technical information on these risks can be obtained from various sources.
Areas of interest for the purpose of capacity building of integrated surveillance should include 
partnerships to address the following:
1. Environmental health emergencies like:
• Natural events
• Technological Incidents
• Complex emergencies
• Deliberate events
2. Chemical risks in food:
• Acute and Chronic dietary exposure (environmental or intentional pollution)
3. Zoonoses:
• Emerging zoonoses
• Neglected zoonoses
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Topics fo r  surveillance on specific risks
1. Infectious disease hazards
Known, new and unknown infectious disease threats
2. Zoonotic events
The emergence and re-emergence of zoonoses and their potentially disastrous effect on human 
health has made zoonoses a priority issue for veterinarian services.
3. Food safety events
Food and waterborne diarrhoeal diseases are leading causes of illness and death in less 
developed countries, killing approximately 1.8 million people annually, most of whom are 
children. The identification of the source of an outbreak and its containment are critical to the 
IHR.
4. Chemical events
The detection and control of chemical, toxic and environmentally-induced events are critical 
for the implementation of the IHR.
5. Radiological and nuclear events
A radio-nuclear emergency at a nuclear facility may be caused by accidental spills or the result 
of a deliberate act. It may also be detected as the result of clinical examination, when patients 
with radiation injuries are admitted to health care facility, while the source of exposure may 
not yet be confirmed.
Source: A guide for assessment teams. International Health Regulations (2005): Protocol for assessing national surveillance and response capacities for the International Health Regulations (IHR) in accordance with Annex 1A o f the regulations. February 2009.
27
ANNEX C Required surveillance and resp on se  core capacities as  described  in the IHR
According to IHR, member states shall use existing national structures and resources to meet 
their core capacity requirements. These requirements include capacity for surveillance, reporting, 
notification, verification, response and collaboration activities. Each part is expected to assess 
the ability of existing national structures and resource to meet the minimum requirements. Based 
on the results of the assessment, each member state should develop and implement action plan to 
ensure that these core capacities are present and functioning throughout the country.
Annex 1 Part A of the IHR (2005) defines the core capacity requirements for surveillance and 
response. The regulations recognise the following three levels of the health care system.
• Community or primary public health response level
• Intermediate public health response levels
• National level
Local community or primary public health level response
At the local community level and/or primary public health response level, the capacities are:
a) To detect events involving disease or death above expected levels for the particular time 
and place in all areas within the country.
b) To report all available essential information immediately to the appropriate level of 
healthcare response. At the community level, reporting shall be to local community 
health-care institutions or the appropriate health personnel. At the primary public health 
response level, reporting shall be to the intermediate or national response level, 
depending on organizational structures.
For the purposes of these guidelines, essential information includes the following:
• Clinical descriptions
• Laboratory results
• Sources and type of risk
• Numbers of human cases and deaths
• Conditions affecting the spread of the disease and the health measures employed
(c) To implement preliminary control measures immediately.
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Intermediate public health response levels
The intermediate public health level response core capacities requirement will need to be adapted 
to the context of each county. Many countries have more than one intermediate level (sub 
district; district/county and province/region/state) while other smaller countries may have only 
one level (district or county level).
The core capacity requirements and functions of the health system may differ from country to 
country. For example, while in large federal states the functions of intermediate levels may be 
close to the core capacity requirements described under “National level”, in smaller states with 
only one level, the functions of the intermediate level may be close to the community level 
and/or primary public health response level.
The core capacity requirements at intermediate levels are the following.
a) to confirm the status of reported events and to support or implement additional control 
measures; and
b) to assess reported events immediately and, if found urgent, to report all essential 
information to the national level. For the purposes of this Annex, the criteria for urgent 
events include serious public health impact and/or unusual or unexpected nature with 
high potential for spread.
National Level: Assessment and notification
The response at national level consists of two functions - assessment and notification:
a) Assessment of all reports of urgent events within 48 hours; and
b) Notification to WHO immediately through the National IHR Focal Point when the 
assessment indicates the event is notifiable under paragraph 1 of Article 6 of IHR and the 
decision instrument for the assessment and notification of events that may constitute a 
PHEIC in Annex 2 of IHR and to inform WHO as required pursuant to Article 7 and 
paragraph 2 of Article 9 of these Regulations.
At the national level, the public health response requires the capacity to:
a) determine rapidly the control measures required to prevent domestic and international 
spread;
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b) provide support through specialized staff, laboratory analysis of samples (domestically or 
through collaborating centres) and logistical assistance (e.g. equipment, supplies and 
transport);
c) provide on-site assistance as required to supplement local investigations;
d) provide a direct operational link with senior health and other officials to approve rapidly 
and implement containment and control measures;
e) provide direct liaison with other relevant government ministries;
f) provide, by the most efficient means of communication available, links with hospitals, 
clinics, airports, ports, ground crossings, laboratories and other key operational areas for 
the dissemination of information and recommendations received from WHO regarding 
events in the State Party’s own territory and in the territories of other States Parties;
g) establish, operate and maintain a national public health emergency response plan, 
including the creation of multidisciplinary/multisectoral teams to respond to events that 
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern; and
h) provide the foregoing on a 24-hour basis.
During several consultations at global level the core capacities were summarized into eight 
components: legislation; policy and coordination; surveillance; preparedness; response; risk 
communications; laboratory; and human resources. These eight components are all important for 
IDSR as well.
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Identify cases of priority diseases, 
conditions and events
Section 1
This section describes how to:
Use standard case definitions for reporting 
suspected priority diseases and conditions 
including events of public health concern 
Update district procedures for surveillance and 
response
Update description and listing of catchment areas,
including distribution of collection forms,
reporting tools and guidelines
Use the laboratory network and procedures to
improve capacity for surveillance and response,
including the ability to confirm suspected
outbreaks
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B2
1.0 Identify cases of priority diseases, conditions, 
and events
Health staff conduct surveillance activities at all levels of the health system so they can 
detect public health problems of concern to their community. Surveillance priorities 
may be communicable and non-communicable diseases, conditions or events that include 
national or local priorities such as acute outbreaks, maternal deaths or events associated 
with human health. An essential function of a public health surveillance system is to be 
vigilant in its capacity to detect not only known public health threats with established 
case definitions and formal reporting channels but also events or hazards that are not 
specifically included in the formal reporting system. These may be events such as 
clusters of disease patterns or rumours of unexplained deaths.
In fact, these diseases, conditions, and events may come to the attention of the health 
system in several ways.
For example:
• A person falls ill and seeks treatment from a health facility.
• Community members report unusual events or occurrences at local level For 
example, a community member reports a cluster of deaths or unusual disease 
pattern to the health facility. A pharmacy reports a sharp increase in the number 
of purchases of a particular medication or treatment. Perhaps a school might 
report unusual absences due to similar signs and symptoms such as an influenza­
like illness (ILI).
• Health staff who conduct routine record reviews to find cases for a specific 
disease observe that cases of another priority disease have not been reported. For 
example, an officer who normally reviews the clinic register for cases of acute 
flaccid paralysis (AFP), also sees that a case cholera has also recently been 
recorded in the clinic register. There are also cases in the register due to non- 
communicable causes such as high blood pressure and diabetes mellitus.
• Radio, television or newspapers report a rumour of rare or unexplained events in 
the area with potential exposure for humans.
• Vital events records show an increase in maternal deaths.
• An individual health facility reports a single adult death due to bloody diarrhoea. 
During analysis of the routine reports from all the facilities in the area, the district
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officer notices that other health facilities in the catchment area have also reported 
adult deaths due to bloody diarrhoea.
1.1 Use standard  ca se  definitions
A standard case definition is an agreed-upon set of criteria used to decide if a 
person has a particular disease or condition. The definition specifies clinical 
criteria and limitations on time, place and person. Using standard case definitions 
ensures that every case is diagnosed in the same way, regardless of where or when 
it occurred, or who identified it. This allows for comparing the number of cases 
of the disease or condition that occurred in one time or place with the number 
occurring in another time or place.
Using the same case definition throughout a national system allows the public 
health surveillance system to track priority diseases or conditions and use 
thresholds or signals for public health action. When health facilities and districts 
use different case definitions, tracking the trend of a disease, condition or event is 
difficult. Urgent action such as investigating the cause of the change in the trend 
is not possible. Health workers who analyze the data using one definition will not 
know if the trends from another catchment area are due to similar or different 
causes.
Using standard case definitions is also important in implementing the 
International Heath Regulations (2005). Even at district level, health staff should 
be aware of case definitions of diseases or events that may afflict not only the 
local community but also have the potential for spread across geographic 
boundaries.
The process of notifying WHO of events under the IHR involves the use of the 
“Decision instrument” that benefits from IDSR’s use of standard case definitions 
as well as confirmation, data analysis, interpretation of the findings and reporting. 
The IHR Decision Instrument is included as Annex 2C in Section 2.
1.1.1 Distribute standard case definitions to health facilities
Make sure that health facility personnel know and have available standard case 
definitions (including those for reporting unusual events, disease patterns, or 
unexplained deaths) specified by the national level. Some countries have prepared
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and disseminated case definitions for diseases under surveillance in the form of a 
poster or as a small pocket-sized booklet. These tools reinforce the use of 
standard definitions for detecting and reporting priority diseases, conditions and 
events.
P ro p o se d  ca se  d efin ition s based  o n  estab lished  d isease-specific  p ro g ra m s are  in  
A n n e x  1A  a n d  a lso  available in  S e ctio n  9 o f  these guidelines.
1.1.2 Distribute key signs or symptoms for use in case definitions at 
community level
Provide information to health staff, traditional healers, birth attendants and 
community leaders on how to recognize and report priority diseases, conditions or 
events to the health facility. A list of case definitions for use at the community 
level is in Annex 1B of this section.
At the same time, emphasize the need to refer people with the suspected disease 
or condition for treatment. Also, provide information to the community on 
priority diseases, using posters, newsletters and announcements during meetings.
Effective feedback to community reports encourages the community to participate 
in the surveillance and response activities.
1.2 Update district p rocedures for surveillance and response  at the  national level
Use available assessment and evaluation results to plan improvements for 
surveillance and response activities in your area. Each year, national level or 
provincial health officials should evaluate the performance of the surveillance 
response system. Use the results to adjust plans accordingly to address the next 
issues in the prioritized list.
1.2.1 Update the description of the catchment area
At least annually, update information about the catchment area and include results 
from a risk assessment. Risk mapping is a tool for identifying and presenting 
particular risks to the community’s health and well-being. This information is 
used to determine prevention actions to take towards reducing those risks and 
preventing illnesses and death. Examples of potential risks include sources of
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contaminated water, lack of urgent transportation to a referral facility for women 
in childbirth, or potential hazards such as inadequate safety precautions in mining 
or occupational sites.
To update the catchment area description, make sure you have current information 
about:
• The size of key target populations in the district such as children less than 5 
years of age, school-aged children, women of childbearing age, all children 
and adults from ages 1 through 30, people living in refugee settlements, 
internal displaced persons settlement, youth out of school, and so on.
• Major public health activities in the area including public, private, and non­
governmental organization (NGO) immunization activities, clean water 
projects, family planning clinics, feeding centers for undernourished children, 
information related to risk factors for non-communicable diseases and so on. 
Create a regular forum with district health stakeholders to discuss surveillance 
and response activities related to priority health events within the community. 
This could be done through a monthly or quarterly meeting. Take the 
opportunity to provide feedback about surveillance data reported from their 
institutions.
1.2.2 Update the list of reporting sites in the district
Identify all of the health facilities, Points of Entry (PoE) and any other location in 
the district required to report surveillance data or events to the district level.
Create relationships with private and NGO sites in the district and involve them in 
surveillance activities. Record (and update as needed) health facility and Points 
of Entry (PoE) locations and names of staff who are responsible for surveillance 
activities. A sample worksheet for listing the reporting sites and contact focal 
person at each site is in Annex 1C of this section.
1.2.3 Distribute updated data collection forms, reporting tools and 
technical guidelines
As you conduct updates of the catchment area description, check to see that 
reporting sites have an adequate supply of forms or other means for reporting 
surveillance data to the district (such as radio phones, mobile phones, or email 
connections). Include updates about forms and procedures for reporting,
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investigating and responding to public health events in quarterly district meetings 
with health facilities and other reporting sites.
1.3 Improve local laboratory capacity for surveillance and response
There are several diseases or conditions with signs and symptoms that are the 
same or similar as other diseases or conditions. For example, a child with fever 
and rash over the entire body might be diagnosed with measles, even though there 
could be several causes for the child’s clinical presentation.
Laboratory confirmation of diagnoses of diseases, conditions and events under 
surveillance is essential in order to:
• Accurately diagnose illness in an individual patient, and
• Verify the cause (or aetiology) of a suspected outbreak.
Laboratory specimens should arrive in the laboratory in good condition so that 
processing of the specimen provides reliable results. Specimens should be 
collected, stored and handled according to disease specification. Minimize delays 
between collection of the specimen and processing in the laboratory.
Many factors can affect the reliability of interpretation laboratory test results. For 
example, results are difficult to interpret when:
• Specimen is collected inappropriately, for example, a blood specimen has 
haemolysed.
• Delay in transportation and processing may result in bacterial overgrowth 
in the collected specimen such as urine and CSF .
• Use of wrong transport or storage media may cause reduced viability of 
the suspected organism.
The disease specific reference tables in Section 9 list recommended laboratory 
procedures for confirming priority diseases and conditions including:
• The diagnostic test for confirming the disease or condition
• The specimen to be collected
• When to collect the specimen
• How to prepare, store and transport it
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• When to expect the results
• Sources for additional information.
Implementing public health measures even before laboratory confirmation has 
been received complete may be necessary.
1.3.1 Designate laboratories for inclusion in the network
Annex 1D of this section contains a description of the laboratory functions by 
level of the health system.
At health facility, district and provincial levels, the focus is on safe collection, 
handling, transportation and processing of specimens. The local surveillance or 
laboratory focal person should establish or strengthen routine communication 
with identified laboratories that receive specimens from your health facility or 
district. The purpose of this routine contact is to strengthen procedures between 
the health facilities in the district that will be sending specimens, and the 
laboratory that will be receiving them. Ensure that the procedures for specimen 
collection, transportation, confirming the disease or condition and reporting the 
results are clear and can be reliably carried out.
To support sub-national or district level laboratories within the network, the 
national level health system will establish a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with laboratories outside the area or network that have the capacity for 
specific diagnostic procedures not available locally. The national level should 
also support the laboratory through advocacy with higher levels in accessing the 
necessary supplies to collect, handle, store, and ship specimens safely through the 
network.
1.3.2 Identify laboratories in the network
The surveillance focal person at each level of the health system should 
maintain an updated list of the laboratories that have the capacity to perform 
required laboratory testing. A sample worksheet for listing national laboratories 
for confirming priority diseases and conditions is in Annex 1E of this section. 
Provide information to all health facilities about the methods for transporting 
specimens including how to prepare, handle, ship and store the specimens. Make 
sure to disseminate information about packing and shipping infectious material as 
directed by national policy.
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1.3.3 Inform laboratories about procedures for confirming priority 
diseases and conditions
Once a district laboratory focal person has been identified, the district level focal 
point should make sure that laboratory confirmation procedures established at the 
national level are known and followed in the district. The designated staff should:
• Ensure that specimen collection and transport materials are pre-positioned 
(reliably available) at district laboratory level. Rapid laboratory diagnostic 
tests or serological tests available for detection of priority diseases and 
hazards (for example chemicals) should be available for timely use.
• Support the health facility in collecting the appropriate specimen for 
confirming the suspected case.
• Coordinate with the laboratory, as needed, to identify the correct specimen for 
collection and any special concerns or procedures.
• Collect and package the specimen safely or assist the health facility in 
collecting the specimen.
• Ensure the safe and reliable transport of the specimen from the health facility 
to the designated laboratory.
• Receive the laboratory results from the laboratory and report them promptly to 
the health facility and national levels. Also report results to the clinician for 
patient care.
• Take action with the health facility based on the laboratory report.
1.3.4 Establish laboratory quality control
Coordinate with provincial or national laboratory authorities to establish activities 
for ensuring quality results from laboratories in the catchment area. Laboratory 
quality control and quality assurance are important for building confidence in the 
results obtained.
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ANNEX 1A WHO/AFRO standard  ca se  definitions for reporting su sp ec ted  priority d isea se s  conditions and events from the health facility to  the district
WHO-AFRO proposes that health facilities use the following examples of standard case 
definitions for reporting suspected cases of priority diseases and conditions to the district level. 
Please refer to the disease-specific guidelines in Section 9 for additional information about 
surveillance for priority diseases and conditions.
Priority Diseases and Conditions
Disease/Condition Standard case definition for suspected cases
Acutehaem orrhagic fever syndrom e
Suspected case : Acute onset of fever of less than 3 weeks duration in a 
severely ill patient AND any 2 of the following; haemorrhagic or purpuric rash; 
epistaxis (nose bleed); haematemesis (blood in vomit); haemoptysis (blood in 
sputum); blood in stool; other haemorrhagic symptoms and no known 
predisposing factors for haemorrhagic manifestations.
Confirmed case : A suspected case with laboratory confirmation or 
epidemiologic link to confirmed cases or outbreak.
Note: During an outbreak, case definitions may be changed to correspond to 
the local event.
Acute viral hepatitis
Suspected case : Any person with acute illness typically including acute 
jaundice, dark urine, anorexia, malaise, extreme fatigue, and right upper 
quadrant tenderness. (Note: infected children are often asymptomatic.)
Confirmed case : A suspected case that is laboratory confirmed
Adverse events following immunization (AEFI)
A medical incident that takes place after immunization, causes concern and is 
believed to be caused by the immunization
Anthrax
Suspected case: Any person with acute onset characterized by several 
clinical forms which are:
(a) Cutaneous form: Any person with skin lesion evolving over 1 to 6 
days from a papular through a vesicular stage, to a depressed black 
eschar invariably accompanied by oedema that may be mild to 
extensive
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Anthrax,
continued
(b) Gastro-intestinal: Any person with abdominal distress characterized 
by nausea, vomiting, anorexia and followed by fever
(c) Pulmonary (inhalation): any person with brief prodrome resembling 
acute viral respiratory illness, followed by rapid onset of hypoxia, 
dyspnoea and high temperature, with X-ray evidence of mediastinal 
widening
(d) Meningeal: Any person with acute onset of high fever possibly with 
convulsions, loss of consciousness, meningeal signs and symptoms; 
commonly noted in all systemic infections, but may present without any 
other clinical symptoms of anthrax.
AND has an epidemiological link to confirmed or suspected animal cases 
or contaminated animal products
Confirmed case:
A confirmed case of anthrax in a human can be defined as a clinically 
compatible case of cutaneous, inhalational or gastrointestinal illness that 
is laboratory-confirmed by:
(a) isolation of B. anthracis from an affected tissue or site; 
or
(b) Other laboratory evidence of B. anthracis infection based on at least 
two supportive laboratory tests.
Note: It may not be possible to demonstrate B. anthracis in clinical specimens 
if the patient has been treated with antimicrobial agents.
Buruli u lcer 
( M yco b a cte riu m  
u lce ra n s  
disease)
Suspected case: A person presenting a painless skin nodule, plaque or ulcer, 
living or having visited a BU endemic area
Confirmed case: A suspected case confirmed by at least one laboratory test 
(ZN for AFB, PCR, culture or histology)
Chikungunya
Suspected case: Any person with acute onset of fever >38.5°C and severe 
arthralgia/arthritis not explained by other medical conditions.
Confirmed case: A suspected case with laboratory confirmation.
Cholera
Suspected case: In a patient age 5 years or more, severe dehydration or 
death from acute watery diarrhoea.
• If there is a cholera epidemic, a suspected case is any person age 5 years 
or more with acute watery diarrhoea, with or without vomiting.
Confirmed case: A suspected case in which Vibrio cholerae O1 or O139 has 
been isolated in the stool.
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Dengue Fever
Dengue Fever Suspected case: Any person with acute febrile illness of 2-7 
days duration with 2 or more of the following: headache, retro-orbital pain, 
myalgia, arthralgia, rash, haemorrhagic manifestations, leucopenia.
Dengue Fever Confirmed case: A suspected case with laboratory 
confirmation (positive IgM antibody, rise in IgG antibody titres, positive PCR or 
viral isolation).
Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever: A probable or confirmed case of dengue with 
bleeding tendencies as evidenced by one or more of the following: positive 
tourniquet test; petechieae, ecchymoses or purpura; bleeding: mucosa, 
gastrointestinal tract, injection sites or other; haematemesis or melaena; and 
thrombocytopenia (100 000 cells or less per mm3) and evidence of plasma 
leakage due to increased vascular permeability, manifested by one or more of 
the following: 20% rise in average haematocrit for age and sex, 20% drop in 
haematocrit following volume replacement therapy compared to baseline, signs 
of plasma leakage (pleural effusion, ascites, hypo-proteinaemia).
Dengue Shock Syndrome: All the above criteria, plus evidence of circulatory 
failure manifested by rapid and weak pulse, and narrow pulse pressure (< 20 
mm Hg) or hypotension for age, cold, clammy skin and altered mental status.
Diabetes
Suspected new case : Any person presenting with the following symptoms:
• Increased thirst
• Increased hunger
• Frequent urination
Confirmed new case : Any person with a fasting venous plasma glucose 
measurement of > 7 mmol/L (126 mg/dl) or capillary glucose > 6.1 mmol/L 
(110 mg/dl)
Or
Any person with a non-fasting venous plasma glucose measurement of > 
11.1mmol/L (200 mg/dl) or capillary glucose > 11,1 nnik>k (200 mg/dl)
* Report only the first lab-confirmed diagnosis of the patient
Diarrhoea with blood(dysentery)
Suspected case : A person with diarrhoea with visible blood in stool.
Confirmed case : Suspected case with stool culture positive for Shigella 
dysenteriae type 1.
Dracunculiasis
Suspected case : A person presenting a skin lesion with itching or blister living 
in endemic area of Guinea worm.
Confirmed case : At the last phase of the programme, confirmation of last 
cases by knowledgeable health staff is required. Follow national guidelines for 
definition of confirmed case.
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Ebola or Marburg viral hemorrhagic Fevers
Suspected case : Illness with onset of fever and no response to usual causes 
of fever in the area, and at least one of the following signs: bloody diarrhoea, 
bleeding from gums, bleeding into skin (purpura), bleeding into eyes and urine.
Confirmed case : A suspected case with laboratory confirmation (positive IgM 
antibody, positive PCR or viral isolation), or epidemiologic link to confirmed 
cases or outbreak.
Note: During an outbreak, these case definitions may be changed to 
correspond to the local event.
FoodborneIllnesses
Suspected case : 2 or more people present with similar symptoms who 
consumed common food or drink
Confirmed case : A laboratory confirmed case of a specific agent with a link to 
a common food or drink source.
Note: A foodborne illness is defined according to the specific agent causing the 
disease (for example, cholera, hepatitis A, salmonellosis, shigellosis).
Human influenza caused by a new subtype
Suspected H5N1 case : Any person presenting with unexplained acute lower 
respiratory illness with fever (>38 °C) and cough, shortness of breath or 
difficulty breathing
AND
one or more of the following exposures within the 7 days prior to symptom 
onset:
a) Close contact (within 1 meter) with a person (e.g. caring for, speaking 
with, or touching) who is a suspected, probable, or confirmed H5N1 
case;
b) Exposure (e.g. handling, slaughtering, de-feathering, butchering, 
preparation for consumption) to poultry or wild birds or their remains or 
to environments contaminated by their faeces in an area where H5N1 
infections in animals or humans have been suspected or confirmed in 
the last month;
c) Consumption of raw or undercooked poultry products in an area where 
H5N1 infections in animals or humans have been suspected or 
confirmed in the last month;
d) Close contact with a confirmed H5N1 infected animal other than poultry 
or wild birds;
e) Handling samples (animal or human) suspected of containing H5N1 
virus in a laboratory or other setting.
Confirmed H5N1 case : A person meeting the criteria for a suspected case AND positive laboratory results from a laboratory whose H5N1 test results are 
accepted by WHO as confirmatory.
46
Human influenza caused by a new subtype, continued
Susp ected  pandem ic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection: An individual presenting 
with influenza-like-illness (sudden onset of fever > 38 °C and cough or sore 
throat in the absence of another diagnosis) with a history of exposure to a 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
Confirm ed pandem ic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection: An individual with a 
laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection by one or more of 
the following tests: PCR; viral culture; 4-fold rise in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus-specific neutralizing antibodies.
Hypertension
Susp ected  new case  at first visit: Any individual presenting with a resting 
blood pressure measurement (based on the average of 3 readings) at or above 
140 mm Hg for systolic pressure, or greater than or equal to 90 mm Hg for 
diastolic pressure.
Confirm ed ca se : Any individual presenting on at least two occasions with a 
resting blood pressure measurement (based on the average of 3 readings) at 
or above 140 mm Hg for systolic pressure, or greater than or equal to 90 mm 
Hg for diastolic pressure.
Influenza-like Illness (ILI)
Influenza-like Illn ess: A person, child or adult with:
• Sudden onset of fever > 38 °C AND
• Cough or sore throat in the absence of other diagnoses
A  confirm ed ca se  of influenza is a case that meets the clinical case definition 
and is laboratory confirmed (laboratory results must be positive for influenza 
virus).
L assa and Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fevers (CCHF)
Susp ected  case  of C C H F : Illness with sudden onset of fever, malaise, 
weakness, irritability, headache, severe pain in limbs and loins and marked 
anorexia. Early development of flush on face and chest and conjunctival 
infection, haemorrhagic enanthem of soft palate, uvula and pharynx, and often 
fine petechial rash spreading from the chest and abdomen to the rest of the 
body, sometimes with large purpuric areas.
Confirm ed ca se  of C C H F : A suspected case with laboratory confirmation 
(positive IgM antibody, PCR, viral isolation or IgG seroconversion by ELISA or 
IFA) or epidemiologic link to confirmed cases or outbreak.
Susp ected  case  of L a s s a  Fev er: Illness with gradual onset with one or more 
of the following: malaise, fever, headache, sore throat, cough, nausea, 
vomiting, diarrhoea, myalgia, chest pain hearing loss and a history of contact 
with excreta of rodents or with a case of Lassa Fever
Confirm ed ca se  of L a s s a  Fever: A suspected case that is laboratory 
confirmed (positive IgM antibody, PCR or virus isolation) or epidemiologically 
linked to a laboratory confirmed case.
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Leprosy
Suspected case : A person showing one of three cardinal signs of leprosy: 
hypo-pigmented or reddish skin lesion, loss or decrease of sensations in skin 
patch, enlargement or peripheral nerve.
Confirmed case: A person showing at least two cardinal signs of leprosy and 
who has not completed a full course of treatment with Multi Drug Therapy 
(MDT).
LymphaticFilariasis
Suspected case : Resident of an endemic area with a clinical sign of 
hydrocoele or lymphoedema for which other causes of these findings have 
been excluded.
Confirmed case: A person with positive laboratory diagnosis of microfilaremia 
in blood smear, filarial antigenaemia or positive ultrasound test.
Malaria
Uncomplicated malaria: Any person with fever or history of fever within 24 
hours; without signs of severe disease (vital organ dysfunction) is diagnosed 
clinically as malaria.
Confirmed uncomplicated malaria: Any person with fever or history of fever 
within 24 hours; and with laboratory confirmation of diagnosis by malaria blood 
film or other diagnostic test for malaria parasites.
Unconfirmed severe malaria
Any patient hospitalised with severe febrile disease with accompanying vital 
organ dysfunction diagnosed clinically.
Confirmed severe malaria
Any patient hospitalized with P. falciparum asexual parasitaemia as confirmed 
by laboratory tests with accompanying symptoms and signs of severe disease 
(vital organ dysfunction) diagnosed through laboratory.
Malnutrition
Low birth weight newborns: Any new born with a birth weight less than 2500 
grams (or 5.5 lbs)
Malnutrition in children:
• Children under five who are underweight (indicator: weight for age<-2 
ZScore)
• Children 6 to 59 months with MUAC<11.5 cm (high risk of mortality)
• Bilateral pitting oedema
Malnutrition in pregnant women: Pregnant women given birth to low birth 
weight babies (birth weight < 2.5 Kg) (poor nutritional and health status of the 
women, can predict which population groups may benefit from improved 
antenatal care of women and neonatal care for infants).
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Maternal Deaths
The death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of the delivery or 
termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site of the 
pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy or its 
management but not from accidental or incidental causes.
Measles
Susp ected  c a s e : Any person with fever and maculopapular (non-vesicular) 
generalized rash and cough, coryza or conjunctivitis (red eyes) or any person 
in whom a clinician suspects measles.
Confirm ed c a s e : A suspected case with laboratory confirmation (positive IgM 
antibody) or epidemiological link to confirmed cases in an outbreak.
MeningococcalMeningitis
Susp ected  c a s e : Any person with sudden onset of fever (>38.5°C rectal or 
38.0°C axillary) and one of the following signs: neck stiffness, altered 
consciousness or other meningeal signs.
Confirm ed c a s e : A suspected case confirmed by isolation of N. meningitidis 
from CSF or blood.
Neonatal te tanus
Susp ected  c a s e : Any newborn with a normal ability to suck and cry during the 
first two days of life, and who, between the 3rd and 28th day of age, cannot 
suck normally, and becomes stiff or has convulsions or both.
Confirm ed c a s e : No laboratory confirmation recommended.
New AIDS C ases
WHO/AFRO recommends that countries use either Bangui or Abidjan 
HIV/AIDSR case definitions. A positive ELISA for confirming HIV and a rapid 
test for confirming the positive results are sufficient for an epidemiologic case 
definition for HIV Infection.
Noma
Susp ected  new c a s e : Any child with a mouth ulcer and other warning signs 
such as; malnutrition, poor hygiene, recent illness from; measles, persistent 
diarrhoea, or malaria should be regarded as a potential noma case.
Confirm ed new c a s e : Any person with a gangrenous disease which starts as 
gingival ulceration and spreads rapidly through the tissues of the mouth and 
face, destroying the soft and hard tissues.
O nchocerciasis
Susp ected  c a s e : In an endemic area, any person with fibrous nodules in 
subcutaneous tissues.
Confirm ed c a s e : A suspected case that is laboratory confirmed by presence of 
one or more of the following: microfilariae in skin snips, adult worms in excised 
nodules, or typical ocular manifestations (such as slit-lamp observations of 
microfilariae in the cornea, the anterior chamber, or the vitreous body).
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Plague
Suspected case : Any person with sudden onset of fever, chills, headache, 
severe malaise, prostration and very painful swelling of lymph nodes, or cough 
with blood stained sputum, chest pain, and difficulty in breathing.
Confirmed case : Suspected case confirmed by isolation of Yersinia pestis 
from blood or aspiration of buboes, or epidemiologic link to confirmed cases or 
outbreak.
Poliomyelitis (Acute flaccid paralysis)
Suspected case: Any child under 15 years of age with acute flaccid paralysis 
or any person with paralytic illness at any age in whom the clinician suspects 
poliomyelitis.
Confirmed case : A suspected case with virus isolation in stool.
Rabies
Suspected: A person with one or more of the following: headache, neck pain, 
nausea, fever, fear of water, anxiety, agitation, abnormal tingling sensations or 
pain at the wound site, when contact with a rabid animal is suspected.
Confirmed: A suspected case that is laboratory confirmed
Rift Valley Fever (RVF)
Suspected case:
Early disease :
• Acute febrile illness (axillary temperature >37.5 °C or oral temperature 
of >38.0°C) of more than 48 hours duration that does not respond to 
antibiotic or antimalarial therapy, and is associated with:
o Direct contact with sick or dead animal or its products AND / OR:
o Recent travel (during last week) to, or living in an area where, after 
heavy rains, livestock die or abort, and where RVF virus activity is 
suspected/confirmed AND / OR:
o Abrupt onset of any 1 or more of the following: exhaustion, 
backache, muscle pains, headache (often severe), discomfort 
when exposed to light, and nausea/vomiting AND / OR:
o Nausea/vomiting, diarrhoea OR abdominal pain with 1 or more of 
the following:
■ Severe pallor (or Hb < 8 gm/dL)
■ Low platelets (thrombocytopenia) as evidence by presence of 
small skin and mucous membrane haemorrhages (petechiae) 
(or platelet count < 100x109 / dL)
■ Evidence of kidney failure (edema, reduced urine output) (or 
creatinine > 150 mol/L) AND / OR:
■ Evidence of bleeding into skin, bleeding from puncture 
wounds, from mucous membranes or nose, from 
gastrointestinal tract and unnatural bleeding from vagina AND / OR:
■ Clinical jaundice (3-fold increase above normal of 
transaminases)
50
Rift Valley Fever, continued
Late stages of diseases or complications (2-3 weeks after onset)
• Patients who have experienced, in the preceding month a flu-like 
illness, with clinical criteria, who additionally develop the following:
• CNS manifestations which resemble meningo-encephalitis
• AND/OR
• Unexplained visual loss
• OR
• Unexplained death following sudden onset of acute flu-like illness with 
haemorrhage, meningo-ecephalitis, or visual loss during the preceding 
month.
Confirmed case: Any patient who, after clinical screening, is positive for anti- 
RVF IgM ELISA antibodies (typically appear from fourth to sixth day after onset 
of symptoms) or tests positive on Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (RT-PCR).
Severe Acute Respiratory Infections (SARIs)
Severe acute respiratory infection (persons > 5 years old): Any severely ill 
person presenting with manifestations of acute lower respiratory infection with:
• Sudden onset of fever (>38°C) AND
• Cough or sore throat AND
• Shortness of breath, or difficulty breathing
• With or without Clinical or radiographic findings of pneumonia
OR
Any person who died of an unexplained respiratory illness.
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
Suspected case of SARS: An individual with:
1. A history of fever, or documented fever > 38 °C AND
2. One or more symptoms of lower respiratory tract illness (cough, 
difficulty breathing, shortness of breath) AND
3. Radiographic evidence of lung infiltrates consistent with pneumonia or 
ARDS or autopsy findings consistent with the pathology of pneumonia 
or ARDS without an identifiable cause AND
4. No alternative diagnosis can fully explain the illness.
Confirmed case of SARS: An individual who tests positive for SARS-CoV 
infection by the WHO recommended testing procedures.
SeverePneumonia in Children under 5
Clinical case definition (IMCI) for pneumonia:
A child presenting with cough or difficult breathing and:
• 50 or more breaths per minute for infant age 2 months up to 1 year
• 40 or more breaths per minute for young child 1 year up to 5 years
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SeverePneumonia in Children under 5, continued
Note: A young infant age 0 up to 2 months with cough and fast breathing is 
classified in IMCI as “serious bacterial infection” and is referred for further 
evaluation.
Clin ical ca se  definition (IMCI) for severe  pneum onia:
A child presenting with cough or difficult breathing and any general danger 
sign, or chest indrawing or stridor in a calm child. General danger signs for 
children 2 months to 5 years are: unable to drink or breast feed, vomits 
everything, convulsions, lethargy, or unconsciousness.
Confirm ed ca se : Radiographic or laboratory confirmation of pneumonia may 
not be feasible in most districts.
Sexuallytransm ittedinfections
Genital ulcer syndrom e (non-vesicular):
Susp ected  c a s e : Any male with an ulcer on the penis, scrotum, or rectum, with 
or without inguinal adenopathy, or any female with ulcer on labia, vagina, or 
rectum, with or without inguinal adenopathy.
Confirm ed case : Any suspected case confirmed by a laboratory method. 
Urethral d ischarge syndrom e:
Susp ected  c a s e : Any male with urethral discharge with or without dysuria.
Confirm ed c a s e : Urethral discharge syndrome: A suspected case confirmed 
by a laboratory method (for example Gram stain showing intracellular Gram­
negative diplococci).
Smallpox (V ario la)
o o
Susp ected  c a s e : An illness with acute onset of fever >38.3 C (101 F) 
followed by a rash characterized by vesicles or firm pustules in the same stage 
of development without other apparent cause.
Probable case : A case that meets the clinical case definition, is not laboratory 
confirmed, but has an epidemiological link to a confirmed or probable case.
Confirm ed ca se : A clinically compatible case that is laboratory confirmed.
Trachoma
Susp ected  c a s e : Any patient with red sticky eyes who complains of pain and 
itchiness of the eyes.
Confirm ed ca se : Any patient with red sticky eyes who complains of pain and 
itchiness of the eyes where examination of the eyes confirms one of the stages 
of Trachoma infection according to the WHO Simplified Trachom a Grading  
S y ste m .
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Trypanosom iasis
Suspected case :
E arly stage: a painful chancre originating as a papule and then evolving into a 
nodule at the primary fly bite site. There may be fever, intense headache, 
insomnia, painless lymphadenopathy, anaemia, local oedema and rash.
Late stage: cachexia, somnolence, and central nervous system signs.
Confirmed case: A suspected case confirmed by card agglutination 
trypanosomal test (CATT) or by isolation of trypanosomes in blood lymph 
nodes or cerebrospinal fluid.
Tuberculosis
Suspected case : Any person with a cough of 3 weeks or more.
Confirmed case :
Sm ear-positive pulm onary  TB: a) a suspected patient with at least 2 sputum 
specimens positive for acid-fast bacilli (AFB), or b) one sputum specimen 
positive for AFB by microscopy and radiographic abnormalities consistent with 
active PTB as determined by the treating medical officer, or c) one positive 
sputum smear by microscopy and one sputum specimen positive on culture for 
AFB.
Smear negative PTB: a patient who fulfils all the following criteria: a) two sets 
taken at least 2 weeks apart of at least two sputum specimens negative for 
AFB on microscopy, radiographic abnormalities consistent with PTB and a lack 
of clinical response despite one week of a broad spectrum antibiotic, a decision 
by a physician to treat with a full course of anti-TB chemotherapy, or b) a 
patient who fulfils all the following criteria: severely ill, at least two sputum 
specimens negative for AFB by microscopy, radiographic abnormalities 
consistent with extensive pulmonary TB (interstitial and miliary), a decision by a 
physician to treat with a full course of anti-TB chemotherapy, or c) a patient 
whose initial sputum smears were negative, who had sputum sent for culture 
initially, and whose subsequent sputum culture result is positive.
Typhoid Fever
Suspected case: Any person with gradual onset of persistent fever >38°C of 3 
or more days duration with no other identified cause and additional 
symptoms that may include malaise, headache, abdominal pain, 
constipation or diarrhea, joint pain, chills or cough. Intestinal perforation 
and neurologic disturbances are known complications of untreated 
typhoid fever.
Confirm ed case: Suspected case confirmed by isolation of Salmonella typhi 
from blood, bone marrow, bowel fluid or stool.
W est Nile Fever
Suspected case: A hospitalized case of encephalitis due to unknown cause
Confirmed case: Confirmation of West Nile Fever is through laboratory 
diagnostics to identify WNV-specific IgM
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Yellow fever
Susp ected  c a s e :
Any person with acute onset of fever, with jaundice appearing within 14 days of 
onset of the first symptoms.
Probable case :
A suspected case
AND
One of the following
• Epidemiological link to a confirmed case or an outbreak
• Positive post-mortem liver histopathology
Confirm ed c a s e :
A probable case
AND
One of the following
• Detection of YF-sp ec ific* IgM
• Detection of four-fold increase in YF IgM and/or IgG antibody titres 
between acute and convalescent serum samples
• Detection of YFV-sp ec ific* neutralizing antibodies
*YF-specific means that antibody tests (such as IgM or neutralizing antibody) for 
other prevalent flavivirus are negative. This testing should include at least IgM for 
Dengue and West Nile and may include other flavivirus depending on local 
epidemiology.
OR
One of the following
• Detection of YF virus genome in blood or other organs by PCR
• Detection of yellow fever antigen in blood, liver or other organs by
immunoassays
Isolation of the yellow fever virus
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ANNEX 1B Key s igns  and sym ptom s for c a se  definitions for use  at community level
Inform community leaders, community health workers, traditional healers, birth attendants, and 
health workers who conduct outreach activities in hard-to-reach areas about the priority diseases 
and conditions under surveillance in your area. Use key signs and symptoms of case definitions 
such as the following to help the community to recognize when they should refer a person with 
these signs for treatment and notify the health facility.
Exam ples of how key s ig n s  and sym ptom s of case  definitions m ay be described  at the
com m unity level
Acute flaccid  paralysis Any child with a sudden onset of acute paralytic disease
A cute watery diarrhoea
Any person with 3 or more loose stools within the last 24 hours and a 
danger sign *or dehydration.
(*Danger signs include lethargy, unconsciousness, vomits everything, 
convulsions, and in children less than 5, unable to drink or breast-feed)
A dverse  event following  
immunization (AEFI)
Any unusual event that follows immunization that is thought to be caused 
by the vaccine
Cholera Any person 5 years of age or more with lots of watery diarrhoea
Diarrhoea in children  
le ss  than 5 years of age
Any child who has three or more loose or watery stools in the past 24 hours 
with or without dehydration
Diarrhoea with blood 
(Shigella) Any person with diarrhoea and visible blood in the stool
D racuncu liasis
Any person exhibiting or having a history of a skin lesion with the 
emergence of a worm
Hepatitis
Any person with fever and yellowing in the white part of the eyes or 
yellowing of the skin within two weeks of onset of first symptoms
Influenza-like Illness  
(ILI)
Any person with fever and cough or sore throat or nasal discharge
Leprosy Any person with light or reddish skin lesions with definite loss of sensation
Malaria
Any person with fever in a malaria endemic area.
Any under five child who has an illness with high fever and a danger sign*
(*Danger signs include lethargy, unconsciousness, vomits everything, 
convulsions, and in children less than 5, unable to drink or breast-feed)
M easles Any person with fever and rash
M eningococcal
m eningitis
Any person with fever and neck stiffness
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Exam ples of how key s ig n s  and sym ptom s of case  definitions m ay be described at the
com m unity level
Neonatal tetanus
Any newborn who is normal at birth, and then after 2 days, becomes stiff 
and unable to suck or feed or has convulsions.
O n ch o cerc iasis Any person in an endemic area with fibrous nodules under the skin
Plague
Any person with painful swelling under the arms or in the groin area. In an 
area known to have plague, any person with cough, chest pain and fever.
Pneum onia
Any child less than 5 years of age with cough and fast breathing or difficulty 
in breathing.
Rabies
Any person with a sense of apprehension, headache, fever, malaise and 
indefinitive sensory changes often referred to the site of a preceding animal 
bite. Excitability and hydrophobia are frequent symptoms
Sexually  transm itted  
infections (STIs)
Any person male or female who has an urethral/vaginal discharge or genital 
ulcer
Tub ercu losis Any person with cough for 3 weeks or more
Typhoid fever Any person with a prolonged fever during the previous 3 weeks or more
Viral hem orrhagic fevers
Any person who has an unexplained illness with fever and bleeding or who 
died after an unexplained severe illness with fever and bleeding
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ANNEX 1C List of district reporting sites
Record information for contacting the health workers who provide information to the district related to surveillance and outbreak, events detection. Include, for example, community health workers, trained birth attendants, village leaders and public safety officials. This list is to be updated regularly to add new sites and delete defunct or non­participating sites.
EX A M P LE :
Name of health facility  
or point of patient 
contact with health 
serv ice
A d d ress or location  
of facility or 
point of contact
Designated focal 
person for 
surveillance and 
response
Telephone or 
facsim ile  number
(or other 
contact information 
su ch  a s  e-mail)
Lima Health Centre Box 123 
Mlima Zone
Dr. Moyo
Tel: 123-458 or send 
message by railroad's 
daily contact with Mlima 
station
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ANNEX 1D Laboratory functions by health system  level
Level 1.0 Collect 2.0 Confirm 3.0 Report
Community or Health 
Facilities
• Use standardized case 
definitions to determine 
initiation of collection process
• Assist First Contact Laboratory 
in specimen collection within 
approved guidelines
• Document specimens with 
patients' complete clinical 
history and description
• Transport specimens to First 
Contact Laboratory and 
Referral Laboratory within 
approved guidelines
• Use standardized case definitions 
to initiate confirmation process as 
part of an outbreak investigation
• Handle specimens within approved 
guidelines
• Record collection of 
specimens
District, Province
• Communicate collection policies 
and procedures to providers
• Request additional specimen 
collection by laboratory or 
providers, as needed
• Store specimens within 
approved conditions pending 
transport or additional studies
• Direct additional collection as 
needed based on outbreak 
investigation
• Perform laboratory studies for 
presumptive diagnosis as 
appropriate: microscopy, staining, 
microscopy, RDT
• Store representative slides from 
the outbreak as needed
• Observe changes in trends during 
routine analysis of laboratory 
results
• Record laboratory 
results
• Provide results to 
clinical staff and 
patients
• Report results to local 
epidemiology offices
• Report observed 
changes in trends 
during routine analysis 
of laboratory results
• Use summary 
information in 
response to out 
breaks
National Referral 
Laboratory 
(some laboratories 
may function as First 
Contact and as 
Referral 
Laboratories)
• Set collection policies and 
procedures with national 
epidemiology office and 
national reference laboratories
• Distribute specimen collection 
kits for special surveillance 
activities
• Request additional specimen 
collection by laboratory or 
providers, as needed
• Store specimens within 
approved conditions pending 
transport or additional studies
• Set confirmation policies and 
procedures with national 
epidemiology office and national 
reference laboratories
• Perform laboratories studies for 
confirmation as appropriate: 
culture, isolation, serogroup 
identification, antimicrobial 
susceptibility, serology
• Store representative isolates from 
the outbreak as needed
• Observe changes in trends during 
routine analysis of laboratory 
results
• Report results and 
summary data to 
national epidemiology 
office
• Report laboratory 
results from screening 
sentinel populations at 
target sites
Global Reference 
Laboratories
• Request additional specimen 
collection by laboratory or 
providers, as needed
• Direct additional collection as 
needed based on outbreak 
investigation
• Perform additional laboratory 
studies as appropriate
• Report laboratory 
results to appropriate 
epidemiology offices
• Use summary 
information in 
response to outbreaks
58
ANNEX 1E List of national laboratories for confirming priority d isea se s  and conditions
Periodically update the list of laboratories in your district or those specified by the national level for confirming priority diseases and conditions. Include in the list whom to contact for assistance. The following list is an example.
EX A M P LE:
Priority Disease, Conditions and Events Focal Person, Name of Lab, Address, and Phone Number
Polio
Exam ple: John  Zim be; National Laboratory, 145 K enyatta  
Road, Pretoria, SA; 234-701342555
Cholera
HIV
Tuberculosis
Measles
Plague
Human influenza caused by a 
new subtype
Rift Valley disease
Dengue fever
Public health events of 
national or international 
concern
Anthrax
Chikungunya
Typhoid fever
59
60
Section 2
Report priority diseases, conditions and events
This section describes how to:
• Report immediately-reportable diseases, 
conditions and events
• Report summary information for epidemic- and 
pandemic-prone diseases
• Report routine summary information for other 
diseases of public health importance
• Improve routine reporting practices
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2.0 Report priority diseases, conditions and events
Ensuring reliable reporting of surveillance data throughout the system is important. 
Reliable reporting provides information for program managers, surveillance officers, the 
national IHR focal point, the WHO contact point, competent authority at Point of Entry 
(PoE) and other health staff to:
• Identify emerging problems and plan appropriate responses
• Take action in a timely way
• Monitor disease trends in the area
• Evaluate the effectiveness of the response
National policy determines whether the data from the districts and health facilities are 
reported immediately, weekly, monthly, or quarterly. The recommendations about when 
to report will depend on specific disease control activities in your country or district. 
Because the diseases targeted by IDSR are public health priorities requiring timely 
action, this guideline describes immediate reporting with case-based data and regular 
reporting of summary data. Districts should also be alert to, and report, unusual events 
that have the potential to affect human health.
This section provides an overview of recommended reporting methods and relevant IDSR 
forms for streamlining reporting of priority diseases, conditions and events.
2.1 Immediately reportable d isea se s  and events
Im m ed ia te  rep o rtin g  allows for timely action to be taken to prevent the 
reemergence or rapid transmission of epidemic prone diseases or events, 
especially diseases due to highly pathogenic and lethal infectious (please see 
Table 2 on the following page), chemical or radio nuclear agents.
Immediate reporting is indicated when an epidemic-prone disease or other 
potential public health event of national concern (PHENC) is suspected or is 
otherwise required under the International Health Regulations. The diseases, 
conditions and events requiring immediate notification to the next level are listed 
in Table 2 on the following page.
P lea se  re fe r  to S e ctio n  9 f o r  d isease-specific  in fo rm a tion  in c lu d in g  su rve illa n ce  
ca se  defin itions f o r  rep o rtin g  su sp ected  cases o r  events.
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Table 2: Diseases, conditions or events requiring immediate reporting
A cute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP)
A cute hem orrhagic fever syndrom e 
(Ebola, M arburg, L assa  Fever, RVF, 
C rim ean-C ongo)
A dverse effects following im munization 
(AEFI)
Anthrax 
Chikungunya 
C holera 
C luster of SARI 
D engue fever
D iarrhoea with blood (Shigella) 
D racunculiasis
Influenza due  to new  subtype
M aternal d eath  
M easles
M eningococcal m eningitis 
N eonatal te tan u s 
P lague
R abies (confirmed c a se s)
SA RS 
Sm allpox 
Typhoid fever 
Yellow fever
Any public health  even t of international 
concern  (infectious, zoonotic, food borne, 
chem ical, radio nuclear or due  to an 
unknown condition)
2.2 Report case-based  information to the next level
If an immediately reportable disease, condition or other public health event is
suspected:
• Make the initial report by the fastest means possible (telephone, text message, 
facsimile, e-mail, radiophone). The health facility should contact the district 
health authority immediately and provide information about the patient.
• Follow up the initial verbal report with a written report of the case-based 
report form. A sample case-based reporting form for recording case-based 
information is in Annex 2A at the end of this section. If a computer or other 
electronic device is available for surveillance or case management, complete 
and submit the form electronically to the next level.
• If a laboratory specimen is requested at this time, make sure that the patient’s 
identifying information matches the information on the case-based reporting 
form. A sample laboratory form is included in Annex 2B.
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• Disease-specific case-based reporting forms for particular diseases of concern 
(cholera, VHF, maternal death, and MDR/XDR TB) are in the annex at the 
end of Section 9. These forms may be used to begin gathering initial 
information for the case investigation.
Note: Some epidemic-prone diseases may have specific reporting 
requirements depending on national or regional policies. Please refer to 
disease-specific requirements in Section 9 of this guide.
• If a potential Public Health Event of International Concern (PHEIC) is 
suspected (as defined in Annex 2 of the IHR 2005 guidelines), notify the 
National IHR Focal Point using the fastest means of communication. A copy 
of the IHR decision instrument is in Annex 2C at the end of this section.
• For events and diseases with epidemic potential detected at Points of Entry, 
report immediately to the next higher level. Provide a copy of the report to 
the national (or central level) for the National IHR Focal Point to assess using 
the decision algorithm. Include yellow fever vaccination for those cases 
originating from endemic or risk areas.
2.3 Report sum m ary information for priority d iseases, conditions and events
After immediately notifying the next level about instances of immediately 
reportable diseases, conditions or events, collect and report weekly summary 
information for the priority diseases, conditions and events listed in Table 2.
Weekly reporting provides data for monitoring trends of diseases or conditions to 
detect epidemics.
If no cases of an immediately reportable disease have been diagnosed during the 
week, record a zero (0) on the reporting form for that disease. If the space is left 
blank, the staff that receives the report will not be able to develop information 
from a blank space. Submitting a zero for each immediately reportable disease 
when no cases were detected during the week tells the staff at the next level that a 
complete report has been filled.
The summary data is important for analysis after an initial case has been detected 
or an outbreak is suspected or confirmed. For example, at the health facility or
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district, the surveillance focal point can draw an epidemic curve to see i f  the 
epidemic thresholds for specific diseases have been crossed. Additionally, this 
data can be used to check whether the case fatality rate is under, at or over the 
target. The weekly data analysis should also help point out possible high risk 
groups with regard to a patients’ case location or residence, age group, sex, and 
exposure during social events (for example, a funeral), occupational hazards (for 
example, butchering), consuming game meat, or exposure to a contaminated food 
or beverage.
A t the district level, weekly data analysis includes verification o f the quality of 
the data coming from the reporting sites and the completeness and timeliness o f 
these reports. The incidence and case fatality rates w ill be evaluated against set 
thresholds, and epidemic curves w ill be updated and in-depth analysis o f the case- 
based data sets received from the reporting sites w ill be performed. Laboratory- 
based data is analyzed similarly to case-based data: for action oriented analysis, 
give importance to the trends describing the quality o f specimens, detected 
pathogens by place and person, age groups at high risk and pathogen resistance to 
recommended drugs.
Districts with a computer are encouraged to store the information electronically 
and forward the surveillance data sets to the next higher level in this format.
2.4 Report routine sum m ary information for other d isease s  of public health importance
At a minimum, report summary data about other endemic diseases to the next 
level each month. This is information that is valuable to disease specific 
programs for use when monitoring progress with prevention and control activities 
as well as for detecting any emergent, unexplained or unusual events or disease 
patterns.
Routinely report the total number o f cases and deaths seen in a given period (for 
example, monthly or weekly) for other diseases o f public health importance. 
Health facilities w ill report summary totals to the district. Districts w ill aggregate 
reports from all reporting sites and provide summary totals to the provincial, 
regional or central level. Each level should observe any unusual increases or 
events seen during analysis o f monthly summary reports. The summary results 
should be analyzed and the results used to monitor progress toward disease 
control targets, measure achievements o f disease prevention activities in the
66
district, and identify hidden outbreaks or problems so that a response action can 
be taken.
Table 3: Diseases requiring monthly or quarterly summary reporting
Each month, the health facility calculates the total number o f cases and deaths due 
to priority diseases and events seen in the health facility. Separate totals are 
calculated for outpatient cases and inpatient cases. The summary totals are 
recorded on a form (please see Annex 2D) and sent to the district level. The 
district aggregates the totals from all the health facilities that reported and 
submitted district summary totals to the provincial, regional or central level.
Special effort shall be made to obtain from the health information system, the 
total number o f outpatients and inpatients seen for any health condition (including 
those not in the IDSR list) during the reported period.
In cases where a computer is available for surveillance or case management, 
patient records can be analyzed to generate the weekly, monthly or quarterly 
reports. This information is important for producing national and sub-national 
situation reports. A ll data sets should be shared with the health authorities with a 
copy to the respective disease prevention and control programme: this is 
important for coordination at central level, and for the building or strengthening 
o f a national IDSR database system.
Acute viral hepatitis 
AIDS (New Cases)
Buruli ulcer 
Diabetes mellitus
Diarrhoea with severe dehydration in 
children under 5 years of age 
HIV (new detections)
Hypertension 
Influenza-like illness 
Injuries (Road Traffic Accidents) 
Leprosy (quarterly)
Lymphatic Filariasis
Malaria
Malnutrition in children under 5 years 
Mental health (Epilepsy)
Noma
Onchocerciasis
Severe pneumonia in children under 5 
years of age
Sexually transmitted diseases (STIs)
T rachoma 
Trypanosomiasis 
Tuberculosis (quarterly)
Underweight Newborns (less than 2500 g)
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2.5 Improve routine reporting practices
In some health facilities, more than one person may be responsible for recording 
information about patients seen in the facility. For example, the clinician records 
the patient’ s name and diagnosis in a clinic register. Later in the day, a nurse 
tallies the number o f cases and deaths seen in an outpatient service. The ward 
nurse tallies the number o f hospitalized cases. Each week, month, or quarter, a 
records clerk or statistician calculates summaries for all the diseases and records 
them in a standard form. In case the health facility is equipped with computers, 
individual patient records shall be entered, from which the surveillance subset w ill 
be extracted and analyzed to get the required weekly, monthly or quarterly 
compilations.
2.5.1 Review the flow of information in the reporting site
During supervisory visits to reporting sites, make sure that:
• Clinicians record information in the patient registers using the recommended 
case definitions so that health workers who tally the cases at the end o f the 
day can reliably record the required diagnoses on the tally sheet.
• Clinicians, ward nurses or other responsible staff should complete the case- 
based reporting form preferably while the patient is still present.
• Records clerks or statisticians have summary forms that contain spaces for 
recording cases and deaths due to the priority diseases according to the 
standard case definitions.
• Health staff review the weekly, monthly and quarterly summary totals and 
provide comments on the forms about results seen during data analysis. (See 
Section 3).
• Health workers record the summary totals on a recommended weekly, 
monthly and quarterly summary reporting form.
2.5.2 Monitor access to forms and procedures
Keep a record o f IDSR forms and reports received at your level. The record you 
keep w ill be an essential data source for calculating indicators for your country’s 
IHR report and for monitoring performance o f the IDSR indicators. A  sample 
IDSR Reports and Data Sharing Log Book form is in Annex 2E.
Periodically check with reporting sites that you supervise (community, health 
facility, and district) to ensure that the correct forms and procedures are available
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to staff so they can record and report the required cases o f priority diseases and 
conditions:
• Take steps to ensure that all health workers know the standard case definitions 
recommended by national policy. Establish or modify existing procedures so 
that all health workers w ill be able to apply the standard case definitions in 
detecting and reporting priority cases, outbreaks or events.
• Highlight with staff those diseases or conditions that require immediate 
reporting for case-based surveillance including PHEIC and other priority 
diseases or events of national and regional concern. For example, all the 
health staff should be aware o f epidemic-prone diseases for which a single 
case is a suspected outbreak requiring immediate action, and o f any unusual or 
unexplained event with potential for affecting human health.
• Review with health staff the role that case-based data plays in determining 
risk factors and the means o f disease transmission or exposure to health risks 
in a public health event. Make sure the staff has access to a recommended 
form for reporting case-based information.
• Ensure that the surveillance unit has access to fast communication means 
(facsimile, telephone, text message, electronic mail, telegrams, personal 
messages, or other rapid communication means). For the district, specify how 
the district should notify the regional or national levels and who should be 
contacted at these levels.
2.5.3 Enhance linkages to strengthen community-based surveillance
A community-based surveillance system relies on the community members’ 
capacity to identify and report public health problems to the nearest health facility 
or to the district health office. In this system, trained surveillance informants 
identify and report events in the community that have public health significance. 
Community informants report to the health facility or, in the case o f a serious 
event, directly to the district authorities.
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Example: A community surveillance informant hears o f several cases o f acute 
watery diarrhea with vomiting in the community. The informant suspects cholera 
and reports the rumor to the local health fac ility  and to the district level heath 
officer by text messaging. Members o f the rapid response team (RRT) travel to 
the community to verify and investigate the possible outbreak, and, based on the 
investigation results, implement control and prevention measures. The outbreak 
is quickly contained thanks to the early warning from  the community-based 
surveillance liaison.
District staff may identify sources in the community with opportunity to know 
about the community’ s health status. Examples o f community sources include:
• Pharmacists
• School teachers
• Staff at private clinics
• Village leaders
• Religious leaders
• Traditional healers
• Birth attendants or other community health workers
The District can organize community-based surveillance informants by:
• Working with community leaders to identify members o f the community to 
receive relevant training.
• Provide the community sources with information about the priority diseases 
and public health events or hazards you are interested in monitoring through 
surveillance. Give enough information about the disease so that the 
community source can refer cases to the health facility, or notify the health 
facility when unusual or unexplained health events occur in the community.
• Involve community surveillance informants in risk mapping, emergency 
simulation exercises and risk communication during outbreaks.
• Disseminate alert and epidemic thresholds
Please refer to the list in Annex 1B o f key signs and symptoms to use in case 
definitions for community surveillance.
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ANNEX 2A IDSR immediate case-based reporting form 
ANNEX 2B IDSR case based laboratory reporting form 
ANNEX 2C IHR (2005) decision instrument 
ANNEX 2D IDSR weekly/monthly summary reporting form 
ANNEX 2E IDSR reports and data sharing log book
Annexes to Section 2
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ANNEX 2A IDSR immediate case-based reporting form
IDSR Immediate Case-Based Report Form
Variab les / Q uestions A nsw ers - C a se  n
i Reporting Country
2 Reporting Province/Region
S Reporting District
4 Reporting Site (Health Facility, Camp, Village...)
5 Disease/Event (diagnosis): *
6 In-patient or Out-patient?
l Date seen at health facility (day/month/year) \ \ \ \
s Patient Name(s)
9 Date of Birth (day/month/year) \ \ \ \
io Age (.... Years/....... Months/.......Days).
i i Sex: M=Male F=Female
i2 Patient’s residence: Town/City /Village
iS Neighborhood
i4 District of residence
i5 Urban/Rural? (U=Urban R=Rural)
i6 Address, (cell)phone number ... If applicable, name of mother and father if neonate or child
i l Date of onset (day/month/year) of first symptoms \ \ \ \
is Number of vaccine doses received in the past against the disease being reported
i9 Date of last vaccination \ \ \ \
20 Laboratory results
2i Outcome: (Alive, Dead, Transferred out, Lost to follow-up or unknown)
22 Final Classification: Confirmed, Probable, Compatible, Discarded
2S Date health facility notified District (day/month/year) \ \ \ \
24 Date form sent to district (day/month/year) \ \ \ \
25 Record's unique identifier
26 Person completing form: name, function, signature
* Disease/Event (Diagnosis):
AFP, Anthrax, Cholera, Bloody Diarrhea, Dracunculiasis, Neonatal Tetanus, Measles, Meningitis, Yellow fever, 
Dengue, Chikungunya, Viral Hemorrhagic Fever, Plague, Typhoid fever, Rabies, Smallpox, SARS, SARI, Maternal 
death, Influenza due to new subtypes, Adverse Effects following immunization (AEFI), Any other event or disease 
of public health importance (Specify)
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ANNEX 2B IDSR case-based laboratory reporting form
IDSR case  based  Laboratory Reporting Form
P a rt I. R e fe rin g  h e a lth  w o rk e r to  co m p le te  th is  fo rm  a n d  s e n d  a c o p y  to  th e  la b  w ith  th e  sp e c im e n
Variab les A nsw ers
i Date of specimen collection (day/month/year)
2 Suspected Disease or Condition
S Specimen type *
4 Specimen unique identifier **
5 Patient Name (s)
6 Sex (M= Male F= Female)
l Age (.... Years/.......Months/.......Days).
s Date Specimen sent to lab (day/month/year) \ \ \ \
P a rt II. L ab  to  co m p le te  th is  s e c tio n  a n d  re tu rn  th e  fo rm  to  d is tr ic t a n d  c lin ic ia n
Variab les A nsw ers
i Laboratory Name and location
2 Date lab received specimen (dd/mm/yyyy) \ \ \ \
S Specimen condition: (Adequate/Not adequate)
4 Type of test(s) performed
5 Final Lab Result(s)
6 Date (dd/mm/yyyy) lab sent results to district \ \ \ \
l Date Results sent to the clinician (dd/mm/yyyy) \ \ \ \
s Date district received lab results (dd/mm/yyyy) \ \ \ \
* Blood, Plasma, Serum, Aspirate, CSF, Pus, Saliva, Biopsy, Stool, Uretral/Vaginal discharge, Urine, Sputum, 
food/water samples
** Same as the patient's identifer in the IDSR immediate case based reporting form
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ANNEX 2C IHR (2005) decision instrum ent
*States Parties th a t answer "yes" to  the  question w he th e r th e  event meets any tw o  o f the  fo u r criteria  
above shall n o tify  WHO according to  A rtic le  6 o f the  IHR
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ANNEX 2D IDSR weekly/monthly summary reporting form
IDSR weekly/monthly sum m ary  reporting form
Year: W eek: Month:
Country: Province/Region: District:
Population:
District Isocode:
Reporting Site  
Name:
Report Unique Identifier :
Officially Expected Reports: Number of reports received: Reports received on time:
Notifiable D ise a se s  and Events C a se s Deaths
Lab confirm ed  
c a se s
O bservations
1 Acute Flacid Paralysis
2 Acute hemorrhagic fever syndrome
3 Acute viral hepatitis
4
Adverse Effects 
following immunization 
(AEFI)
5 AIDS/HIV
6 Anthrax
7 Buruli ulcer
8 Chikungunya
9 Cholera
10 Dengue
11 Dengue fever
12 Diabetes mellitus
13 Diarrhoea with blood
14 Diarrhoea with severe dehydration <5
15 Dracunculiasis
16 Influenza-like illness
17 Leprosy
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IDSR weekly/monthly sum m ary  reporting form
18 Malaria
19 Malnutrition < 5 years
20 Maternal deaths
21 Measles
22 Meningococcalmeningitis
23 Mental health (Epilepsy)
24 Neonatal tetanus
25
Newborn with low 
birthweight (less than 
2500 g)
26 Noma
27 Onchocerciasis
28 Plague
29 Poliomyelitis (AFP)
30
Public health events of 
international or national 
concern
31 Rabies
32 SARS
33
Severe Acute 
Respiratory Infection 
(SARI)
34 Severe pneumonia <5
35 Sexually Transmitted Infections
36 Smallpox
37 Trachoma
38 Trypanosomiasis
39 Typhoid fever
40 Viral hemorrhagic fever
41 Yellow Fever
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IDSR weekly/monthly sum m ary  reporting form
A n a lysis , Interpretation, D ecision, Action and Recom m endations
Epidemiological
comments
Decisions and Action(s) 
taken
Recommendations
Report date :
/ / Responsible Officer :
(dd/mm/yyyy)
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ANNEX 2E IDSR reports and data sharing logbook
IDSR Reports and Data Sharing Log book
Country:
Province /Region:
District:
Surveillance site name:
Reception 
Date o f the 
Report or Data 
set
Report 
description: pick 
one from the list 
below *
Reporting 
Site name
Reported 
Period **
Report 
form  well 
filled? 
(Y/N)
Report 
received 
Timely or 
Late ?
Feedback sent 
to the 
reporting site? 
(Yes/No)
Comments
*
Weekly AFP polio; Weekly Epidemic Prone Diseases; Weekly Influenza sentinel sites and labs findings; Monthly IDSR 
Aggregated data including malaria and Guinea worm disease; Monthly Pediatric bacterial Meningitis surveillance data; Monthly 
Measles and yellow fever lab data; Monthly Measles, yellow fever and NNT case-based data; Monthly Bacteriology lab data; 
Monthly Rotavirus surveillance data; Quarterly Tuberculosis Report; Quarterly MDR and XDR Tuberculosis Report; Quarterly 
Leprosy Report; Quarterly Trypanosomiasis Report; Annual HIV Surveillance data, Etc.
**
(Use epidemiologic notation to record the reporting period, for example: W-2010-18 for weekly data, M-2010-12 for monthly 
data, Q-2010-02 for quarterly data)
N o te : Instructions for completing form s can be printed on the reverse side if  a paper form  is used or in 
electronic form at if  reports are compiled and transmitted by computer
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Section 3
Analyze data
This section describes how to:
• Receive, handle and store data from reporting
sites
• Analyze data by time, place and person
• Compare analysis results with thresholds for
public health action
• Draw conclusions from the analysis
• Summarize and use the information to improve
public health action
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3.0 Analyze data
Organizing and analyzing data is an important function o f surveillance. It is not enough 
to collect, record and report numerical information about illness, death and disability 
from the catchment area; the data must also be analyzed at each level where it is 
collected. Analyzing data provides the information that is used to take relevant, timely 
and appropriate public health action. For example, analysis o f surveillance data allows 
for:
• Observing trends over time and alerting health staff about emergent events or unusual 
patterns
• Identifying geographic areas o f higher risk
• Characterizing personal variables such as age, gender or occupation that place a 
person at higher risk for the disease or event.
In general, analyzing routine surveillance data should include the following questions:
• Have any priority diseases or other public health events o f concern been detected 
during the reporting period (this week, for example)? Is an epidemic or unusual 
public health event suspected?
• O f the cases, deaths or events detected, how many were confirmed?
• Where did they occur?
• How does the observed situation compare to previous observation periods o f time this 
year? For example, when compared to the start o f the reporting period, is the 
problem increasing?
• Are the trends stable, improving or worsening?
• Is the reported surveillance information representative enough o f the reporting site’s
catchment area? Out o f all the sites that should report, what proportion has actually 
reported?
• How timely were the data received from the reporting sites?
Each site that collects or receives data should prepare and follow an analysis plan for 
analyzing routine surveillance information (refer to Annex 3A o f this section).
This section describes how to receive surveillance data and analyze it by time, place and 
person. The analysis may be done electronically or manually. Methods for carrying out 
the analysis and steps for interpreting and summarizing the findings are also included. 
Information in this section can be applied to health facility and district levels.
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3.1 Receive, handle and s to re  data from reporting sites
The routine flow o f surveillance data is usually from reporting sites to the next 
level up to the central level as indicated in the diagram below. A t the health 
facility level, both in-patient and out-patient areas are surveillance sites. The 
information collected from this site is compiled in standard forms, analysed and 
then forwarded, to the district health management team. In some countries, a sub­
district team collects the data from the health facilities in its catchment area and 
forwards it to the district team. Districts merge, aggregate and send their data and 
reports to provinces, regions or states and subsequently to the central health 
authorities.
The diagram below illustrates a usual flow o f surveillance data throughout a 
health system.
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For special emergency situations (such as public health events o f concern), an 
urgent data flow system should be defined in line with the International Health 
Regulations (2005). For example, a country may decide that during emergencies, 
the situation report is sent to the next level with an immediate copy to levels 
beyond the next higher level. In all such cases, the Ministry o f Health is expected 
to share the situation report and data with the World Health Organization in 
compliance with Article 7 o f IHR (2005). This article states, “ I f  a State Party has 
evidence o f an unexpected or unusual public health event within its territory, 
irrespective o f origin or source, which may constitute a public health emergency 
o f international concern, it shall provide to WHO all relevant public health 
information.”
3.1.1 Receive data
Make a careful record o f all data received at your site. The surveillance team at 
each level or reporting site where data is received should:
• Acknowledge receipt o f the report.
• Log into an appropriate log-book any data set or surveillance report received 
from any reporting site (Refer to Annex 2E in Section 2).
• Review the data quality.
• Verify whether the form (hard copy or electronic file) is filled out accurately 
and completely.
• Check to be sure there are no discrepancies on the form.
• Record in the log the date the data was received, what it is about and who is 
the sender.
• Verify whether the data set arrived timely or was late.
• Merge the data and store them in a database.
3.1.2 Enter and clean the data
At each level where data is received (health facility, district, province or national), 
the surveillance team should take steps to correctly enter the data into aggregated 
reporting forms listing data from all the reporting sites. Troubleshooting and 
cleaning data prior to analysis is an important data management practice. Disease 
trends and maps w ill not be accurate i f  information about numbers o f cases, time 
o f onset, or geographic location o f cases is missing. Use opportunities during 
supervisory visits to sensitize clinicians about the importance o f quality practices 
for recording patient information in patient log books or reporting forms. 
Emphasize that patient logs are sources o f data for reporting public health
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information and may play a role in detecting an unusual event or otherwise 
undetected public health problem.
Data may be recorded and aggregated either manually or electronically i f  a 
computer is available. Regardless o f the method, use the following practices:
• Update aggregate totals for each week or month that data was received.
• Record a zero when no cases were reported. I f  a space which should have 
been filled in is left blank, the next level may have an incorrect picture o f the 
situation. They w ill not know i f  data is missing or i f  no cases were reported. 
Zero reporting lets the next level know that surveillance did not detect a case 
o f the particular disease or condition.
• Ensure that weekly totals include only those cases or deaths actually reported 
for that week. Late reports from previous weeks should be entered with the 
relevant week and totals updated accordingly.
• Avoid duplicate entries by using the report or case record unique identifier to 
prevent, and also check for, multiple entries o f the same records.
• Establish frequent contacts with the reporting sites in order to clarify issues, 
remove missing information and address inconsistencies detected in the 
reporting.
Once the data have been received and entered into the aggregate forms, review 
them carefully to ensure no mistakes were made during entry. Since surveillance 
data informs decisions about disease control and prevention actions, there are 
important ethical, social and economic consequences i f  data are not entered and 
managed correctly or on time.
3.2 Analyze data  by time, place and person
Findings from data analysis may trigger investigations and subsequent response to 
an outbreak, condition, or public health event. Data should be analyzed by time, 
place and person (refer to Table 4, on the following page).
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Table 4: Types of analysis, objectives, tools and methods
Type of analysis Objective Tools Method
Time
Detect abrupt or long­
term changes in 
disease or unusual 
event occurrence, how 
many occurred, and 
the period of time from 
exposure to onset of 
symptoms.
Record summary totals 
in a table or on a line 
graph or histogram.
Compare the number of 
case reports received 
for the current period 
with the number 
received in a previous 
period (weeks, months, 
seasons or years)
Place
Determine where 
cases are occurring 
(for example, to identify 
high risk area or 
locations of populations 
at risk for the disease)
Plot cases on a spot 
map of the district or 
area affected during an 
outbreak.
Plot cases on a map 
and look for clusters or 
relationships between 
the location of the cases 
and the health event 
being investigated.
Person
Describe reasons for 
changes in disease 
occurrence, how it 
occurred, who is at 
greatest risk for the 
disease, and potential 
risk factors
Extract specific data 
about the population 
affected and summarize 
in a table.
Depending on the 
disease, characterize 
cases according to the 
data reported for case- 
based surveillance such 
as age, sex, place of 
work, immunization 
status, school 
attendance, and other 
known risk factors for 
the diseases.
3.2.1 Analyze data by time
Data from this tape o f analysis is usually shown on a graph. The number or rate of 
cases or deaths is placed on the vertical or y-axis. The time period being evaluated 
is placed along the horizontal or x-axis. Events that occurred that might affect the 
particular disease being analyzed can also be noted on the graph.
Graphs can show how many cases and deaths have occurred in a given time. It is 
easier to see changes in the number o f cases and deaths by using a graph, 
especially for large numbers o f cases or showing cases over a period o f time.
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Graphs are made with lines (a trend line) or bars (a bar graph or histogram) to 
measure the number o f cases over time. How to make a graph is described in 
Annex 3B o f this section.
Example o f trend line o f reported cases fo r Cerebrospinal Meningitis,
weeks 1-9, 2010
Weeks
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Example o f a bar graph o f cases o f reported diseases 
fo r  weekly surveillance Jan-Aug, 2010
Bloody Severe Measles Meningitis MNT Severe Thyphoid Yellow Fever 
Diarrhoea malaria Malnutrition fever
U sin g  a h istogram
Prepare a histogram using data from the case reporting forms and line lists. Plot 
each case on the histogram according to the date o f onset. Use symbols to 
represent each case. As the histogram develops, it w ill demonstrate an epidemic 
curve. Define the geographical area the curve w ill represent. For example, decide 
i f  the curve should describe the entire district or the health facility catchment area 
where the case occurred.
Highlight significant events on the histogram with arrows. For example, review 
the log o f reported outbreaks to highlight the dates when:
• Onset o f the first (or index) case
• The health facility notified the district
• The first case was seen at the health facility
• The district began the case investigation
• A  response began
• The district notified the higher level
The results of this analysis allow users of this information to look back at the 
outbreak and answer questions such as when were patients exposed to the illness 
and the length o f the incubation period.
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Example o f histogram  show ing detected cholera cases 
by ep idem iologic week 1 to  31
100 -i
1 2  3  4 5  6  7  8 9  1 0  11 1 2  1 3  14 1 5  1 6  17  1 8  1 9  2 0  21 2 2  2 3  2 4  2 5  2 6  2 7  2 8  2 9  3 0  31
W e e k  n u m b e r
3.2.2 Analyze data by place
Analyzing data according to place gives information about where a disease is 
occurring. Establishing and regularly updating a spot map o f cases for selected 
diseases can give ideas as to where, how, and why the disease is spreading.
Use the place o f residence on the case reporting forms or line list to plot and 
describe:
• Clusters o f cases occurring in a particular area
• Travel patterns that relate to the method o f transmission for this disease
• Common sources o f infection for these cases.
Use manual methods or geographic information software to create a map to use as 
part o f routine analysis o f surveillance o f disease. On a map o f the area where 
cases occurred, mark the following:
• Roads, water sources, location o f specific communities and other factors 
related to the transmission risk for the disease or condition under 
investigation. For example, a map for neonatal tetanus includes locations of 
traditional birth attendants and health facilities where mothers deliver infants.
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• Location o f the patients’ residences or most relevant geographical 
characteristic for this disease or condition (for example, by village, 
neighbourhood, work camp, or refugee settlement. Another example is when 
mapping young patients during a meningitis outbreak, remember to locate the 
school that the patients attend.)
• Other locations appropriate to the disease or condition being investigated. 
Please see the disease specific guidelines for specific recommendations for 
analyzing data by place.
Example of district spot map showing location of suspected 
and confirmed cases
3.2.3 Analyze data by person
Analysis by person describes the population with the condition as well as those at 
risk o f contracting the condition or being exposed to factors associated with it. .
well □  health market
—  road facility
+ confirmed case suspect caseriver ♦ city, town, ^  forest
or village
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Make a distribution o f the cases by each o f the person variables in the reporting 
form. For example, compare the total number and proportion o f suspected and 
confirmed cases by:
Age group 
Sex
Occupation
Urban and rural residences
Vaccination status
Risk factors
Outcomes
Final classification
Use disease-specific information to decide which variables to compare. For 
example, i f  information has been collected about a malaria outbreak, specify the 
age groupings that are targeted by the National Malaria Program. Compare the 
age groupings o f cases detected in young children (age 2 months up to 59 months) 
cases in older children (age 5 to 14 years) and cases in adults (age 15 and over).
Analysis by person is usually recommended for describing the population at risk. 
This analysis is easiest when the data are case-based.
Identifying numerators and denominators
A simple count o f cases does not provide all o f the information needed to 
understand the impact o f a disease on the community, health facility or district. 
Simple percentages and rates are useful for comparing information reported to the 
district.
The first step in analyzing person data is to identify the numerator and 
denominator for calculating percentages and rates.
• The numerator is the number o f specific events being measured (such as 
the actual number o f cases or deaths o f a given disease, for example the 
number o f cases o f Guinea worm that occurred during the year in school 
age children)
• The denominator is the number o f all events being measured (such as the 
size o f the population in which the cases or deaths o f a given disease 
occurred, or the population at risk.
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U sin g  sim ple p ercen ta g es
Simple percentages can be calculated to compare information from populations of 
different sizes. For example:
Number o f Guinea worm cases th is year in 
school age childrenHealth facility
A 42
B 30
By looking only at the number o f reported cases, it appears that a higher 
occurrence o f Guinea worm cases occurred in health facility A.
But when the number o f reported cases at each health facility is compared to the 
total number o f school-aged children living in each catchment area, then the 
situation becomes clearer.
Number o f school-aged children
Health facility living in the catchment area
A 1,150
B 600
By calculating the percentage o f the number o f cases o f Guinea worm during the 
last 12 months in school aged children, the district officer can compare the impact 
o f the illness on each facility. The numerator is the number o f cases that occurred 
over one year. The denominator is the number o f school aged children at risk in 
each catchment area. In this example, the incidence rate is higher in health facility 
B than in health facility A.
Percentage o f cases o f Guinea worm in 
school-aged children during last 12 monthsHealth facility
A 4%
B 5%
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3.2.4 Make a table for person analysis
For each priority disease or condition under surveillance, use a table to analyze 
characteristics o f the patients who are becoming ill. A  table is a set o f data 
organized in columns and rows. The purpose o f a table is to present the data in a 
simple way. For surveillance and monitoring, use a table to show the number o f 
cases and deaths from a given disease that occurred in a given time.
To make a table:
1. Decide what information you want to show on the table. For example, 
consider analysis o f measles cases and deaths by age group
2. Decide how many columns and rows you w ill need. Add an extra row at the 
bottom and an extra column at the right to show totals as needed. In the 
example, you w ill need a row for each age group, and a column for each 
variable such as age group or cases and deaths.
3. Label all the rows and columns, including measurements o f time. In the 
example below, the analysis is done yearly. Analysis o f person is also 
recommended for analysis o f outbreak data.
4. Record the total number o f cases and deaths as indicated in each row. Check 
to be sure the correct numbers are in the correct row or column.
Number o f
Age group reported cases Number o f deaths
0 - 4 years 40 4
5-14 years 9 1
15 years and older 1 0
Age unknown 28 0
Total 78 5
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3.2.5 Calculate the percentage of cases occurring within a given age 
group
When the summary totals for each age group are entered, one analysis that can be
done is to find out what percent o f the cases occurred in a given age group. To
calculate this percentage:
1. Identify the total number o f cases reported within each age group from the 
summary data for which time or person characteristics are known. (For 
example, there are 40 cases in children 0 up through 4 years o f age.)
2. Calculate the total number o f cases for the time or characteristic being 
measured. (In this example, there are 78 cases whose age is known.)
3. Divide the total number o f cases within each age group by the total 
number o f reported cases. (For example, for children age 0 up through 4 
years, divide 40 by 78. The answer is 0.51.)
4. M ultiply the answer by 100 to calculate the percent. (M ultiply 0.51 X 100. 
The answer is 51%.)
Number o f % o f reported cases 
in each age groupAge group reported cases
0-4 years 40 51%
5-14 years 9 12%
15 years and older 1 1%
Age unknown 28 36%
Total 78 100%
3.2.6 Calculate a case fatality rate
A case fatality rate helps to:
• Indicate whether a case is identified and managed promptly.
• Indicate any problems with case-management once the disease has been 
diagnosed.
• Identify a more virulent, new or drug-resistant pathogen.
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• Indicate poor quality o f care or no medical care.
• Compare the quality o f case management between different catchment areas, 
cities, and districts.
• Identify underlying conditions to severe diseases e.g. immune deficiency.
Public health programs can impact the case fatality rate by ensuring that cases are 
promptly detected and good quality case management takes place. Some disease 
control recommendations for specific diseases include reducing the case fatality 
rate as a target for measuring whether the outbreak response has been effective.
To calculate a case fatality rate:
1. Calculate the total number o f deaths. (In the example o f the measles data, 
there are a total o f 5 deaths.)
2. Divide the total number o f deaths by the total number o f reported cases.
(For example, the total number o f reported cases is 78. The number of 
deaths is 5. So divide 5 by 78. 5 ^  78 is 0.06.)
3. M ultiply the answer times 100 (0.06 X  100 equals 6%).
Number o f 
reported 
cases
Number o f Case fatality 
rateAge group deaths
0-4 years 40 4 10%
5-14 years 9 1 11%
15 years and older 1 0 0
Age unknown 28 0 0%
Total 78 5 6%
Please see the disease specific guidelines in Section 9.0 for recommendations 
about the essential variables to compare for each disease.
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3.3 Compare analysis results  with th resho lds for public health action
Thresholds are markers that indicate when something should happen or change. 
They help surveillance and program managers answer the question, “When should 
I take action, and what w ill that action be?” Information on establishing 
thresholds is in Section 4.1 o f this guide.
Thresholds are based on information from two different sources:
• A  situation analysis describing who is at risk for the disease, what are the 
risks, when is action needed to prevent a wider outbreak, and where do the 
diseases usually occur?
• International recommendations from technical and disease control program 
experts.
These guidelines discuss two types of thresholds: an alert threshold and an 
epidemic threshold. Not every disease or condition uses both types o f thresholds, 
although each disease or condition has a point where a problem must be reported 
and an action taken.
An alert threshold suggests to health staff and the surveillance team that further 
investigation is needed. Depending on the disease or condition, an alert threshold 
is reached when there is one suspected case (as for an epidemic-prone disease or 
for a disease targeted for elimination or eradication) or when there is an 
unexplained increase for any disease or unusual pattern seen over a period of time 
in weekly or monthly summary reporting.
An epidemic threshold triggers a definite response. It marks the specific data or 
investigation finding that signals an action beyond confirming or clarifying the 
problem. Possible actions include communicating laboratory confirmation to 
affected health centres, implementing an emergency response such as an 
immunization activity, community awareness campaign, or improved infection 
control practices in the health care setting.
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Several thresholds have been proposed for action based on disease surveillance 
findings. For rare diseases or diseases targeted for eradication, detection o f a 
single case suggests an epidemic. In such situations, one case is unusual and is a 
serious event. This is because these rare or targeted diseases have the potential for 
rapid transmission or high case fatality rates.
In other situations, a number of cases w ill trigger a response. For example, the 
epidemic threshold for cerebrospinal meningitis in countries of the meningitis belt 
is 10 cases per 100,000 population, and the alert threshold is 5 cases per 100,000.
In practice, the national level is responsible for communicating the thresholds for 
priority diseases to all reporting sites in the health system. This is so surveillance 
information can be used for action at the level where it is collected. Periodically, 
surveillance thresholds are assessed and reset at national or international levels 
according to the observed trends of the diseases, events or conditions under 
surveillance.
Suggested thresholds for taking action in specific diseases or conditions are 
discussed Section 9.0.
3.4 Draw conclusions from the findings
Routinely gather or present the graphs, maps and tables and meet with the district 
(or relevant) health team to review analysis results and discuss the findings. 
Systematically review the findings following the district’s analysis plan (see 
Annex 3A) i f  one has been prepared. A t minimum, review the findings to:
• Assess whether the situation is improving or not, and
• Find what explains the observed situation.
3.5 Summarize and use  the  analysis to improve public health action
Prepare and share with all stake holders who need this information, a concise 
action oriented summary o f the surveillance findings. Use simple tables, graphs 
and maps, with clear and short description, interpretation, comments and 
recommendations.
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Make statements that describe the conclusions you have drawn from the 
surveillance data analysis results. Use them to take action to:
• Conduct an investigation to find out why there is an increase in the number of 
cases.
• Collaborate with specific disease reduction programs to intensify surveillance 
if  an alert threshold has been crossed.
• Advocate with political leaders and the community for more resources, i f  a 
lack of resources is identified as a cause for the increased number of cases.
Information sharing is an important surveillance function and a powerful 
mechanism of coordination. It motivates the staff who send reports and builds 
partnership through the transparency that information sharing displays. Thus it is 
important to share analysis results and provide feedback on time. Please refer to 
Section 7 o f these guidelines for information and examples about communication 
and sharing feedback.
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ANNEX 3A Make a plan for routine analysis o f surveillance information 
ANNEX 3B How to manually make a line graph
Annexes for Section 3.0
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ANNEX 3A Make a plan for routine analysis of surveillance information
A minimum plan for routine analysis of surveillance information should include the
following tables, graphs and maps.
1. Calculate completeness and timeliness of reporting
Monitoring whether surveillance reports are received on time and if  all reporting sites 
have reported is an essential first step in the routine analysis of the surveillance system. 
This assists the district (or other level) surveillance team in identifying silent areas (areas 
where health events may be occurring but which are not being reported) or reporting sites 
that need assistance in transmitting their reports.
2. Calculate district (or other level) totals by week (or by month). Update the total number 
of reported cases and deaths for the whole year. This is summary information that helps 
to describe what has happened in the particular reporting period.
3. Prepare cumulativee totals o f cases, deaths and case fatality rates since the beginning of 
the reporting period.
4. Use geographic variables (such as hospitals, residence, reporting site, neighborhoods, 
village and so on) to analyze the distribution o f cases by geographic location. This is 
information that w ill help to identify high risk areas.
5. Analyze disease trends for at least the diseases o f highest priority in your district.
Monitor the trends for cases, deaths, and case fatality rates to identify any unusual 
increases or disease patterns.
An example of a product from an analysis plan for routine surveillance information is on the
next page.
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Example of analysis plan for cholera in Country A, 2010
Distribution by Time
O nset week
Outcom e
Total C a se  fatality rate
Deaths Alive
26 7 16 23 30
27 5 92 97 5
28 1 87 88 1
29 2 19 21 10
32 0 11 11 0
33 2 9 11 18
Total 17 234 251 7
Distribution by Place
District
Outcom e
Total C a se  fatality rate
Deaths Alive
District 1 0 1 1 0
District 2 6 86 92 7
District 3 11 147 158 7
Total 17 234 251 7
District Population C a se s Attack rate_per 100,000
District 1 179888 92 51
District 2 78524 158 201
Distribution by Person
Age Group
Outcom e
Total C a se  fatality rate
Deaths Alive
00-4 years 2 35 37 5
05-9 years 5 50 55 9
10-14 years 2 28 30 7
15-19 years 0 23 23 0
20-24 years 1 27 28 4
25-29 years 2 24 26 8
30-34 years 1 11 12 8
35-39 years 2 6 8 25
40 + years 2 30 32 6
Total 17 234 251 7
Sex
Outcom e
Total C a se  fatality rate
Deaths Alive
F 8 114 122 7
M 9 120 129 7
Total 17 234 251 7
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ANNEX 3B How to manually make a line graph
How to make a line graph
1. Decide what information you want to show on the graph.
2. Write a title that describes what the graph will contain (for example, Monthly totals for inpatient cases and deaths due to malaria with severe anaemia).
3.
Decide on the range of numbers to show on the vertical axis.
• Start with 0 as the lowest number
• Write numbers, going up until you reach a number higher than the number of cases
• Chose an interval if the numbers you will show on the vertical axis are large.
4. Label the vertical axis, explaining what the numbers represent.
5.
Label the horizontal axis and mark the time units on it. The horizontal axis is divided into equal units of 
time. Usually you will begin with the beginning of an outbreak, or the beginning of a calendar period, 
such as a week, month or year.
6. Make each bar on the graph the same width.
7.
Mark the number of cases on the graph or histogram. For each unit of time on the horizontal axis, find 
the number of cases on the vertical axis. Fill in one square for each case, or for some number of cases 
in the column for the day on which the patient was seen. Show deaths by using a different pattern of 
lines, or a different color. If you are making a line graph, instead of making a bar or filled-in squares, 
draw a cross or make a point where the horizontal and vertical lines cross. Connect the points on the 
graph to show the trend going up or down over time.
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Section 4
Investigate suspected outbreaks and 
other public health events
This section describes how to:
• Decide to investigate a reported outbreak or other
public health event
• Record outbreaks, public health events and
rumours
• Verify reported information
• Prepare to conduct an investigation
• Confirm the outbreak or event
• Conduct an immediate response
• Analyze the investigation results to determine
what caused the Public health event or risk
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4.0 Investigate and confirm suspected outbreaks and other 
public health events
The results o f an investigation o f an outbreak or other public health event lead to 
identification and assessment o f people who have been exposed to an infectious disease 
or affected by an unusual health event. The investigation provides relevant information to 
use for taking immediate action and improving longer-term disease prevention activities. 
The steps for conducting an investigation o f a suspected outbreak due to an infectious 
disease can also be used to investigate other public health problems in the district such as 
when an increase in chronic or non-communicable disease is detected.
The purpose o f an investigation is to:
• Verify the outbreak or the public health event and risk.
• Identify and treat additional cases that have not been reported or recognized.
• Collect information and laboratory specimens for confirming the diagnosis.
• Identify the source o f infection or cause o f the outbreak.
• Describe how the disease is transmitted and the populations at risk.
• Select appropriate response activities to control the outbreak or the public health 
event.
4.1 Decide to investigate a reported outbreak, or public health event
The responsibility for investigating outbreaks depends on national policy, 
resources, and local policy. In most countries, districts have the overall 
responsibility for investigating outbreaks. These guidelines assume that the 
district level has responsibility for leading the investigation, and the guidelines 
also apply to health facilities and provinces.
For some communicable diseases, a single suspected case is the trigger for taking 
action, reporting the case to a higher level, and conducting an investigation. This 
is because these are dangerous diseases with either the potential for rapid 
transmission or high case fatality rates i f  cases are not treated promptly.
For other diseases, the trigger is when cases reach a defined threshold (a particular 
number o f cases per 100,000 population, for example). Health staff should 
promptly investigate the problem and respond to the immediate cases.
Preparations for taking a wider public health response should be made. Alert and 
epidemic thresholds are described in Section 3.
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N O T E :  The threshold fo r some diseases w ill not change between districts or 
health facilities because the thresholds trigger immediate notification, and are set 
by national policy
Still, some urgent health events require investigations to be started immediately. 
R eg a rd less, d istricts sh o u ld  aim  to investigate su sp ected  outbreaks a n d  events 
w ith in  48  h o u rs  o f  notification.
Conduct an investigation when:
• The district receives a report o f a suspected outbreak due to a disease that is 
targeted for immediate notification
• An unusual increase is seen in the number o f cases or deaths during routine 
analysis o f data
• Alert or epidemic thresholds have been reached for specific priority diseases.
• Communities report rumours o f deaths or a large number o f cases that are not 
being seen in the health facility
• A  cluster o f illnesses or deaths occurs for which the cause is not explained or 
is unusual (for example, an adult death due to bloody diarrhoea)
4.2 Record reported outbreaks, public health events and rum ours
Prepare a method for tracking the reporting suspected outbreaks, events and 
rumours to the district. The purpose for tracking reported outbreaks is to ensure 
that the report o f each suspected outbreak or rumour is followed by some action 
and resolution. Keeping this record w ill help to gather information for evaluating 
the timeliness and completeness o f the outbreak investigation and response 
process.
A sample form for tracking reports o f outbreaks is in Annex 4A o f this section. I f  
the district is using a district analysis workbook for recording and analyzing long 
term trends, include the tracking form in the workbook.
4.3 Verify the  reported information
Investigating outbreaks requires human, logistic and financial resources. When a 
suspected outbreak or event is reported, promptly verify that the information is 
accurate and reflects conditions suggesting a true outbreak or event. This w ill 
help to ensure that resources are used effectively.
110
To verify the information, consider the following factors:
• Source o f information (for example, is the source o f the rumour reliable? Is 
the report from a health facility?)
• Severity o f the reported illness and use o f standard case definition for 
reporting
• Number o f reported cases and deaths
• The age and gender o f reported cases or deaths
• Transmission mode o f suspected pathogen and risk for wider transmission
• Political or geographic considerations
• Importance o f maintaining good partner and community relations
• Available resources.
After taking the above factors into consideration, the situation may require a more 
urgent response than it might otherwise have done. For example, reports o f a 
suspected viral hemorrhagic fever case are treated with more urgency than reports 
o f a less virulent disease because o f the potential for high rates o f death and rapid 
transmission.
R eg a rd le ss  o f  the fa cto rs , a ll su sp ected  outbreaks o r  events ( in c lu d in g  
im m ediately notifiable d iseases o r  events) re p o rte d fro m  health  fa c ilit ie s  n eed  to 
be rep o rted  to the  n ex t level w ith in  48  h o u rs
4.4 P repare  to conduct an investigation
Mobilize the district epidemic response team and make arrangements for 
investigating the report. Include the district coordinator for the disease or event 
being investigated and any other relevant staff who have already been identified 
and trained to be part o f the rapid response team in the investigation planning. 
(Note: periodically review and update the immunization status o f personnel who 
take part in infectious diseases outbreak investigation and response activities.)
W ith the team, define the objectives o f the investigation so that the essential 
information w ill be gathered for implementing the most appropriate and relevant 
response. Include standard methods that are relevant to the disease or condition 
being investigated (for example, collecting the correct laboratory specimen).
1 1 1
4.4.1 Specify work health workers are expected to do
Inform health staff about the tasks they w ill be expected to do during the 
investigation and the functions they w ill support. Contribute to the positive 
motivation for doing the investigation. For example, make sure that the 
investigation team understands the link between the investigation results and the 
selection o f response activities for preventing additional cases and saving lives. 
Ensure that health staff has access to and know how to use required personal 
protection equipment and universal precautions relevant for the possible cause of 
the suspected outbreak or event.
4.4.2 Define supervision and communication lines
Make a plan for how the teams w ill communicate during an investigation. Prepare 
a diagram showing who w ill report to whom and how information w ill move both 
within the investigation team and between the district and other levels, including 
the most local level. For example, define who w ill communicate with the Ministry 
o f Health, the media and the community. State the methods for communicating 
and how often it should be done during an outbreak to keep officials informed. 
Methods may include daily updates by radiophone, mobile phone, facsimile, 
electronic mail or conference calls. Show on the diagram the lines o f authority 
and the roles o f each staff person on the team. Define the role o f non-health 
workers and how they should be supervised.
It is essential to have in place a communication procedure for communication 
with the community and key partners. This is important for ensuring the sharing 
o f critical information about identifying and responding to risks associated with 
the outbreak or event.
4.4.3 Decide where the investigation will take place
Review information already known about the suspected illness, including its 
mode o f transmission and risk factors. Use this information to define the 
geographical boundaries and target population for conducting the investigation. 
Begin the investigation in the most affected place.
Contact nearby health facilities to see i f  they have seen similar cases or an 
increase in cases with the same diagnosis. Involve the community and local health 
facility staff in planning and conducting the investigation. Listen to and seek out 
information about local customs, culture, and routines could affect the success o f 
the outbreak investigation.
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4.4.4 Obtain the required authorizations
Observe the appropriate authorizations, clearances, ethical norms, and 
permissions that are required to do the investigation. In addition to official 
authorizations, make sure to include agreements with local persons o f influence in 
the community.
4.4.5 Finalize forms and methods for collecting information and 
specimens
Select those variables needed to identify, record, and analyze the disease being 
investigated (A selection o f case investigation forms with key variables noted are 
in the annex to this section). Depending on staff responsibilities, review how to:
Record case information on a line list for later use in summarizing variables
for use in time, place and person analysis
Prepare (and update as needed) an epidemic curve
Construct a spot map showing location o f geographic variables such as
location o f cases and deaths
Develop analysis tables for risk factors, age group, sex, immunization status 
and so on.
4.4.6 Arrange transportation and other logistics
Make travel arrangements for getting to and from the site o f the investigation and 
for travelling during the investigation. Make sure transportation for moving 
specimens to the appropriate laboratories has been arranged in advance o f the 
team’s departure.
4.4.7 Gather supplies for collecting laboratory specimens
Some districts may already have in place a rapid response k it that contains 
supplies and equipment for carrying out an investigation (including laboratory 
supplies).
113
I f  a k it is not available in your district, look at the disease specific program 
guidelines and talk to laboratory specialists to find out the requirements for 
laboratory supplies for proper collection, storage, and transport o f relevant 
specimens (refer to Annex 4B).
U se o f  p e rso n a l p ro tective  equ ipm en t (P P E ) a n d  d isin fection  m ateria ls is 
strong ly  reco m m en d ed  (re fer to A n n e x  4C).
Refer to the disease specific guidelines in Section 9 for laboratory requirements.
4.5 Confirm the outbreak or event
4.5.1 Review the clinical history and epidemiology
Examine the patient or patients to confirm that their signs and symptoms meet the 
case definition. Ask the patient or a family member who can speak for the patient:
• Where do you live?
• When did the symptoms begin?
• Who else is sick in your home, school, workplace, village, and 
neighbourhood?
• Where have you travelled to recently?
• Where have you been living during the past 3 weeks prior to the onset of
symptoms (residence at time o f infection)?
• Were you visited by anyone within the last 2 weeks?
• Have you been in contact with sick or dead poultry or birds or animals
recently (for zoonosis)?
• What vaccines have you received recently (for AEFIs)?
4.5.2 Collect laboratory specimens and obtain laboratory results to 
confirm the diagnosis
I f  the disease can be confirmed by laboratory testing, refer to the laboratory 
requirements in Section 9.0 to determine the diagnostic test and the specimen that 
is required. The disease specific laboratory requirements also describe how to 
collect, store and transport the relevant specimen, and how many specimens to 
collect to confirm an outbreak for that particular disease.
Review laboratory results with the investigation team, clinicians, and laboratory 
persons at the health facility. Are the laboratory results consistent with the clinical
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findings? Seek additional assistance from national level program managers or 
technical experts i f  you have any questions about the laboratory results.
4.6 Conduct an immediate respon se
4.6.1 Isolate and treat cases as necessary
As indicated by the case management guidelines, strengthen infection control 
(including isolation o f patients i f  indicated) and case management where the 
patients are being treated. Provide the health facility with advice, support, and 
supplies.
U se sta n d a rd  p re ca u tio n  w ith  a ll patients in  the health  fa cility , especially  
d u rin g  an  outbreak  o f  a d isease transm itted  by con ta ct w ith  contam in ated  
sup p lies  a n d  body f lu id s .
4.6.2 Search for additional cases
Once the initial cases have been clinically confirmed and treatment has begun, 
actively search for additional cases.
4.6.2.1 Search for suspected cases and deaths in the health 
facility records
In the health facilities where cases have been reported, search for 
additional suspected cases and deaths in the registers. Look for other 
patients who may have presented with the same or similar signs and 
symptoms as the disease or condition being investigated. The team should 
request health workers to search for similar cases in the neighbouring 
health facilities.
See Annex 4D at the end o f this section for instructions on conducting a 
register review. Make sure to follow up any cases that have been allowed 
to go home.
4.6.2.2 Search for contact persons and suspected deaths in 
the community
Identify areas o f likely risk where the patients have lived, worked, or 
travelled such as a zoo, poultry farm, laboratory, or hunting sites. Also talk 
to other informants in the community such as pharmacists, school
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teachers, veterinarians (to know about the animal health situation), 
farmers, and community leaders.
The areas for the search may be influenced by the disease, its mode o f 
transmission, and factors o f risk related to time, place and person analysis. 
V isit those places and talk to people who had, or were likely to have had, 
contact with the patient. Ask i f  they or anyone they know has had an 
illness or condition like the one being investigated. Find out i f  anyone else 
in the area around the case has been ill with signs or symptoms that meet 
the case definition. Collect information that w ill help to describe the 
magnitude and geographic extent o f the outbreak.
Refer newly identified cases to the health facility for treatment. See 
Annexes 4E and 4F o f this section for examples o f forms for recording 
and following-up on contacts for additional cases.
4.7 Record information about the  additional c a se s
For each new case either in the health facility register or in searches o f the 
community that fits the surveillance case definition, record the collected 
information on either a case-based reporting form, line list or other recommended 
form.
4.7.1 Record information on a case reporting form
At a minimum, record information on a case reporting form for the first five 
patients. Also record information on a case form for all those from which 
laboratory specimens w ill be taken. For each case, record at least:
• The patient’s name, address, and village or neighbourhood and locating 
information. I f  a specific address is not available, record information that can 
be used to contact patients i f  additional information is needed or to notify the 
patient about laboratory and investigation results
• The patient’s age and sex. This information is used to describe the 
characteristics o f the population affected by the disease
• The date o f onset o f symptoms and date the patient was first seen at the health 
facility
• Relevant risk factor information such as immunization status i f  the disease 
being investigated is a vaccine-preventable disease
• The name and designation o f the person reporting the information.
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Some diseases have their own more detailed case investigation form. Detailed 
forms outlining particular information for investigating specific diseases are in the 
Annexes at the end o f Section 9.
4.7.2 Record information about additional cases on a line list
When more than five to ten cases have been identified, and the required number 
o f laboratory specimens has been collected, record any additional cases on a line 
list. Use the line list as a laboratory transmittal form i f  10 or more cases need 
laboratory specimens collected on the same day and specimens w ill be transported 
o ff to the lab in a batch.
4.8 Analyze data about the  outbreak
The methods for analyzing outbreak data are similar to how the analysis of 
summary data is described in Section 3. Data about the outbreak is analyzed and 
reanalyzed many times during the course o f an outbreak.
During the initial analysis, summarize the outbreak or events and look for clues 
about where the outbreak or event is occurring, where it is moving, the source of 
the outbreak (from a single source, for example, a well or a funeral), and the 
persons at risk o f becoming ill (for example, young children, refugees, persons 
living in rural areas, and so on). Present the data in the following way:
• Draw a histogram representing the course o f the disease (an “Epi” curve).
• Plot the cases on a spot map.
• Make tables o f the most relevant characteristics for cases (for example, 
comparing age group with vaccination status, sex ratio).
• Calculate case fatality rates (refer to the steps in Section 3).
• Calculate attack rates (refer to the steps in Section 3).
During an outbreak, these data w ill need to be updated frequently (often daily) to 
see i f  the information being received changes the ideas regarding the causes o f the 
outbreak.
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4.9 Interpret analysis results
Review the analysis results and make conclusions about the outbreak. For
example:
• What was the causal agent o f the outbreak?
• What was the source o f infection?
• What was the transmission pattern?
• What control measures were implemented and to what effect?
4.9.1 Interpret the time analysis results
Look at the histogram and observe the shape o f the epidemic curve. Draw
conclusions about when exposure to the agent that caused the illness occurred, the
source o f infection and related incubation period.
• I f  the shape o f the curve suddenly increases to develop a steep up-slope, and 
then descends just as rapidly, exposure to the causal agent was probably over 
a brief period o f time. There may be a common source o f infection.
• I f  exposure to the common source was over a long period o f time, the shape of 
the epidemic curve is more likely to be a plateau rather than a sharp peak.
• I f  the illness resulted from person-to-person transmission, the curve w ill 
present as a series o f progressively taller peaks separated by periods of 
incubation.
4.9.2 Interpret the place analysis results
Use the map to:
• Describe the geographic extent o f the problem and identify high risk areas.
• Identify and describe any clusters or patterns o f transmission or exposure. 
Depending on the organism that has contributed to this outbreak, specify the 
proximity o f the cases to likely sources o f infection.
4.9.3 Interpret the person analysis results
Information developed from the person analysis is essential for planning the 
outbreak response because it describes more precisely the high risk group(s) for 
transmission o f this disease or condition. For example, i f  yellow fever cases 
occurred in patients less than 15 years o f age, then the immunization response 
would need to target children less than 15 years o f age.
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4.10 Conclusions and recom m endations of the investigation
After reviewing the analysis results, formulate conclusions and recommendations 
about the outbreak:
• Situation is confirmed as an outbreak or public health problem.
• Population affected and at risk
• Possible causes o f the outbreak/ public health problem, laboratory results, 
source o f infection, mode o f transmission, attack rate, case fatality rate and 
possible risk factors
• Measures already initiated to contain the outbreak
• Recommendations:
o For controlling the situation 
o Further investigation/studies
4.11 Report the  outbreak investigation
The district rapid investigation team should immediately prepare an outbreak 
investigation report. This detailed report o f the outbreak investigation should be 
prepared and disseminated immediately to all concerned including the health 
facility where the outbreak occurred.
A  suggested outline for writing an investigation report is described in Annex 7A 
o f Section 7.
4.12 Conduct a risk a s se s sm e n t  and identify the  determ inants to explain the outbreak or the event
Risk assessment should be initiated as soon as possible by the designated 
investigation team to address the following questions:
• Is the public health impact o f the event serious?
• Is the vent unusual or unexpected?
• Is there a significant risk o f international spread?
• Is there a significant risk o f international travel or trade restrictions?
The national level may be called upon to participate in the risk assessment at the 
end o f which the decision w ill be made on whether the event is potential PHEIC 
hence warranting its notification (refer to decision instrument in Section 2)
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Recommended list o f personal protective equipment
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ANNEX 4A District log of su sp ec ted  outbreaks and rum ours
R ecord verbal or written information from  health facilities or communities about suspected outbreaks, rumours, or reports o f  unexplained events. R ecord the steps taken and any response activities carried out.
Condition  
or D isease  
or Event
(1)
N um ber  
of cases  
initially 
reported
(2)
Location
(H ea lth
C entre,
village,
etc)
(3)
D ate
district
w as
notified
(4)
D ate
suspected
outbreak
w as
investigated  
by the  
district 
(5 )
Result of
District
investigation
(C onfirm ed,
R uled Out, or
Unknow n)
(6)
D ate
O u tbreak  
B eg an  
D ate  onset 
index  
cas e /d ate  
crossed  
threshold or 
first cluster) 
(7)
D ate  a  case  
w a s  first 
s ee n  at a 
health  
facility
(8)
D ate
specific
in tervention
began
(9)
Ty p e  of 
C oncrete  
Intervention  
that w as  
begun
(10)
D a te
District
Notified
National
Level o f the
O u tbreak
(11)
D a te
District
received
national
response
(12)
C om m ents
(13)
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ANNEX 4B Checklist of laboratory supplies for u se  in an outbreak investigation
For using standard safety precautions when co llecting  and handling all specim ens:
Pieces of bar soap and bleach for setting up hand-washing stations
Supply of gloves
Safety boxes for collecting and disposing of contaminated supplies and
equipment
For co llecting  laboratory specim ens:
Blood Cerebral spinal fluid (CSF)
Sterile needles, different sizes Local anaesthetic
Sterile syringes Needle and syringe for anaesthetic
Vacutainers Antiseptic skin disinfectant
Test tube for serum Sterile screw-top tubes and tube rack
Antiseptic skin disinfectant Microscope slides in a box
Tourniquets Trans-Isolate transport medium
Transport tubes with screw-on tops Latex kit
Transport media (Cary-Blair, Trans-Isolate) Gram stain
May Grunwald Giemsa Kit
Blood films (malaria)
Sterile or disposable lancet Stool
Glass slides and cover slips Stool containers
Slide box Rectal swabs
Cary-Blair transport medium
Respiratory specimens
Swabs Plague
Viral transport medium Gram stain kit
Rapid diagnostic test (dipstix AgF1)
Cary-Blair transport
If health fa c ility  has a centrifuge:
Sterile pipette and bulb
Sterile glass or plastic tube, or bottle with a screw-on top
For packaging and transporting  samples:
Cold box with frozen ice packs or vacuum flask
Cotton wool for cushioning sample to avoid breakage
Labels for addressing items to lab
Labels for marking “store in a refrigerator” on outside of the shipping box
Case forms and line lists to act as specimen transmittal form
marking pen to mark tubes with patient's name and ID number (if assigned by the district)
Appropria te  personal protection (PPE) (fo r all EPR diseases such as VHF, suspected
avian influenza, etc.)
124
ANNEX 4C Recomm ended list of personal protective equipm ent (PPE)
The following equipment should be available for the personal protection o f all staff investigating 
a suspected case o f any viral haemorrhagic fever or avian influenza. The equipment should be 
held at Provincial level. See Annex 5A for other stocks that may be needed to respond to a 
suspected outbreak.
Com position o f one set o f PPE WHO Deployment Kit
1 surgical gown 100 surgical gowns
1 coverall 100 coveralls
1 head cover 100 head cover
2 pairs of goggles 50 pair of goggles
1 pair of rubber gloves 100 pairs
1 mask N95 200 pieces
1 boot cover* 0
1 box 50 pairs of examination gloves 800 pairs of examination gloves
1 plastic apron re-usable 20 pieces
1 pair of gum boots 20 Gum boots
1 hand sprayer 2 of 1.5 litres each
1 Back sprayer 1 back sprayer of 10-12 litres
specimen containers
Scotch of tapes 3 rolls
Anti fog for goggles 3 bottles
Chlorine
N.B: chlorine and gum boots can be purchased locally 
* Not essential
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ANNEX 4D How to conduct a register review
1. B a c k g ro u n d
The purpose o f a register review is to collect information on cases admitted to the health facility 
during a specific period. Explain that the information w ill be used to determine what caused the 
outbreak or increase in number o f cases.
• Any inpatient facility with m ore than 10 hospital b ed s. Give priority to government 
health facilities.
• Large reference or teaching hospitals with paediatric wards because they receive referrals 
from other health facilities.
• Small hospitals or health facilities that serve remote areas and high risk populations. For 
example, nomadic groups, refugees, or areas without regularly scheduled health services.
2. M e e t  w ith  the health  fa c ility  s ta ff a n d  expla in  the p u rp o se  o f  the review
Explain to the health facility’s senior staff the purpose o f the review. The information w ill assist 
the district and health facility in determining the most appropriate action for lim iting the 
outbreak and preventing future cases from occurring. Emphasize that the activity is an 
information-gathering exercise, and is not a review o f health worker performance.
3. A rra n g e  to co n d u ct the review
Arrange a time to conduct the review when staff who w ill assist with the review are present and 
available to help or to answer questions.
4. Id en tify  so u rce s  o f  in form ation
During the visit, depending on the priority disease or condition or events being investigated, 
check inpatient registers for the paediatric and infectious disease wards. The inpatient register for 
the paediatric ward is a good source because it lists all children admitted to the ward. Annual 
summary reports are not always accurate, and outpatient registers often include only a 
provisional diagnosis.
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Review the system and procedures health workers use to record information in the registers 
about diagnoses. Make sure that the information needed for investigating any suspect case is 
available. A t a minimum, the register should include:
• the patient’ s name and location
• the signs and symptoms
• date o f onset o f symptoms and outcome (for example, date o f death, i f  
relevant)
• immunization status, i f  appropriate to this disease
I f  the health facility does not keep at least the minimum information, talk with senior staff about 
how to strengthen the record keeping so that the minimum information is collected.
5. D o  the re c o rd  rev iew  at the sch e d u le d  date a n d  tim e
Go to the selected wards as scheduled. During the visit, look in the health facility registers for 
cases and deaths that may be suspected cases o f a priority disease. These should be cases or 
deaths that meet the standard case definition for suspected cases. Find out whether the suspected 
case was investigated and reported according to national guidelines.
6. L in e - lis t  the su sp ected  cases that a re  f o u n d
Record information about the suspected cases. This information w ill be used during case 
investigation activities.
7. P ro v id e  fe e d b a ck  to the health  fa c ility  s ta ff
Meet with the health facility supervisor and discuss the findings o f the activity. Use the 
opportunity to review any features o f case management for the illness that may help health 
workers in the facility. Reinforce the importance o f immediate reporting and case investigation 
as tools for prevention o f priority diseases and conditions.
8. R e p o rt  any su sp ected  cases to the n ext level
Report the suspected cases according to local procedures. Investigate the case further to 
determine the factors that placed the patient at risk for the disease or condition. Develop an 
appropriate case response.
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ANNEX 4E Contacts3 recording sheet
Contacts3 Recording Sheet filled in b y ........................................................................
Case nam e........................................................  Case number (if assigned).................................................
Case's Village/neighborhood.........................  Chief or Community leader.................................................
District/Town................................................ Province/Region.................................................................
Hospitalized .... / Found in the community .... If hospitalized, Hospital....................... Date of Admission:
Surname Other
Name
Relationship 
with the 
case
Age
(yrs)
Sex
(M/F)
Head of 
Household
Village/
neighborhood
Chief or
Community
leader
District/Town Type of Contact 
(1, 2 or 3, list 
all)
Date of last 
contact
Last date for 
follow-up
1st
Visit
Out come
3 Contacts are defined as:
1 - sleeping in the same household with a suspected or a case within 3 weeks
2 - direct physical contacts with the case (dead or alive)
3 - has touched his / her linens or body fluids
4 -  has eaten or touched a sick or dead animal
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Contact Tracing Form -  by Village Team Volunteer’s name:
ANNEX 4F Contact tracing form (follow-up)
Village............................................. Chief or Community leader
District/Town............................................. Province/Region ..
CN
Family
Name
First
Name Age Sex
Date of 
last
contact
Day of Follow-up
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
Record "O " if the  contact has no t developed fever or bleeding
Record "X" if th e  contact has died o r developed fever a n d /o r bleeding (com plete Case Investigation 
Form and, if alive, re fe r to  the  hospital)
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Section 5
Prepare to respond to outbreaks and 
other public health events
This section describes how to:
• Establish a district public health management
committee
• Establish a district emergency rapid response team
• Prepare an epidemic preparedness and response
plan
• Set up contingency stocks o f drugs, vaccines,
reagents and supplies
• Carry out risk mapping for outbreaks and PH
events
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5.0 Prepare to respond to outbreaks and other public health 
events
A public health emergency such as an acute outbreak or public health event calls for an 
immediate response. Being prepared to detect and respond to such an event is an 
essential role o f the district. Examples o f advanced preparations include: identifying key 
members o f an event management team, mapping available resources, and estimating 
required supplies and procuring them. If these steps are carried out in advance o f an 
event, the health system will be able to function promptly, effectively, and efficiently to 
prevent unnecessary deaths or disabilities due to the emergency.
This section describes steps for organizing preparedness activities in the district. 
Preparedness activities should take place through the health system and may be guided by 
a national preparedness plan. The plan should address the roles and responsibilities for a 
national Public Health Emergency Management Committee and emergency Rapid 
Response Teams at the national, regional, and district/state/province levels. National 
preparedness guidelines are followed at the district level to develop contingency plans 
and other preparedness activities.
5.1 Establish a district public health em ergency m anagem ent committee
District-level public health emergency management committees (PHEMC) work 
closely with their counterparts at the provincial/regional and national levels to 
plan and monitor the implementation of public health emergency plans. PHEMCs 
are coordinating committees composed o f technical and non-technical members 
from health and other sectors. The role o f the PHEMC is to develop and oversee 
the implementation o f emergency preparedness strategies, action plans, and 
procedures.
5.1.1 Identify functions of the emergency management 
committee
The district’s public health emergency management committee should meet to 
develop the district emergency preparedness and response plan. Once the plan is 
developed, the committee should periodically review and update the plan in 
response to any changes in technical, managerial or epidemiologic situations in 
the district.
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The main functions o f the district public health emergency committee are to:
• Develop a district emergency preparedness and response plan that accounts 
for all potential emergencies including disease outbreaks and detection of 
other emergent public health events or hazards.
• Establish a community communications plan for sharing information with 
communities before, during, and after any public health emergency. The 
plan should also include a plan for disseminating information to the public 
and media about activities conducted for preparedness and during a response. 
The plan should also include liaison activities with relevant partners in 
multiple sectors including Points o f Entry and other required reporting sites.
• Mobilize resources for emergency prevention and control including 
procurement o f response and communication supplies. Plan to monitor the 
use o f the resources before, during and after the emergency event.
• Support the procurement o f emergency material stockpiles within the district.
• Enhance linkages with community surveillance informants to ensure flow of 
data for early detection o f public health events.
• Coordinate community risk mapping activities within the district and ensure 
all reporting sites are aware o f the use o f thresholds for reporting acute 
outbreaks or events.
• Coordinate training o f community, health facility, and district personnel in 
emergency preparedness and response.
• Plan to periodically conduct emergency response simulation activities at the 
district and community levels.
• Coordinate the post-emergency evaluation and plan to disseminate findings 
with the affected communities.
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5.1.2 Identify members of the PHEMC
Organize the district PHEMC to include a mix o f representatives from the public, 
non-governmental organizations (NGO) and private sectors.
Participants from the public sector may include:
District administrator or equivalent 
District police commissioner
District civic or community representative (for example, the district chief) 
District director o f health services 
District public health nurse 
District disease control officer 
District environmental health officer 
The district medical or clinical officer 
Wildlife and veterinary experts
Laboratory technician or laboratory technologist from the district 
laboratory
From non-governmental organizations with health care activities in the area, 
include representatives from:
• Community health programs and mission hospitals
• Red Cross, Red Crescent or similar agencies working in the area
From the private sector, involve participation from:
• Clinical or nursing officers from private hospital, clinic or laboratory
• Pharmacists or chemists
5.1.3 Meet regularly before and during public health events
When there is no epidemic, the PHEMC should:
• Meet to review district disease trends and updates on preparedness steps 
adopted by the district
• Review the level o f preparedness at the beginning o f each epidemic season 
(e.g. before the period when cases o f meningitis increase)
• Share conclusions and recommendations o f these meetings with the 
regional and national level authorities
• Organize simulation exercises/drills to test the operation plans
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During an emergency or outbreak response, the epidemic management 
committee should:
• Meet as soon as the epidemic or event is recognized
• Assess the need for, and request support from, the regional or national 
PHEMC or Rapid Response Teams when necessary
• Meet daily at the beginning o f an outbreak or epidemic and weekly as the 
epidemic response continues or when indicated
• Regularly review the epidemic response and take action to improve 
epidemic control actions as indicated
• Document and communicate epidemic response actions to next higher level
5.2 Establish a district em ergency rapid resp on se  team
A Rapid Response Team is a technical, multi-disciplinary team that is readily 
available for quick mobilisation and deployment in case o f emergencies.
5.2.1 Identify members of the district epidemic rapid response team
Members o f the district epidemic rapid response team (DRRT) should include:
• An epidemiologist or public health officer (the disease control officer, for 
example)
• Laboratory technol ogi st or techni ci an
• Clinician
• Environmental health officer
• Veterinary or wildlife management experts
• Others based on availability o f technical staff and specificity o f the outbreak 
(such as experts in industrial poisoning or chemical events, for example)
5.2.2 Identify roles and responsibilities of the district rapid response 
team
• Investigate rumours, reported outbreaks, and other public health 
emergencies
• Propose appropriate strategies and control measures including risk 
communications activities
• Coordinate rapid response actions with partners and other agencies
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• Initiate the implementation o f the proposed control measures including 
capacity building
• Prepare detailed investigation reports
• Contribute to the final evaluation of the outbreak response
5.3 P repare  an epidemic p reparedness  and resp on se  plan
The purpose o f the plan is to strengthen the ability o f the district to respond 
promptly when an acute outbreak or other public health event is detected.
This plan should:
• Be based on district risk assessments, and should specify the resources 
available for epidemic preparedness and response.
• Take into account diseases with epidemic potential in the district and in 
neighboring districts.
• Provide estimates o f the population at risk for epidemic-prone diseases 
and other public health emergencies.
• Clearly indicate for each suspected outbreak which reference laboratory 
will be used for confirmation.
• Provide estimates o f quantities o f drugs, vaccines and supplies for each 
epidemic-prone disease likely to occur in the district.
• Plan to be tested before implementation.
• Include standard operating procedures (SOPS) in the training plan.
Key sections of the epidemic preparedness and response plan should include:
1 . Designated coordination committees
2 . Epidemiology and surveillance including data management3. Steps for carrying out a risk communication strategy including social mobilization4. Operational actions according to expected phases of the epidemic5. Laboratory: specimen collection, handling , transportation and processing
6 . Case management , Treatments (anti-viral, antimicrobial, decontamination, disinfection or others asindicated) & Infection control7. Pre- and post-exposure prophylaxis treatment
8 . Immunization strategies9. Rapid containment activities and additional methods if rapid containmentfails
1 0 . Capacity building including required training, sensitization meetings and simulation
1 1 . Logistics including supply lists
1 2 . Environment, water and sanitation13. Monitoring of the outbreak or event
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5.4 Set up contingency s to cks  of drugs, vaccines, reagentsand supplies
Outbreaks and other public health emergencies require the rapid mobilization of 
resources such as vaccines, medicines and lab supplies. It is prudent to establish 
and preposition stockpiles o f materials before an emergency occurs.
As follow up to the public health risk assessment activity, districts should set up a 
contingency stock of drugs, vaccines, reagents and supplies to permit prompt 
management o f the first cases without delay before support arrives from higher 
levels. Also regularly and carefully monitor the contingency stock in order to 
avoid shortages and expiry o f drugs, vaccines, reagents and supplies. Examples 
of stock management tools are included in the annexes at the end o f this section.
The content o f the contingency stock varies with the nature o f epidemic-prone 
diseases and the risk o f outbreak in the district. Risk assessment activities help to 
develop a list o f materials that should be stockpiled at the district and community 
levels. A suggested list o f contingency drugs and supplies is available in Annex 
5A at the end o f this section.
5.4.1 Conduct stock management for outbreak response
Maintain a reliable supply o f supplies and materials for responding to an outbreak 
or public health event.
Use an inventory checklist such as the one in Annex 5B to assess which supplies 
are already available for use during a response activity. If the supplies are already 
available, determine if  they can be set aside for use during a response. If they are 
not available, can they purchased or requested through the national system for 
procurement?
Periodically, for example, every 4 months, make sure the supplies are dry, clean, 
and ready to be used.
At a minimum, carry out the following tasks (relevant to each level) to estimate 
necessary supplies, inventory what is available, and plan to procure essential 
items for use in response.
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1. List all required items for carrying out surveillance, laboratory and 
response necessary for detecting and responding to priority diseases, 
conditions and events. Consider:
a. Forms
b. Laboratory reagents and supplies
c. Case management and field intervention materials
2. Make an inventory and note the quantity o f each item that is available.
3. Complete and regularly update a stock balance sheet for each item.
4. Observe expiry dates and practice best logistical practices for packing, 
shipping, storing and disposing o f supplies and materials.
5. Establish a critical or minimum quantity for each item that would need to 
be on hand for an investigation or response activity. Consider logistic and 
epidemiologic factors in establish minimum quantities.
6 . Monitor the stock balances against the critical quantity established.
7. Report regularly on the IDSR stock situation. See Annex 5C for an 
example o f a stock item transaction and balance sheet.
5.5 Risk mapping for outbreaks and o ther public health events
Preparedness activities should be ongoing and updated periodically. This 
includes assessing risks (in the catchment area) with the potential to affect 
community health. These risk assessment activities may include evaluating 
drinking water sources or food storage methods. Regularly, once a year, for 
example, assess those risks and record the information on a map. This is useful 
information when considering supplies, transport and other resource issues 
necessary for the response.
Risk mapping should extend to all public health hazards as specific by IHR 
(2 0 0 5 ) including chemical, zoonotic, radiological and nuclear.
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Annexes to Section 5
ANNEX 5A Essential stock items for responding to outbreaks 
ANNEX 5B Stock situation report
ANNEX 5C IDSR stock item transaction and balance sheet
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ANNEX 5A Essential s tock  items for responding to  outbreaks
Essential Stock items for Responding to  Outbreaks
Drugs Disinfectants, Insecticides and Rodenticides
Supplies Vaccines Equipment
Benzyl penicillin Disinfectants Auto-disable syringes Meningitis vaccines AC Body bags
Ciprofloxacin 2% Chlorine Auto-disable syringes Meningitis vaccines ACW135 Buckets
Diazepam Bleach Bed nets Meningitis vaccines Conjugated Camping kits
Doxycycline Calcium hypochlorite
Personal Protective 
Equipment (see 
Annex 4D)
Cholera vaccines Candles
Drugs for supportive 
care Cresol
Laboratory supplies 
(see Annex 4C) Tetanus anatoxin Computer
Erythromycin Sodium hypochlorite Mosquito nets Yellow fever Containers
Nalidixic acid Pesticides Nasogastric tubes 2.7 mm OD, 38 cm Other vaccines Cook-ware
Oily chloramphenicol Cypermethrin Nasogastric tubes 5.3 mm OD, 50 cm Diesel
Oral rehydration salts Malathion Needles Front lamp
Paracetamol Permethrin Intravenous giving sets ( different sizes) GPS
Penicillin V Rodenticides Teaspoons Kerosene lamp
Rehydration fluids: Brodifacom Sprayers (pump and fogger) Lab: see annex 5a
Ribavirin Bromadione Lamps
Ringer lactate Maps
Streptomycin Paraffine
Tetracyclin Phones
Trimetroprim-
sulfamethoxazole Plastic sheets
Power generator
Radio
Sprayers
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ANNEX 5B Stock situation report
Surveillance and Epidemic P reparedness  and R esponse: Stock Situation Report
Year:
R epo rt day  (day/m m /yyyy):
R eporting  period :
R eporting  s ite  nam e:
District:
P rovince:
C ountry:
Item Description OpeningStock Quantityreceived TotalStock Quantityissued StockBalance
Observations, decisions and recom m endations
Title, Name and function ol Responsi ble Officer:
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ANNEX 5C IDSR stock  item transaction  and balance sh ee t
IDSR Stock Item Transaction and Balance Sheet
Lab
orat
ory 
or 
War
ehou
se 
Nam
e ItemDescription(Name)
Pres
enta
tion
 (U
nit 
of p
urch
ase)
Expi
ry 
date £3O
£ 3CCO Batc
h n
umb
er
Loca
tion 
in s
tore
Airw
ay 
bill
Allo
tme
nt n
umb
er
Ship
men
t &
 
oper
atio
ns 
cos
t 
(US
D)
Tran
sact
ion 
Date
 
(Da
y/M
onth
/Ye
ar)
Qua
ntity
 re
ceiv
ed DonororSupplier
Qua
ntity
 is
sue
d DestinationorBeneficiary
Stoc
k B
alan
ce
Sign
atur
e (
Nam
e 
and 
func
tion
) Observations/Remarks
0 Inventory
Use one sheet by stock item, and update the sheet every time any transaction takes place
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Section 6
Respond to outbreaks and 
other public health events
This section describes how to:
Convene the district public health emergency 
management committee and Select appropriate 
public health response
Mobilize response teams for immediate action 
Implement response activities 
Provide regular situation reports on the outbreak 
and events
Document the response
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6.0 Respond to outbreaks and other public health events
The goal o f an integrated disease surveillance and response is to use data for public 
health action. When an outbreak, acute public health event or condition is detected, an 
investigation should take place to determine the cause o f the problem. The results o f the 
investigation should guide the selection o f the response. Most disease prevention and 
control programs promote recommended response actions such as conducting a mass 
immunization campaign for a vaccine-preventable disease, strengthening nutritional 
support and feeding practices for children with malnutrition, or administering anti- 
malarial, antibiotic or antiviral treatments as indicated. Successful responses are carried 
out with community involvement and often include a community education and behavior 
change component. Regardless o f the specific recommended response, the district’s role 
in selecting and implementing a recommended response is essential for safe-guarding the 
health and well-being o f communities in the district.
As a result o f the International Health Regulations, districts are also involved in response 
to other infectious, zoonotic, chemical, radio-nuclear and other unknown events if  they 
are detected.
This section will describe steps for conducting a public health response and provide 
general directions for immediate response actions for leading causes o f illness, death and 
disability. Please consult relevant WHO guidelines for responding to chemical and radio- 
nuclear events.
6.1 Convene the district public health em ergency m anagem ent committee
Once an outbreak or event is confirmed, the District Health Management Team 
(DHMT) convenes the public health epidemic management committee to assess 
and implement the response. The following steps should take place:
1. Report the outbreak or event to the next level. It is likely that the outbreak 
has already been reported to the next level and coordination has been 
ongoing with the investigation
2. Take every opportunity to communicate with the designated level that is 
providing coordination for the response
3. Request outbreak or event response funds to be released
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4. Alert nearby districts about the outbreak. If they are reporting a similar 
outbreak, coordinate response efforts with them
5. Assign clear responsibilities to individuals or teams for specific response 
activities
6 . Provide orientation or training along with adequate supplies o f relevant 
supplies for the district response team and affected health facility staff.
7. The national level in collaboration with the district will assess whether the 
event is a potential public health event o f international concern (PHEIC) 
using the decision instrument
8 . Review existing resources as defined in the preparedness plan. Determine 
what additional resources are required. For example, consider:
• Human resources that could be mobilized to manage the epidemic
• Funds to support response activities
• Emergency stocks or required drugs and other medical supplies
• Laboratory support for confirmation of pathogens responsible for the
epidemics. If the district does not have the capacity to collect, package 
and ship the specimen, contact the reference laboratory for assistance
9. Mobilize logistics support (travel o f rapid response team, accommodation 
arrangement, communication, other essential equipment)
10. If supplies are not available locally:
• Contact the provincial or central levels to request alternate suppliers
• Borrow from other services, activities, or non-governmental 
organizations in your area
• Identify practical low-cost substitutes
6.1.1 Select appropriate public health response
Review investigation results and data analysis interpretation to select appropriate 
response activities to contain the confirmed outbreak or public health problem.
Refer to Section 9 and national disease specific guidelines to select response 
activities, which involve:
• Proven measures to prevent unnecessary deaths or disabilities due to the 
specific cause o f the problem
• A mix o f activities for immediately controlling the problem in the short-term, 
and reducing the risk o f ongoing transmission in the long-term through 
prevention activities
• Participation from the community, health care facilities and the district 
personnel
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For example, response activities for particular outbreaks or public health 
problems or events include the following:
• Conduct emergency vaccination campaigns, when recommended
• Provide relevant chemoprophylaxis and vaccination for health workers
• Improve access to clean water
• Improve safe disposal o f human waste
• Improve food handling practices
• Reduce exposure to mosquitoes and other vectors
• Control vectors
6.2 Mobilize resp on se  team s for immediate action
Rapid response teams should have already been identified during preparedness 
activities. Mobilize the teams and make sure that the membership o f the team 
reflects the technical needs o f the response. Refer to Section 5 o f these guidelines 
for recommendations on the composition o f the rapid response team and the 
team’s roles and responsibilities.
6.3 Implement resp on se  activities
Implementing a response means carrying out the operational steps so the actions 
take place as planned. Regardless o f the specific causes o f the outbreak or event, 
the success o f the response relies on the success o f general factors such as case 
management, provision o f supplies, and trained health staff. The selected 
response activities common factors for responding to outbreaks or public health 
events include the following:
6.3.1 Strengthen case management and infection control measures
Take steps to support improved clinical practices in the district. Review the 
recommendations in Annex 6 A for treating cases during an outbreak. Prepare 
health workers to conduct these responses.
• Review with each health facility whether the clinical staff know and use 
recommended protocols for case management o f outbreak diseases.
• Make sure that clinicians receive results o f laboratory confirmation where 
necessary.
• In a large epidemic, ask the medical officer at each health facility to identify 
an area that can be used to accommodate a large number o f patients.
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• Provide Standard Operating Procedures that include Infection control 
guidelines.
• Implement infection control and risk mitigation measures, for example:
o Establish an isolation ward for highly infectious diseases (Ebola, 
Cholera, SARS, etc.) 
o Ensure health staff access to safety and personal protective 
measures for any infectious diseases (especially for Ebola and 
SARS).
• Make the necessary drugs and treatment supplies available.
6.3.2 Update health staff skills
Provide opportunities for health staff to receive information and updates on the 
outbreak or event case definition, case management procedures, reporting process 
and required data elements. It is essential that members o f the rapid response 
team are aware o f and have access to any indicated personal protection equipment 
and infection control practices indicated by the disease involved in the response.
If there are immunization requirements for responding to the particular disease or 
condition, ensure that rapid responders are up-to-date with indicated 
immunizations.
To update the health staff and rapid response team:
1. Give clear and concise directions to health workers taking part in the 
response.
2. Select topics for orientation or training. Emphasize case management for the 
specific disease according to disease specific recommendations. Select other 
training topics depending on the risk o f exposure to the specific public health 
hazard for example:
• Enhancing standard precautions (use o f clean water, hand-washing and 
safe sharps disposal)
• Barrier nursing and use o f protective clothing
• Isolation precautions
• Treatment protocols such as delivering oral rehydration salts (ORS) 
and using intravenous fluids
• Disinfecting surfaces, clothing and equipment
• Disposing o f bodies safely
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3. Conduct training
• Orient or reorient the district epidemic management committee, rapid 
response team and other health and non-health personnel on epidemic 
management based on the current epidemic.
• In an urgent situation, there often is not time for formal training. 
Provide on-the-job training as needed. Make sure there is an 
opportunity for the training physician or nursing staff to observe the 
trainees using the updated or new skill.
• Monitor participant performance and review skills as needed.
6.3.3 Enhance surveillance during the response
During a response to an outbreak, encourage health staff at all health facilities to 
be vigilant in surveillance o f the disease or condition. For example, members of 
the response teams and health staff in affected facilities should:
• Search for additional persons who have the specific disease and refer them 
to the health facility or treatment centres, or if  necessary quarantine the 
household and manage the patient.
• Ensure timely exchange o f laboratory information with the team
• Update the line list, make data analysis by time (epi-curve), person (age 
and sex) and place (mapping cases).
• Monitor the effectiveness o f the outbreak or response activity.
• Report daily at the beginning of the epidemic. Once the epidemic matures, 
the committee can decide on a different frequency of reporting.
• Actively trace and follow up contacts as indicated.
6.3.4 Inform and educate the community
Effective risk communication is an essential element o f managing public health 
events. When the public is at risk o f a real or potential health threat, treatment 
options may be limited, direct interventions may take time to organize, and 
resources may be few. Communicating advice and guidance, therefore, may be 
the most important public health tool in managing a risk.
Keep the public informed to calm their fears and encourage cooperation with the 
outbreak response. Develop community education messages with information 
about recognizing the illness, how to prevent transmission and when to seek 
treatment. Begin communication activities with the community as soon as an 
epidemic or public health problem is identified.
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1. Decide what to communicate by referring to disease specific 
recommendations in Section 9. Make sure to include:
• Signs and symptoms of the disease
• How to treat the disease at home, if  home treatment is recommended, 
including preparing disinfectant solutions
• Prevention behaviours that are feasible and that have a high likelihood of 
preventing disease transmission
• When to come to the health facility for evaluation and treatment
• Immunization recommendations, if  any
2. Decide how to state the message. Make sure that the messages:
• Use local terminology
• Are culturally sensitive and acceptable
• Are clear and concise
• Work with local traditions
• Address beliefs about the disease
Sample community education messages are in Annex 6 F at the end o f this 
section.
3. Select appropriate communication methods that are present in your district. 
For example,
• Mass media, (radio, television, newspapers)
• Meetings (health personnel, community, religious, opinion and political 
leaders)
• Educational and communication materials (posters, fliers)
• Multi-media presentations (for example, films, video or narrated slide 
presentations) at the markets, health centres, schools, women’s and other 
community groups, service organizations, religious centres
4. Give health education messages to community groups and service 
organizations and ask that they disseminate them during their meetings.
5. Give health education messages to trusted and respected community leaders 
and ask them to transmit them to the community.
6 . Select and use a community liaison officer, focal point, or health workers to 
serve as spokesperson to the media. As soon as the outbreak has been 
recognized:
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• Tell the media the name of the spokesperson, and that all information 
about the outbreak will be provided by the spokesperson
• Release information to the media only through the spokesperson to make 
sure that the community receives clear and consistent information.
7. On a regular basis, meet with the community spokesperson to give:
• Frequent, up-to-date information on the outbreak and response
• Clear and simple health messages that the media should use without 
editing
• Clear instructions to communicate to the media only the information and 
health education messages from by the Epidemic Response Committee
6.3.5 Conduct a mass vaccination campaign
Collaborate with the national EPI and disease control program manager to 
conduct a mass vaccination campaign, if  indicated. Begin planning the mass 
vaccination campaign as soon as possible. Speed is essential in an emergency 
vaccination because time is needed to obtain and distribute vaccine.
Determine the target population for the activity based on the case and outbreak 
investigation results (refer the EPI program guidelines for specific 
recommendations about delivery o f the indicated vaccines).
A worksheet called “Planning a mass vaccination campaign” is in Annex 6 C at 
the end of this section.
A worksheet called “estimating vaccine supplies for vaccination activities in 
Annex 6 D at the end o f this section. Annex 6 E describes recommended 
vaccination practices for use during the vaccination campaign.
6.3.6 Improve access to safe water
Containers that hold drinking water can be the vehicle for disease outbreaks 
including cholera, typhoid, Shigella and hepatitis A and E. Make sure the 
community has an adequate supply o f safe water for drinking and other uses. The 
daily water needs per person during non-outbreak situations are shown below. 
Water needs are much higher during an outbreak situation, especially outbreaks of 
diarrhoeal diseases.
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Daily w ater needs per person*
N on -o u tb rea k  s itu a tio n
D uring  o u tb re a k  o f  
d ia rrh o e a l disease
Hom e use 20 litres per day 50 litres
H ea lth  care se ttin g 40 to  60 litres per day
50 litres in wards 
100 litres in surgery 
10 litres in kitchen
**Refugee Health: an Approach to Emergency Situations, Medecins sans Frontieres, 1997 MacMillan
Safe sources o f drinking water include:
• Piped chlorinated water
• Chlorination at point-of-use to ensure safe drinking water
• Protected water sources (for example, closed wells with a cover, rain water 
collected in a clean container)
• Boiled water from any source
If no local safe water sources are available during an emergency, water supply 
may need to be brought from outside.
To make sure that families have safe drinking water at home (even if  the source 
is safe) provide:
• Community education on how to keep home drinking water safe. Refer to 
Annex 6 F for sample community messages and references to specific 
prevention guidelines for preparing safe water at home.
• Containers that prevent contamination o f water. For example, provide 
containers with narrow mouths so that people cannot contaminate the water by 
putting their hands into the container.
• Sites for waste disposal including faeces should at least be 30 metres or more 
away from sources o f water.
6.3.7 Ensure safe disposal of infectious waste
To make sure that human excreta are disposed safely to avoid secondary 
infections due to contact with contaminated substances:
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• Assign teams to inspect local areas for human waste disposal. Safe practices 
include disposing o f faeces in a latrine or burying them in the ground more 
than 1 0  metres from water supply.
• If unsafe practices are found, provide information to the community about 
safe disposal o f the waste. Construct latrines appropriate for local conditions 
with the cooperation of the community
• Conduct effective community education on sanitation practices.
6.3.8 Improve food handling practices
Make sure that people in the home, in restaurants, at food vending settings, and in 
factories handle food safely. Refer to the nationally established standards and 
controls for the handling and processing o f food.
To ensure food hygiene:
• Conduct community education on food hygiene practices for the general 
public and those in the food industry.
• Visit restaurants, food vendors, food packaging factories, and so on to inspect 
food-handling practices. Look for safe practices such as proper hand-washing, 
cleanliness and adherence to national standards.
• Close restaurants, vending areas or factories if  inspection results show unsafe 
food handling practices.
• Strengthen national controls as necessary.
6.3.9 Reduce exposures to infectious or environmental hazards
As indicated by the outbreak or event, take action to reduce exposure to hazards 
or factors contributing to the outbreak or event. This may involve chemical, 
physical or biological agents. Technical requirements for reducing exposure will 
be determined according to national policy and through collaboration with those 
who have experience in these areas. For example, occupational or industrial 
exposure to heavy metals (for example, lead) will require coordination with 
multiple ministries and partners. Community education and behaviour change 
interventions can be supportive in engaging the community to affect changes that 
will limit exposure to dangerous levels o f chemicals and other hazards.
For vector-borne diseases, engage the service o f experts such as an entomologist 
in designing appropriate interventions that will reduce exposure to the offending 
vectors (for example, for mosquito borne-illness) work with the malaria control 
program in your district to:
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• Implement an insecticide treated nets (ITNs) program.
• Conduct community education on the proper use o f bed nets and how to avoid 
dusk-to-dawn mosquito bites.
• Promote the use o f locally available ITNs and other insecticide treated 
materials (blankets, clothes, sheets, curtains, etc.).
Encourage prevention o f diseases carried by rodents by helping people in your 
district reduce their exposure to these animals. For example, rodents can transmit 
the virus that causes Lassa fever or they may be infested with fleas that carry 
plague. Work with the vector control officer in your district to encourage the 
community to:
• Avoid contact with the rodents, urines, droppings and other secretions
• Keep food and water in the home covered to prevent contamination by rodents
• Keep the home and cooking area clean and tidy to reduce possibilities of. 
rodents nesting in the room.
• Use chemicals (insecticides, rodenticides, larvicides etc.) and traps as 
appropriate based on environmental and entomological assessment.
6.3.10 Ensure appropriate and adequate logistics and supplies
Throughout the outbreak, monitor the effectiveness o f the logistics system and 
delivery o f essential supplies and materials. Carry out logistical planning to make 
sure transport is used in the most efficient ways. Monitor the reliability of 
communication between teams during the outbreak and if  additional equipment is 
needed (for example, additional minutes for mobile phones), take action to 
provide teams what they need to carry out the response actions.
Monitoring the implementation of the outbreak or event is key for outbreak 
control. The monitoring results will be important for including in the report of 
response to supervisory levels, to community leaders and for future advocacy.
For example, make sure there is ongoing monitoring o f :
• Disease trends in order to assess the effectiveness o f the response measures, 
the extension of the epidemic and risk factors
• Effectiveness o f the response: case fatality rate, incidence
• Implementation o f the response: program coverage, meetings o f the epidemic 
management committee etc.
• Availability and use o f adequate resources, supplies and equipment
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6.4 Provide regular situation reports on the outbreak andevents
Periodically, report on progress with the outbreak response (refer to Annex 6 G). Provide
information developed by the PHEMC to the affected communities and health facilities.
In the situation updates, provide information such as:
• Details on the response activities. Include dates, places, and individuals involved in 
each activity. Also include the “Epi” curve, spot map, table o f person analyses, and 
the line list o f cases
• Any changes that were made since the last report
• Recommended changes to improve epidemic response in the future such as a 
vaccination strategy to make the vaccination activity more effective or a transporting 
procedure for laboratory specimens to allow specimens to quickly reach the reference 
laboratory in good condition.
The situation reports will be an important reference for evaluating the response and
developing a final report. A suggested format o f the report is in Annex 7A of Section 7.
Steps for monitoring and evaluating a response are in Section 8 .
6.5 Document the response
At the end of the response, the district health management team should:
• Collect all the documents including minutes o f the meeting, activity, process, 
epidemic report, evaluation report and other relevant documents.
• Prepare a coversheet listing o f all the above documents.
This will become an essential source o f data for evaluating the response. How to monitor
and evaluate IDSR activities is described in Section 8 .
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Annexes to Section 6
ANNEX 6 A 
ANNEX 6 B 
ANNEX 6 C  
ANNEX 6 D  
ANNEX 6 E 
ANNEX 6 F
ANNEX 6 G
Treat cases during an outbreak
Preparing disinfectant solutions from ordinary household products 
Planning an emergency immunization campaign 
Estimating vaccine supplies for immunization activities 
Recommended immunization practices 
Sample messages for community education
• Hand-washing
• Safe handling o f food
• Safe disposal o f human waste
• Clean drinking water and storage
• Safe burial o f bodies
• Reducing exposure to mosquitoes
Outbreak communication
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Annex 6A Treat c a se s  during an outbreak
Use appropriate drugs and treatments for managing cases during an outbreak. Below are treatment recommendations for use in an outbreak situation for:1. Cholera2. Dysentery3. Measles4. Bacterial meningitis.
1. T r e a t  c h o l e r a  i n  a n  o u t b r e a k  s i t u a t i o n
Source: WHO guidelines for management of the patient with cholera, WHO/CDD/SER/91.15 and The New Emergency Health Kit 98, WHO/DAP/98.10
1. Assess the patient for signs o f dehydration. See assessment guide below.
2. Give fluids according to the appropriate treatment plan (see next page).
3. Collect a stool specimen from the first 5 suspected cholera patients seen.
4. Give an oral antibiotic to patients with severe dehydration.
A ssess the patient for signs of dehydration
• Look at patient's general condition: Is the patient lethargic, restless and irritable or unconscious?
• Are the patient's eyes sunken?
• Offer the patient fluid. Is the patient: not able to drink, or drinking poorly, drinking eagerly, thirsty?
• Pinch the skin of the abdomen. Does it go back very slowly (longer than 2 seconds?) or slowly?
Decide if the patient has severe, some, or no signs of dehydration, and give extra fluid according to the treatm ent plan
If two of the following signs are present:
• lethargic or unconscious
• sunken eyes
• not able to drink or drinking poorly
• skin pinch goes back very slowly
SEVERE DEHYDRATION*
Give fluid for severe dehydration 
(Plan C)
*In adults and children older than 5 years, other signs for severe dehydration are “absent radial pulse” and “low blood pressure”.
If two of the following signs are present:
• restless, irritable
• sunken eyes
• drinks eagerly, thirsty
• skin pinch goes back slowly
SOME DEHYDRATION
Give fluid according to “for some dehydration” 
(Plan B)
If there are not enough signs to classify 
as some or severe dehydration
NO DEHYDRATION
Give fluid and food to treat 
diarrhoea at home 
(Plan A)
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Give antibiotics recom mended for treatm ent of severely dehydrated cholera patients
Antibiotic Children Adults
Doxycycline
one single dose 300 mg
Tetracycline
4 times per day for 3 days 12.5 mg per kg 500 mg
Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole
(TMP-SMX) TMP 5 mg per kg TMP 160 mg
and and
2 times a day for 3 days SMX 25 mg per kg4 SMX 800 mg
Furazolidone
4 times per day for 3 days 1.25 mg per kg 100 mg5
Erythromycin
adults: 4 times per day for 3 days 
children: 3 times per day for 3 days 10 mg per kg 250 mg
• If the patient vomits while taking fluid, wait 10 minutes. Then allow the patient to resume feeding, but 
more slowly.
• Continue monitoring the patient and replacing fluid until the diarrhoea stops.
• When the patient is ready to leave the facility, counsel the patient on treating diarrhoea at home.
• Refer to IMCI guidelines for treating children under 5 years o f age and to national guidelines for further 
information on treating acute watery diarrhoea and confirmed cholera.
• Tetracycline should be avoided in children under 8  years o f age.
Plan A: Treat diarrhoea at home
If patients showed no signs o f dehydration when they were first assessed, they may be treated at home. Give a 
2-day supply o f ORS and explain how to take the ORS solution according to the following schedule: Advise the 
mother to give extra fluid; give zinc supplements and continue feeding.
AGE
Amount of solution 
after each loose stool
Provide enough ORS 
packets for preparing:
Up to 2 years 50 to 100 ml after each loose stool 500 ml per day
2 years up to 10 years 100 to 200 ml after each loose stool 1000 ml per day
10 years or more As much as the patient wants 2000 ml per day
Plan B: Treat som e dehydration with ORS
4 T M P -S M X  is  W H O ’ s a n tib io tic  o f  ch o ice  fo r  ch ild re n . T e tra c y c lin e  is  e q u a lly  e ffe c tive . H o w e v e r, in  som e cou n tries , i t  is  n o t a va ila b le  fo r  
p a e d ia tr ic  use.
5 F u ra zo lid o n e  is  W H O ’ s a n tib io tic  o f  ch o ice  fo r  p re g n a n t w om en. 162
In the clinic, give the recommended amount o f ORS over a 4-hour period. Determine the amount according to 
the patient’s weight. Use the patient’s age only when the weight is not known.
< Determine the amount of ORS to give during the first 4 hours
AGEorWEIGHT Up to 4 months
4 months up to12 months
12 months up to 2 years 2 years up to 5 years 5 years up to 14 years 15 years and more
Weight 
in kg
< 6 kg 6 - < 10 kg 10 - < 12 kg 12 - < 19 kg 19 - 30 kg 30 kg and 
more
Give this 
amount of 
ORS
200 -  400 ml 400 - 700 ml 700-900 ml 900 -400 ml 1400-2200 ml 2200-4000 ml
• If the patient wants more ORS than shown, give more.
• For infants under 6  months who are not breast-fed, also give 100-200 ml o f clean water during this
period.
• Give frequent small sips from a cup.
• If the patient vomits, wait 10 minutes. Then continue giving fluids, but more slowly.
• For infants who are breast-feeding, continue breast-feeding whenever the infant wants.
• Assess patients every 1-2 hours to make sure they are taking ORS adequately and to monitor fluid 
loss. Completely reassess the patient’s dehydration status after 4 hours, and follow the appropriate 
treatment plan for the patient’s dehydration classification.
Plan C: Treat severe dehydration quickly
1. Start intravenous fluids immediately. If the patient is a child and can drink, give ORS by mouth 
while the drip is set up. Give 100 ml per kg o f Ringer’s Lactate Solution divided as follows:
For giving IV fluids:
F irst: Then:
For adults (and patients 1 year 
and older), give 100 ml per kg IV 
within 3 hours as follows:
First, give 30 ml/kg as rapidly as 
possible within 30 minutes
Then, give 70 ml per kg during 
the next 2 % hours
For patients less than 1 year, 
give 100 ml per kg IV in 6 hours 
as follows:
First, give 30 ml per kg 
in the first hour*
Then, give 70 ml per kg in the 
next 5 hours
* R epeat once i f  radial pulse is still very w eak or no t detectable after the f ir s t  30 m l p er  kg  is given.
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2. Reassess the patient after the first 30 ml per kg, and then every 1 to 2 hours. If hydration status is 
not improving, give the IV drip more rapidly.
3. Also give ORS (about 5 ml per kg per hour) as soon as the patient can drink. This is usually after
3 to 4 hours for infants and after 1 to 2 hours for patients older than one year.
4. Reassess the patient after 6  hours (for infants) or 3 hours (for one year and older). Classify
dehydration. Then choose the appropriate plan (Plan A, Plan B, Plan C) to continue treatment.
5. Give antibiotics recommended for treatment o f severely dehydrated cholera patients. See the 
schedule on the next page.
6 . Give patients information about home care before they leave the health facility.
• If the patient vomits while taking ORS, wait 10 minutes and then continue giving fluids 
more slowly.
• Continue breast-feeding o f infants and young children.
• Return for treatment if  the patient develops any of the following:
o increased number o f watery stools
o eating or drinking poorly
o marked thirst
o repeated vomiting
o fever
o blood in the stool
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2. G iv e  a n  a p p r o p r i a t e  o r a l  a n t i b i o t i c  f o r  o u t b r e a k s  o f  b l o o d y  d i a r r h o e a  d u e  to  S h i g e l l a  
d y s e n ta r ia e  t y p e  1.
Source: WHO Guidelines fo r the control o f epidemics due to S. dysentariae type 1. WHO Geneva. 1995
NALIDIXIC ACID
OSive four times 
daily for 5 days
CIPROFLOXACIN
□Give two times 
daily for 5 days
COTRIMOXAZOLE
(trimethoprim + sulphamethoxazole)
□Give two times daily for 5 days
WEIGHT TABLET250 mg TABLET250 mg
ADULTTABLET
80 mg 
trimethoprim 
+ 400 mg 
sulphametho 
-xazole
PEDIATRICTABLET
20 mg 
trimethoprim 
+ 100 mg 
sulphametho- 
xazole
SYRUP 40 mg
trimethoprim + 
200 mg 
sulphametho­
xazole per 5 ml
C hildren’s
dose
3 - 5 kg % % 1/4 2 5.0 ml
6 - 9 kg % 1/ 2 1/2 2 5.0 ml
10 - 14 kg 1 1 1 3 7.5 ml
15 - 19 kg 1 1 1 3 7.5 ml
20-29 kg 2 2 1 6 15 ml
A d u lt dose
TABLET
250 mg
TABLET
250 mg
TABLET
160 mg TMP 
+800 mg 
SMX
4 tablets 4 tablets 2 tablets
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3 . G iv e  v i t a m i n  A  t o  c h i l d r e n  w i t h  m e a s l e s
• Give the first dose in the health facility or clinic.
• Give the mother one dose to give at home the next day.
Source: WHO guidelines for epidemic preparedness and response to measles outbreaks, WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.1
AGE
Vitamin A  Capsules
200 000 IU 100 000 IU 50 000 IU
Up to 6 months V  capsule 1 capsule
6 months up to 12 months V  capsule 1 capsule 2 capsule
12 months up to 5 years 1 capsule 2 capsules 4 capsules
4 . G iv e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a n t i b i o t i c  f o r  b a c t e r i a l  m e n i n g i t i s  c a s e s  d u r i n g  a n  o u t b r e a k
Source: Control of epidemic-prone meningococcal disease, WHO practical guidelines, 2nd edition 1998,WHO/EMC/BAC/98.3
1. Admit patient to a health facility for diagnosis and treatment.
2. Start an antibiotic immediately. Intra-muscular injectable oily chloramphenicol is best choice during an 
epidemic. It is very effective and a single dose is usually effective. If injectable treatment is not possible, 
give oral amoxicillin or cotrimoxazole or treat with an antimicrobial recommended by national treatment 
guidelines for meningitis.
3. Patient isolation is not necessary. Provide good supportive care and simplify case management.
Give a single dose of oily chloramphenicol
AGE
INTRAMUSCULAR OILY CHLORAMPHENICOL 
100 mg per kg in a single dose, If the patient has not improved, give 
a second dose 24 to  48 hours later.
Dose in grams Dose in m illilitres
Adult:
Age 15 years and older
3.0 g 12 ml
Child:10 to 14 years 2.5 g 10 ml
6 to 9 years 2.0 g 8 ml
3 to 5 years 1.5 g 6 ml
1 to 2 years 1.0 g 4 ml
2 to 11 months 0.5 g 2 ml
1 to 8 weeks 0.25 g 1 ml
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Other recommended antibiotics to treat meningitis
Agent Route Dose for adults Dose for children Duration of treatment
Penicillin G IV 3-4 MU daily, every 4-6 hours 400 000 Units/ kg 4 days
Ampicillin or Amoxicillin IV 2-3 g daily every 6 hours 250 mg per kg 4 days
Amoxicillin Oral 2-3 g every 6 hours 250 mg per kg 4 days
Chloramphenicol IV 1 g every 8-12 hours 100 mg per kg 4 days
Cefotaxime IV 2 g every 6 hours 250 mg per kg 4 days
Ceftriaxone IV 1-2 g over 12-24 hours 50-80 mg per kg 4 days
Ceftriaxone IM 1-2 g single dose 50-80 mg per kg 1-2 days
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ANNEX 6B Preparing disinfectant so lutions from ordinary household products
During a response to an outbreak of any disease transmitted through direct contact with infectious body fluids 
(blood, urine, stool, semen, and sputum for example), an inexpensive system can be set up using ordinary 
household bleach.
The following table describes how to make 1:10 and 1:100 chlorine solutions from household bleach and other 
chlorine products.
Use this chlorine product To make a 1:10 solution for disinfecting:
-- Excreta 
-- Cadavers 
-- Spills o f infectious body 
fluids
To make a 1:100 solution for disinfecting:
-- Gloved hands 
-- Bare hands and skin 
-- Floors 
-- Clothing 
-- Equipment 
-- Bedding
Household bleach 
5% active chlorine
1 litre bleach per 10 litres of 
water
100 ml per 10 litres of water, or
1 litre of 1:10 bleach solution per 
9 litres of water
Calcium hypochlorite powder or 
granules 70% (HTH)
7 grams or % tablespoon per 1 
litre of water
7 grams or % tablespoon per10 
litres of water
Household bleach 
30% active chlorine
16 grams or 1 tablespoon per 1 
litre of water
16 grams or 1 tablespoon per10 
litres of water
To disinfect clothing:
• Promptly and thoroughly disinfect patient’s personal articles and immediate environment using one of the 
following disinfectants:
o Chlorinated lime powder 
o 1% chlorine solution 
o 1% to 2 % phenol solution
• Promptly and thoroughly disinfect patient’s clothing:
o Wash clothes with soap and water 
o Boil or soak in disinfectant solution 
o Sun dry
o Wash utensils with boiling water or disinfectant solution
o Do not wash contaminated articles in rivers or ponds that might be sources o f drinking water, or 
near wells.
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ANNEX 6C Planning an emergency immunization activity
1. Specify the target population for the immunization activity.
2. Estimate the necessary amounts of vaccine, diluent, and immunization supplies such as sterile syringes
and sterile needles, cold boxes and safety boxes.
3. Choose the immunization sites and inform the community.
a. Coordinate with the EPI or disease control program in your district to identify sites for conducting the immunization activity.
b. Identify the facilities that can participate in the activity.
c. Identify a mobile immunization team, if needed.
d. Determine if there are any hard-to-reach areas, e.g. a transient workers’ camp. Identify a mobile immunization team to reach these areas.
e. Contact the facilities and schedule the immunization sites.
f. Contact the national level to request vaccine. If a national reserve stock is not available, the 
national EPI program manager will request an emergency supply from WHO.
g. Make sure there is enough capacity to store extra amounts of the vaccine during storage andtransportation to the immunization site.
4. Select immunization teams. For every 100 to 150 people expected at the immunization site, the followed
staff is required:
a. One to two vaccinators to give immunizations
b. One recorder to record on immunization cards
c. Volunteers to verify age and immunization status
5. Work with your EPI team to conduct refresher training for vaccinators on recommended immunization
practices.
6 . Mobilize the community. Inform the public about the emergency immunization activity.
7. Arrange staff transportation to the immunization site.
a. Plan their transportation to and from the site.
b. Schedule vehicles and plan for fuel and other costs.
c. Estimate per diem costs and make necessary arrangements for lodging if the site is away from the 
health worker’s usual station.
8 . Monitor the number o f doses o f vaccine given.
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ANNEX 6D Estimating vaccine supplies for immunization activities
Outbreak: Date confirmed.
Target population .  children age 0 up to 5 years
 children age 9 months up to 14 years
 children and adults age 0 up to 30 years
 women of childbearing age - 15 years up to 45 years
 all adults and children in the general population
1. Calculate the size of the target population. If the activity only targets a proportion of the general population, 
estimate the size of the target population. Multiply the general population times the percentage of children or 
adults in the target population. If you do not know the exact age distribution rates in your area, use recommended 
estimates such as the following:
• children age 0 up to 5 years 20%
• children age 9 months up to 14 years 45%
• children and adults age 1 up to 30 years 70%
• women of childbearing age 15-45 years 20%
2. Find out how many doses each person should receive. Record the number below as “number of doses 
recommended.”
3. Allow for wastage. Use a wastage factor of 20%. Multiply the size of the target population (see step 1) times the 
number of doses times 1 .2 0 .
x x
Size o f  target population Number o f  
recommended doses
1 . 2 0  =
wastage Number o f  doses 
to order including wastage
Allow for a reserve stock. Use a reserve factor of 25%. Multiply the estimated number of doses including wastage 
times 1.25 to obtain the total estimated number of doses._____________________ x 1.25 = __________________
Reserve factorNumber o f  doses 
including wastage
Total number o f  estimated doses
5. To obtain the total number of vials of vaccine to order, divide the total number of estimated doses by the number 
of doses that are contained in the vial. (This is usually printed on the label and may be one dose, two doses, five 
doses, ten doses or twenty doses).
Total number o f  Doses per vial Total number o f  vials
estimated doses required
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6 . If the vaccine requires a diluent, multiply the number of millilitres of diluent per vial times the total number of 
vials required.
__________  x   = ________
Diluent required Total number o f  vial Total diluent to order
p er  vial
7. Estimate the number of sterile needles and syringes that will be needed to carry out the activity. If single-use 
needle and syringes are used, order the same amount as for the estimated number of doses in Step 4.
8 . In addition, estimate the number of dilution syringes necessary for preparing the vaccine.
Source: F ield  Guide fo r  Supplementary Activities A im ed  A t  Achieving Polio Eradication , World Health Organization, Geneva 1997
D istrict guidelines fo r  yellow  fe v e r  surveillance, Division of Emerging and other communicable disease surveillance and control, World Health Organization, Geneva 1998.
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ANNEX 6E Recomm ended immunization practices
Work with your EPI team to give refresher training to the vaccinator teams that will conduct the emergency immunization activity. As a minimum, make sure vaccinator teams know how to:
1. Reconstitute the vaccine correctly:
•  Determ ine the appropriate quantity  o f  d iluen t to  reconstitute the freeze-dried vaccine.
•  Use a sterile syringe and sterile needle fo r  each dose.
•  U sing the d ilu tio n  syringe, draw  up and expel the d iluen t several tim es in  the v ia l that contain the 
vaccine so as to  m ix  the reconstituted vaccine w e ll.
2. W rap  the v ia l in  s ilver fo i l  o r cover i t  w ith  a dark cloth. This w i l l  protect the v ia l from  sunlight.
3. In  a fie ld  situation, protect the vaccine and d iluen t from  contam ination. Cover the open top o f  the v ia l w ith  fo il  to  
keep out d ir t and flies.
4. Place reconstituted vaccine via ls  and opened liq u id  vaccine via ls im m edia te ly  in to  a cup o f  ice, or stand thm  on an 
ice pack. Keep the ice and vaccines in  the shade.
5. F o llo w  national p o licy  fo r  reusing opened liq u id  vaccine v ia ls such as DTP.
6 . Record the dose on an im m unization  card fo r  each person im m unized, i f  i t  is national p o licy  to  require im m unized 
persons to  have a card.
7. C o llect data fo r  m on ito ring  the activ ity . For example, record the num ber o f  doses g iven on a ta lly  sheet so that 
coverage from  the campaign can be calculated.
8 . Rem ind health workers about the risk  o f  getting blood-borne diseases from  an accidental needle stick. Review  
safe practices fo r  handling and disposing o f  sharp instruments and needles using a sharps box.
9. A rrange fo r  safe disposal o f  used in jection  m aterials at the end o f  the activ ity . They can be burned or buried in  a 
p it.
10. G ive instructions fo r  use o f  safe in jection  techniques. R eview  w ith  health workers the need to  p lan vaccination 
campaigns.
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ANNEX 6F Sample m essag es  for community education
IMPROVE HAND-WASHING
Hand-washing with soap may be the most effective way to prevent transmission of some organisms causing infectious diseases. For that reason, promote hand-washing in every family. Hand-washing is particularly important after defecation, after cleaning a child who has defecated, after disposing o f a child’s stool, before preparing or handling food and before eating.
Hand-washing is practiced more frequently where water is plentiful and within easy reach. If possible, water for washing should be stored separately from drinking-water. During an epidemic, soap should be provided to those without it. If soap is not available, ash or earth can be used to scrub the hands. Do not dry washed hands with dirty cloths. Air-dry wet hands.
Message:
A R E  Y O U  P R O T E C T E D  F R O M  D Y S E N T E R Y  (b lo o d y  d ia rrh e a )?
Washing your hands protects yourself and others from disease.
A lw a y s  wash:
• after defecation
• after cleaning a child who has defecated
• after disposing of a child’s stool
• before and after eating
• before preparing or handling food
Message:
A R E  Y O U  R E A D Y  F O R  H A N D -W A S H IN G ?Do you have:
•  Clean water and soap (or if you do not have soap, use ash or earth to scrub your hands)
•  Clean cloth for drying
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SAFE HANDLING OF FOOD
Encourage the following food safety practices:
• Wash hands with soap before preparing food
• Thoroughly wash the fruit and green vegetables before consuming using clean water
• Cook food until it is hot throughout
• Eat food while it is still hot, or reheat it thoroughly before eating
• Wash all cooking and serving utensils after use
• Keep cooked food and clean utensils separate from uncooked foods and potentially contaminated utensils
• Cover your food appropriately
Message:
D O  Y O U  P R E P A R E  F O O D  S A F E L Y ?
C o o k in g  k ills  g e r m s
• Thoroughly cook all meats, fish and vegetables
• Eat cooked meats, fish and vegetables while they are hot
W a sh in g  p r o te c t s  from  d is e a s e
• Wash your hands before preparing or serving food
• Wash your dishes and utensils with soap and water
• Wash your cutting board especially well with soap
P e e lin g  p r o te c t s  from  d is e a s e
• Only eat fruits that have been freshly peeled (such as bananas and oranges)
K E E P  IT  C L E A N :  C O O K  IT, P E E L  IT, O R  L E A V E  IT.
Five Keys to Safer Food
• Keep clean• Separate raw and cooked• Cook thoroughly• Keep food at safe temperature• Use safe water and raw materials
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SAFE DISPOSAL OF HUMAN W ASTE
High priority should be given to ensuring the safe disposal o f human waste at all time, and especially during epidemics o f diarrhoea. Sanitary systems appropriate for local conditions should be constructed with the cooperation of the community.
Community messages should emphasize:
• Everyone should use latrines properly, including children• Transfer children’s excreta with a scoop or shovel to the latrine or bury in a hole.• Avoid defecating on the ground, or in or near the water supply
When large groups o f people congregate— as for fairs, funerals, or religious festivals— , ensure the safe disposal o f human waste. If there is no latrine, designate areas for defecation and provide a shovel to bury the excreta.
Message:
A R E  Y O U  P R O T E C T E D  F R O M  D Y S E N T E R Y  (b lo o d y  d ia rrh o e a )?
D O  Y O U  U S E  A  T O IL E T  O R  L A T R IN E ?
G erm s that c a u se  dysentery  live in feces. Even a  person  who is healthy might have dysentery  
germ s.
• A lw ays u se  a  toilet or latrine. It you don’t have one  -  build one!• Keep the toilet or latrine clean• W ash yo u r h a n d s  with so ap  (or ash) and  clean  w ater after using th e  toilet or latrine
K E E P  IT  C L E A N : U S E  A  T O IL E T  O R  L A T R IN E
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CLEAN DRINKING WATER AND STORAGE
• Community drinking water supply and storage
1. Piped water. To maintain safety, properly chlorinate piped water. To prevent entry of 
contaminated groundwater into pipes, repair leaking joints and maintain constant pressure 
in the system.
2. Closed wells. Equip with a well-head drainage apron, and with a pulley, windlass, or 
pump.
3. Trucked in. If locally available water is likely to be contaminated, drinking water should 
be supplied by tankers or transported in drums, if it is adequately chlorinated and a 
regular supply can be ensured. The trucking of water, however, is expensive and difficult 
to sustain; it is usually considered a short-term measure until a local supply can be 
established.
• Home drinking water storage and treatment
When the safety o f the drinking water is uncertain, it should be chlorinated in the home or boiled.
To prevent contamination o f drinking water, families should store drinking water using one o f the following types o f containers:
1. Covered containers that are cleaned daily and kept away from children and animals. 
Water should be removed from the containers using a long-handled dipper, kept 
especially for this purpose.
2. Narrow-mouthed containers with an opening too small to allow the insertion of a hand. 
Water should be removed by pouring from the opening or spout.
Water used for bathing, washing and other purposes other than drinking need not be treated and should be stored separately from drinking water.
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SAFE DISPOSAL OF BODIES
The body fluids o f persons who die due to diarrhoea or a viral hemorrhagic fever are still 
infectious. Use extreme caution when preparing the bodies o f suspected cholera or viral 
hemorrhagic fever patients. Encourage safe funeral and burial practices
REDUCING EXPOSURE TO MOSQUITOES
Mosquito control is the main intervention for reducing malaria transmission. It can reduce 
malaria transmission from very high levels to close to zero. In high transmission areas, mosquito 
control can significantly reduce child and maternal deaths. Personal protection against mosquito 
bites represents the first line o f defense for malaria prevention.
Message:
ARE YOU PROTECTED FROM MOSQUITO BITES?
Whenever possible,
• Avoid going out between dusk and dawn when mosquitoes commonly bite
• Wear long-sleeved clothing and long trousers when going out at night, and avoid dark 
colours, which attract mosquitoes
• Apply insect repellent to exposed skin ( if the repellent is available)
• Use screens over doors and windows
• Use a insecticide treated mosquito net over the bed
• Use anti-mosquito sprays or insecticide dispenser (if available)
Malaria transmission can rapidly be reduced by indoor residual spraying (IRS) with insecticides. 
IRS works for between 3 to12 months, depending on the insecticide used and the type of surface 
on which it is sprayed.
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ANNEX 6G Outbreak communication
Introduction
Following confirmation and verification of the event, the primary health and the district level 
authorities should liaise with the national level authorities to communicate and receive 
guidance on common positions to be delivered to the media.
From first announcement throughout the outbreak, communication from the district level 
should follow the directions and the key messages developed at national level in consultation 
with the field team, in order to ensure consistency and speaking with one voice.
Even though communication should be centrally coordinated by the national level, media 
would approach local and district public health response level to obtain first hand information 
from direct sources.
In addition, the director of the district level hospital should support the communication and 
provide scientific expertise as evidence for intervention.
Actions at the district level
• Identify spokesperson(s) at district level (political and technical)
• Liaise regularly with national authorities to provide them with first hand information 
(received at the community local level, the media, local stakeholders)
• Be in contact regularly with national authorities to receive common messages including 
guide and answers for frequently asked questions to feed the local media
• Be available for interviews by local media upon request to provide accurate, transparent 
and updated information following directions from national level in simple clear key 
messages
• Organize press briefings to provide regular information to local media, following 
directions from national level
• Develop good relationships with local media to partnership for delivery of accurate, 
transparent, timely messages to the population
• Use information materials developed at the national level with clear consistent messages 
to provide guidance to the population
• Identify local powerful channels for the delivery of information to the population
• Meet regularly with local stakeholders to disseminate correct message of prevention and 
surveillance to the population
• Organize preventive door-to-door campaigns to reach the remote rural areas and promote 
prevention and surveillance, following directions from national level
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Section 7 
Communicate information
This section describes how to:
• Prepare an outbreak or event response report
• Inform stakeholders and the population
o Develop fact sheets
o Communicate with community leaders and stakeholders
o Develop and distribute public health bulletins
• Provide feedback to health staff
o Develop information summary sheets 
o Develop district newsletters
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7.0 Communicate information
Effective communication is an essential function o f surveillance. For example, providing 
decision makers with summary information about an outbreak response allows them to 
review how resources were applied to contain the event. Effective communication during 
an outbreak or a public health event also demonstrates transparency in the management 
of the event. Ensuring reliable participation o f the population in responding to a disease 
or other public health event relies on provision o f information and addressing community 
concerns.
Feedback consists o f communicating with health staff from other levels about the data, 
results o f the analysis o f these data and measures that were taken to respond to the 
potential public health event reported. Feedback aims at reinforcing health workers 
efforts to participate in the surveillance system.
7.1 Prepare an outbreak or event resp onse  report
After an outbreak or event response has taken place, district staff who led the 
investigation should prepare a report. The purpose o f the report is to document 
how the problem was identified, investigated, responded to, what the outcome 
was, decision taken and recommendations made. Make sure that the health unit 
that reported the initial cases receives a copy of the report.
See Annex 7A at the end o f this section for an example o f a recommended format.
7.2 Inform stakeholders and the population
7.2.1 Develop fact sheets
Fact sheets are brief summaries o f 1 to 2 pages. They are usually prepared by 
health staff for consumption by the general public and deal with a single topic or 
message. For example, a fact sheet on a Shigella outbreak in a district may 
contain the following information for the community; the cause o f Shigella, how 
it is transmitted, steps for: prevention and updates on the number o f cases and 
deaths. The fact sheets could be posted on a bulletin board or distributed to 
community groups that are planning health education campaigns.
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7.2.2 Communicate with the affected community and stakeholders
Partner coordination is essential during outbreak and event response. Thus 
establishing routine communication structures and processes between the health 
and community partners helps to ensure that this vital link is available and 
functional during an emergency. Options for communicating between the various 
partners can range from SMS, telephone, hand-carried message, fax, email 
updates and exchanges o f communication materials to more formal decision­
making committees. Regardless o f the mechanism, ensure that the focus is on 
transparent and trustworthy communication that takes community experiences 
into account.
7.2.3 Develop and distribute public health bulletins
In many countries, the national level or region publishes a national public health 
bulletin on a regular basis. These bulletins have a wider audience than just the 
health staff in a particular district or health facility. The bulletins are usually brief 
(2 to 8  pages). They are seen by policy makers, legislators and other decision­
makers. The bulletins are valuable channels for reaching technical and donor 
partners.
The bulletins contain at least:
• A summary table showing the number o f reported cases and deaths to date for 
each priority disease
• A commentary or message on a given disease or topic
If a national public health bulletin is sent to the district office, display it where 
everyone can see it. Make copies to distribute to health facility staff. Take a copy 
of the bulletin with you on your next supervisory visit to show health workers 
how data they report contributes to public health.
A sample template for preparing a bulletin is in Annex 7B.
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7.3 Provide feedback
In most cases, health facilities and districts reliably report surveillance data to the 
next level as required. But if  the facility does not receive information from the 
next level about how the data were used or what the data meant, health staff may 
think that their reporting is not important. As a result, future reporting may not be 
as reliable because health staff will not know if  the information they sent to other 
levels was important or necessary. They will have a good understanding of the 
health situation at their own level, but they will not have the information they 
need for characterizing the situation at a district or national level.
When the district or national managers receive data, they should respond to the 
health facilities that reported it. The purpose o f the feedback is to reinforce health 
workers efforts to participate in the surveillance system. Another purpose is to 
raise awareness about certain diseases and any achievements o f disease control 
and prevention projects in the area.
Feedback may be written, such as a monthly newsletter, or it may be given orally 
through a telephone call or periodic meetings. This section focuses on district 
level feedback. But the information can also be applied in health facility and 
national levels.
7.3.1 Develop information summary sheets
An information summary sheet is a report that presents data and its interpretation 
in a table or other graphic format. For example:
• At a staff meeting, or during a supervisory visit, give a verbal report or 
comment about the data that were reported by the health facility during a 
given period of time. Display the data in a simple table. Sit with the health 
staff and show them the data. Talk together about the likely conclusions 
that can be drawn. Consider conclusions not only for the health facility, 
but for the district as a whole.
• Prepare a single sheet with a simple table that shows how the data reported 
for this period are different from the data reported for some other period or 
target population. For example, show the number o f cases o f diarrhoea 
with dehydration in children less than 5 years o f age from the same period 
last year. Compare them with a corresponding period this year, after a safe 
water project was implemented in a high-risk area, for example.
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Use the summary sheets to support requests made to higher levels for 
additional funds, supplies and resources.
7.3.2 Develop district newsletters
The purpose o f a district newsletter is to provide shorter updates than those 
provided in a more detailed feedback bulletin. The district newsletter is useful 
for informing and motivating health staff.
The target audience for a newsletter could be health staff in the district. The 
newsletter can be 2 to 4 pages long and produced simply with a computer-entered 
or typewritten text.
Examples o f articles that could be carried in a newsletter are:
• Summary o f national or district data for a given priority disease
• Report o f progress towards a specific public health target
• Report o f a specific achievement towards public health by an individual 
health worker or a group of health workers
• Description o f special events or activities (for example, a change in market 
day)
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Annexes to Section 7
ANNEX 7A Sample district outbreak report 
ANNEX 7B Sample public health bulletin
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ANNEX 7A Sample district outbreak report
Title/Description (include disease/condition investigated)
Period Place (Villages, Neighborhoods, District, Province)
Executive summary:
I. Introduction:
• Background
• Reasons for investigation (public health significance, threshold met, etc.)
• Investigation and outbreak preparedness
II. Methods:
• Dates of investigation
• Site(s) of investigation (health care facilities, villages, other)
• Case finding (indicate what was done regarding case finding, e.g., register review, 
contact investigation, alerting other health facilities, other)
• Lab specimens collection
• Description of response and intervention (include dates)
• Data management
III. Results:
• Date and location of first known (index) case
• Date and health facility where first case was seen by the health care system
• Results of additional case finding
• Lab analysis and results
• With text, describe key features of results of time, place, and person analysis
• For detailed results by time (epi curve), place (map), and person characteristics (tables) 
and line lists
• Results of response and evidence of impact
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IV. Self-evaluation of the timeliness and quality of preparedness, outbreak detection, investigation, 
and response
Epidemic Preparedness
In d ica to r Yes NoWere adequate drugs and medical supplies available at the onset of the outbreakWere treatment protocols available to health workers?Does the district epidemic management committee regularly meet as part of epidemic preparedness?
Outbreak Detection
In d ica to r Date 1 Date 2 In te rva lInterval between onset of index case (or occurrence of an unusual cluster at the community level) [date 1] to arrival of first outbreak case at the health facility [date 2](Target: <3 days)Interval between initial outbreak case seen at the health facility (or date of outbreak threshold crossing at the health facility) [date 1] and reporting to the district health team [date 2](Target: within 24 hours)Cumulative interval between onset of index case (or occurrence of an unusual cluster at the community or health facility) [date 1] to notification to the district [date 2](Target: <7 days)
Outbreak investigation
In d ica to r Yes No
Were case forms and line lists completed?
Were laboratory specimens taken (if required)?
In d ica to r Date 1 Date 2 In te rva l
Interval between notification of district [date 1] and district field investigation conducted [date 2]
(Target: within 48 hours)
Interval between sending specimens to the lab [date 1] and receipt of results 
by the district [date 2](Target: 3-7 days, depending on type of test)
Outbreak response:
In d ica to r Date 1 Date 2 In te rva l
Interval between notification of outbreak to district [date 1] and concrete
response by the district [date 2](Target: within 48 hours of notification)
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Evaluation and Feedback:
In d ica to r Date 1 Date 2 In te rva l
Interval between end of the outbreak [date 1] and finalization of outbreak 
report with case forms/line list sent to national level [date 2]
(Target: 2 weeks)
In d ica to r Yes No
Did the outbreak management committee meet to review investigation results?
Was feedback given to health facilities and community?
V. Evaluation of other aspects of the response:
VI. Interpretations, discussion, and conclusions:
V II. Recommended public health actions:
Comment on following levels: community, health facility, district, partners, provincial, and national
District Epidemic Committee Chairperson:
Name Signature
District Medical Officer:
Name Signature
Date reported completed:
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ANNEX 7B Sample public health bulletin
M INISTRY OF H EALTH  
W EEKLY EPIDEM IO LO G ICAL BU LLETIN
District________________  Epidemiological Week______  Week ending (date)
I. Epidemiological Situation: Week (insert week number and date here)
Table 1: Epidem iological S ituation: W eek
Disease Cases Deaths Fatality
(%>)
Districts in 
Alert
Districts in 
Epidemic
Reported
week
Timeliness
(%)
Completeness
(%)D1
D2
Dn...
Total
Comments:
Contact us:
II. Synthesis of the Epidemiological Situation (insert the weeks being reported on here)
Table 2: Epidem iological S ituation: Weeks
Districts Cases Deaths Fatality
(%>)
Districts in 
Alert
Districts in 
Epidemic
Reported
week
Timeliness
(%)
Completeness
(%)D1
D2
Dn
Total
Comments:
III. Graphs (This section provides a graphical representation of data)
IV. Epidemic Trends
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Section 8
Monitor, evaluate, and improve 
surveillance and response
This section describes how to:
• Identify targets and indicators
• Monitor the quality o f surveillance activities at the 
district level
• Supervise surveillance and response activities
• Evaluate the surveillance and response system
• Take action to improve surveillance and response 
system
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8.0 Monitor, evaluate, and improve surveillance and 
response
Monitoring o f surveillance and response systems refers to the routine and continuous 
tracking o f planned surveillance activities (for example, reports are received on time). 
Evaluation periodically (for example annually) assesses whether surveillance and 
response objectives have been achieved. Both monitoring and evaluation are used to 
improve surveillance and response.
Section 3 o f these guidelines describes how each month, the health staff responsible for 
surveillance at the health facility and at the district level review and analyze the data 
reported during the month. Each month they make conclusions about:
• The timeliness and completeness o f reporting from each level, and
• The quality o f routine prevention and control activities are taking place so that when
problems are detected, districts respond with appropriate action.
The same information can also be used to routinely monitor and annually evaluate:
• The timeliness in reporting immediately-notifiable diseases, conditions or events
• Outbreak investigations and responses and
• Reporting o f summary data on a routine basis
When problems are detected in the surveillance and response system, action can be taken 
to strengthen the system. By making corrections as they are identified, it is more likely 
that the end o f the year results w ill show the desired outcomes. For example, use the 
monthly monitoring data to do an evaluation at the end o f the year. Questions to help 
evaluate include:
• Are surveillance objectives for existing activities being met?
• Was surveillance data used for taking public health action?
• Did surveillance, laboratory and response activities have an impact on the outcome of
health events in the district?
The information in this section w ill describe how to routinely monitor and annually 
evaluate the performance o f the surveillance system and specific disease or public health 
events control and prevention programs.
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8.1 Identify targets  and indicators
Using indicators is a method for measuring the extent o f achievement for a 
particular program or activity. The achievement is compared to overall 
recommended standard quality practices. It can also measure progress towards 
implementing an overall program target. For example, a district may have as its 
goal the achievement o f 100% completeness o f reporting by a certain period. An 
indicator can be developed to measure the proportion or percentage o f facilities 
that are reporting. This proportion is then compared with the desired goal or 
target, and can be used to evaluate progress and, therefore, the quality o f the 
service or activity.
Use indicators in accordance with national goals and to specific plans for 
improving integrated surveillance and response activities in a district. Select the 
indicators that are most relevant to the district’ s plan for improving surveillance 
this year and that w ill provide information that the district can use.
Selected indicators are likely to be the following:
• Indicators for measuring quality o f surveillance in general. For example, to 
evaluate timeliness and completeness o f reporting, select as an indicator the 
percentage o f health facilities that reported routine information on time.
• Indicators for measuring quality o f surveillance for specific diseases or public 
health events (for example, to monitor response to surveillance data about 
meningitis, select as an indicator the percentage o f health facilities where 
meningitis outbreaks were detected -- that is, the rate was more than 15 
suspected cases per 100 000 population -- and which were laboratory 
confirmed)
• Additional indicators may be necessary to measure the impact o f public health 
interventions.
Suggested indicators and a chart for monitoring core indicators at the health 
facility are in Annexes 8A and 8B. Core indicators for the district level are in 
Annex 8C and 8D, for the province in Annex 8E and for the national level in 8F.
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Indicators fo r  m onitoring perform ance o f core functions  o f 
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response
1. Proportion of health facilities submitting weekly (or monthly) surveillance reports on time to the district
2. Proportion of districts submitting weekly (or monthly) surveillance reports on time to the next higher level
3.
Proportion of cases of diseases targeted for elimination, eradication and any other 
diseases selected for case-based surveillance that were reported to the district using 
case-based or line-listing forms
4. Proportion of suspected outbreaks of epidemic-prone diseases notified to the next higher level within 2 days of surpassing the epidemic threshold
5. Proportion of districts in which a current trend analysis (line graph or histogram) is available for selected priority diseases
6. Proportion of reports of investigated outbreaks that include analyzed case-based data
7. Proportion of investigated outbreaks with laboratory results
8. Proportion of confirmed outbreaks with a nationally recommended public health response
9. Case fatality rate for each epidemic prone disease reported
10. Attack rate for each outbreak of a priority disease
11. The number of epidemic detected at the national level that were missed by the district level during the last year
12. Proportion of districts that report laboratory data for diseases under surveillance
13. Proportion of district laboratories that received at least one supervisory visit that included written feedback from the provincial or national level during the last year
14. Proportion of provinces reporting monthly analyzed laboratory data to the national reference laboratory
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Indicators fo r  m onitoring perform ance o f core functions  
fo r  IHR (2005) im plem entation
1. Proportion of Hospitals with Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) requirements established
2. Proportion of districts with Public health risks and resources mapped
3. Proportion of districts reporting information using event-based surveillance
4. Proportion of districts provided by national authorities with laws or instruments sufficient for implementation of obligations under IHR
5. Proportion of districts with mechanism for the coordination of relevant sectors in the implementation of IHR established
8.1.1 Select data for measuring the indicators
After you have selected relevant indicators, specify the numerator and the 
denominator. For example, a district objective is for all health facilities to keep 
trend lines for selected priority diseases. The numerator and denominator are 
defined as follows:
Indicator: The proportion of health facilities in the district that keep trend
lines for priority diseases.
Numerator: The number of health facilities that keep trend lines for priority
diseases.
Denominator: The number o f health facilities in the district.
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Each level should make sure that the level it supervises has the following sources 
o f data available.
8.1.2 Ensure sources of data are available
Form Health Facility District Provincial National
Monitoring chart for tracking indicators X X X X
(S a m p le  ch a rt s  a re  in A n n e x  8A.)
Outpatient register X
Inpatient register X
Health facility reporting forms X
Case-based and/or line listing reporting forms X X X X
Outbreak investigation report X X X X
Log of suspected outbreaks and rumours X X X X
Supervisory reports from district and/or province X X X X
Laboratory reports received X X X X
8.2 Monitor the quality of the  surveillance activities at district level
An important indicator o f a quality reporting system is the timeliness and 
completeness at each level. When reports are sent and received on time, the 
possibility o f detecting a problem and conducting a prompt and effective response 
is greater. Completeness o f reporting describes whether all the reporting units 
have reported as expected. I f  reports are late, or are not submitted, the aggregated 
information for the district (or other administrative area) w ill not be accurate. 
Outbreaks can go undetected, and other opportunities to respond to public health 
problems w ill be missed.
8.2.1 Monitor detection and notification of immediately reportable 
diseases or events
Monitor how well the system is able to detect immediately notifiable diseases or 
events. Monitor the interval between the onset o f the first known case and when 
first case was seen in the health facility. I f  this interval is too long, it w ill
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seriously affect the outcome o f individual patients and w ill alter the spread o f the 
outbreak.
Other intervals to monitor for detection o f immediately reportable diseases 
include monitoring reporting from the community to the health facility (within 48 
hours o f onset o f illness), from the health facility to the district (within 24 hours) 
and from the time the threshold is reached to a concrete response (within 48 
hours).
8.2.2 Monitor the timeliness and completeness of monthly reporting
Routinely monitor the receipt o f reports to evaluate the timeliness o f reporting and 
the completeness o f the information. Use a monitoring tool such as a record of 
reports received to monitor timeliness and completeness o f reporting in your 
district. A  sample form for recording timeliness o f reporting is in Annex 8G at the 
end o f this section.
I f  you routinely record and review the dates on which reports are received, the 
effectiveness o f the system can be assessed easily each month during the analysis 
o f routine and case-based data. For example, use the record o f reports received to:
• Measure how many reporting units submitted reports for a given month
• Identify which reporting units have reported
• Measure how many reports were timely, i.e., submitted before the last day of 
the following month (for example, March data received by the next level by 
30 April)
8.2.3 Identify problems and take action
I f  the monitoring information shows that a health facility or other reporting unit 
has not provided a report, or i f  the report is not on time, contact the surveillance 
focal point at the facility. Work with the designated staff to identify what has 
caused the problem and develop solutions together (for example, find out i f  a 
reliable supply o f forms or other reporting method such as text messaging or 
radiophone is available). Additionally, ask i f  a new staff person has started at the 
facility and has yet to receive orientation on the procedure for reporting. Or, find 
out i f  health staff receives feedback about reports they have made and have 
resources to take action as a result o f the information.
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Make plans with the reporting unit to find solutions for improving the situation. 
Explain that when information is complete, the district can assist health staff more 
efficiently with planning responses and carrying them out. For example, i f  lack of 
supplies is a problem, the district can use the reporting information to advocate 
with higher levels in the system.
8.2.4 Report timeliness and completeness to other levels
When routine reports o f the number o f cases are sent to the provincial, regional or 
national level, also send the necessary data for timeliness and completeness. This 
w ill help the other levels understand the situation more clearly and evaluate the 
quality o f the data that is being sent. For example, i f  the report to the central level 
states that two cases o f measles were detected during the month, it should also 
include information about the number o f health facilities that reported. It w ill 
make a difference to the other levels when they evaluate the information i f  the 2 
cases occurred with only 20% rather than 100% of the units reporting.
8.3 Supervise surveillance and resp onse  activities
Supervision is a process o f helping to improve work performance. Supervision is 
not an inspection. Rather, good supervision aims to sustain good quality services 
rather than finding things that are wrong.
In a good system, supervisors and health professional work together to review 
progress, identify problems, decide what has caused the problem and develop 
feasible solutions.
8.3.1 Prepare job descriptions for surveillance staff
Job descriptions are the basis for conducting supervision and assessing 
performance. Review the job descriptions o f health staff who have a role in the 
surveillance and response system. Make sure that the job description states:
• The surveillance tasks to perform
• To whom the staff person reports
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8.3.2 Prepare a supervision plan
Include surveillance and response targets in the overall plan for supervision in 
your district. For example:
• Decide how often to monitor health staff performance. For example, a district 
may decide to conduct a supervisory visit at least 2 times a year for each 
health facility. In some countries, depending on resources, supervisory visits 
take place more often (monthly, for example).
• Ask health facility supervisors to make a schedule o f the supervision they w ill 
conduct over the next year in their own facilities and to any community sites 
that report to the facility.
• Make sure that transport is available for supervision and for surveillance 
activities that require transportation. For example, coordinate travel or 
logistics for surveillance supervisory visits with visits made by other programs 
or activities.
• Include other reporting sites in supervision o f district surveillance activities 
such as clinics, medical centres and community reporting sites in the overall 
plan. Include private health centers, i f  feasible.
8.3.3 Use a supervisory checklist
Each health facility has unique problems and priorities that require specific 
problem solving and corrections. To maintain the positive motivation o f the health 
facility staff for making the improvements, consider developing a graduated 
checklist to guide the supervisory visit. The items listed in a graduated checklist 
(such as the one in Annex 8H) are selected based on what has been achieved so 
far at the health facility. For example, when the facility has achieved one 
objective (using standard case definitions consistently, for example), work with 
health facility staff to include the next indicator or item for monitoring 
performance (using thresholds for action, for example). Revise the supervisory 
checklist accordingly. Use it during future visits to help health staff monitor their 
activities and progress towards an improved system.
During the visit, use a checklist to monitor how well health staff are carrying out 
the recommended surveillance functions. For example, a district surveillance 
officer visiting a health facility for a supervisory visit should verify the following:
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Identify and 
register cases
Check in the clinic register to see i f  the
diagnoses correspond to the recommended case definition.
Confirm cases
Reporting
Review and 
analyse data
Preparedness
Check the register to see if  all the columns in the registry are 
filled out correctly.
Compare the laboratory records for priority diseases with the 
number of cases seen in the clinic for the same period of time. 
For example, compare the number of positive malaria slides with 
the reported number of hospitalized malaria cases.
Ask to see copies of the most recent reports for the most recent 
reporting period. Compare the number of cases of priority 
diseases that were reported with the number recorded in the 
register.
Check the date on which the case report was sent against the date 
recommended for sending the report.
Check the reports to make sure they are complete and accurate.
Verify that trend lines are prepared and kept up-to-date for 
priority diseases. Ask to see the “Health Facility Analysis 
Book,” i f  these are in use in your district. Look to see i f  the trend 
lines for selected diseases are up to date.
Look at the stocks of emergency drugs, supplies and protective 
clothing to be sure there is an adequate supply.
Note: A  sample supervisory checklist is in Annex 8H at the end o f this section. 
The questions to be answered during the supervisory visit can be adapted or 
modified to meet the specific concerns and extent o f progress towards an 
integrated surveillance system within the health facility.
8.3.4 Conduct supervisory visits
Begin regularly scheduled supervision in the district to ensure that:
• Appropriate supplies (e.g. forms, job aids) and required standard case 
definitions/ guidelines are available.
Health staff know how to identify and use standard case definitions to 
record suspected cases o f priority diseases seen in their health facility.
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• Priority diseases are recorded in the case register according to the case 
definition.
• Some data is analyzed in the health facility to identify thresholds to take 
action both for routinely reported priority diseases (disease o f public health 
importance) and case-based diseases (epidemic-prone diseases, and diseases 
targeted for eradication or elimination).
• Reported cases o f diseases for which a single case is a suspected outbreak 
are investigated promptly.
• Response takes place when outbreaks are confirmed, or when problems are 
identified in routine reporting.
• Response actions are monitored and action is taken by the health facility to 
improve surveillance actions and readiness for outbreak response.
Make sure during the visit to:
1. Provide feedback to health staff. Let the health staff know what is 
working well and what is not working. Also give feedback on how the 
data reported previously was used to detect outbreaks and take action to 
reduce illness, mortality and disability in the district. I f  improvements are 
needed, discuss solutions with the staff.
2. Provide on-the-job training as needed i f  a problem is identified. For 
example, during a review o f the analysis workbook, the supervisor noted 
that case fatality rates were not calculated correctly. The supervisor met 
with the health staff who do the calculation and reviewed the steps for 
calculating the rate with the staff.
3. Follow up on any request for assistance such as for emergency response 
equipment or supplies.
4. I f  a solution to a pre-existing problem was identified in a previous visit, 
check to see how well the solution has been implemented. Find out i f  
problems are still occurring and modify the solution i f  necessary.
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8.3.5 Write a report of the supervisory visit
Put in the report achievements that were recognized during the visit. Also state the 
actions that were planned with the health staff and any requests for additional 
resources, funds or special problems.
8.3.6 Use supervisory visits to improve surveillance activities in the 
district
Visits o f surveillance supervisors and regional or provincial disease control 
programs are good opportunities to discuss and improve disease control in your 
district. For example, i f  a national malaria control person visits the district, you 
might discuss why the inpatient malaria deaths have not been declining. You can 
ask about additional ideas or resources that the malaria control program can 
provide.
8.4 Evaluate perform ance of surveillance and response  system
The purpose o f the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness o f the surveillance and 
response system in terms o f timeliness quality o f data, preparedness, case 
management, overall performance and using the indicators to identify gaps or 
areas that could be strengthened.
Depending on the development status o f surveillance in a district, select indicators 
for evaluation that w ill provide information that relates to the district’ s priorities 
and objectives for the year.
8.4.1 Compile and organize monitoring data and other results
The district health office should summarize the surveillance data received from 
all health facilities in the catchment area, and submit the compiled report to the 
province or national level as appropriate. The submission o f the report should not 
be delayed until reports from all health facilities are received. Submit all reports 
received on time. Late reports may be submitted when they arrive. Follow up 
with health facilities who did not report or who consistently provide late reports.
Help the health facility to solve any problems that prevent them from submitting 
their summary reports on time. Provide feedback to health facilities about the 
indicator results on a regular basis. Feedback is a positive tool for motivating 
health staff to provide information on time and contribute to the national system.
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The provincial health department should compile the surveillance data received 
from all districts in the province and submit the report to the national level. 
Submission o f the report should not be delayed until the last report is collected. 
The province should compile and submit the available reports on time. The late 
reports may be sent separately when they are received.
The national level should compile the surveillance data received from all the 
provinces (or regions). The national level should look for epidemics that were not 
identified by the districts. Follow up with areas where reporting continues to be 
unreliable or does not happen at all. Support the provinces in providing assistance 
to the districts when they evaluate the measurements and take action to improve 
the situation. Provide feedback to each o f the levels about the national, 
provincial, district and health facility levels.
Use a monitoring chart such as the one on the next page to monitor performance 
o f the indicators at your level. Share these results with the staff in your 
catchment level. Acknowledge successes and help health staff to maintain the 
positive progress. When problems occur, talk together about what is causing the 
problem and how it can be solved. Seek assistance o f the next level as needed for 
obtaining additional help or resources.
Gather data from several sources. For example:
• Review the objectives for the year listed in the district’ s annual plan for 
improving surveillance and response.
• Gather the monthly summaries o f cases and deaths reported to the district, 
spot maps, and other analysis results performed by the district.
• Collect any results from special surveys or studies that were done in the 
district over the last year.
• Include case investigation forms and reports o f outbreak response activities 
that took place in the district.
• Gather summary information from the community and also from health staff.
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8.4.2 Analyze results
As you evaluate the summary data for the year, some items to decide on are:
• Were the reports complete, on time and accurate?
• What were significant changes in disease or event trends during the year? I f  
an increase occurred, was the problem identified?
• I f  additional cases are still occurring, why are they occurring? Where are they 
occurring?
• Were appropriate and timely actions taken in response to the surveillance 
data?
• Were supervisory visits conducted as planned and follow up tasks carried out 
as planned?
• Did the community feel that response activities were successful?
• Were any actions taken to address health staff requests or suggestions about 
services or surveillance?
• Were appropriate measures taken to prevent similar events?
8.4.3 Identify problems and their causes
I f  problems occurred, and the district did not meet an expected target, or reach a 
desired level o f performance with any indicator, find out what caused the 
difference between what was planned and what actually occurred. I f  a problem is 
identified, talk with the district team and health facility staff to find out the 
possible causes o f the problem.
8.4.4 Update plans for improvements to surveillance and response
Include in the district plan successful activities that should continue. Also include 
feasible solutions selected as a result o f analysis o f this year’ s annual evaluation. 
Plan to implement the solution. For example:
1. State the new activity and its objectives.
2. Specify the personnel who w ill carry out the activity.
3. Estimate the cost of the activity ( if any).
4. Develop a timetable for the activity. Define the sequence of activities in logical order.
5. Specify the logistics for the new activity (equipment, personnel, transportation, 
resource allocation).
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8.4.5 Provide feedback to health facilities about the evaluation
Provide a report and give feedback to health facilities and others in the district 
about the results o f the evaluation activity. Mention in the feedback report:
• What the obj ectives were for the year?
• What was actually achieved?
• What were likely reasons for any differences between what was planned
and what was achieved?
• Recommended solutions and prioritized activities for improving
surveillance and response in the district.
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Annexes to Section 8
ANNEX 8A IDSR core indicators for the health facility level
ANNEX 8B Chart for monitoring performance o f IDSR indicators at health facility
level
ANNEX 8C IDSR core indicators for the district level
ANNEX 8D IHR core indicators for monitoring the implementation at district level
ANNEX 8E IDSR core indicators for the provincial level
ANNEX 8F IDSR core indicators for the national level
ANNEX 8G Sample form for recording timeliness and completeness o f monthly 
reporting from the health facility to the district level
ANNEX 8H Checklist for supervising surveillance and response activities at the 
health facility
ANNEX 8I Monitoring chart for use o f indicators at district, regional or provincial 
level
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ANNEX 8A Core indicators for the health facility level
Indicator Purpose Numerator Denominator So u rce  of information Target
1
Proportion of 
complete6 
surveillance reports 
submitted on time 
to the district
Measures the 
practice of health 
facilities in 
submitting timely 
surveillance reports 
to the next level
Number of 
complete 
surveillance 
reports submitted 
on time to the 
district
Number of 
expected
surveillance reports 
from the health 
facility
Monitoring chart for 
timely submission of 
report7
80%
2
Proportion of 
priority diseases for 
which a current line 
graph8 is available.9
Measures the 
practice and 
capacity to analyze 
surveillance data
Number of priority 
diseases for which 
a current line 
graph is available.
Number of priority 
diseases
The activity checklist for 
the “in charge” at the 
health facility and the 
IDSR summary 
reporting forms from 
the health facility
80%
3
Proportion of cases 
of diseases 
targeted for 
elimination, 
eradication and any 
other disease 
selected for case- 
based surveillance 
reported with case- 
based forms or line 
lists.
Measures reporting 
of surveillance data 
with detailed 
information to use 
for further analysis
Number of 
diseases selected 
for case-based 
surveillance 
reported with 
case-based forms 
or line list
Total number of 
cases of diseases 
selected for case- 
based surveillance 
that occurred in the 
health facility
Routine summary 
reports and case-based 
or line listing reports
80%
4
Proportion of 
suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic prone 
disease notified to 
the district level 
within 2 days of 
surpassing the alert 
threshold
Measures early 
detection and 
timely reporting of 
outbreaks
Number of 
suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic prone 
diseases notified 
to the district 
within 2 days of 
surpassing the 
alert threshold
Total number of 
suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic prone 
diseases in the 
health facility
Health facility log of 
suspected outbreaks 
and rumors
80%
5
Case fatality rate for 
each epidemic 
prone disease 
reported
Measures quality of 
case management
Number of deaths 
from each of the 
epidemic-prone 
diseases
Number of cases 
from the same 
epidemic-prone 
disease
Routine reports and 
outbreak investigation 
reports
Depends
on
disease
6 “Complete” in this indicator means that all possible cells in the reporting forms are filled in.7 A chart for monitoring health facility performance is on the next page.8 The national IDSR team should define the list of diseases for which a line graph should be kept at the health facility level. AFRO recommends that at a minimum, health facilities maintain current line graphs for 1) weekly trend analysis of cerebrospinal meningitis, particularly in the meningitis belt countries, 2) monthly malaria inpatient cases and deaths in children under 5 years of age and 3) trends for malaria in children under 5 years of age.9 “Current” in this indicators means that the line graph display should reflect data within the past three months from the day of the assessment.
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ANNEX 8B Chart for monitoring performance of IDSR indicators athealth facility level
Instructions:
Use this chart to keep track of the health facility’s performance with those indicators relevant 
to health facility performance for IDSR.
Each month, summarize and compile the health facility’s summary data for priority diseases. 
Report the summary data to the district level on time. Record on this chart the indicator results. 
Share this chart with the district supervisor during his or her visit to the health facility, or bring it to 
the quarterly district meeting.
Indicator Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Proportion of complete 
surveillance reports 
submitted on time to the 
district
Proportion of priority 
diseases for which a 
current line graph is 
available
Proportion of cases 
diseases selected for 
case-based surveillance, 
which were reported to the 
district using case-based 
or line listing forms
Proportion of suspected 
outbreaks of epidemic 
prone diseases notified to 
the district level within 2 
days of surpassing the 
epidemic threshold
Case fatality and attack 
rate for each epidemic- 
prone disease reported
Reply Y ES  or NO to the following checklist items
Were surveillance reports 
submitted on time?
Are the trend graphs up- 
to-date?
If YES, have you observed 
any changes in the 
trends?
If YES, has the threshold 
been crossed?
If YES, have you taken 
action to alert the district?
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ANNEX 8C Core indicators for the district level
Indicator Purpose Numerator Denominator So u rce  of information Target
1
Proportion of health 
facilities submitting 
surveillance reports 
on time to the district
Measures the 
timeliness of 
submission of 
surveillance 
reports
Number of health 
facilities that 
submitted
surveillance reports 
on time to the district
Number of 
health facilities 
in the district
Monitoring chart for timely 
submission of report10
80%
2
Proportion of cases of 
diseases targeted for 
elimination, 
eradication and any 
diseases selected for 
case-based 
surveillance reported 
with case-based 
forms or line lists.
Measures 
reporting of 
surveillance 
data with 
detailed 
information to 
use for further 
analysis
Number of diseases 
targeted for 
elimination, 
eradication, and any 
diseases selected for 
case-based 
surveillance reported 
with case-based 
forms or line list
Total number of 
cases of 
diseases 
selected for 
case-based 
surveillance that 
occurred in the 
district
Routine summary reports 
and case-based or line 
listing reports for 
diseases targeted for 
elimination and 
eradication and for any 
diseases selected for 
case-based surveillance
80%
3
Proportion of 
suspected outbreaks 
of epidemic-prone 
diseases notified to 
the provincial level 
within 2 days or 
surpassing the 
epidemic threshold
Measures use 
of data and 
thresholds for 
early detection 
of outbreaks 
and timely 
reporting at the 
local level
Number of suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic-prone 
diseases notified to 
the province within 2 
days of surpassing 
the epidemic 
threshold
Number of 
suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic-prone 
diseases in the 
district
Log of suspected 
outbreaks and rumors 
District analysis book or 
other routine analysis tool
80%
4
Proportion of priority 
diseases for which a 
current line graph11 is 
available.12
Measures the 
practice and 
capacity of the 
district health 
management 
team to 
analyze 
surveillance 
data
Number of selected 
diseases (at least 
malaria and 
meningococcal 
meningitis in districts 
at high risk for 
meningitis) for which 
a line graph is 
available and current
Total number of 
selected 
diseases with a 
line graph 
(at least malaria 
and
meningococcal 
meningitis if 
district is at high 
risk for 
meningitis)
Indicator monitoring chart 
District analysis book
80%
5
Proportion of health 
facilities that have 
current trend analysis
Measures the 
practice and 
capacity of the 
health facility 
team to
Number of health 
facilities that have 
current trend 
analyses for selected
Total number of 
health facilities 
in the district
Supervisory report 
Health facility data 
analysis tools
80%
10 A chart for monitoring district indicator performance is in Annex 5.11 The national IDSR team should define the list of diseases for which a line graph should be kept at the health facility level. AFRO recommends that at a minimum, health facilities maintain current line graphs for 1) weekly trend analysis of cerebrospinal meningitis, particularly in the meningitis belt countries, 2) monthly malaria inpatient cases and deaths in children under 5 years of age and 3) trends for malaria in children under 5 years of age.12 “Current” in this indicators means that the line graph display should reflect data within the past three months from the day of the assessment.
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Indicator Purpose Numerator Denominator So u rce  of information Target
(line graphs) for 
selected priority 
diseases
analyze
surveillance
data
priority diseases
6
Proportion of reports 
of investigated 
outbreaks that include 
analyzed case-based 
data
Measures 
availability of 
additional 
variables for 
further analysis
Number of outbreak 
investigation reports 
that include case- 
based data
Total number of 
outbreak 
investigation 
reports
conducted in the 
district
Investigation report 
Epidemic curve 
Map
Person analysis table 
Line lists or case-based 
reporting forms
80%
7
Proportion of 
investigated 
outbreaks with 
laboratory results
Measures 
capacity of 
laboratory to 
confirm 
diagnosis and 
involvement of 
laboratory in 
surveillance 
activities
Number of 
investigated 
outbreaks with 
laboratory results in a 
given time period
Total number of 
investigated 
outbreaks that 
occurred in a 
given time 
period
Log of suspected 
outbreaks and rumours 
Laboratory reports 
Outbreak investigation 
reports
80%
8
Proportion of 
confirmed outbreaks 
with a nationally 
recommended public 
health response
Measures 
capacity of the 
district to 
respond to 
outbreaks
Number of confirmed 
outbreaks with a 
nationally 
recommended 
response
Number of 
confirmed 
outbreaks in the 
district
Log of suspected 
outbreaks and rumors 
Outbreak investigation 
reports
Supervisory reports
80%
9
Case fatality rates for 
outbreaks of priority 
diseases
Measures 
quality of case 
management
Number of deaths 
from each of the 
outbreak diseases
Number of 
cases from the 
same outbreak 
due to that 
disease
Routine summary report 
Outbreak investigation 
report
Will vary; 
depends 
on
disease
10
Attack rate for each 
outbreak of a priority 
disease
Helps to 
identify the 
population at 
risk and 
efficacy of the 
intervention
Number of new cases 
of an epidemic-prone 
disease that occurred 
during an outbreak
Number of 
population at 
risk during the 
outbreak
Demographic data about 
the district
Outbreak investigation 
report with line lists or 
case-based forms
Will vary; 
depends 
on
disease
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ANNEX 8D IHR core indicators for monitoring the implementation atdistrict level
IHR Indicator Purpose Numerator Denom inator So u rce  of information Target
Measures the Number of C01. Total Routine summary 80%
I.Proportion of practice and the Hospitals that number of reports and supervisory
Hospitals with Infection Capacity of the reported Hospitals in the reports
Prevention and Control hospital to apply having District
(IPC) requirements infection control established
established requirements Infection 
Prevention and 
Control (IPC) 
requirements 
established
Measures the Number of C02. Total Risk assessment and 80%
2. Proportion of districts practice and the districts that number of mapping reports and
with Public health risks Capacity o the reported districts targeted supervisory reports
and resources mapped district to conduct 
mapping of 
available resources 
and health risks
having 
conducted 
Public health 
risks and 
resources 
mapping
for public health 
risks and 
resources 
mapping
3. Proportion of districts Measures the Number of C03. Total Routine summary 80%
reporting information practice and the districts number of reports and supervisory
using Event-based capacity of the reporting districts reports
surveillance district submitting 
surveillance reports 
using event-based 
surveillance 
methods
information 
using event- 
based
surveillance
methods
Measures use of Number of C04. Total Routine summary 80%
4. Proportion of districts laws or districts number of reports and supervisory
provided by national instruments to reporting districts reports
authorities with laws or facilitate the having been
legal instruments implementation of provided with
sufficient for IHR obligations laws or legal
implementation of instruments
obligations under IHR
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IHR Indicator Purpose Numerator Denom inator So u rce  of information Target
Measures the C05. Number C05. Total Meetings reports and 80%
5. Proportion of districts practice and the of districts number of supervisory reports
with mechanism for the capacity of the which districts
coordination of relevant district to established
sectors in the coordinate IHR mechanism for
implementation of IHR implementation the
established coordination of 
relevant 
sectors in the 
implementation 
of IHR
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ANNEX 8E Core indicators for the provincial level
Indicator Purpose Numerator Denominator So u rce  of information Target
1
Proportion of monthly 
surveillance reports 
submitted from the 
district to the province 
on time in the last 3 
months
Measures the 
practice of 
timely
submission of
surveillance
data
Number of districts 
that submitted 
IDSR reports on 
time to the 
province
Total number of 
districts that 
report to the 
province
Monitoring chart 
Routine summary 
reports
80%
2
Proportion of cases of 
diseases targeted for 
elimination, eradication 
and any diseases 
selected for case- 
based surveillance 
reported with case- 
based forms or line 
lists.
Measures 
reporting of 
surveillance 
data with 
detailed 
information to 
use for further 
analysis
Number of 
diseases targeted 
for elimination, 
eradication, and 
any diseases 
selected for case- 
based surveillance 
reported with 
case-based forms 
or line list
Number of 
districts that 
submitted case- 
based
surveillance 
reports on time to 
the province
Routine summary 
reports and case-based 
or line listing reports
80%
3
Proportion of 
suspected outbreaks 
of epidemic prone 
disease notified to the 
provincial level within 2 
days of surpassing the 
alert threshold
Measures early 
detection and 
timely reporting 
of outbreaks
Number of 
suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic prone 
diseases notified 
to the province 
within 2 days of 
surpassing the 
alert threshold
Total number of 
suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic prone 
diseases in the 
province
Log of suspected 
outbreaks and rumors 
Routine summary 
reports
80%
4
Proportion of districts 
that maintain a current 
line graph13 for 
selected priority 
diseases.14
Measures the 
practice and 
capacity to 
analyze 
surveillance 
data
Number of districts 
for which a current 
line graph is 
available
Number of 
districts
Supervisory reports 
District analysis book
80%
5
Proportion of reports of 
investigated outbreaks 
that includes analyzed 
case-based data
Measures 
availability of 
additional 
variables for 
further analysis 
including 
possible risk 
factors involved
Number of district 
outbreak 
investigation 
reports that 
include epi curve, 
mapping, personal 
tables and case- 
based forms or 
line lists
Number of district 
outbreak 
investigation 
reports
Investigation reports 
Routine summary 
reports
80%
13 The national IDSR team should define the lis t o f diseases fo r which a line graph should be kept at the health 
fa c ility  level. AFRO recommends that at a minimum, health facilities m aintain current line graphs fo r 1) weekly 
trend analysis o f cerebrospinal meningitis, particularly in  the m eningitis belt countries, 2) m onthly malaria inpatient 
cases and deaths in  children under 5 years o f age and 3) trends o f malaria in  children under 5 years o f age.
14 “ Current”  in  this indicators means that the line graph display should reflect data w ith in  the past three months from  
the day o f the assessment.
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Indicator Purpose Numerator Denominator So u rce  of information Target
6
Proportion of 
investigated outbreaks 
with laboratory results
Measures 
capacity of the 
laboratory to 
confirm the 
diagnosis and 
involvement of 
laboratory in the 
surveillance 
activities
Number of 
investigated 
outbreaks with 
laboratory results
Number of 
investigated 
outbreaks in the 
province
Outbreak investigation 
reports
Laboratory reports 
Routine summary 
reports
Log of outbreaks and 
rumours
80%
7
Proportion of 
confirmed outbreaks 
with a nationally 
recommended public 
health response
Measures 
capacity of the 
province to 
respond to 
outbreaks
Number of
confirmed
outbreaks with a
nationally
recommended
public health
response
Number of
confirmed
outbreaks
Log of suspected 
outbreaks and rumors 
Outbreak investigation 
reports
Supervisory visit reports
80%
8
Case fatality rate for 
each epidemic prone 
disease reported
Measures 
quality of case 
management
Number of deaths 
from each of the 
epidemic-prone 
diseases
Number of cases 
from the same 
epidemic-prone 
disease
Routine reports and 
outbreak investigation 
reports
Depends
on
disease
9
Attack rate for each 
outbreak of a priority 
disease
Helps to identify 
the population at 
risk and efficacy 
of the
intervention
Number of new 
cases of an 
epidemic-prone 
disease that 
occurred during an 
outbreak
Number of 
population at risk 
during the 
outbreak
Demographic data about 
the province 
Outbreak investigation 
report with line lists or 
case-based forms
Will vary; 
depends 
on
disease
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ANNEX 8F Core indicators for the national level
Indicator Purpose Numerator Denominator So u rce  of information Target
1
Proportion of monthly 
IDSR reports submitted 
from the province to the 
national level on time in 
the last 3 months
Measures the 
practice of 
timely
submission of
surveillance
data
Number of 
provinces that 
submitted IDSR 
reports on time to 
the national level
Total number of 
provinces that 
report to the 
national level
Monitoring chart 
Routine summary 
reports
80%
2
Proportion of health 
facilities submitting 
surveillance reports on 
time to the district
Measures 
practice of 
timely
submission of 
surveillance 
data from health 
facilities to 
district
Number of health 
facilities 
submitting 
reports on time to 
the districts
Number of 
districts
Summary reporting 
forms
80%
3
Proportion of cases of 
diseases targeted for 
elimination, eradication 
and any diseases 
selected for case-based 
surveillance reported 
with case-based forms 
or line lists.
Measures 
reporting of 
surveillance 
data with 
detailed 
information to 
use for further 
analysis
Number of 
diseases targeted 
for elimination, 
eradication, and 
any diseases 
selected for case- 
based
surveillance 
reported with 
case-based 
forms or line list
Number of 
diseases targeted 
for elimination, 
eradication and 
any other disease 
selected for case- 
based
surveillance
Routine summary 
reports and case-based 
or line listing reports
80%
4
Proportion of suspected 
outbreaks of epidemic 
prone disease notified 
to the national level 
within 2 days of 
surpassing the alert 
threshold
Measures early 
detection and 
timely reporting 
of outbreaks
Number of 
suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic prone 
diseases notified 
to the national 
level within 2 
days of 
surpassing the 
alert threshold
Total number of 
suspected 
outbreaks of 
epidemic prone 
diseases
Log of suspected 
outbreaks and rumors 
Routine summary 
reports
80%
5
Proportion of districts in 
which a current line 
graph15 is available16 
for selected priority 
diseases
Measures the 
practice and 
capacity to 
analyze 
surveillance 
data
Number of 
priority diseases 
for which a 
current line graph 
is available in the 
districts.
Number of 
districts
Supervisory reports 
District analysis book
80%
15 The national IDSR team should define the lis t o f diseases fo r which a line graph should be kept at the health 
fa c ility  level. AFRO recommends that at a minimum, health facilities maintain current line graphs fo r 1) weekly 
trend analysis o f cerebrospinal meningitis, particularly in  the m eningitis belt countries, 2) m onthly malaria inpatient 
cases and deaths in  children under 5 years o f age and 3) trend analysis o f malaria in  children under 5 years o f age.
16 “ Current”  in  this indicators means that the line graph display should reflect data w ith in  the past three months from  
the day o f the assessment.
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Indicator Purpose Numerator Denominator So u rce  of information Target
6
Proportion of reports of 
investigated outbreaks 
that includes analyzed 
case-based data
Measures 
availability of 
additional 
variables for 
further analysis 
including 
possible risk 
factors involved
Number of 
outbreak 
investigation 
reports that 
include epi curve, 
mapping, 
personal tables 
and case-based 
forms or line lists
Number of 
outbreaks 
investigatation 
reports
Investigation reports 
Routine summary 
reports
80%
7
Proportion of 
investigated outbreaks 
with laboratory results
Measures 
capacity of the 
laboratory to 
confirm the 
diagnosis and 
involvement of 
laboratory in the 
surveillance 
activities
Number of 
investigated 
outbreaks with 
laboratory results
Number of
investigated
outbreaks
Outbreak investigation 
reports
Laboratory reports 
Routine summary 
reports
Log of outbreaks and 
rumours
80%
8
Proportion of confirmed 
outbreaks with a 
nationally
recommended public 
health response
Measures 
capacity of the 
province to 
respond to 
outbreaks
Number of
confirmed
outbreaks with a
nationally
recommended
public health
response
Number of
confirmed
outbreaks
Log of suspected 
outbreaks and rumors 
Outbreak investigation 
reports
Supervisory visit reports
80%
9
Case fatality rate for 
each epidemic prone 
disease reported
Measures 
quality of case 
management
Number of 
deaths from each 
of the epidemic- 
prone diseases
Number of cases 
from the same 
epidemic-prone 
disease
Routine reports and 
outbreak investigation 
reports
Depends
on
disease
10
Attack rate for each 
outbreak of a priority 
disease
Helps to identify 
the population at 
risk and efficacy 
of the
intervention
Number of new 
cases of an 
epidemic-prone 
disease that 
occurred during 
an outbreak
Number of 
population at risk 
during the 
outbreak
Demographic data about 
the district
Outbreak investigation 
report with line lists or 
case-based forms
Will vary; 
depends 
on
disease
11
The number of 
epidemics detected at 
the national level and 
that were missed by the 
district level
Checks the 
capacity of the 
entire health 
system to detect 
epidemics and 
shows that the 
national level is 
checking 
whether districts 
are observing 
trends
Number of 
epidemics 
detected by the 
regional or 
national level 
from analyzing 
district specific 
data
Total number of 
epidemics 
reported by the 
districts
District summary 
reporting forms 
District analysis book 
Supervisory reports 
Standard surveillance 
reports
Zero
220
Indicator Purpose Numerator Denominator So u rce  of information Target
12
Proportion of districts 
that report laboratory 
data for diseases under 
surveillance
Measures if 
districts are 
collecting and 
reporting lab 
data to higher 
level
Number of district 
labs that 
submitted 
monthly data to 
higher level
Total number of 
district labs
National log book of 
reports received
13
Proportion of district 
laboratories that 
received at least one 
supervisory visit with 
written feedback by 
provincial/national level
Measures the 
support 
supervision 
district labs 
receive to help 
to solve 
problems
Number of district 
laboratories that 
received at least 
one supervision 
activity
Total number of
district
laboratories
Reports of the District 
Lab Focal Person -this 
may require field visits
14
Proportion of provincial 
laboratories reporting 
analysed lab data to the 
national lab
Measures how 
well provincial 
levels analyse 
district
laboratory data
Number of 
provincial 
laboratories 
analysing and 
reporting to 
NPHL monthly
Total number of
provincial
laboratories
NPHL
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ANNEX 8G Sample form for recording tim eliness and com pleteness of monthly reporting from the health facility to  the  district
Legend
T = arrived on time 
L = arrived late 
NR=report not received
Country__________________  District_________________  Year
Name o f health 
F acility
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Total num ber o f 
reports expected 
(N)
Total reports sent 
on tim e (T)
Total reports sent 
late (L)
Total num ber o f 
reports not 
received (W)
Tim eliness o f the 
reports =100 * T / 
N
Com pleteness o f 
reporting =100 * 
(N-W) / N
*The timeliness and completeness are expressed as percentages (%). When the surveillance system is 
good, the rates for timeliness and completeness should approach 100%. This table allows for monitoring 
the progress of these two indicators in the district so that action can be taken to improve timeliness for 
each health facility in the district.
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ANNEX 8H Checklist for supervising surveillance and resp on se  activities at the  health facility
Health F a c ility :______________________________________________________________Date of Sup erv isory V is it :________________________________________________________________
A CTIV ITY S U P E R V IS O R Y  Q U ESTIO N A N SW ER
COM M ENT  
(What C aused  Problem)
Data collection to 
identify Suspected  
C a se s  within  
health facilities
1. How often do you collect information from the community 
about reports of suspected cases or deaths due to a priority 
disease or condition?
Register c a se s 1. Are diagnoses of cases of priority diseases recorded in the 
clinic register according to the standard case definition?
Yes No
Report 1. Do health staff use a standard case definition to report the 
suspected cases and outbreaks?
2. Do you record information about immediately notifiable 
diseases on a case form or line list?
Yes No 
Yes No
Analyze and 
Interpret
1. Do you plot the numbers of cases and deaths for each priority 
disease on a graph? (Ask to see the health facility’s analysis 
book. Look to see if the trend lines are up-to date.)
2. Do you plot the distribution of cases on a map?
Yes No 
Yes No
Investigate and 
Confirm  Reported  
C a se s  and 
O utbreaks
1. If an epidemic-prone disease was suspected, was it reported 
immediately to the district office?
2. For the cases of priority diseases needing laboratory tests 
seen since the last supervisory visit, how many had 
laboratory results?
3. Are appropriate supplies available or set aside for collecting 
laboratory specimens during an urgent situation and show me 
the supply?
Yes No
Number of results 
obtained:
Number of expected cases 
seen:
Yes No
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A CTIV ITY S U P E R V IS O R Y  Q U ESTIO N A N SW ER
COM M ENT  
(What C aused  Problem)
Respond 1. Are appropriate supplies available for responding to a 
confirmed case or outbreak (for example, immunization 
supplies and vaccine, ORS, antibiotics, and so on)?
2. Please show me the supplies for carrying out a 
recommended response.
3. Who is the outbreak coordinator for this facility?
4. How often do you provide information and training in outbreak 
response to the staff of this facility?
Yes No
Yes No
Name:
Designation:
Training is done
Provide Feedback 1. How often do you report information to the community?
2. Do you receive the latest bulletin from the (central, 
subnational) level?
Report it
Evaluate and 
Improve the 
System
1. Were the last 3 routine monthly reports sent to the district 
office?
2. Were the last 3 routine monthly reports sent on time?
Yes No 
Yes No
Epidem ic
Preparedness
1. What precautions do health staff (including laboratory staff) 
take routinely with all patients regardless of the patients’ 
infection status?
2. How do you estimate the number of supplies to set aside for 
use during an emergency situation?
Minimum level of standard 
precautions:
How supplies are estimated:
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ANNEX 8I Monitoring chart for u se  of indicators at district, regional or provincial level
D istrict:___________________ Region/Province:_____________________ Year:___________________
Note: Please compute the actual percentage fo r  each cell
Indicator Indicator results as a percentage
Jan. Feb. Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
Proportion of health facilities 
submitting surveillance reports on 
time to the district
Proportion of suspected outbreaks of 
epidemic prone diseases notified to 
the next higher level within 2 days of 
surpassing the alert threshold
Proportion of cases of diseases 
targeted for elimination, eradication 
and any other diseases selected for 
case-based surveillance which were 
reported to the district using case- 
based or line-listing forms
Proportion of reports of investigated 
outbreaks that included analyzed 
case-based data.
Proportion of districts that have 
current trend analysis (line graphs) 
for selected priority diseases.
Proportion of health facilities that 
have current trend analysis (line 
graphs) for selected priority diseases
Proportion of outbreaks with 
laboratory results
Proportion of confirmed outbreaks 
with recommended response
Case fatality rate for each epidemic- 
prone disease (priority disease) 
reported
Attack rate for each epidemic-prone 
disease reported
(for national level)
The number of epidemics detected at 
the national level and that were 
missed by the district level
Have you calculated the indicators 
this month?
If YES, have you used the results to 
take action correct any problems?
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Section 9
Summary guidelines fo r 
specific priority diseases and conditions
This section provides disease specific guidance to:
Take action to respond to alert and epidemic 
thresholds for specific diseases 
Identify surveillance goals and objectives for each 
priority disease
Identify surveillance data to analyze and interpret
for each priority disease
Prepare to use the district analysis workbook
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The pages in this section provide summary guidelines for each of the priority diseases targeted for 
surveillance by WHO/AFRO. This section is intended as a rapid reference only. When further information 
is required, please use the detailed references listed in the summary. The table below shows how 
information is organized in this section.
In  adapting these guidelines each country will create a list o f  priority diseases depending on the local 
epidemiological situation. The list of priority diseases could vary from country to country depending on 
national policy and resources.
____________________P rio rity  disease o r event fo r integrated disease surveillance_________________
Background_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
In this section, you will find general inform ation about:
•  T h e  d isease  or event, the  causative  agent, geograph ic  range  affected, and other ep idem io log ic  inform ation.
•  Transm ission routes such as  person-to -person , unprotected contact w ith infectious body fluids or contam inated  m aterials, vector-borne, 
and so on.
•  W h y  the  d isease  is a  priority d isease  for surveillance. For exam ple , the  d isease  is responsible for a  high num ber o f deaths, disability and  
illness, especia lly  in A frican countries.
•  G enera l and specific  risk factors in A frican countries.
•  A ny  additional background inform ation that m ight serve  the  district surveillance team .
Surveillance goal_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Th is  section s tates how the  surveillance in form ation is used for action.
Standard case definition
Suspected case: A  definition is provided for suspecting a  c ase  or o u tb reak  o f this d isease  or event.
Probable case: A  definition is provided for a  suspected  case  w ith epidem io log ical link to a  confirm  case  or an  outbreak.
Confirmed case: A  definition is provided for classifying a  case  as  confirm ed through laboratory  diagnostic  testing.
Respond to alert threshold_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
S o m e  d iseases  or even ts  have  program  specific thresholds for alerting the  health facility or district to a  potential problem .For epidemic-prone diseases, diseases targeted for elimination or eradication, or public health events of international concern, a  single case  is a 
suspected o u tb reak  and requires im m ed ia te  reporting follow ed by patient trea tm ent, collection o f spec im ens for c ase  confirm ation, and investigation  
of the  case  to determ in e  the  risk factors and potential interventions.
For other priority diseases of public health importance, an  ou tbreak  or even t is suspected  w h en  there  is any  unusual c luster, pattern , or increase in 
the  num ber o f cases  w h en  com pared  w ith previous tim e periods. Th is  should prom pt a  response such as  investigating w h at m ight have caused  the  
unusual events . If laboratory  confirm ation is indicated, spec im ens should be collected for laboratory  confirm ation.
Respond to action threshold______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
For epidemic-prone diseases, diseases targeted for elimination or eradication, or public health events of international concern, a  confirm ed case  
should trigger a  response such as  conducting an em erg en cy  im m unization activity, enhanc ing  access  to sa fe  drinking w ater, com m unity education  
cam paigns , and im proving case  m an ag em ent.
For other priority diseases of public health importance, a  confirm ed ou tbreak  should prom pt an  appropriate  response such a s  im proving coverage  for 
specified  im m unizations, s trengthening case  m an ag em en t, providing inform ation, education  and com m unication about preventing and controlling the  
d isease, and so on.
Analyze and interpret data______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Th is  section contains generic  inform ation about the  m inim um  data  e lem en ts  to collect, a n a ly ze  and interpret. T h e  key points to consider for 
interpreting the  d a ta  and specific  e lem en ts  for analysis  a re  also stated (tim e, place and person).
Laboratory confirmation____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
In this section guidelines on laboratory  confirm ation a re  provided including: relevant diagnostic  test, how to collect, store and transport the  spec im ens  
needed  for lab confirm ation, and inform ation on the  results o f laboratory work.
Reference
A ppropriate  refe rences  for further inform ation stated for e ac h  d isease. Most a re  ava ilab le  from  the  W H O  w ebsite .
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Acute haem orrhagic fever syndrom e
B a c k g r o u n d _____________________________________________________________________________________
Acute haemorrhagic fever syndromes can be attributable to Ebola and Marburg viral diseases (filoviridae); Lassa 
fever (arenaviridae), Rift Valley fever (RVF) and Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) (bunyaviridae); 
dengue (dengue haemorrhagic fever (DHF)) and yellow fever (flaviviridae); and other viral, bacterial or rickettsial 
diseases with potential to produce epidemics.
All cases of acute viral haemorrhagic fever syndrome whether single or in clusters, should be immediately 
notified without waiting for the causal agent to be identified.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l________________________________________________________________________________
Early detection of acute viral haemorrhagic fever syndrome cases and outbreaks, rapid investigation, and early 
laboratory verification of the aetiology of all suspected cases.
Investigation of all suspected cases with contact tracing.
During epidemics, most infected patients do not show haemorrhagic symptoms and a specific case definition 
according to the suspected or confirmed disease should be used (e.g. case definitions for Ebola-Marburg,
CCHF, RVF, Lassa, DHF, and yellow fever).
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Susp ected  c a s e : Acute onset of fever of less than 3 weeks duration in a severely ill patient AND any 2 of the 
following; haemorrhagic or purpuric rash; epistaxis (nose bleed); haematemesis (blood in vomit); haemoptysis 
(blood in sputum); blood in stool; other haemorrhagic symptoms and no known predisposing factors for 
haemorrhagic manifestations.
Confirm ed c a s e : A suspected case with laboratory confirmation or epidemiologic link to confirmed cases or 
outbreak.
N ote : During an outbreak, case definitions may be changed to correspond to the local event.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single ca se  is susp ected :
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Suspected cases should be isolated from other patients and strict barrier nursing techniques
implemented. Standard precautions should be enhanced throughout the health care setting.
• Treat and manage the patient with supportive care.
• Collect specimen safely to confirm the case.
• Conduct case-contact follow-up and active case search for additional cases.
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Acute haem orrhagic fever syndrom e
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a single ca se  is confirm ed:
• Maintain strict VHF infection control practices* throughout the outbreak.
• Mobilize the community for early detection and care and conduct community education about how the 
disease is transmitted and how to implement infection control in the home care setting and during 
funerals.
• Conduct case-contact follow-up and active searches for additional cases that may not come to the health 
care setting.
• Request additional help from other levels as needed.
• Establish isolation ward to handle additional cases that may come to the health centre.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
P erso n : Implement immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths. Analyze age and sex distribution.
Assess risk factors and plan disease control interventions accordingly.
Tim e : Graph cases and deaths daily/weekly. Construct an epidemic curve during the outbreak.
P lace : Map locations of cases’ households and work sites.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test Presence of IgM antibodies against Ebola, Marburg, CCHF, Lassa or West Nile Fever 
o r
Presence of Ebola in post-mortem skin necropsy
Specimen F o r  E L I S A  :
Whole blood, serum or plasma 
F o r  P C R :
Whole blood or blood clot, serum/plasma or tissue
F o r  im m u noh isto -chem istry : Skin or tissue specimens from fatal cases
When to collect the 
specimen
Collect specimen from the first suspected case.
If more than one suspected case, collect until specimens have been collected from 5 
to10 suspected cases.
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Acute haem orrhagic fever syndrom e
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
HANDLE AND TRANSPORT SPECIMENS FROM SUSPECTED VHF PATIENTS WITH 
EXTREME CAUTION. WEAR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND USE BARRIER 
PRECAUTIONS.
For ELISA or PCR:
• Refrigerate serum or clot
• Freeze (-20C or colder) tissue specimens for virus isolation
For Immunohistochemistry:
• Fix skin snip specimen in formalin. Specimen can be stored up to 6 weeks. The 
specimen is not infectious once it is in formalin.
• Store at room temperature. Formalin-fixed specimens may be transported at 
room temperature.
Results Diagnostic services for VHF are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are 
usually required for VHF diagnostic services. Contact the appropriate National authority 
or WHO.
R e f e r e n c e
• Interim Infection Control Recommendations for Care o f Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Filovirus 
(Ebola, Marburg) Hemorrhagic Fever. BDP/EPR/WHO, Geneva March 2008
• Infection control for VHF in the African health care setting, WHO, 1998. WHO/EMC
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
• WHO recommended Guidelines for Epidemic Preparedness and Response: Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever 
(EHF). WO/EMC/DI S/97.7.
• Infection Control for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers in the African Health Care Setting WHO/EMC/ESR/98.2
• Viral Infections o f Humans; Epidemiology and Control. 1989. Evans, A.S. (ed). Plenum Medical Book 
Company, New York
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Acute viral hepatitis
B a c k g r o u n d _____________________________________________________________________________________
Viral hepatitis A  and viral hepatitis E
• Enterically transmitted HAV and HEV are a worldwide problem.
• Common source epidemics have been related to contaminated water and to contamination via infected
food handlers.
• In general, both HAV and HEV are self-limiting viral infections; case fatality is normally low (0.1 -  0.3%). 
Women in the third trimester of pregnancy are especially susceptible to fulminant HEV disease.
• Both HAV and HEV are transmitted via the faecal-oral route.
• Prevention and control measures for hepatitis A and hepatitis E include adequate supplies of safe­
drinking water and improvement of sanitary and hygienic practices to eliminate faecal contamination of 
food and water.
Viral hepatitis B and viral hepatitis C :
• Estimates indicate that worldwide, there are 350 million carriers of hepatitis B virus and 170 million 
carriers of hepatitis C virus.
• Hepatitis B and C epidemics are uncommon.
• Chronic infection and severe sequelae occur with hepatitis B -  an estimated 15% to 25% of chronically
infected persons will die prematurely of either cirrhosis or hepatocellular carcinoma. Chronic infection is 
common in hepatitis C and 5% to 20% of those infected with HCV may develop cirrhosis. There seems 
to be a connection between HCV infection and hepatocellular carcinoma.
• Hepatitis B is transmitted by percutaneous or permucosal exposure to blood or other infectious body 
fluids. Major modes of transmission include sexual contact with an infected person, perinatal 
transmission from mother to infant, shared needles or syringes among injecting drug users, household 
contact (e.g., communally used razors and toothbrushes) and nosocomial exposure (transfusions, 
unsafe injection practices). In most countries where HBV is highly endemic, most infections occur 
during infancy and early childhood.
• Hepatitis C is transmitted by parenteral exposure to blood and plasma derivatives. It is found in highest 
concentrations in blood. The major causes of HCV infection worldwide are use of unscreened blood 
transfusions and re-use of needles and syringes that have not been adequately sterlised.
• Prevention and control measures for hepatitis B and C include transfusion safety, safe and appropriate 
use of injections and vaccination (hepatitis B).
• There is no specific treatment for acute viral hepatitis A, B, C and D.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Detect hepatitis outbreaks.
• Identify areas/populations at high risk to target prevention and control measures.
• Estimate burden of disease.
• If countrywide surveillance is not possible, surveillance in sentinel areas or hospitals may provide useful 
information on potential sources of infection.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c t e d  c a s e : Any person with acute illness typically including acute jaundice, dark urine, anorexia, malaise, 
extreme fatigue, and right upper quadrant tenderness. (Note: infected children are often asymptomatic)
C o n f i r m e d  c a s e :  A suspected case that is laboratory confirmed
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R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If hepatitis c a se s  are su sp ected :
• Report case-based information to the appropriate levels.
• As necessary, treat and manage the patient(s) with supportive care.
• Collect specimens and send to laboratory to identify the aetiology of the illness.
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If hepatitis c a se s  are confirm ed
• Determine mode of transmission
• Identify population exposed to risk of infection
• Eliminate common source(s) of infection
• Implement appropriate prevention and control interventions
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Tim e : Analysis of suspected and confirmed cases by week. Graph cases and deaths weekly. 
Construct an epidemic curve during outbreaks.
P lace : Plot location of case households.
P erso n : Analyze by age and gender. Assess risk factors to plan and monitor prevention and control measures
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test Hepatitis A: IgM anti-HAV positive
Hepatitis B: +ve for Hepatitis B surface antigen (HbsAg) or IgM anti-HBc positive 
Hepatitis C : Anti-HCV positive
Hepatitis D: HBsAg positive or IgM anti-HBc positive plus anti-HDV positive (only as 
co-infection or super-infection of hepatitis B)
Hepatitis E : IgM anti-HEV positive and/or IgG anti-HEV positive
Specimen Serum
When to collect the 
specimen
Specimens should be collected from suspected patient.
IgM anti-HAV becomes detectable 5-10 days after exposure.
HBsAg can be detected in serum from several weeks before onset of symptoms to 
days, weeks or months after onset; it persists in chronic infections. IgM anti-HBc 
positive usually disappears within 6 months.
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How to prepare, 
store and transport 
the specimen
Use universal precautions to minimize exposure to sharps and any body fluid.
Collect 5-10 ml of venous blood.
• Let clot retract for 30 to 60 minutes at room temperature or centrifuge to 
separate serum from red blood cells.
• Aseptically pour off serum into sterile, screw capped tubes.
• Store serum at 4°C.
• For storage >5 days, samples are held at -20°C.
• Transport serum samples using appropriate packaging to prevent breakage or 
leakage.
Results
Results are usually available within one to 3 days from arrival in the laboratory.
R e f e r e n c e
• WHO Recommended Strategies for Prevention and Control o f Communicable Diseases; 
WHO/CDS/CPE/SMT/2001.13
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
• WHO Fact Sheet No 328, Hepatitis A , revised May 2008
• WHO Fact Sheet No 204, Hepatitis B, revised August 2008
• WHO Fact Sheet No 164, Hepatitis C
• WHO Fact Sheet No 280, Hepatitis E, revised January 2005
• World Health Organization http://www.who.int/topics/hepatitis/en/
• United States, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/
• Control o f Communicable Diseases Manual, 18th Edition
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Adverse Events Following Immunization (AEFI)
B a c k g r o u n d __________________________________________________________________________________
Reports of AEFIs have had negative effects on national immunization programmes. Most reports are 
“coincidental” events not related to vaccines. It is important to identify real events and determine their cause.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l____________________________________________________________________________
To determine the cause of an AEFI or cluster of AEFIs and correct it.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
A medical incident that takes place after immunization, causes concern, and is believed to be caused by the 
immunization.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single ca se  is susp ected :
• Treat the patient
• Communicate with the parents and community
• Respond to rumours or public enquiries
• Complete case investigation form
R e s p o n d  to  e p i d e m i c  t h r e s h o l d _____________________________________
If a single ca se  is confirm ed:
• Monitor for a cluster
• Send report immediately to initiate investigation of cause
• Take remedial action to avoid another AEFI occurring from the same cause
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a ___________________________________________________________________
Determine the cause of the event. Is it programme-related, Vaccine-induced, coincidental or unknown? Beware 
of mass psychological illness if a number of school-aged or older individuals are involved at the same time.
R e f e r e n c e
• Surveillance o f adverse events following immunization. Field guide for managers o f immunization 
programmes. WHO/EPI/93.02 Rev 1. http://www.who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsPDF/www9541.pdf
• Kharabsheh S. Mass psychogenic illness following Td vaccine in Jordan. Bulletin of the WHO 2001. 79 
(8); 764-770. http://www.who.int/bulletin/pdf/2001/issue8/vol79.no.8.764-770.pdf
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A nthrax (hum an)
B a c k g r o u n d
• Anthrax is a widespread zoonotic disease caused by the spore-forming bacterium B a c il lu s  a n th ra c is , a 
Gram positive rod-shaped bacterium. A. It is transmitted from infected domestic livestock (cattle, sheep, 
goats, buffaloes, pigs and others) or wild game animals to humans by direct contact or indirect contact with 
animals or their products.
• The incubation period typically ranges from 1 to 7 days, but may be longer (up to two to three weeks for 
cutaneous anthrax and up to 42 days for inhalation anthrax). Persons exposed to occupational hazards 
include those handling infected carcasses and those employed in the processing of bones, hides, wool and 
other animal products. Persons may also become infected by handling or consuming meat from animals 
that are sick with or have died of the disease. Biting flies have been reported to transmit the disease from 
infected animals to humans however how readily or often this occurs is unknown.
• Human anthrax is a serious problem in several countries and has potential for explosive outbreaks 
(especially the gastrointestinal form that is contracted from eating infected meat); while pulmonary 
(inhalation) anthrax is mainly occupational, the threat of biological warfare attacks should not be forgotten. 
Anthrax has a serious impact on the trade of animal products.
• The control of anthrax is based on its prevention in livestock. Programmes based only on prevention in 
humans are costly and likely to be ineffective except for those industrially exposed.
• There is an effective vaccine for those persons considered at risk for occupational exposure, and 
successful vaccines are used for livestock, particularly for herds with ongoing exposure to contaminated 
soil or vegetation.
• In most countries anthrax is a notifiable disease.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• To detect outbreaks
• To monitor control and prevention programmes
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c te d  case
Any person with acute onset characterized by several clinical forms which are:
(e) C utan eo us fo rm : Any person with skin lesion evolving over 1 to 6 days from a papular through a 
vesicular stage, to a depressed black eschar invariably accompanied by oedema that may be mild to 
extensive
(f) G a s tro -in te s tin a l: Any person with abdominal distress characterized by nausea, vomiting, anorexia and 
followed by fever
(g) P u lm o n a ry  ( in h a la tio n ): any person with brief prodrome resembling acute viral respiratory illness, 
followed by rapid onset of hypoxia, dyspnoea and high temperature, with X-ray evidence of mediastinal 
widening
(h) M en ingea l: Any person with acute onset of high fever possibly with convulsions, loss of consciousness, 
meningeal signs and symptoms; commonly noted in all systemic infections, but may present without any 
other clinical symptoms of anthrax
AND has an epidemiological link to confirmed or suspected animal cases or contaminated animal products
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_____________________ Anthrax (human)_____________________
C o n firm e d  case
A confirmed case of anthrax in a human can be defined as a clinically compatible case of cutaneous, 
inhalational or gastrointestinal illness that is laboratory-confirmed by:
(c) isolation of B .  a n th ra c is  from an affected tissue or site 
or
(d) Other laboratory evidence of B. a n th ra c is  infection based on at least two supportive laboratory tests
Note: it may not be possible to demonstrate B. a n th ra c is  in clinical specimens if the patient has been treated with 
antimicrobial agents.
R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case  is su sp ected :
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels (public health sector and animal 
health sector).
• Use standard barrier precautions for all forms. Use protective equipment and clothing (gloves, gowns, 
face shields), and respiratory protection if there is a risk of aerosols, disinfection and dressing any cuts 
and abrasion before putting on protective clothing.
• Perform environmental cleaning (disinfection) with hypochlorite.
• Treat and manage the patient with supportive care and using antibiotics such as Penicillin V, procaine 
penicillin (uncomplicated cases), or penicillin G (severe cases).
• Collect specimen safely to confirm the case.
• Conduct joint (public health and animal health sectors) investigation of cases/deaths.
• Vaccination is required for animals when exported/imported.
• In humans, selective preventive vaccination may be considered in case of occupational exposure.
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case  is confirm ed:
• Standard infection control precautions are sufficient and should be used when managing the patients
• Particular attention should be paid to body fluid spills which should be managed by the usual methods for
cleaning and decontamination of any body fluid spills. This should be done promptly and thoroughly, 
because organisms which remain on surfaces may form spores which are infectious.
• As is usual practice, personal protective equipment should be used in situations where there is potential
for splashes and inoculation injuries. Any incidents should be reported immediately.
• Mobilize the community for early detection and care.
• Proper burial or cremation (if practiced) of dead bodies (humans and animals).
• Conduct community education about the confirmed case, how the disease is transmitted, and how to use 
infection control in the home care setting.
• Conduct active searches for additional cases that may not come to the health care setting (older women 
or small children, for example) and provide information about prevention in the home and when to seek 
care.
• Request additional help from national levels as needed.
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A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Tim e: Graphs of number of suspected / probable / confirmed cases by date
Place: Map of suspected and confirmed human and animal cases by geographical area (district)
Person: Table showing the number of suspected / probable / confirmed cases by date, age and sex
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test Isolation of Bacillus anthracis from a clinical specimen (e.g. blood, lesions, discharges)
Demonstration of B.anthracis in a clinical specimen by microscopic examination of 
stained smears (vesicular fluid, blood, cerebrospinal fluid, pleural fluid, stools)
Positive serology (ELISA, Western blot, toxin detection, chromatographic assay, 
fluorescent antibody test)
Specimen Cutaneous
1. For vesicular lesions, two swabs of vesicular fluid from an unopened vesicle.
2. For eschars, the edge should be lifted and two swab samples rotated underneath.
3. For ulcers, the base of the lesion should be sampled with two saline moistened swabs.
4. Blood cultures obtained prior to antimicrobial therapy, if the patient has evidence of 
systemic symptoms.
5. A full thickness punch biopsy of a papule or vesicle including adjacent skin should be 
obtained from all patients with a lesion being evaluated for cutaneous anthrax, to be 
submitted in 10 percent formalin for histopathology.
6. In patients not on antibiotic therapy or on therapy for <24 hours, a second biopsy 
specimen.
7. Acute and convalescent serum samples for serologic testing.
Gastro-intestinal
1. Blood cultures obtained prior to antimicrobial therapy.
2. Ascites fluid for culture and PCR.
3. Stool or rectal swab for culture and PCR.
4. Oropharyngeal lesion, if present, for culture and PCR.
5. Acute and convalescent serum samples for serologic testing.
6. Autopsy tissues from fatal cases for histopathology.
Inhalation
1. Blood cultures obtained prior to antimicrobial therapy.
2. Pleural fluid, if present, for culture and PCR.
3. CSF, in patients with meningeal signs, for culture and PCR.
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4. Pleural and/or bronchial biopsies for IHC.
5. Acute and convalescent serum samples for serology.
6. Autopsy tissues from fatal cases for histopathology.
When to collect the 
specimen
Specimens should be collected from any patient being evaluated for cutaneous Bacillus 
anthracis infection.
It may not be possible to demonstrate B.anthracis in clinical specimens if the patient has 
been treated with antimicrobial agents.
Organism is best demonstrated in specimen taken at the Vesicular stage.
Specimens for culture should be obtained prior to initiation of antimicrobial therapy.
If available at reference laboratories specimens may be submitted for PCR.
Caution: B.anthracis is highly infectious
How to prepare, 
store and transport 
specimen
Vesicular stage: collect fluid from intact vesicles on sterile swabs.
Eschar stage: without removing eschar, insert swab beneath the edge of eschar, rotate 
and collect lesion material. Store specimen for <24 h and transport for <2h at room 
temperature.
Stool: collect 5-10 g in a clean sterile leak-proof container. Store for <24 h at 4°C. 
Transport <1h at room temperature.
Blood: collect per institution’s procedure for routine blood culture. Collect 10 ml of blood 
in EDTA for PCR. Transport <2h in room temperature.
Sputum : collect expectorated specimen into a sterile leak proof container. Store for <24 
h at 4°C. Transport <2 h in room temperature.
Results
Diagnostic services for Anthrax are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are 
usually required for Anthrax diagnostic services. Contact the appropriate National 
authority or WHO.
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_____________________ Anthrax (human)
R e f e r e n c e
• WHO. Anthrax in humans and animals. World Health Organization, Geneva. (2008) (Available on
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ AnthraxGuidelines2008/en/index.html
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
• WHO recommended Strategies for the Prevention and Control o f Communicable Diseases, 
WHO/CDS/CPE/SMT/2001.13
• 2003 WHO Manual for Laboratory Diagnosis o f Anthrax
(http://www.searo.who.int/en/Section10/Section17/ Section58/Section909.htm)
• Anthrax Information for Health Care Providers, CDC (http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/anthrax- 
hcp-factsheet.asp)
• Recommended Specimens for Microbiology and Pathology for Diagnosis: Inhalation, Cutaneous, and 
Gastrointestinal Anthrax, CDC
• (http://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/lab-testing/recommended specimens.asp)
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Buruli ulcer (M ycobacterium  ulcerans disease)
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Skin infection caused by M y co b a c te r iu m  u lce ra n s  (an AFB).
• Occurring mainly as skin lesions (nodules, plaques and ulcers) than can be complicated by bone and joint 
involvement. Involvement of other organs like the eyes is rare.
• Spreading in inter-tropical areas, in swampy soils or water body surroundings, forestry or surface mining 
zones.
• Patients are classified into three categories:o Category I: patient with a single lesion which size is less than 5 cm of diameter (early lesion)o Category II: patient with single lesion which size is between 5 and 15 cm of diametero Category III: patient single lesion which size is over 15 cm of diameter or with multiple lesions or
lesion located in critical site (face, head & neck, breast, perineum, genitalia, lesion spanning over 
joints)
• BU case management has improved greatly through use of WHO recommended antibiotics (rifampicin 
and streptomycin) in 2004. Surgery is still needed for late cases (category III). Cumulative number of 
cases is over 60,000 in 2009.
• Mode of transmission is still unknown. M  u lce ra n s  could penetrate the skin through insect bite (water 
bugs); micro trauma or small wounds.
• Confirmation of diagnosis is done by PCR, AFB search with ZN staining, culture or histology. Specimens 
of lesions are taken by swab in ulcer, fine needle aspiration (FNA) or biopsy in case of surgery.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Geographical distribution of the disease to locate endemic areas and districts and focus early case 
finding, proper management with WHO recommended antibiotics and prevention of disabilities.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c te d  ca se : A person presenting a painless skin nodule, plaque or ulcer, living or having visited a BU 
endemic area
C o n firm e d  ca se : A suspected case confirmed by at least one laboratory test (ZN for AFB, PCR, culture or 
histology)
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R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single ca se  is susp ected :
• Report the suspected case to the appropriate level of the health system
At health facility level:
• Take a specimen for laboratory confirmation (Swab or FNA)
• Begin wound dressing and combined antibiotic treatment with:
o Rifampicin 10 mg/kg daily oral intake for 8 weeks (56 days) 
o Streptomycin 15mg/Kg daily injection for 8 weeks (56 days)
• Refer category III patients to reference hospital/centre
• Fill in case report form (BU 01 or BU 02) with origin village GPS data and report to Health District, 
Regional and National levels
• Search other cases in origin village of confirmed case of BU
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a suspected case is confirmed (Not applicable to BU)
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a ___________________________________________________________________
Time: Graph of cases by year of diagnosis, graph of cumulative number of cases
Place: Plot cases by location of households and colour shade endemic districts
Person : Count newly detected cases monthly by category of patients (Cat I, II or III). Analyze age and disability 
distribution and treatment outcomes (cases cured, cured without limitation of movement or amputation, 
relapse after recommended antibiotic treatment)
L a b o r a t o r y  C o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
M y co b a c te r iu m  u lce ran s:  Smears and biopsy specimens can be sent to the laboratory for 
confirmation by:
• Ziehl-Neelsen stain for acid-fast bacilli
• Culture
• PCR
• Histopathology
Specimen
Smears
Biopsy specimens
243
Buruli ulcer (M ycobacterium  ulcerans disease)
When to collect the 
specimen Specimens should be collected from suspected patient with clinical symptoms (nodule, plaque, ulcer, osteomielite ...)
Specimen should be collected before any antibiotic is given. Another specimen should be 
collected at the end of the treatment (in case the treatment is not efficacious or surgery is 
indicated)
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
Collection of specimen: it is important to avoid cross contamination between the 
collection of samples
Materials: Dry swabs and recipients
Types of specimens: No ulcerative forms, Ulcerative forms, Bone 
Store at 4°C
Results
Buruli ulcer is usually diagnosed clinically and by fininding acid fast bacilli (AFB) in 
smears from infected ulcers and tissue bipsies. It can also be identified using PCR.
M ulcerans can be cultured in a refernce lab using the same culture media used to grow 
M.tuberculosis.
The organism grows very slowly, usually requiring several weeks to provide visible 
colonies.
Diagnostic services are not routinely available. Contact the appropriate National authority 
or WHO.
R e f e r e n c e s
• Resolution WHA 57.1 on surveillance and control of Mycobacterium ulcerans disease (Buruli ulcer). In: 57th 
World Health Assembly, Geneva, 17-22 May 2004; Resolutions and decisions, annexes. Geneva, WHO; 2004 
(WHA57/2004/REC/1: 1-2)
• Provisional guidance on the role o f specific antibiotics in the management o f Mycobacterium ulcerans disease 
(Buruli ulcer) WHO/CDS/CPE/GBUI/2004.10
• Buruli ulcer: First programme review meeting for West Africa -  Summary report. WHO, WER, 6; 2009 : 43-48
• Control o f Communicable Diseases Manual, 18th Edition
• District Laboratory Practice in Tropical Countries, Cambridge
• Ulcere de Buruli, prise en charge de l’infection a Mycobacterium ulcerans
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Chikungunya
B a c k g r o u n d
• Chikungunya fever is a viral illness that is spread by the bite of infected mosquitoes. The disease 
resembles dengue fever, and is characterized by severe, sometimes persistent, joint pain (arthritis), as 
well as fever and rash. It is rarely life-threatening. Nevertheless widespread occurrence of diseases 
causes substantial morbidity and economic loss.
• The word "Chikungunya" is Makonde for "that which bends up," in reference to the stooped posture of 
patients afflicted with the severe joint pain associated with the disease. Epidemics of fever, rash and 
arthritis, resembling Chikungunya fever were recorded as early as 1779. However, the virus was first 
isolated between 1952-1953 from both man and mosquitoes during an epidemic, in Tanzania.
• Chikungunya fever historically displayed interesting epidemiological profiles in that: major epidemics 
appeared and disappeared cyclically, usually with an inter-epidemic period of 7-8 years and sometimes 
as long as 20 years. After a long period of absence, outbreaks appeared in Indonesia in 1999 and have 
been virtually ongoing since 2004.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Detect Chikungunya sporadic cases and outbreaks promptly, and seek laboratory verification.
• Identify high risk areas in order to improve prevention of outbreaks by taking steps to avoid mosquito 
bites and elimination of breeding sites.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c te d  case:
Any person with acute onset of fever >38.5°C and severe arthralgia/arthritis not explained by other medical 
conditions.
C o n firm e d  case:
A suspected case with laboratory confirmation.
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R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If Chikungunya c a se s  are susp ected :
• Report case-based information immediately to the next level
• Collect specimens for confirming the cases
• Conduct an investigation to determine the risk factors for transmission
• Manage and treat the cases using anti-inflammatory agents
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If Chikungunya c a se s  are confirm ed
• Symptomatic treatment for mitigating pain and fever using anti-inflammatory drugs along with rest 
usually suffices. Persistent joint pain may require analgesic and long-term anti-inflammatory therapy.
• Prevention is entirely dependent upon taking steps to avoid mosquito bites and elimination of 
mosquito breeding sites.
To avoid mosquito bites:
• Wear full sleeve clothes and long dresses to cover the limbs.
• Use mosquito coils and repellents.
• Use mosquito nets -  to protect babies, old people and others, who may rest during the day. The
effectiveness of such nets can be improved by treating them with permethrin (pyrethroid insecticide).
Curtains (cloth or bamboo) can also be treated with insecticide and hung at windows or doorways, to 
repel or kill mosquitoes.
• Mosquitoes become infected when they bite people who are sick with Chikungunya. Mosquito nets 
and mosquito coils will help prevent mosquitoes from biting sick people.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Tim e: Graph cases and deaths weekly. Construct an epidemic curve during outbreaks.
Place: Plot location of case households with precise mapping.
Person: Report immediate case-based information for cases and deaths. Report summary totals monthly.
During outbreak, count cases and deaths weekly. Analyze by age. Assess risk factors to improve 
prevention of outbreaks.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Specimen
Serological tests show a rise in antibody titer to Chikungunya virus; the virus may be 
isolated from the blood of acutely ill patients in newborn mice, mosquitoes or cell culture 
or detected using IFA or Reverse Transcription Polymerase Chain Reaction (RT-PCR)
Serum
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When to collect the 
specimen Collect specimen from the first suspected case (s). Suspected CHIK cases occur in clusters.
Collect representative specimens from suspected cases. If outbreak is confirmed, collect 
more specimens from cases and also mosquitoes from the affected homes for testing.
Type of Specimen
• Acute-phase blood (0-10 days after onset)
• Convalescent-phase blood (7 - 21 days after onset)
Time of collection:
When patient presents; collect second sample during convalescence. Between days 7 
and 21 after onset.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
Transport of specimens should comply with the WHO guidelines for the safe transport of 
infectious substances and diagnostic specimens (WHO, 1997).
For ELISA:
• Refrigerate at 2° to 8° C serum or clot for testing within 24 hour. If kept for longer 
store at -80°
For Isolation and RT_PCR
• Store at -80° or transport in fully charged dry shipper
Mosquitoes for testing should be transported in fully charged dry shipper. Focus on 
Aedes species.
Results
Diagnostic services for Chikungunya are not routinely available. Contact the appropriate 
National authority or WHO.
• Minstry of Health, Disease Outbreak Management Unit should send samples to 
WHO reference labs e.g KEMRI.
• Preliminary results are ready within 24 hours after samples arrive in the 
laboratory. Confirmatory results are ready within a week from sample reception.
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R e f e r e n c e
• Weekly Epidemiological Record N° 1, 2005, 80, 1-8; http//www.who.int/wer
• World Health Organization http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs327/en/
• United States, Centers for Disease Control http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/chikungunya/
• Sergon et al Seroprevalence o f Chikungunya Virus (CHIKV) Infection on Lamu Island, Kenya, October 
2004. Am J Trop Med Hyg. 2008 Feb;78(2):333-337
• Powers et al. Evolutionary relationships and systematics o f the alphaviruses. J Virol. 2001 
Nov;75(21):10118-31
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Cholera
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Acute illness with profuse watery diarrhoea caused by Vibrio ch o le ra e  serogroups O1 or O139. The 
disease is transmitted mainly through the faecal-oral route; that is through eating or drinking 
contaminated food or water.
• Cholera causes over 100 000 deaths per year. It may produce rapidly progressive epidemics or 
worldwide pandemics. In endemic areas, sporadic cases (less than 5% of all non-outbreak-related 
diarrhoea cases) and small outbreaks may occur.
• Incubation period is from a few hours to 5 days, usually in the range of from 2 to 3 days.
• There has been a resurgence of cholera in Africa since the mid-1980s, where over 80% of the world’s 
cases occurred in 1999. The majority of cases occurred from January through April.
• Cholera may cause severe dehydration in only a few hours. In untreated patients with severe 
dehydration, the case fatality rate (CFR) may exceed 50%. If patients present at the health facility and 
correct treatment is received, the CFR is usually less than 1%. At least 90% of the cases are mild, and 
they remain undiagnosed.
• Risk factors: eating or drinking contaminated foods such as uncooked seafood or shellfish from estuarine 
waters, lack of continuous access to safe water and food supplies, attending large gatherings of people 
including ceremonies such as weddings or funerals, contact with persons who died of cholera.
• Other enteric diarrhoea may cause watery diarrhoea, especially in children less than 5 years of age. 
Please see D ia rrh o e a  with d ehyd ra tion  summary guidelines.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Detect and respond promptly and appropriately to cases and outbreaks of watery diarrhoea. To confirm
an outbreak, collect and transport stool specimens transported in Cary-Blair medium.
• Do immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths when an outbreak is suspected.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n ________________________________________________________________________
S u s p e c te d  case:
• In a patient age 5 years or more, severe dehydration or death from acute watery diarrhoea.
• If there is a cholera epidemic, a suspected case is any person age 5 years or more with acute watery 
diarrhoea, with or without vomiting.
C o n firm e d  case:
• A suspected case in which Vibrio ch o le ra e  O1 or O139 has been isolated in the stool.
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R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single ca se  is su sp ected :
Report case-based information immediately.
Manage and treat the case according to national guidelines.
Enhance strict hand-washing and isolation procedures.
Conduct case-based investigation to identify similar cases not previously reported.
Obtain stool specimen from 5 patients within 5 days of onset of acute watery diarrhoea, and before 
antibiotic treatment is started. See laboratory guidelines for information on how to prepare, store and 
transport the specimens.
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a susp ected  ca se  is confirm ed:
• Establish treatment centre in locality where cases occur. Treat cases onsite rather than asking patients 
to go to standing treatment centres elsewhere.
• Strengthen case management including treatment.
• Mobilize community early to enable rapid case detection and treatment. Survey the availability of clean 
drinking water.
• Work with community leaders to limit the number of funerals or other large gatherings for ceremonies or 
other reasons, especially during an epidemic.
• Reduce sporadic and outbreak-related cases through continuous access to safe water. Promote safe 
preparation of food (especially seafood, fruits, and vegetables). Promote safe disposal of human waste.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Tim e: Graph weekly cases and deaths and construct an epidemic curve during outbreaks. Report case-
based information immediately and summary information monthly for routine surveillance.
Place: Plot the location of case households.
Person: Count weekly total cases and deaths for sporadic cases and during outbreaks. Analyze distribution of 
cases by age and according to sources of drinking water. Assess risk factors to improve control of 
sporadic cases and outbreaks.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Isolate V. ch o le ra e  from stool culture and determine O1 serotype using polyvalent 
antisera for V. ch o le ra e  O1.
If desired, confirm identification with Inaba and Ogawa antisera.
If specimen is not serotypable, consider, V. ch o le ra e  O139 (see note in Results column).
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Specimen Liquid stool or rectal swab
When to collect the 
specimen
For each new area affected by the outbreak, a laboratory confirmation should be done.
Collect stool sample from the first suspected cholera case. If more than one suspected 
case, collect until specimens have been collected from 5 to 10 cases. Collect stool from 
patients fitting the case definition and:
• Onset within last 5 days, and
• Before antibiotics treatment has started
D o  n o t  d e la y  treatm ent o f  d e h yd ra te d  patients. Specimens may be collected after 
rehydration (ORS or IV therapy) has begun.
If possible, specimens should be collected from 5 -  10 suspected cases every 1 -  2 
weeks to monitor cessation of the outbreak, changes in serotypes, and antibiotic 
sensitivity patterns of V. c h o le ra e .
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
• Place specimen (stool or rectal swab) in a clean, leak proof container and transport 
to lab within 2 hours.
• If more than 2- hour delay is expected, place stool-soaked swab into Cary-Blair 
transport medium.
If Cary-Blair transport medium is not available and specimen will not reach the lab within 
2 hours:
• Store at 4°C to 8°C
• Do not allow specimen to dry. Add small amount of 0.85% NaCl if necessary
• To transport, transport in well-marked, leak proof container
• Transport container in cold box at 4°C to 8°C
Results • Cholera tests may not be routinely performed in all laboratories.
• Culture results usually take 2 to 4 days after specimen arrives at the laboratory.
• Cary-Blair transport medium is stable and usually good for at least one year 
after preparation. It does not require refrigeration if kept sterile and in properly 
sealed container. If colour changes (medium turns yellow) or shrinks (depressed 
meniscus), do not use the medium.
• The O139 serotype has not been reported in Africa and only in a few places in 
southwest Asia.
Serological determination of Ogawa or Inaba is not clinically required. It is also not 
required if polyvalent antisera results are clearly positive.
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CholeraReference
• M a n a g e m e n t  o f  the patient with cholera , World Health Organization, 1992. WHO/CDD/SER/91.15 Rev1 
(1992)
• E p id e m ic  d ia rrhoea l d is e a se  p re p a re d n e s s  a n d  re sp o n se - -T r a in in g  a n d  practice. Facilitator and 
participant manuals. World Health Organization, 1997. WHO/EMC/DIS/97.3 and WHO/EMC/DIS/97.4
• L a b o ra to ry  M e th o d s  for the D ia g n o s i s  o f  E p id e m ic  D y se n te r y  a n d  Cho lera . CDC/WHO, 1999 CDC, 
Atlanta, GA, USA
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D engue FeverIncluding Dengue haemorrhagic fever (DHF) and Dengue shock syndrome (DSS)Background
• Dengue fever is an arbovirus transmitted by aedes mosquitoes (both Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopiticus). 
Dengue is caused by four serologically distinct, but closely related viruses: dengue virus (DENV) 1, 2, 3, 
and 4 of the Flaviviridae family.
• Dengue fever is an emerging pandemic that has spread globally during the past 30 years as a result of 
changes in human ecology. Dengue is found in tropical and sub-tropical regions around the world, 
predominately in urban and semi-urban areas. During dengue epidemics, infection rates among those 
who have not been previously exposed to the virus are often 40% to 50%, but can reach 80% to 90%.
• Dengue fever is a severe, influenza-like illness that affects infants, young children and adults, but seldom 
causes death. Dengue haemorrhagic fever (DHF) is a potentially deadly complication that has become a 
leading cause of hospitalization and death among children in Asia. There is good evidence that 
sequential infection with the different serotypes of dengue virus increases the risk of more severe 
disease that can result in shock syndrome (DSS) and death.
• Epidemic dengue activity in Africa has mostly been classical dengue fever caused by DENV-1 and 
DENV-2 without associated mortality. The first major outbreak of DENV-3 in Africa was documented in 
Mozambique in 1984-1985. During this outbreak, most patients experienced secondary infections and 2 
deaths were attributed to DHF and shock. In 2008, yellow fever and DENV-3 were found to be co- 
circulating in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, however, no severe dengue cases or deaths attributable to dengue 
were identified.
• There is no specific treatment for dengue, but appropriate medical care frequently saves the lives of 
patients with dengue haemorrhagic fever.
• Infected humans are the main carriers and multipliers of the virus, serving a source of the virus for 
uninfected A e d e s  a e g yp t i mosquitoes which maintain the urban dengue transmission cycle. The virus 
circulates in the blood of infected human for 2-7 days, at approximately the same time that they have a 
fever. A sylvatic transmission cycle has been documented in West Africa where DENV-2 has been found 
in monkeys. There is no evidence of person-to-person transmission.
• At present, the only method of controlling or preventing dengue virus transmission is to combat the 
vector mosquitoes using environmental management and chemical methods.
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D engue FeverIncluding Dengue haemorrhagic fever (DHF) and Dengue shock syndrome (DSS)
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Surveillance for suspected cases and investigation of clusters of suspected cases in areas with Ae. 
a e g yp t i and A e. a lbop it icu s  mosquitoes.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
D engue  F e ve r S u s p e c te d  case : Any person with acute febrile illness of 2-7 days duration with 2 or more of the 
following: headache, retro-orbital pain, myalgia, arthralgia, rash, haemorrhagic manifestations, leucopenia.
D engue  F e ve r C o n firm e d  case: A suspected case with laboratory confirmation (positive IgM antibody, rise in 
IgG antibody titres, positive PCR or viral isolation).
D engue  H a e m o rrh a g ic  F e v e r : A probable or confirmed case of dengue with bleeding tendencies as evidenced 
by one or more of the following: positive tourniquet test; petechieae, ecchymoses or purpura; bleeding: mucosa, 
gastrointestinal tract, injection sites or other; haematemesis or melaena; and thrombocytopenia (100 000 cells or 
less per mm3) and evidence of plasma leakage due to increased vascular permeability, manifested by one or 
more of the following: 20% rise in average haematocrit for age and sex, 20% drop in haematocrit following 
volume replacement therapy compared to baseline, signs of plasma leakage (pleural effusion, ascites, hypo- 
proteinaemia).
D engue  S h o c k  S y n d ro m e : All the above criteria, plus evidence of circulatory failure manifested by rapid and 
weak pulse, and narrow pulse pressure (< 20 mm Hg) or hypotension for age, cold, clammy skin and altered 
mental status.
R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
• Report case-based information immediately to the next level
• Conduct active search for additional cases
• Collect specimens for confirming the cases
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D engue FeverIncluding Dengue haemorrhagic fever (DHF) and Dengue shock syndrome (DSS)Respond to action threshold
If a single case is confirmed:
• Report case-based information immediately to the next level.
• Conduct active search for additional cases.
• Collect specimens for confirming the cases.
• Survey the community to determine the abundance of vector mosquitoes, identify the most productive 
larval habitats, promote and implement plans for their elimination, management or treatment with 
appropriate larvicides.
• Educate the public and promote behaviors to remove, destroy or manage mosquito vector larval habitats.
• Manage and provide supportive treatment to dengue fever cases. Implement standard infection control
precautions. Prevent access of mosquitoes to patients by using mosquito bed nets.
• Refer suspected DHF/DSS cases to more advanced facilities.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths weekly/monthly. Construct an epidemic curve during the outbreak.
Place: Plot location of case households and work sites using precise mapping.
Person: Case-fatality rate. Analyze age and sex distribution. Percentage of DHF / DSS cases and of 
hospitalizations.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Demonstration of IgM and IgG by Antibody Assays.
Detection of viral genomic sequences by PCR.
Isolation of the dengue virus using cell culture.
Antigen detection Assays for acute phase samples when PCR or isolation is negative.
Demonstration of dengue virus antigen in autopsy tissue by immunohistochemistry or 
immunofluorescence or in serum samples by EIA.
N ote : there a re  se v e r a l  d ia g n o st ic  te ch n iq u e s  a va ilab le  to d o cu m e n t  a n  infection  b y  the  
d e n g u e  virus. T h e  I g M  E L I S A  is  the b a s ic  te st for se ro lo g ic  d ia g n o s is .
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Dengue Fever
Including  D engue haemorrhagic fever (D H F ) and D engue shock syndrome (D SS)
Specimen
ELISA: Whole blood, serum or plasma from acute (0-5 days) and convalescent 6 or more 
days) depending on each case.
PCR: Whole blood or blood clot, serum/ plasma or tissue preferably from acute 
specimens (0-5 days).
The samples should be collected for diagnosing a suspected dengue fatality:
A blood sample to attempt PCR, virus isolation and serology. If an autopsy is performed, 
blood from the heart should be collected.
When to collect the 
specimen Collect specimen from the first suspected case.
If more than one suspected case, collect until specimens have been collected from 5 
to10 suspected cases.
Type of Specimen
• Acute-phase blood (0-5 days after onset of symptoms)
• Convalescent-phase blood (> 6 days after onset)
Time of collection
• Collect 2nd sample during convalescence. Between days 6 and 21 after onset.
Lab diagnosis of fatal cases is indispensable for understanding the risk factors for severe 
cases.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
T ransport of specimens should comply with the WHO guidelines for the safe transport of 
infectious substances and diagnostic specimens.
F o r  E L I S A  o r  P C R :
• Refrigerate serum or clot. For long term storage freeze -20C
• Freeze (-20C or colder) tissue specimens for virus isolation
If an autopsy has been performed and no fresh tissues are available, tissues fixed in 
formalin should be submitted for immunohistochemical studies.
Results Diagnostic services for Dengue fever and Dengue hemorrhagic fever are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are usually required for VHF diagnostic 
services. Contact the appropriate National authority or WHO.
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D engue FeverIncluding Dengue haemorrhagic fever (DHF) and Dengue shock syndrome (DSS)
R e f e r e n c e
• W H O  R e c o m m e n d e d  Su rve illa n ce  S t a n d a rd s  WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
• D e n g u e :  C lin ica l a n d  P u b lic  H ea lth  A sp e c t s ,  CDC
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DiabetesBackground
• Diabetes mellitus (DM) is a widespread chronic disease that occurs when the pancreas does not
produce enough insulin, or when the body cannot effectively use the insulin it produces. Diabetes can
cause serious health complications including heart disease, blindness, kidney failure, and lower- 
extremity amputations.
• The most common form is Type 2 diabetes that represents more than 85% of the cases. Other forms are 
less common such as Type 1 (10% of cases), specific diabetes and gestational diabetes (5% of cases).
• The risk factors that affect the onset of diabetes are well-known. They comprise non-modifiable factors
like old age (over 45 years of age), family history, and the causes of diabetes in pregnancy. Modifiable
risk factors for diabetes are obesity, physical inactivity and excessive alcohol consumption.
• The global prevalence in 2000 was estimated at 2.8%, with projections of 4.8% by 2030. The total 
number of persons affected will rise from 171 million in 2000 to 366 million in 2030 if no action is taken. 
Annual mortality linked to diabetes worldwide is estimated at more than one million.
• Diabetes is no longer considered rare in Africa. Recent estimates based on the WHO STEP-wise 
approach for monitoring the risk factors of non-communicable diseases indicate prevalence of between 
1% and 20%. In some countries such as Mauritius, it reaches 20%.
• The rate of limb amputations due to diabetes varies from 1.4% to 6.7% of diabetic foot cases. In some 
African countries, the mortality rate is higher than 40 per 10,000 inhabitants.
• In the African Region, efforts made to create an environment that enhances the fight against diabetes 
include adoption of resolutions on non communicable diseases in 2000, cardiovascular diseases 
strategy in 2005, and diabetes mellitus strategy in 2007. The World Health Organization and the 
International Diabetes Federation (IDF) have also jointly carried out actions to contribute to promoting 
diabetes awareness in Africa.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Estimate the magnitude of the disease
• Monitor trends and risk factors
• Identify populations at highest risk (e.g.; age groups, urban vs. rural)
• Monitor prevention and control program activities
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected new case:
Any person presenting with the following symptoms:
• Increased thirst
• Increased hunger
• Frequent urination
258
Diabetes
Confirmed new case :
Any person with a fasting venous plasma glucose measurement of > 7 mmol/L (126 mg/dl) or capillary glucose > 
6.1 mmol/L (110 mg/dl)
Or
Any person with a non-fasting venous plasma glucose measurement of > 11.1mmol/L (200 mg/dl) or capillary 
glucose > 11,1 nnik>k (200 mg/dl)
* Report only the first lab-confirmed diagnosis of the patient
R e c o m m e n d e d  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  a c t i o n
For people with diabetes:
• Treat confirmed cases according to the standardized case management guidelines (WHOPEN).
District-level Prevention:
• Implement an integrated prevention and control programme for non-communicable diseases focusing on 
diabetes through community awareness and education activities conducted in accordance with national 
prevention and control programmes for non-communicable diseases. These activities would include 
multi-sectoral strategies and plans of action on diet, weight-reduction, and physical activity.
• Implement clinical preventive measures and treatment interventions using evidence-based guidelines 
(screening high risk patients, for example).
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases quarterly to analyze trends.
Place: Compare district trends with national and regional trends.
Person: Analyze the distribution of cases by age and other demographic factors. 
*Data for non-communicable diseases is analyzed for long term trends
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Measuring glucose in capillary blood using a reagent strip test and reference meter 
Measuring glucose in plasma using a glucose-oxidase colorimetric test method 
Lab case definition (see section 8.0)
Specimen
Plasma
Capillary blood
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When to collect
Blood glucose measurements must be carried out on the day and at the time requested.
Fasting specimen: for adult the fasting time is usually 10 tu 16 hours. For children the 
fasting time is 6 hours.
Post-prandial specimen: 2h post-prandial specimen.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport
Specimen should be examined as soon as possible (before 2 hours) at health facility 
where the specimen is taken.
Results
Results are ready within a few hours.
R e f e r e n c e
N o n  c o m m u n ica b le  D i s e a s e s :  A  stra te gy  for the A frican  R e g io n ,  AFR/RC50/10 
C a rd io v a s c u la r  D i s e a s e s  in the A frican  R e g io n :  C u rren t situation a n d  p e rsp e c t iv e s , AFR/RC55/12 
D ia b e te s  p re ven tion  a n d  control: a  stra te gy  for the A frican  R e g io n ,  AFR/RC57/7 
Steps manual: http://www.who.int/chp/steps/en/
Gojka R et al, G lo b a l p re v a le n ce  o f  d iabe te s, Diabetes Care 27(5): 1047-1053, 2004
IDF, D ia b e te s  Atlas, 2nd Edition, Brussels, International Diabetes Federation, 2003
WHO, P re ve n t in g  ch ro n ic  d i s e a se s :  A  vital investm ent, Geneva, World Health Organization, 2005
WHO, T h e  b u rd e n  o f  m ortality attributable to d iabetes, Geneva, World Health Organization, 2004
WHO-PEN: Protocols for health promotion, prevention and management of NCDs at primary care level 
http://www.afro.who.int/en/divisions-a-programmes/ddc/division/2257-who-pen-protocols.html
D istrict L a b o ra to ry  P ra ct ice  in T rop ica l Countrie s, Cambridge
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D iarrhoea with blood (Shigella)
B a c k g r o u n d ___________________________________________________________________________________
• Sh ig e lla  d y se n te r ia e  type 1 (SD1)  is the most common cause of enteric infections and is transmitted from 
person-to-person through faecal-oral spread.
• Large scale outbreaks may be caused by Sh ig e lla  d y se n te r ia e  type 1 (SD1) with up to 30% of populations 
infected. The case fatality rate may approach 20% among young children and elderly persons with severe 
dehydration.
• The incubation period is from 1 to 4 days.
• Clinical illness is characterized by acute fever and bloody diarrhoea, and can also present with systemic 
symptoms and signs as well as dehydration especially in young children.
• Risk factor: overcrowded areas with unsafe water and poor sanitation (for example, refugee and famine
populations).
• SD1 is frequently resistant to multiple antibiotics including trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole.
• Enterohaemorrhagic and enteroinvasive E. co li and other bacteria or parasites such as E n ta m o e b a  
h isto lytica  may also cause bloody diarrhoea.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Detect and respond to dysentery outbreaks promptly.
• Improve percentage of laboratory-confirmed cases and evaluate proportion verified as type 1 (SD1).
• Determine antibiotic sensitivity pattern of the agents isolated (especially SD1) both for routine surveillance
and during outbreaks.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n ___________________________________
S u s p e c t e d  c a s e :
A person with diarrhoea with visible blood in stool.
C o n f i r m e d  c a s e :
Suspected case with stool culture positive for Sh ig e lla  d y se n te r ia e  typel.
R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If you observe that the number of cases or deaths is increasing over a period of time:
• Report the increase to the next level of the health system.
• Treat the suspected cases with oral rehydration and antibiotics based on recent susceptibility results, if
available.
• Obtain stool or rectal swab specimen for confirming the SD1 outbreak.
• Investigate the case to determine risk factors contributing to transmission.
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D iarrhoea with blood (Shigella)Respond to action threshold
If a suspected outbreak is confirmed:
• Search for additional cases in locality of confirmed cases.
• Strengthen case management and treatment.
• Mobilize community to enable rapid case detection and treatment.
• Identify high risk populations using person, place, and time data.
• Reduce sporadic and outbreak-related cases by promoting hand-washing with soap or ash and water 
after defecating and before handling food. Strengthening access to safe water supply and storage, and 
use of latrines and safe disposal of human waste.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a _________________________________________________________
Time: Graph monthly trends in cases and deaths. Construct an epidemic curve for outbreak cases.
Place: Plot location of case households.
Person: Count cases and deaths each month. During an outbreak, count outbreak-related cases by week.
Routinely analyze age distribution. Assess risk factors to improve control and prevention of sporadic 
diseases and outbreaks.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Isolate Sh ig e lla  d y se n te r ia e  type 1 (SD1) in culture to confirm shigella outbreak. 
If SD1 is confirmed, perform antibiotic sensitivity tests with appropriate drugs.
Specimen
Stool or rectal swab.
When to collect 
the specimen
For each new area affected by the outbreak, a laboratory confirmation should be done.
Collect sample when an outbreak is suspected. Collect stool from 5-10 patients who have 
bloody diarrhoea and:
Onset within last 4 days, and 
•Before antibiotic treatment has started.
Preferably, collect stool in a clean, dry container. Do not contaminate with urine. Sample 
stool with a swab, selecting portions of the specimen with blood or mucus.
If stool cannot be collected, obtain a rectal swab sample with a clean, cotton swab.
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How to prepare, 
store, and 
transport the 
specimen
Place stool swab or rectal swab in Cary-Blair transport medium. Transport to laboratory 
refrigerated.
If Cary-Blair not available, send sample to lab within 2 hours in a clean, dry container with 
a tightly-fitting cap. Specimens not preserved in Cary-Blair will have significant reduction 
of sh ig e lla e  after 24 hours.
If storage is required, hold specimens at 4°C to 8°C, and do not freeze.
Results
Culture results are usually available 2 to 4 days after receipt by the laboratory.
SD1 isolates should be characterized by antibiotic susceptibility.
After confirmation of initial 5-10 cases in an outbreak, sample only a small number of 
cases until the outbreak ends, to monitor cessation of the outbreak, and antibiotic 
sensitivity patterns, which will guide the definitive treatment.
Refer to disease specific guidelines in Section 8.0 for additional information about the 
epidemic potential of Sh ig e lla  d y se n te r ia e  1
R e f e r e n c e
• G u id e lin e s  for the contro l o f  e p id e m ic s  d u e  to Sh ig e lla  d y se n te r ia e  type  1. WHO/CDR/95.4
• S a fe  W a te r  S y s t e m s  for the D e v e lo p in g  W orld: A  H a n d b o o k  for Im p lem e ntin g  H o u s e h o ld -b a se d  W ate r  
Treatm ent a n d  S a fe  S t o ra g e  P ro jects. Department of Health & Human Services. Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. Atlanta. 2000
• L a b o ra to ry  M e th o d s  for the D ia g n o s i s  o f  E p id e m ic  D y se n te r y  a n d  C ho lera . CDC/WHO, 1999 CDC, 
Atlanta, GA, USA
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Diarrhoea with dehydration in children less than 5 years of age
B a c k g r o u n d
• Diarrhoea with dehydration in children less than 5 years of age is due to infections of the gastrointestinal tract 
caused by viruses (especially R o ta v iru s ), bacteria (E . C o li, S a lm o n e lla e ,  sh ige lla e , C a m p y lo b a cte r ,  Y e r s in ia , 
and others), and parasites (G ia rd ia , E n t a m o e b a , cryptosporidia, and cyclospora). These diseases are 
transmitted through eating contaminated food or water, or through faecal-oral spread.
• Diarrhoeal diseases represent the second leading cause of death among children less than 5 years of age in 
many African countries, with more than 3 million deaths per year.
• Different epidemiological patterns (for example, seasonality) are observed for different pathogens.
• The WHO and UNICEF advocate that each district team use the Integrated Management of Childhood 
Illnesses (IMCI) strategy to reduce morbidity and mortality of childhood diarrhoea.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Detect diarrhoea outbreaks promptly. Laboratory confirmation can confirm specific pathogenic agent 
outbreak, but laboratory confirmation is not necessary for routine surveillance of diarrhoea with dehydration.
• Monitor antimicrobial resistance during outbreaks of bacterial origin.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c te d  case:
Passage of 3 or more loose or watery stools in the past 24 hours with or without dehydration and:
S o m e  d ehydra tion  -- two or more of the following signs: restlessness, irritability; sunken eyes; thirsty; skin 
pinch goes back slowly, or
S e v e re  d ehyd ra tion  -- two or more of the following signs: lethargy or unconsciousness; sunken eyes; not 
able to drink or drinking poorly; skin pinch goes back very slowly.
C o n firm e d  case:
Suspected case confirmed with stool culture for a known enteric pathogen. N ote : Laboratory confirmation of
specific agent causing outbreak is not routinely recommended for surveillance purposes.
R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If you observe that the number of cases or deaths is increasing over a period of time:
• Report the problem to the next level.
• Investigate the cause for the increased number of cases or deaths and identify the problem.
• Make sure that cases are managed according to IMCI guidelines.
• Encourage home-based therapy with oral rehydration.
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Diarrhoea with dehydration in children less than 5 years of age
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If the number of cases or deaths increase to two times the number usually seen in a similar period in the past:
• Assess health worker practice of IMCI guidelines for managing cases and improve performance for 
classifying diarrhoea with dehydration in children less than 5 years of age.
• Teach mothers about home treatment with oral rehydration.
• Conduct community education about boiling and chlorinating water, and safe water storage and preparation 
of foods.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths to compare with same period in previous years. Prepare graphs for
outpatient diarrhoea with some dehydration and for diarrhoea with severe dehydration. Construct an 
epidemic curve when outbreaks are detected.
Place: Plot location of case households.
Person: Report monthly totals due to diarrhoea with some dehydration and also for diarrhoea with severe
dehydration from outpatient services. Also report monthly inpatient total cases and deaths due to 
diarrhoea with severe dehydration.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Laboratory culture of stools may be used to confirm possible outbreaks of specific agents, but is not necessary 
for case definition.
R e f e r e n c e
• M a n a g e m e n t  o f  c h ild h o o d  illn e ss: C lin ica l sk ills  tra in ing c o u r se  for first le ve l health  facilities. World Health 
Organization. WHO/CDR/95.14
• In teg ra ted  M a n a g e m e n t  o f  C h ild h o o d  Illn e ss :  A  W H O / U N IC E F  Initiative Bulletin  o f  the W orld  H ea lth  
O rgan ization . Vol. 75, 1997, Supplement 1, 1997. ISBN 92 4 068750 5
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DracunculiasisBackground
• Dracunculiasis is commonly known as Guinea worm disease. It is caused by a large nematode, a disabling
parasite that emerges through the skin of the infected person.
• This is an old disease, known since antiquity, leaving many patients with unfortunate socio-economic
consequences. It is transmitted through ingestion of water containing a crustacean (cyclops) which is infested 
by an immature form (larvae) of the nematode. The Cyclops is found in stagnant surface water sources 
(ponds, traditional shallow wells) in rural areas. The female nematode discharges from the host’s skin when 
there is contact with water. The incubation period is between 9 to 12 months. There is no treatment or vaccine 
against the disease.
• Successful disease control strategies conducted by the endemic countries and an international coalition of 
partners has pushed Dracunculiasis towards eradication. By December 2008, 4619 cases of Guinea worm 
were reported to WHO, worldwide, compared to 892 000 that were reported in 1989, showing a reduction of 
99.47%.
• In 1989, the disease was endemic in 20 countries, worldwide: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Chad Ghana, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, Sudan, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Yemen.
• Currently, solely Africa remains affected where 6 countries are still endemic in 2009: Sudan, Ghana, Mali,
Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Niger.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Active detection and investigation of each case at the community level. Monthly reporting of cases to the next 
level.
• In zones where local transmission of the Guinea worm disease has been interrupted, maintain active 
searches for additional cases or rumors of case.
• Report all imported cases to countries or areas of origin.
• Integrate into surveillance to confirm absence of transmission.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c t e d  c a s e :
• A person presenting a skin lesion with itching or blister living in endemic area of Guinea worm.
• C o n f i r m e d  c a s e :  at the last phase of the programme, confirmation of last cases by knowledgeable health 
staff is required. Follow national guidelines for definition of confirmed case.
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R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
• Report the case according to national program guidelines for eradication of Dracunculiasis.
• T reat the wound (if any) to decrease disability associated with painful leg lesions.
• Conduct case investigation to confirm risk factors.
• Improve access to safe water according to national guidelines.
Analyze and interpret data
Time: Graph cases monthly.
Place: Plot distribution of households and work sites for cases from which cases have been reported.
Person: Count monthly cases, and analyze age distribution. Report monthly to next levels.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
R o u t in e  labo ra to ry  confirm ation  for su rve illa n ce  is  n o t  required. Diagnosis is made by visual recognition of the 
adult worm protruding from a skin lesion (see section 8.0) or by microscopic identification of larvae. Laboratory 
tests to investigate dracunculiasis are limited because the larvae of D. m e d in e n s is  are normally washed into 
water. A diagnosis usually made when the blister has ruptured and the anterior end of the female worm can be 
seen. If required, laboratory confirmation of the diagnosis can be made as follows: place a few drops of water on 
the ulcer, collect and transfer the water to a slide and examine microscopically for motile larvae.
R e f e r e n c e
• D ra c u n c u l ia s is  o r  gu in ea -w orm , Geneva, World Health Organization, WHO/CDS/CEE/DRA/99.2, 1999 and 
WHO/WER N°37 September 2003
• C ontro l o f  C o m m u n ic a b le  D i s e a s e s  M anua l, 18th Edition
• D istrict L a b o ra to ry  P ra c t ice  in T ro p ic a l C o u n tr ie s , Cambridge
267
Ebola or M arburg viral hem orraghic fevers
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• The Ebola and Marburg viruses are both filoviruses.o Almost 3,000 cases of Ebola with over 1,900 deaths have been documented since the Ebola virus 
was discovered in 1976. Major Ebola outbreaks have occurred in Sudan, DRC, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Uganda and Congo.o More than 500 cases of Marburg with over 400 deaths were reported during outbreaks of Marburg 
virus that occurred in DRC (1998-2000), Angola (2004-2005) and Uganda (3 cases in 2007).
• These two viruses are transmitted by direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs or other body fluids of 
infected persons. The infection of humans with Ebola virus through the handling of infected chimpanzees, 
gorillas, and forest antelopes (alive and dead) has been documented.
• Ecological studies are in progress to identify the natural reservoirs of both Marburg and Ebola. There is 
evidence that bats are involved.
• Epidemics can be dramatically amplified in health care facilities with inadequate infection control 
precautions/barrier nursing procedures.
• Incubation period for Ebola and Marburg is 2 to 21 days.
• Between 20% and 80% of patients have haemorrhagic manifestations depending on the Ebola or Marburg 
virus strain. Patients become increasingly infectious as their illness progresses.
• High case fatality ratios have been reported during Ebola outbreaks (25% to 90%) and during Marburg 
outbreaks (25% to 80%).
• There is no specific treatment for either disease. Severe cases require intensive supportive care, as patients 
are frequently dehydrated and in need of intravenous fluids or oral rehydration with solutions containing 
electrolytes.
• Close contact with a severely ill patient, during care at home or in hospital, and certain burial practices are 
common routes of infection. Transmission via contaminated injection equipment or through needle-stick 
injuries is associated with more severe disease. Infection may also be spread through contact with soiled 
clothing or bed linens from an infected patient.
268
Ebola or M arburg viral hem orraghic fevers
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l s ________________________________________________________________________________
• Early detection of cases and outbreaks, rapid investigation, and early laboratory verification of the aetiology of 
all suspected cases.
• Investigation of all suspected cases with contact tracing.
• During epidemics, most infected patients do not show haemorrhagic symptoms and a specific case definition 
according to the suspected or confirmed disease should be used.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c t e d  c a s e :  Illness with onset of fever and no response to usual causes of fever in the area, and at least 
one of the following signs: bloody diarrhoea, bleeding from gums, bleeding into skin (purpura), 
bleeding into eyes and urine.
C o n f i r m e d  c a s e :  A suspected case with laboratory confirmation (positive IgM antibody, positive PCR or viral 
isolation), or epidemiologic link to confirmed cases or outbreak.
N o te :  D u r in g  a n  outbreak, th e se  c a s e  defin itions m a y  b e  c h a n g e d  to c o r re sp o n d  to the lo ca l event.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Suspected cases should be isolated from other patients and strict barrier nursing techniques implemented.
• Standard precautions should be enhanced throughout the healthcare setting.
• Treat and manage the patient with supportive care.
• Collect specimen to confirm the case(s).
• Conduct case-contact follow-up and active case search for additional cases.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is confirmed:
• Maintain strict VHF infection control practices* throughout the outbreak.
• Mobilize the community for early detection and care of cases and conduct community education about how
the disease is transmitted and how to implement infection control in the home care setting and during 
funerals.
• Conduct case contact follow-up and active searches for additional cases that may not come to the health care 
setting.
• Request additional help from other levels as needed.
• Establish isolation ward to handle additional cases that may come to the health centre.
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A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Person: Implement immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths. Analyze age and sex distribution. 
Assess risk factors and plan disease control interventions accordingly.
Time: Graph cases and deaths daily/weekly. Construct an epidemic curve during the outbreak.
Place: Map locations of cases’ households.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Presence of IgM antibodies against Ebola, Marburg, CCHF, Lassa or West Nile Fever 
o r
Presence of Ebola in post-mortem skin necropsy
Specimen F o r  E L I S A  :
Whole blood, serum or plasma 
F o r  P C R  :
Whole blood or blood clot, serum/plasma or tissue
F o r  im m uno h isto -che m istry : Skin or tissue specimens from fatal cases.
When to collect
Collect specimen from the first suspected case.
If more than one suspected case, collect until specimens have been collected from 5 to10 
suspected cases.
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How to prepare, 
store, and transport HANDLE AND TRANSPORT SPECIMENS FROM SUSPECTED VHF PATIENTS WITH 
EXTREME CAUTION. WEAR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND USE BARRIER 
PRECAUTIONS.
F o r  E L I S A  o r  P C R :
• Refrigerate serum or clot
• Freeze (-20C or colder) tissue specimens for virus isolation 
F o r  Im m u n o h isto ch e m istry :
• Fix skin snip specimen in formalin. Specimen can be stored up to 6 weeks. The 
specimen is not infectious once it is in formalin.
• Store at room temperature. Formalin-fixed specimens may be transported at room 
temperature.
Results
Diagnostic services for VHF are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are 
usually required for VHF diagnostic services. Contact the appropriate National authority 
or WHO.
R e f e r e n c e
• Interim  In fection  C on tro l R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  for C a re  o f  P a t ie n ts  with S u s p e c t e d  o r  C o n firm e d  F ilov iru s  
(Ebo la, M a rb u rg ) H e m o rrh a g ic  Fever. B D P / E P R / W H O ,  G e n e v a  M a rc h  2 0 0 8
• In fection  contro l for V H F  in  the A frican  hea lth  ca re  setting, W H O , 1998. W H O / E M C
• W H O  R e c o m m e n d e d  Su rve illa n ce  S t a n d a rd s  W H O / C D S / C S R / IS R / 9 9 .2
• W H O  F a c t  S h e e t  N o  103, E b o la  h a e m o rrh a g ic  fever, r e v ise d  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 8
• W H O  F a c t  Sheet, M a rb u rg  h a e m o rrh a g ic  fever, r e v ise d  Ju ly  2 0 0 8
• Interim  In fection  C on tro l R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  for C a re  o f  P a t ie n ts  with S u s p e c t e d  o r  C o n firm e d  F ilov iru s  
(Ebo la, M a rb u rg ) H e m o rrh a g ic  Fever. B D P / E P R / W H O ,  G e n e v a  M a rc h  2 0 0 8
• W H O  re c o m m e n d e d  G u id e lin e s  for E p id e m ic  P r e p a r e d n e s s  a n d  R e s p o n s e :  E b o la  H a e m o rrh a g ic  F e v e r  
(E H F ).  W O / E M C / D IS / 9 7 .7
• D e n g u e  h a e m o rrh a g ic  fever: d ia g n o s is ,  treatment, p re ven tion  a n d  control. 2 n d  edition. G e n e v a :  W orld  H ea lth  
O rgan ization . 1997.
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Foodborne IllnessesBackground
• Foodborne illnesses are caused by a variety of bacterial, viral, parasitic and bacterial or fungal pathogens or 
their toxins that enter the body through consumption of food or water. In addition to diseases listed elsewhere 
in this guideline such as cholera, and shigellosis, surveillance for foodborne illnesses may involve other 
causes such as salmonellosis, hepatitis A or chemical contamination.
• A foodborne illness occurs when two or more people have shared common food or drink followed by an onset 
of symptoms within a short time period.
• Most people with a foodborne illness do not seek medical care, so cases and outbreaks of foodborne illness 
usually are neither recognized nor reported.
• The first symptoms often occur in gastrointestinal tract. Nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps and diarrhoea 
are frequent symptoms of foodborne diseases.
• Outbreaks may be localized affecting as few as 2 individuals who ate a common meal or product, but large 
and geographically widespread outbreaks may also occur. Large outbreaks occur when food is contaminated 
prior to distribution and is widely consumed by many people in many areas.
• Surveillance for foodborne illnesses is needed to monitor food safety and target health promotion actions 
aimed at food handlers for safer food practices and improved personal hygiene.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  G o a l
• To promptly identify any unusual cluster of disease potentially transmitted through food, which may need a 
public health investigation or response.
• Monitor the magnitude of foodborne illnesses.
• Identify high risk foods or food practices.
• Monitor risk factors to inform public health interventions and health promotion for targeted foods or food 
practices.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
A foodborne illness is suspected when 2 or more people present with similar symptoms and who consumed 
common food or drink.
A foodborne illness is defined according to the specific agent causing the disease (for example, cholera, hepatitis 
A, salmonellosis, shigellosis).
A confirmed foodborne illness is a laboratory confirmed case of a specific agent with a link to a common food or 
drink source.
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R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If observed that >2 people are ill and have eaten food from a common source:
• Immediately report the illness to the next level of the health system.
• From patients and from the suspected food items and drinks, collect specimens for laboratory confirmation.
• Treat suspected cases.
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If an outbreak of a foodborne illness is confirmed:
• Search for additional cases in locality of confirmed cases
• Strengthen case management and treatment
• Mobilise community for rapid case detection and treatment
• Identify high risk groups
• Remove from the restaurant menu or the supermarkets shelves, food items from which evidence of unsafe 
food may be obtained
• Eventually call for in-depth investigation of the food chains that may be associated with the outbreak
• Reduce sporadic and outbreak-related cases by promoting hand washing with soap and water after
defecating/urinating and before food handling/meals; strengthen access to safe water supply and storage, 
use of latrines and safe human waste disposal
• Scale-up food safety health promotion activities using the WHO F iv e  K e y s  to S a fe r  F o o d  (see reference 
below) and the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) system
• Scale-up food inspection activities
A n a l y s e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
• Time: Graph monthly trends in cases and deaths; Construct an epidemic curve for outbreak cases.
• Place: Plot location of households for cases and deaths.
• Person: Count cases and deaths each month. During an outbreak, count outbreak-related cases by week.
• Routinely review clinical data and laboratory results from food and human analyses to identify clusters of 
cases in time, place or person. Investigate any suspected foodborne outbreaks detected in the data.
• Investigate all suspected outbreaks of foodborne illnesses.
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R e f e r e n c e
• Guidelines for Strengthening Foodborne Disease Surveillance in the WHO African Region
• WHO Five Keys to Safer Food at www.who.int/fsf/Documents/5keys-ID-eng.pdf
• WHO Foodborne disease outbreaks: Guidelines for investigation and control 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241547222 eng.pdf
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H um an influenza caused by a new  subtype
B a c k g r o u n d _______________________________________________________________________________________
• An influenza pandemic occurs when a new influenza A virus emerges with efficient and sustained 
human-to-human transmission in populations with limited immunity. Influenza pandemics occurred in 
1918, 1957 and 1968. The 1918 pandemic killed an estimated 40-50 million people. It is predicted that a 
pandemic of equivalent magnitude could kill 62 million people, 96% of them in developing countries.
• Successful containment or control of pandemic influenza is dependent on early recognition of sustained 
human-to-human transmission. Countries have been encouraged as part of pandemic preparedness 
planning to enhance surveillance to (i) detect the emergence of new disease; (ii) characterize the disease 
(epidemiology, clinical manifestations, severity); and (iii) monitor its evolution.
• Influenza A (H1N1) 2009: On 11 June 2009, WHO declared a global pandemic due to influenza A
(H1N1) 2009 virus and of 8 October 2009, 195 countries, territories and areas had reported cases and/or 
outbreaks of pandemic (H1N1) virus. The spectrum of disease ranges from non-febrile, mild upper 
respiratory tract illness to severe or fatal pneumonia.
• Influenza A (H5N1): Another influenza subtype, H5N1 has been circulating among birds for more than 
10 years. In 2003, infections in people exposed to sick birds were identified. Since 2003, H5N1 has 
been confirmed in poultry and/or wild birds in 62 countries and 442 confirmed human H5N1 cases with 
262 deaths have been reported from 15 countries. One confirmed death from human infection with A 
(H5N1) was reported from Nigeria in January 2007. Most patients with H5N1 present with symptoms of 
fever, cough and shortness of breath and radiological evidence of pneumonia. The large majority of 
cases for which risk factor data are available indicate that direct contact with live or recently dead poultry 
is the most important risk factor for human H5N1 infection. However, the continued geographical spread 
of this highly pathogenic avian influenza virus among birds in Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa 
has heightened concerns about the possibility of a global human pandemic of influenza H5N1.
• Under the IHR (2005), a State Party is required to notify WHO of the first occurrence of human influenza 
caused by a new subtype, including pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l s
• To detect and investigate the first evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission of an influenza 
virus with pandemic potential.
• To assess the earliest cases of pandemic influenza occurring in a country in order to characterize the new 
disease including its clinical characteristics, risk factor information, and epidemiological and virological 
features.
• To monitor the course of the pandemic within the country, regionally and globally.
275
H um an influenza caused by a new  subtype
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c te d  H5N1 ca se :
Any person presenting with unexplained acute lower respiratory illness with fever (>38 °C) and cough, shortness 
of breath or difficulty breathingAND one or more of the following exposures within the 7 days prior to symptom onset:
1. Close contact (within 1 meter) with a person (e.g. caring for, speaking with, or touching) who is a 
suspected, probable, or confirmed H5N1 case.
2. Exposure (e.g. handling, slaughtering, de-feathering, butchering, preparation for consumption) to poultry 
or wild birds or their remains or to environments contaminated by their faeces in an area where H5N1
infections in animals or humans have been suspected or confirmed in the last month.
3. Consumption of raw or undercooked poultry products in an area where H5N1 infections in animals or 
humans have been suspected or confirmed in the last month.
4. Close contact with a confirmed H5N1 infected animal other than poultry or wild birds.
5. Handling samples (animal or human) suspected of containing H5N1 virus in a laboratory or other setting.
C o n firm e d  H5N1 c a s e : A person meeting the criteria for a suspected case AND positive laboratory results from 
a laboratory whose H5N1 test results are accepted by WHO as confirmatory.
S u s p e c te d  p a n d e m ic  (H1N1) 2009 v iru s  in fe c tio n : An individual presenting with influenza-like-illness (sudden 
onset of fever > 38 °C and cough or sore throat in the absence of another diagnosis) with a history of exposure to 
a pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
C o n firm e d  p a n d e m ic  (H1N1) 2009 v iru s  in fe c tio n :  An individual with a laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus infection by one or more of the following tests: PCR; viral culture; 4-fold rise in pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus-specific neutralizing antibodies.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
Respond to a suspected case of human influenza caused by a new subtype or to an unusual event of severe acute respiratory infection:
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Implement acute respiratory disease infection control precautions immediately and enhance Standard 
Precautions throughout the health care setting.
• Treat and manage the patient according to national guidelines.
• Collect laboratory specimens from case-patient and from symptomatic contacts and arrange for 
laboratory testing***.
• Review clinical and exposure history during 7 days before disease onset.
• Identify and follow-up close contacts of case-patient.
• Search for additional cases.
• Conduct epidemiological investigation to identify risk factors for infection and populations at risk for 
severe disease.
• Plan and implement prevention and control measures.
276
H um an influenza caused by a new  subtypeRespond to action threshold
If a single case of human influenza caused by a new subtype is confirmed or if another acute respiratory disease of epidemic or pandemic potential is confirmed:
• Maintain strict acute respiratory disease infection control precautions and establish an isolation ward to 
manage additional cases who may present for care.
• Treat and manage the patient according to national guidelines.
• Implement active surveillance of case-patient contacts.
• Conduct active searches for additional cases.
• Distribute laboratory specimen collection kits to health care facilities.
• Identify high risk populations.
• Mobilize the community to enable rapid case detection and treatment.
• Conduct community education on how influenza is transmitted and on how to implement infection 
measures in home and community settings.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph weekly cases and deaths, construct an epidemic curve.
Place: Plot location of case households and work sites using precise mapping.
Person: Count weekly total cases and deaths for sporadic cases and during outbreaks. Analyze age and sex
distribution. Characterize the illness in terms of clinical presentation, the spectrum of disease, the 
proportion of cases requiring hospitalization, clinical outcomes, case fatality ratio, attack rates by 
age/occupation/blood relation.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Identification of human influenza virus infections by:
1) Detection of influenza-specific RNA by reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain 
reaction
2) Isolation in cell culture (BSL3 lab required for suspected new subtype)
3) Direct antigen detection (low sensitivity)
4)Specimen A variety of specimens are suitable for the diagnosis:
• Throat swab
• Nasopharyngeal swab
• Nasal swab
• Nasopharyngeal aspirate
• Intubated patients: tracheal swab or broncholavage fluid
• Blood
Specimens should be collected in the following order of priority:
• Throat swab/Nasopharyngeal aspirate
• Acute serum
• Convalescent serum
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When to collect the 
specimen Obtained specimen within 3 days of the onset of symptoms,
Initial specimens (respiratory or blood) should ideally be collected from suspected 
patients before antiviral therapy is begun but treatment must not be delayed in order to 
take specimens.
Optimally, paired sera (3-5 ml of whole blood), collected first during the acute phase of 
illness and then 14 days or later after the onset of illness, should be tested 
simultaneously.
Specimens should be collected from deceased patients as soon as possible after death.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
Respiratory specimens should be transported in virus transport media. Media that could 
be used for a variety of viruses are commercially available.
Specimens in viral transport medium for viral isolation should be kept at 4°C and 
transported to the laboratory promptly. If specimen is transported within 2 days, it may be 
kept at 4°C; otherwise should be frozen at or below -70 °C until transported to the 
laboratory. Repeated freezing and thawing must be avoided to prevent loss of infectivity.
Sera may be stored at 4°C for approximately one week, but thereafter should be frozen at 
-20°C.
T ransport of specimens should comply with the WHO guidelines for the safe transport of 
infectious substances and diagnostic specimens.
Results
• Laboratory results should be confirmed by an approved laboratory.
• Any specimen with a positive result for influenza A virus and suspected of avian 
influenza infection/new subtype should be further tested and verified by a designated 
WHO CC/ WHO H5 Reference laboratory. Laboratories that lack the capacity to 
perform specific influenza A subtype identification procedures are requested to:
o Forward specimens or virus isolates to a National Influenza Centre or to a WHO 
CC/WHO H5 Reference Laboratory for further identification or characterisation.
o Inform the WHO Office in the country that specimens or virus isolates are being 
forwarded to other laboratories for further identification or further 
characterization.
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HypertensionBackground
• Hypertension or high blood pressure (HBP) is a chronic condition in which the blood pressure in the 
arteries is elevated. It is classified as either primary (essential) or secondary. ‘Primary’ Hypertension is 
elevated blood pressure where no medical cause is found. ‘Secondary’ Hypertension is caused by other 
conditions that affect the arteries, heart, endocrine system or kidneys.
• Hypertension is a major risk factor for cardiovascular diseases such as heart attack or stroke. According to 
The World Health Report 2001, cardiovascular disease related deaths are increasing in the African Region, 
and in 2000 accounted for 9.2% of the total deaths in the African Region. Prevalence ranges from 25% to 
35% in adults aged 25 to 64 years.
• Hypertension affects approximately 1 billion worldwide and it is estimated that more than 20 million people in 
the African Region are affected.
• Major risk factors for hypertension are ageing, lack of physical activity, obesity, and a diet high in salt and fat. 
Other risk factors include; tobacco and alcohol use.
• Lifestyle modifications shown to lower BP include; weight reduction for individuals who are overweight or
obese, reducing the amount of fat and salt in the diet, and eating more fresh fruits and vegetables, increased
physical activity, and reduction of alcohol and tobacco consumption.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Prevention of secondary illness by early detection and standardized treatment
• Estimation of disease burden and reduction of identified risk factors
• Monitor control and prevention activities
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected new case at first visit:
Any individual presenting with a resting blood pressure measurement (based on the average of 3 readings) 
at or above 140 mm Hg for systolic pressure, or greater than or equal to 90 mm Hg for diastolic pressure.
Confirmed case:
Any individual presenting on at least two occasions with a resting blood pressure measurement (based on 
the average of 3 readings) at or above 140 mm Hg for systolic pressure, or greater than or equal to 90 mm 
Hg for diastolic pressure.
* R e p o rt o n ly  the  f i r s t  d ia g n o s tic  o f  the  case in  th e  h ea lth  ce n tre
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R e c o m m e n d e d  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  a c t i o n
• Health promotion for non-communicable diseases focusing on HBP should be established, including 
community-based education on behavior change and adoption of healthy lifestyles.
• Promote secondary prevention and treatment interventions at health facilities according to national 
guidelines.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases quarterly to analyze trends.
Place: Compare district trends with national and regional trends.
Person: Analyze the distribution of cases by age and other demographic factors.
*D ata  fo r  n o n -c o m m u n ic a b le  d ise ase s  is  o fte n  a n a lyze d  fo r  lo n g  te rm  tre n d s
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic is clinical.
R e f e r e n c e
• WHO, A t la s  o f  hea rt  d is e a s e  a n d  stroke, Geneva, World Health Organization, 2004
• N o n  c o m m u n ica b le  D i s e a s e s :  A  stra te gy  for the A frican  R e g io n ,  AFR/RC50/10
• C a rd io v a s c u la r  D i s e a s e s  in the A frican  R e g io n :  C u rren t situation a n d  p e rsp e c t iv e s , AFR/RC55/12
• http://www.who.int/ch p/steps/en/
• http://www.afro.who.int/dnc/databases/afro infobase/index.html
• WHO CVD-risk management package for low-and medium resource settings
• The  S e v e n th  R e p o r t  o f  the Jo in t N a t ion a l Com m ittee  o n  P revention , Detection, Eva luation , a n d  T reatm ent  
o f  H ig h  B lo o d  P r e s s u r e  U.S. Department of health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, 
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, NIH Publication No. 03-5233, December 2003
• H a n d b o o k  o f  H yp e rten sion , Vol 20. Editor; C.J. Bulpitt, 2000
• http://www.cdc.gov/bloodpressure/
281
Influenza-like Illness (ILI)Background
• Respiratory infections are a significant cause of infectious disease morbidity and mortality in the world. The 
mortality rates are particularly high among infants, children and the elderly. However, the burden of disease is 
not well characterized in Africa.
• The most common pathogens causing respiratory infections are; Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus 
influenzae type b (Hib), Staphylococcus aureus and other bacterial species, Respiratory Syncytial Virus 
(RSV), measles virus, human parainfluenza viruses type 1, 2, and 3 (PIV-1, PIV-2 and PIV-3), influenza virus 
and varicella virus.
• An improved understanding of the epidemiology and seasonality of respiratory infections in Africa is essential 
for optimizing public health strategies for their prevention and control (e.g., vaccines and antivirals for 
prophylaxis and treatment, infection control).
• The threat of respiratory infections due to novel organisms that have epidemic or pandemic potential warrants 
special precautions and preparedness. Respiratory disease events that may constitute a public health 
emergency of international concern include; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS); human influenza 
caused by a new subtype, including human episodes of avian influenza; pneumonic plague; and novel agents 
that can cause large-scale SARI outbreaks with high morbidity and mortality.
• Surveillance for respiratory infections is based on the Influenza-like Illness (ILI) case definition. Lab-based 
surveillance or investigations using the ILI case definition is used to identify the disease causing pathogen.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l s
• Early detection of unusual events that might indicate a shift in the severity or pattern of disease associated 
with influenza, or emergence of a new influenza strain.
• Establish and monitor baseline rates of severe respiratory disease, including monitoring the severity and 
impact of influenza,
• Describe and monitor vulnerable groups at highest risk of severe disease.
• Detection of antigenic or genetic changes in circulating viruses or the appearance of antiviral resistance.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Influenza-like Illness
A person child or adult with:
• Sudden onset of fever > 38 °C AND
• Cough or sore throat in the absence of other diagnoses
A confirmed case of influenza is a case that meets the clinical case definition and is laboratory confirmed 
(laboratory results must be positive for influenza virus).
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R e s p o n d  t o  a n  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If there is an unusual event (a cluster of deaths, for example) of respiratory infection, or if a single caseof pandemic-prone acute respiratory disease is suspected:
• Unusual cases of influenza-like illness.
• Health-care workers with only occupational exposure risks develop ILI after providing care to patients with ILI.
• Two or more children and/or adults presenting with a respiratory infection or who died from a respiratory 
infection with onset of illness in a two-week period and in the same geographical area and/or are 
epidemiologically linked.
• Persons who have contact with birds/animals present with ILI.
• Any rumor of clusters of acute respiratory infections or of atypical respiratory infections.
Respond to a suspected case of an epidemic- or pandemic-prone acute respiratory disease or to an unusual event of severe acute respiratory infections:
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Practice infection control precautions for an acute respiratory disease with epidemic/pandemic potential (e.g., 
Standard plus Contact plus Droplet Precautions) immediately and enhance Standard Precautions throughout 
the health care setting.
• Treat and manage the patient according to national guidelines.
• Collect and transport laboratory specimens from case-patient and from symptomatic contacts and arrange for
laboratory testing.
• Review clinical history and exposure history during 7days before disease onset.
• Identify and follow-up close contacts of case-patient.
• Conduct active searches for additional cases.
• Conduct risk assessment to guide decision-making.
• Public health measures related to international border and travel should be implemented under the
framework of the international health regulations (2005).
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths weekly. Describe changes in the level of respiratory activity compared to the
previous week. Construct an epidemic curve throughout the year and describe transmission patterns.
Person: Characterize the illness in terms of clinical presentation, the spectrum of disease including severity of 
illness, count and report cases and deaths, the proportion of cases requiring hospitalization, clinical 
outcomes, case fatality ratio, attack rates by age/occupation/blood relation, laboratory confirmed cases. 
Describe the overall level of respiratory disease activity. Immediate case-based reporting of cases and 
deaths. During the outbreak, Analyze age and sex distribution. Assess risk factors immediately.
Place: Describe the degree of disruption of schools, health care infrastructure, workplace and point of entry 
(PoE). Ascertain whether any evidence exists that the virus may have increased its ability to cause 
human disease or improved its transmissibility. Also use trends of flu remedies and painkillers sales.
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L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Further technical information on the role of laboratory can be found in the WHO guideline on sentinel surveillance 
of influenza viruses
R e f e r e n c e
• World Health Organization -  Acute Respiratory Infections 
http://www.who.int/vaccine research/diseases/ari/en/index.html
• World Health Organization -  Influenza resources 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/inforesources/en/index.html
• World Health Organization -  Influenza Fact Sheet http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs211/en/
• World Health Organization - Interim guidelines on infection prevention and control of epidemic- and 
pandemic-prone acute respiratory diseases in health care, June 2007 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/WHO CD EPR 2007 6/en/index.html
• World Health Organization - Guidelines for investigation of human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1), 
January 2007.
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/influenza/WHO CDS EPR GIP 2006 4/en/index.html
• World Health Organization - Collecting, preserving and shipping specimens for the diagnosis of avian 
influenza A (H5N1) virus infection. Guide for field operations, October 2006.
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/surveillance/WHO CDS EPR ARO 2006 1/en/index.html
• World Health Organization - Guidelines for the collection of human specimens for laboratory diagnosis of 
avian influenza infection, 12 January 2005.
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian influenza/guidelines/humanspecimens/en/
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Injuries (Road traffic accidents)
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Injury is a physical damage resulting when the human body is briefly or suddenly subjected to levels of 
energy exceeding its physiological tolerance or the impairment in function resulting from the lack of one or 
more vital elements (water, air, warmth) .The energy causing the injury can be mechanical, electrical, thermal, 
radiant or chemical. Injury is classified as intentional and unintentional.
• All injuries account for 10% of the world’s deaths. 5.8 million People die each year as a result of different 
types of injuries. Of the all systems that people have to deal with on a daily basis; road transport is the most 
complex and the most dangerous.
• Road traffic accidents result in unintentional injury.
• A traffic collision (motor vehicle collision, motor vehicle accident, car accident, or car crash) occurs when a 
road vehicle collides with another vehicle, pedestrian, animal, road debris, or other geographical or 
architectural obstacle. Traffic collisions can result in injury, property damage, and death.
• Worldwide, the number of people killed in road traffic crashes each year is estimated at 1.2 million, while the 
number of injured could be as high as 50 million.
• Road traffic injuries are a major but neglected global public health problem, requiring concerted efforts for 
effective and sustainable prevention.
• Road traffic injuries continue to be among the leading causes of death and disability among young people 
aged between 5 and 44 years and the leading cause of death in the category of people between 15-29 years. 
The majority of such deaths are currently among “vulnerable road users”-pedestrians, pedal cyclists and 
motorcyclists.
• Without increased efforts and new initiatives, the total number of road traffic deaths worldwide and injuries is 
forecast to rise by some 67% by 2020, and in low income and middle-income countries deaths are expected 
to increase by as much as 83%.
• The African region has the highest fatality rate for road traffic crashes at 32/100 000 population.
• Road traffic injuries are preventable. Very substantial reductions in juries can be achieved by implementing 
measures which address risk factors (excessive and inappropriate speed, driving under the influence of 
alcohol, non-use of seat belts and child restraints, non- use of helmets for cyclists).
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l______________________________________________________________________________
• Estimate and monitor incidence of road traffic injuries and related outcomes
• Identify risk factors and high risk areas to inform prevention policy and programs
• Evaluate programmes aimed at preventing road traffic injuries
• Establish alert thresholds for fatalities to allow health facility personnel review care and services provided to
injured persons
• Establish incidence alert thresholds and monitor trends to enable district health personnel inform relevant
stakeholders
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_______________Injuries (Road traffic accidents)
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Road traffic injury: Any person who has sustained an injury as a result of a road traffic crash presenting for the 
first time.
Road traffic fatality: Any person killed immediately or dying within 30 days as a result of an injury crash.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
■ Promote primary prevention by supporting interventions to address risk factors
■ Review and monitor care and services provided to injured persons
■ Review arrangements for mass casualty management
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
■ Step up enforcement of measures to address risk factors
■ Activate mass casualty management system
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Person: Analyze the distribution of cases by sex, age and other demographic factors
Time: Graphs to show monthly figures of cases and deaths, curves for the year to depict trends
Place: Plot location of cases and identify high risk areas
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Imaging of the injured person - when required 
R e f e r e n c e
■ W orld  H ea lth  Report, 2004, WHO
■ WHO- 2010 Status report on Road Safety in Africa, 2010, WHO
■ 2004Peden,M.; et al (eds), W orld  R e p o rt  o n  R o a d  Traffic In jury  P revention , 2004, WHO
■ Holder Y., Peden M., Krug E. et al (eds), In jury  Su rve illa n ce  G u ide line s, 2001, Geneva WHO
■ Harvey A, (Ed). D a ta  s y s te m s ,  Geneva, World Health Organisation, 2010___________________________
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Lassa and C rim ean-Congo H aem orrhagic Fevers
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
■ Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) belongs to the Bunyaviridae virus family and Lassa fever belongs 
to the Arenaviridae virus family.
o CCHF is endemic in Africa and outbreaks have been reported from Uganda, Mauritania, and South
Africa. Mauritania reports a few cases each year and South Africa reported 165 laboratory- 
confirmed cases between 1981 and March 2006.
o Lassa fever is known to be endemic in Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, but probably exists
in other West African countries as well. Some studies indicate that 300,000 to 500,000 Lassa fever 
cases with 5,000 deaths occur each year in West Africa.
■ CCHF spreads to humans either by tick-bites, or through contact with viraemic animal tissue immediately post­
slaughter.
■ The animal reservoir of the Lassa virus is a rodent of the genus Mastomys. Mastomys infected with Lassa 
virus do not become ill but shed the virus in their excreta (urine and faeces) and humans usually become 
infected through aerosol or direct contact with excreta of infected rodents. Lassa fever can also be spread 
between humans through direct contact with the blood, pharyngeal secretions, urine, faeces or other body 
secretions of an infected person.
■ Person-to-person transmission of both CCHF and Lassa fever has occurred in health care settings after 
exposure to blood and secretions of infected patients.
■ The incubation period for CCHF following a tick bite is usually 1-3 days (max 9 days) and following contact with 
blood or tissues is usually 5-6 days (max 13 days). The incubation period for Lassa fever ranges from 6-21 
days.
■ The onset of symptoms among CCHF patients is sudden with fever, myalgia and other signs and symptoms. 
The reported case fatality ratio for CCHF is between 3% and 30%.
■ About 80% of human Lassa fever infections are mild or asymptomatic; the remaining cases have severe multi­
system disease. The onset of disease in symptomatic patients is usually gradual starting with fever, general 
weakness and malaise. Lassa fever is difficult to distinguish from many other diseases which cause fever, 
including malaria, shigellosis, typhoid fever, yellow fever and other VHFs. The overall case fatality ratio is 1­
15% among hospitalized patients.
■ General supportive therapy is the mainstay of patient management in CCHF. Intensive monitoring to guide 
volume and blood component replacement is required. The antiviral drug, ribavirin, has been used in the 
treatment of established CCHF infection. Both oral and intravenous formulations seem to be effective.
Ribavirin is effective treatment for Lassa fever is given early in the course of clinical illness.
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S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l_______________________________________________________________________________
■ Early detection of cases and outbreaks, rapid investigation, and early laboratory verification of the aetiology of 
all suspected cases.
■ Investigation of all suspected cases with contact tracing.
■ Assess and monitor the spread and progress of epidemics and the effectiveness of control measures.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n s
S u s p e c te d  case  o f  C C HF . Illness with sudden onset of fever, malaise, weakness, irritability, headache, severe 
pain in limbs and loins and marked anorexia. Early development of flush on face and chest and conjunctival 
infection, haemorrhagic enanthem of soft palate, uvula and pharynx, and often fine petechial rash spreading from 
the chest and abdomen to the rest of the body, sometimes with large purpuric areas.
C o n firm e d  case o f  CCHF . A suspected case with laboratory confirmation (positive IgM antibody, PCR, viral 
isolation or IgG seroconversion by ELISA or IFA) or epidemiologic link to confirmed cases or outbreak.
S u s p e c te d  case  o f  L assa  F e ve r. Illness with gradual onset with one or more of the following. malaise, fever, 
headache, sore throat, cough, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, myalgia, chest pain hearing loss and a history of 
contact with excreta of rodents or with a case of Lassa Fever.
C o n firm e d  case o f  L assa  F ever: A suspected case that is laboratory confirmed (positive IgM antibody, PCR or 
virus isolation) or epidemiologically linked to a laboratory confirmed case.
R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
■ Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
■ Suspected cases should be isolated from other patients and strict barrier nursing techniques implemented.
■ Standard infection control precautions should be enhanced throughout the healthcare setting.
■ Treat and manage the patient with supportive care.
■ Collect specimen to confirm the case(s).
■ Case-contact follow-up and active case search for additional cases.
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is confirmed:
■ Maintain strict VHF infection control practices* throughout the outbreak.
■ Mobilize the community for early detection and care and conduct community education about how the disease 
is transmitted and how to implement infection control in the home care setting. For CCHF, educate the public 
about the mode of tick transmission and enhance rodent control activities for Lassa fever.
■ Conduct active searches for additional cases.
■ Request additional help from other levels as needed.
■ Establish an isolation ward to handle additional cases that may come to the health centre.
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A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Person: Implement immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths. Analyze age and sex distribution. 
Assess risk factors and plan disease control interventions accordingly.
Time: Graph cases and deaths daily/weekly. Construct an epidemic curve during the outbreak.
Place: Map locations of cases’ households.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test Presence of IgM antibodies against CCHF, or Lassa Fever
Specimen
F o r  E L I S A  :
Whole blood, serum or plasma 
F o r  P C R :
Whole blood or blood clot, serum/plasma or tissue
F o r  im m u no h isto -che m istry : Skin or tissue specimens from fatal cases
When to collect the 
specimen Collect specimen from the first suspected case.If more than one suspected case, collect until specimens have been collected from 5 
to10 suspected cases.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
HANDLE AND TRANSPORT SPECIMENS FROM SUSPECTED VHF PATIENTS WITH 
EXTREME CAUTION. WEAR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND USE BARRIER 
PRECAUTIONS.
F o r  E L I S A  o r  P C R :
■ Refrigerate serum or clot
■ Freeze (-20C or colder) tissue specimens for virus isolation 
F o r  Im m u n o h isto ch e m istry :
■ Fix skin snip specimen in formalin. Specimen can be stored up to 6 weeks. The 
specimen is not infectious once it is in formalin.
■ Store at room temperature. Formalin-fixed specimens may be transported at room 
temperature.
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Diagnostic services for VHF are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are 
usually required for VHF diagnostic services. Contact the appropriate National authority 
or WHO.
R e f e r e n c e s
■ Interim  Infection  C ontro l R e c o m m e n d a t io n s  for C a re  o f  P a t ie n ts  with S u s p e c t e d  o r  C o n firm e d  F ilov iru s  
(Ebo la, M a rb u rg ) H e m o rrh a g ic  Feve r. BDP/EPR/WHO, 2008
■ In fection  contro l for V H F  in the A frican  health  ca re  se tt in g , WHO, 1998. WHO/EMC
■ Ergonul O. C r im e a n -C o n g o  H a e m o rrh a g ic  Feve r. Lancet Infect Dis 2006;6:203-14
■ W H O  R e c o m m e n d e d  Su rve illa n ce  S t a n d a r d s  WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
■ WHO Fact Sheet No 208, C r im e a n -C o n g o  H a e m o rrh a g ic  Feve r, revised November 2001
■ WHO Fact Sheet No 179, L a s s a  Feve r, revised April 2005
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Leprosy
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
■ Leprosy is a chronic mycobacterial disease of the skin, the peripheral nerves and upper airway mucous 
membranes. The disease is transmitted mainly through airborne spread from nasal secretions of patients 
infected by Hansen’s bacillus and also through inoculation into broken skin. Leprosy is endemic in several 
tropical areas around the world, including Africa.
■ Patients are classified into two groups, depending on presence of skin and nerve signs:o Multibacillary patients (MB) with more than 5 skin patches and several nerve enlargements. o Paucibacillary patients (PB) with one to five skin patches and a single nerve enlargement.
■ Leprosy control has improved greatly through use of WHO recommended multidrug therapy (MDT). Multiple 
drug therapy combining two or three drugs (rifampicin, clofaximine and dapsone) is very effective in curing 
leprosy. At the end of 1999, leprosy point prevalence in African countries was 1.6 cases per 10 000 
population with about 70 000 registered cases.
■ Incubation period is 6 months to 20 years or more. Infection is probably frequent but clinical disease is rare, 
even among the closest contacts of patients. Multibacillary patients are most contagious, but infectiousness is 
reduced rapidly as soon as multiple drug therapy begins. Leprosy can be complicated by neuritis and leprosy 
reactions, resulting in impairment and disabilities of hands, feet, and eyes.
■ Leprosy has historically been associated with social isolation and psychosocial consequences. This social 
stigma still persists in some countries in Africa.
■ Some skin diseases such as tinea versicolor, mycosis, vitiligo, Scleroderma, psoriasis, systemic lupus 
erythematosus and Von Recklinghausen disease may be mistaken for leprosy.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
■ Observe national trends towards the leprosy elimination target, defined as a reduction in prevalence to less 
than 1 case per 10 000 population.
■ Monitor resistance of Hansen’s bacillus to drugs used for multi-drug therapy (MTD) on an ongoing basis.
■ As leprosy nears elimination, supplement routine surveillance with community-based surveillance.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n _______________________________________________________________________
S u s p e c t e d  c a s e :
A person showing one of three cardinal signs of leprosy: hypo-pigmented or reddish skin lesion, loss or decrease 
of sensations in skin patch, enlargement or peripheral nerve.
C o n f i r m e d  c a s e :  A person showing at least two cardinal signs of leprosy and who has not completed a full 
course of treatment with multidrug therapy (MDT).
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R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
■ Report the suspected case to the appropriate level of the health system.
■ Investigate case for risk factors.
■ Begin appropriate case management:o MB patients must be treated for 12 months with a three-drug regimen (12 MB blister packs to be
taken in a period of 18 months). o PB patients must be treated for 6 months with a two drugs MDT regimen (6 PB blister packs to be 
taken in a period of 9 months).
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a suspected case is confirmed:
■ Examine patients for skin and nerve signs at each contact patient has with a health worker to diagnose
and care for leprosy reactions and impairments.
■ Examine risk factors for treatment interruption (for example, inadequate supplies of MDT in the health
centre, poor accessibility of patients’ villages, and so on). Give sufficient blister packs for a full course of
treatment to patients unable to attend a health centre monthly.
■ Identify any fast increase or decrease of new cases during a period. Assess adequacy of surveillance in 
areas where under- or ever-reporting is suspected. Monitor distribution of MDT drugs.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases by date diagnosed and treatment begun.
Place: Plot cases by location of households and disease classification (MB or PB).
Person: Count newly detected cases monthly by the type of leprosy (MB or PB). Analyze age and
disability distribution and treatment outcomes (cases cured, defaulted, relapsed).
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.
R e f e r e n c e
■ E n h a n c e d  g lo b a l S t ra te g y  for Fu rthe r R e d u c in g  the D i s e a s e  B u rd e n  d u e  to L e p r o s y  ( S E A - G L P - 2 0 0 9 . 3 )
■ WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
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Lym phatic FilariasisBackground
■ Lymphatic filariasis is the second leading cause of permanent and long-term disability worldwide. It affects 
over 120 million persons in 80 countries, and over 40 million persons are seriously incapacitated by the 
disease; 20% of the world population is at risk of infection. Of those infected, roughly 1/3 are in India, 1/3 in 
Africa, and the rest in the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific. In 1997, resolution WHA50.29 called for the 
elimination of lymphatic filariasis as a global public health problem. The strategy adopted is based on:o Reducing transmission below a threshold where new infection ceases to occur.o Treatment of the problems associated with disability control and prevention.
■ Causal agents: in Africa only the filariae W u ch e re r ia  bancrofti, B ru g ia  m alayi, and B ru g ia  timori
■ Modes of transmission: transmitted by various species of mosquitoes, these parasitic filarial worms lodge in 
the human lymphatic system, producing millions of immature microfilariae that circulate in the blood. 
Microfilariae appear in the peripheral blood after 3 to 6 months for B ru g ia  m alayi, 6 to 12 months for 
W u ch e re r ia  bancrofti, often with nocturnal periodicity. When a mosquito thereafter bites the infected person, 
the microfilariae are picked up and the infection may be transmitted to others after about 2 weeks.
■ Clinical description:o Filarial infection may be clinically asymptomatic (even in the presence of laboratory evidence of
lymphatic and kidney damage); the disease may also present as one or more acute manifestations 
(fever, local swellings, tropical pulmonary eosinophilia syndrome, lymphangitis).
■ Chronic complications include:o Lymphoedema or elephantiasis of the limbso Damage to the genital organs (including hydrocoele in men)o Damage to the kidney (including chyluria) and lymphatic system
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
There are currently 3 options and the choice will depend on the local situation:
1. Routine monthly reporting of aggregated data on probable and confirmed cases from periphery to 
intermediate level and to central level.
2. Sentinel population surveys (standardized and periodical).
3. Active case-finding through surveys of selected groups or through mass surveys. International: Annual 
reporting from central level to WHO (for a limited number of countries).
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case:
Resident of an endemic area with a clinical sign of hydrocoele or lymphoedema for which other causes of these 
findings have been excluded.
Confirmed case:
A person with positive laboratory diagnosis of microfilaremia in blood smear, filarial antigenaemia or positive 
ultrasound test.
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R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
Confirm community prevalence of infection by surveys
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d ___________________________________________________________________
Case management
Hygiene measures for the affected body parts (and, when necessary, antibiotics and antifungal agents) can 
decrease the risk of adenolymphangitis.
■ Washing the affected parts twice daily with soap and water
■ Raising the affected limb at night
■ Exercising to promote lymph flow
■ Keeping nails short and clean
■ Wearing comfortable footwear
■ Using antiseptic or antibiotic creams to treat small wounds or abrasions, or in severe cases systemic 
antibiotics.
For the treatment of filarial carriers, the regimen recommended by the country is to be followed.
■ In areas where there is neither Onchocerciasis nor loiasis. DEC 6 mg/kg single dose.
■ In areas where Onchocerciasis has been excluded but not loiasis. individual clinical decision.
The current strategy for Filariasis control rests essentially on anti-parasitic measures. To interrupt transmission, 
the entire at risk population must be given a yearly, 1-dose regimen of the following.
A r e a s  with co n cu rre n t  o n c h o c e r c ia s is :
■ 400 mg of albendazole + ivermectin 150 micrograms per kg of body weight once a year for 4-6 years
A r e a s  with n o  co n cu rre n t  O n c h o c e r c ia s i s
■ Diethylcarbamazine 6 milligrams per kg of body weight + albendazole 400 mg once a year, or
■ Diethylcarbamazine fortified salt for daily use for at least 6-12 months.
NOTE. In areas with co n cu rre n t  lo ia s is  (sub-Saharan Africa rain forest), mass interventions cannot at present be 
envisaged systematically (unless Onchocerciasis is a severe public health problem), because of the risk of severe 
adverse reactions in patients with high-density L o a  infections (about 1 in 10,000 treatments).
It is important to educate the population on the importance of compliance during mass chemotherapy.
Special efforts for vector control are not required as regards Lymphatic Filariasis. They should be carried out 
under other existing vector control programmes such as anti-malaria vector control operations.
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Lym phatic Filariasis
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
■ Map the distribution of Lymphatic Filariasis and identify implementation units that will require mass drug 
administration.
■ Analyze the drug coverage in implementation units.
■ Assess the decline of parasitological indices microfilaremia before starting MDA and after at least four rounds of 
MDA till the criteria of less than 1% microfilaraemia in the population and less than 0.1% antigenaemia in school 
entry children is achieved.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test • Night blood smear
• Filarial antigen test
Specimen
Blood smear 
Blood
When to collect
Night between 10pm and 2am 
Any time of the day
How to prepare, 
store, and transport Spread three drops of blood on a glass slide and spread across the slide to make three lines. After fixing with heat stain with Geimsa stain and examine under microscope 
Either a rapid ICT card test or by an lab based ELISA test
Results
Positive test is when microfilarieae of W. bancrofti is seen under the microscope 
Positive if filarial antigen is detected
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Lym phatic FilariasisReference
■ WHO. M on ito r in g  a n d  e p id em io lo g ica l a s s e s s m e n t  o f  the p ro g ra m m e  to elim inate lym phatic  filariasis at 
im plem entation  unit le ve l WHO/CDS/CPE/CEE/2005.50
■ WHO. L ym p h a t ic  filariasis. WHO/CDS/CPE/SMT/2001 .7
■ W H O . T ra in ing  m od u le  o n  lym ph atic  filariasis for d ru g  d istributors (in cou n tr ie s  w he re  o n c h o e r c ia s is  is  n o t  c o ­
endem ic). WHO/CDS/CPE/CEE/2000.10 (Parts 1 &2)
■ W H O . T ra in ing  m od u le  o n  lym ph atic  filariasis for d ru g  d istributors (in cou n tr ie s  w he re  o n c h o e r c ia s is  is  c o ­
endem ic). WHO/CDS/CPE/CEE/2000.11 (Parts 1 & 2)
■ W H O . The  p ro g ra m m e  to elim inate lym ph atic  filariasis -  e sse n t ia l e le m e n ts  for m e d ic a l p e r so n n e l  (in 
cou n trie s  w here  o n c h o e r c ia s is  is  n o t  co -en d em ic ). WHO/CDS/CPE/CEE/2000.12
■ W H O . The  p ro g ra m m e  to elim inate lym ph atic  filariasis -  e sse n t ia l e le m e n ts  for m e d ic a l p e r so n n e l  (in 
cou n trie s  w here  o n c h o e r c ia s is  is  co -en d em ic ). WHO/CDS/CPE/CEE/2000.13
■ WHO. P re p a r in g  a n d  im p lem entin g  a  n a tiona l p lan  to elim inate filariasis (in cou n tr ie s  w here  o n c h o e r c ia s is  is  
n ot  co -en d em ic ). WHO/CDS/CPE/CEE/2000.15
■ WHO. The  p ro g ra m m e  to elim inate lym ph atic  filariasis (in onchoerciasis co-endemic countries). 
WHO//CDS/CPE/CEE/2000.16 Webpage: www.who.int/lymphatic filariasis
296
M alariaBackground
■ Malaria is a highly prevalent tropical illness with fever following the bite of infected female Anopheles
mosquitoes which transmit a parasite, P la sm o d iu m  falciparum , P. ovale, P. vivax, or P. m alariae. Serious
malarial infections are usually due to P. fa lc iparum  which may result in severe anaemia and vital organ 
involvement.
■ Malaria is one of the leading causes of illness and death in many African countries. There are 900 000 deaths 
per year in Africa mainly in children less than 5 years of age and pregnant women.
■ Incubation period from the time of being bitten to onset of symptoms is 7 to 30 days. The incubation period
may be longer, especially with non- P. fa lc iparum  species.
■ Transmission of malaria is highly seasonal in some areas in African countries but is perennial in the rest of the 
region.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
Detect malaria epidemics promptly, especially in areas with seasonal epidemic transmission or with a 
large population at risk.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
U n c o m p lic a te d  m alaria
Any person living in area at risk of malaria with fever or history of fever within 24 hours; without signs of severe 
disease (vital organ dysfunction) is diagnosed clinically as malaria.
C o n firm e d  u n c o m p lic a te d  m a la ria
Any person with fever or history of fever within 24 hours; and with laboratory confirmation of diagnosis by malaria 
blood film or other diagnostic test for malaria parasites.
U n c o n firm e d  se ve re  m alaria
Any patient living in area at risk of malaria hospitalized with severe febrile disease with accompanying vital organ 
dysfunction diagnosed clinically.
C o n firm e d  S evere  m a la ria
Any patient hospitalized with P. fa lc iparum  asexual parasitaemia as confirmed by laboratory tests with 
accompanying symptoms and signs of severe disease (vital organ dysfunction) diagnosed through laboratory.
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R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If there is an unusual increase in the number of new malaria cases or deaths as compared to the same period in previous non-epidemic years:
Report suspected epidemic to the next level.
Treat with appropriate anti-malarial drugs according to national program recommendations.
Investigate the cause for the increase in new cases.
Make sure new cases in children age 2 months up to 5 years are managed according to IMCI guidelines. 
Conduct community education for prompt detection of cases and access to health facilities.
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If the number of new cases exceeds the upper limit of cases seen in a previous non-epidemic period in previous years:
Evaluate and improve, as needed, prevention strategies, such as use of ITNs and IRS for all at risk of 
malaria.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph the number of cases by month/week. Construct an epidemic curve during epidemics.
Place: Plot location of households for new cases and deaths.
Person: Count the number of new malaria cases and deaths by month and analyze age groups and time
of onset.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test Microscopy: Presence of malarial parasites in blood films for suspected cases 
Malaria Rapid diagnostic test: Positive or negative test
Specimen
Blood
Usually finger-stick sample for all ages or other accepted method for collecting blood 
from very young children
When to collect
F o r  b lo o d  sm e a r:  prepare blood film for all suspected cases admitted to inpatient 
facility, or according to national malaria case management guidelines
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How to prepare, store, 
and transport
B lo o d  sm e a r:
■ Collect blood directly onto correctly cleaned and labeled microscope slides and 
prepare thick and thin smears
■ Allow smears to dry thoroughly
■ Stain using the appropriate stain and technique
■ Store stained and thoroughly dried slides at room temperature out of direct sunlight 
F o r  rap id  d ia g n o st ic  test:
■ C o lle ct  s p e c im e n  a n d  perform  te st a c c o rd in g  to m a n u fa c tu re r s ’ in stru ction s
Results
Thick and thin smear results can be available the same day as preparation.
Microscopic examination of malarial slides may also reveal the presence of other blood- 
borne parasites.
RDT result is obtained immediately.
Note:
In the inpatient setting, perform a hemoglobin estimation laboratory test to confirm 
severe anaemia, in children 2 months to 5 years in age.
R e f e r e n c e
■ M ala ria  e p id e m ic s:  D e tection  a n d  control, fo re ca st in g  a n d  prevention. Geneva. World Health Organization. 
WH0/MAL/98.1084
■ B a s i c  L a b o ra to ry  M e th o d s  in  M e d ic a l  P a ra sito lo g y , WHO, Geneva, 1991
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Malaria Continued..
Note: Setting an epidemic threshold:
The national Malaria Control Program can assist districts and health centers with determining appropriate 
thresholds for detecting possible epidemics. In the absence of a threshold set by the national program, 
the following method can be used to determine the threshold level for a malaria epidemic. The threshold 
is determined using the median and the 3rd Quartile of a period of time (for example, 5-year data from a 
health facility or district by month/week):
1. Look at the number of malaria cases at a specific health facility or district by month/week for the
past 5 years.
2. Determine the median for each month/week (for example, each January for the last 5 years). 
Rank the monthly/weekly data for each month/week for the five years in ascending order. Identify 
the number in the middle of each month’s/week’s series for the five years. This is the median. 
Repeat this process for each month/week in the five years.
3. Determine the 3rd Quartile for the monthly/weekly series by identifying the 4th highest number
from the bottom in each data series (since data is ranked in ascending order). This is the 3rd
Quartile representing the upper limit of the expected normal number of malaria cases.
4. Plot the 3rd Quartile for each data series by month/week for the five year period and join the 
points with a line. The line represents the upper limit of the expected number of cases.
5. Plot the median for each data series by month/week for the five year period and join the points 
with a line. This line represents the lowest limit of expected number of cases.
6. The area between the two lines (the median and the 3rd Quartile) represents the “normal 
channel”. If the number of currently observed cases of malaria falls between the two lines, the 
number of new cases for that month/week is assumed to be “normal”. If the number is above the 
3rd Quartile (upper limit), this is an indication of a possible malaria epidemic.
Please note that to ensure early detection and control of malaria epidemics, it is preferable to use weekly 
surveillance data in Malaria epidemic prone areas.
S o u r c e :  W H O / A F R O  R e g io n a l  M a la ria  P ro g ra m
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M alnutritionBackground
■ Globally, maternal and child under-nutrition are underlying causes for 35  million deaths, including 35% of the 
disease burden in children younger than 5 years. Of the 40 countries with a child stunting prevalence of 40% 
or more, 23 are in Africa.
■ Severe malnutrition may act as a direct cause of death or an indirect cause by increasing dramatically the 
number of deaths in children suffering from common childhood illnesses such as diarrhea and pneumonia.
■ Despite the above, the burden of child mortality due to severe malnutrition remains largely absent from the 
international health agenda and few countries, even in high prevalence areas, have specific national policies 
aimed at addressing it comprehensively.
■ The most vulnerable are children under five and pregnant and lactating women. The poor nutritional status 
and nutritional intake of pregnant women may contribute to newborns with low birth weight (a weight 
measured immediately after birth). A newborn weighing less than 2500 grams (2.5 kilos or 5.5 pounds) is 
considered a newborn with low birth weight (LBW). LBW is a major determinant of death, illness and 
disability in infancy and childhood and also impacts health outcomes in adult life.
■ Socio-economic conditions, poor water and sanitation, mothers’ nutritional education on how to feed babies 
and young children, and repeated infections are the main causes of malnutrition.
■ Programmes elaborated to eradicate malnutrition are on food security, water and sanitation, promotion of 
infant and young children feeding practices, micronutrient supplementation programmes, management of 
severe cases of malnutrition in the communities and in the health facilities, management of infections mainly 
diarrhoeal disease.
■ Many sporadic surveys are being organized, but nutrition surveillance is currently poorly implemented and 
does not allow for interventions related to prevention and management of malnutrition.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
■ Early warning and problem identification.
■ Policy-making and planning.
■ Programme management and evaluation.
■ Assess effectiveness of public health response that address causes of low birth weight, malnutrition in 
children and malnutrition in pregnant women
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Low birth weight newborns:
Any new born with a birth weight less than 2500 grams (or 5.5 lbs)
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M alnutritionMalnutrition in children:
• Children under five who are underweight (indicator: weight for age<-2 ZScore)
• Children 6 to 59 months with MUAC<11.5 cm (high risk of mortality)
• Bilateral pitting oedema
Malnutrition in pregnant women:
Pregnant women given birth to low birth weight babies (birth weight < 2.5 Kg) (poor nutritional and health status 
of the women, can predict which population groups may benefit from improved antenatal care of women and 
neonatal care for infants).
R e s p o n s e  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If more than 20% of children are underweight:
Programme emphasis on
■ Breastfeeding support
■ Nutrition education
■ Supplementation of child and mother
■ Prevention and treatment of diarrhoea
■ Prevention and treatment of severe malnutrition
■ Socio-economic support
As soon as one case with MUAC less than 11.5 cm is detected or presence of bilateral oedema identified:
Alert, further investigation should be conducted. In addition, referral of the child to a therapeutic feeding 
programme.
If more or equal than 15% of low birth weight are less than 2.5 Kg:
Targeting interventions for improved antenatal care for women and neonatal care of infants including nutritional
care (anti-smoking and anti-alcohol campaigns, nutritional care for women before and during antenatal and
during lactating period, malaria prophylaxis, new-born care facilities, etc.) to those at risk of poor pregnancy 
outcomes and treat new born to prevent morbidity and death.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases monthly to analyze trends and weekly in emergency
Place: Plot location of households/community with cases
Person: Count monthly/weekly cases and analyze age and gender distribution
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.
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M alnutritionReference
■ Black R.E. et al. M ate rn a l a n d  C h ild  Undernutrition: g lo b a l a n d  re g io n a l e x p o su re s  a n d  health  
c o n se q u e n c e s .  The Lancet, Volume 371, Issue 9608, Pages 243 -  260
■ Gross R, Webb P, W a st in g  time for w a s te d  ch ildren: s e v e r e  ch ild  undernutrition m u s t  b e  r e s o lv e d  in n o n ­
e m e rg e n c y  settings. Lancet 2006; 367: 1209-1211
■ P h y s ic a l  sta tu s: the u s e  a n d  interpretation o f  a n th rop om etry . Report of a WHO Expert Committee.WHO 
Technical Report Series, 1995, No 854: 81, 128-130, 198-208
■ WHO child growth standards and the identification of severe acute malnutrition in infants and children. A Joint 
Statement by the World Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fund
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M aternal Deaths
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
■ Deaths during pregnancy, childbirth or termination of pregnancy, and deaths up to 6 weeks (42 days) after 
childbirth or termination of pregnancy related to pregnancy are considered Maternal Deaths.
■ Globally, about 80% of maternal deaths are due to; severe bleeding (mostly bleeding postpartum), infections 
(also mostly soon after delivery), hypertensive disorders in pregnancy (eclampsia) and obstructed labor. 
Complications after unsafe abortion cause 13% of maternal deaths.
■ Across the developing world, maternal mortality levels remain too high, with more than 500,000 women dying 
every year as a result of complications during pregnancy and childbirth. About half of these deaths occur in 
sub-Saharan Africa where a woman’s lifetime risk of maternal death is 1 in 22, compared with 1 in 8,000 in 
industrialized countries.
■ Hemorrhage is the leading cause of maternal death in sub-Saharan Africa, and unattended births are a 
particular risk, especially in rural areas where transport to health care facilities is a problem.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
■ Estimate and monitor maternal mortality rates.
■ Identify risk factors and high risk areas for maternal mortality to inform program decisions.
■ Evaluate programs aimed at reducing maternal mortality.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
The death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of the delivery or termination of the pregnancy, 
irrespective of the duration and site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy 
or its management but not from accidental or incidental causes.
R e c o m m e n d e d  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  a c t i o n
■ Establish alert thresholds to allow health facility or district health personnel determine when special targeted 
interventions are necessary.
■ Monitor trends and respond to alert thresholds.
■ Increase availability and use of antenatal care.
■ Provide specialized training to traditional and profession birth attendants.
■ Support interventions to improve recognition and response to high-risk pregnancies at the community level.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a ___________________________________________________________________
Time: Graph cases to construct an epidemic curve throughout the year in order to identify trends.
Place: Plot the location of cases and analyze the distribution.
Person: Analyze the distribution of cases by age and other demographic factors.
3Q4
M aternal Deaths
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.
R e f e r e n c e
■ WHO Maternal Mortality
http://www.who.int/making pregnancy safer/topics/maternal mortality/en/index.html
■ UNICEF http://www.unicef.org/index.php
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M easles
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
■ Measles is a febrile rash illness due to paramyxovirus (M orbillivirus) transmitted human-to-human via airborne 
droplet spread. It is the fourth leading cause of death in children less than 5 years of age in many African 
countries.
■ The incubation period is 7 to 18 days from exposure to onset of fever.
■ Among children with vitamin A deficiency and malnutrition, measles may result in severe illness due to the 
virus itself and associated bacterial infections, especially pneumonia; only the minority of cases are severe.
■ Measles is among the most transmissible of human infections. Large outbreaks occur every few years in 
areas with low vaccine coverage and where there is an accumulation of persons who have never been 
infected or vaccinated. The true incidence of measles far exceeds reported cases.
■ Risk factors include low vaccine coverage (<85 to 90%) which allows accumulation of susceptible persons at 
high risk for measles. Outbreaks can be explosive in areas of high population density.
■ Other viral illnesses such as rubella may cause or contribute to similar outbreaks.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
■ Detect outbreaks of fever with rash illness promptly:
In  cou n tr ie s  with a  m e a s le s  e lim ination  target: immediate case-based reporting of suspected cases and deaths of 
fever with rash illness; confirm all suspected measles cases with laboratory test (usually serum IgM)
In  cou n tr ie s  with a c ce le ra te d  m e a s le s  contro l p ro g ra m s:  Summary reporting of cases and deaths for routine 
surveillance and outbreaks; confirm the first five cases of suspected measles in a health facility per week with 
laboratory test (usually serum IgM)
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c te d  case:
Any person with fever and maculopapular (non-vesicular) generalized rash and cough, coryza or conjunctivitis 
(red eyes) or any person in whom a clinician suspects measles.
C o n firm e d  case:
A suspected case with laboratory confirmation (positive IgM antibody) or epidemiological link to confirmed cases 
in an outbreak.
3Q6
M easles
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If an outbreak is suspected:
■ Report suspected case to the next level.
■ Collect blood sample for confirming the outbreak.
■ Treat cases with oral rehydration, vitamin A, and antibiotics for prevention of bacterial super-infection. Use 
airborne isolation precautions where feasible.
■ Investigate the case or outbreak to identify causes for outbreak.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If an outbreak is confirmed:
■ Improve routine vaccine coverage through the EPI, and lead supplemental vaccination activities in areas of 
low vaccine coverage.
■ Mobilize the community early to enable rapid case detection and treatment.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph weekly cases and deaths. Construct epidemic curve for outbreak cases.
Place: Plot location of case households.
Person: Count total cases and analyze by age group and immunization status.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Presence of IgM antibodies to measles virus in serum.
Specimen
Serum 
Whole blood
When to collect the 
specimen Collect specimens between the 3rd day of the rash and 28th day after onset of rash.
Collect blood samples on 5 suspected measles cases when the number of cases exceeds 
the measles outbreak threshold (usually more than 5 cases in a district in a month).
In countries with an elimination target:
■ Collect specimen from every suspected case of measles
■ Collect serum for antibody testing at first opportunity or first visit to the health facility.
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How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
■ For children, collect 1 to 5 ml of venous blood depending on size of child. Collect into 
a test tube, capillary tube or microtainer.
■ Separate blood cells from serum. Let clot retract for 30 to 60 minutes at room 
temperature. Centrifuge at 2000 rpm for 10-20 minutes and pour off serum into a 
clean glass tube.
■ If no centrifuge, put sample in refrigerator overnight (4 to 6 hours) until clot retracts. 
Pour off serum the next morning.
■ If no centrifuge and no refrigerator, let blood sit at an angle for at least 60 minutes. 
(without shaking or being driven in a vehicle). Pour off serum into a clean tube.
■ Store serum at 4°C.
■ Transport serum samples using appropriate packaging to prevent breaking or leaks 
during transport.
Results
The specimen should arrive at the laboratory within 3 days of being collected.
Results are usually available after 7 days.
If as few as 2 out of 5 suspected measles cases are laboratory confirmed, the outbreak is 
confirmed.
Avoid shaking of specimen before serum has been collected.
To prevent bacterial overgrowth, ensure that the serum is poured into a clean glass test 
tube. The test tube does not need to be sterile, just clean.
T ransport the serum in an EPI hand vaccine carrier to 4°C to 8°C to prevent bacterial 
overgrowth (up to 7 days). If not refrigerated, serum stored in a clean tube will be good 
for at least 3 days.
R e f e r e n c e
■ U s in g  su rve illa n ce  data  a n d  ou tb re ak  in ve st ig a t io n s  to stren gth en  m e a s le s  im m unization  p ro g ra m s,  Geneva, 
World Health Organization. WHO/EPI/GEN/96.02
■ W H O  G u id e lin e s  for E p id e m ic  P r e p a r e d n e s s  a n d  R e s p o n s e  to M e a s le s  O u tb re a k s  WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.1
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M eningococcal M eningitis
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
■ N e is se r ia  m eningitid is, H a e m o p h ilu s  in flu enzae  type b (Hib), and S t r e p to c o c c u s  p n e u m o n ia e  constitute the 
majority of all cases of bacterial meningitis and 90% of bacterial meningitis in children.
■ Meningococcal meningitis is the main form of meningitis to cause epidemics and remains a major public 
health challenge in the African meningitis belt, an area that extends from Senegal to Ethiopia. In these 
countries, large outbreaks may occur during the dry season (e.g., November through May). Outside of the 
meningitis belt, smaller outbreaks may occur year-round.
■ Epidemics in the meningitis belt are traditionally associated with N e is se r ia  m e n in g it id e s  serogroup A although 
in 2002 an epidemic due to Nm serogroup W135 occurred in Burkina and in 2006 Nm serogroup X was 
isolated in Niger.
■ Human-to-human disease transmission is via large respiratory droplets from the nose and throats of infected 
people.
■ Incubation period is 2 to 10 days.
■ Attack rates are highest among children aged less than 15 years. Case fatality rates are usually 8-15% 
among treated patients, and >70% among untreated cases. Many survivors suffer long-term sequelae 
including mental retardation, hearing loss and loss of limb use.
■ Oily chloramphenicol is the drug of choice during epidemics because a single dose of this long-acting 
formulation has been shown to be effective. Antimicrobial resistance to chloramphenicol has not yet been 
detected in Africa; however, resistance to sulphonamides is widespread.
■ The current response to meningitis epidemics consists of reactive mass vaccination campaigns with bivalent 
(A and C) and/or trivalent polysaccharide vaccine (A, C, and W135) as soon as possible after an epidemic 
has been declared. Polysaccharide vaccines do not protect very young children and only provide protection 
for up to three years resulting in repetitive meningitis outbreaks.
■ A meningococcal A conjugate vaccine has been developed which is immunogenic in both infants and adults 
and is expected to confer long-term protection. It is expected that introduction of this conjugate vaccine into 
meningitis belt countries is likely to dramatically reduce the circulation of Nm A and eliminate Nm A 
epidemics.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l s
■ To promptly detect meningitis outbreaks and to confirm aetiology of meningitis outbreaks.
■ To use the data to plan for treatment and vaccination supplies and other prevention and control measures.
■ To assess and monitor the spread and progress of the epidemic and the effectiveness of control measures.
■ To monitor the situation including serogroup shifts throughout the year.
■ To perform periodic susceptibility testing for penicillin and chloramphenicol.
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M eningococcal M eningitis
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
S u s p e c t e d  c a s e :  Any person with sudden onset of fever (>38.5°C rectal or 38.0°C axillary) and one of the 
following signs: neck stiffness, altered consciousness or other meningeal signs.
C o n f i r m e d  c a s e :  A suspected case confirmed by isolation of N. m en ing it id is  from CSF or blood.
R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
Alert threshold:
■ For populations between 30 000 and 100 000 inhabitants, an attack rate of 5 cases per 100 000 inhabitants
per week.
■ For populations less than 30 000 inhabitants, 2 cases in 1 week or an increase in the number compared to
the same time in previous non-epidemic years.
Respond to alert threshold:
■ Inform next level of health system
■ Record cases on a line listing form
■ Investigate and laboratory confirm the cases
■ Treat all suspected cases with appropriate antibiotics as recommended by National protocol
■ Intensify surveillance for additional cases in the area
■ Prepare to conduct a mass vaccination campaign
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
Epidemic threshold:
■ For populations between 30 000 and 100,000: an attack rate of 15 cases per 100 000 inhabitants per week.
When the risk of an epidemic is high (no epidemic during last 3 years, alert threshold reached in dry 
season), epidemic threshold is 10 cases per 100 000 inhabitants per week.
■ For populations less than 30 000 inhabitants: 5 cases in 1 week or the doubling of the number of cases over
a 3-week period.
Respond to epidemic threshold:
■ Immediately vaccinate the epidemic district as well as any contiguous districts in alert phase.
■ Mobilize community to permit early case detection and treatment, and improve vaccine coverage during 
mass vaccination campaigns for outbreak control.
■ Continue data collection, transmission and analysis.
■ Maintain regular collection of 5-10 CSF specimens per week throughout the epidemic season in all affected
districts to detect possible serogroup shift.
■ Treat all cases with appropriate antibiotics as recommended by National protocol.
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M eningococcal M eningitis
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: In meningitis belt countries during epidemic season, graph weekly cases and deaths. Otherwise, graph 
monthly trends in cases and deaths. Construct an epidemic curve for outbreak cases.
Place: In epidemics (not in endemic situations), plot location of case households and estimate distance to the 
nearest health facility.
Person: Count total sporadic and outbreak cases. Analyze age distribution.
Target case fatality rate: <10%
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Microscopic examination of CSF for Gram negative diplococci 
Culture and isolation of N. m en ing itid is  from CSF
Specimen
Cerebral spinal fluid (CSF)
Note: CSF is the specimen of choice for culture and microscopic exam. If CSF not 
available, collect blood (10 ml adults, 1-5 ml for children) for culture.
W hen to collect the  
specim en Collect specimens from 5 to 10 cases once the alert or epidemic threshold (see 
“Meningitis” in Section 8.0) has been reached.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
■ Prepare the patient and aseptically collect CSF into sterile test tubes with tops.
■ Immediately place 1 ml of CSF into a pre-warmed bottle of trans-isolate medium.
■ Incubate at body temperature (36C to 37C).
■ Never refrigerate specimens that will be cultured.
Keep CSF for microscopic exam and chemistry in the original syringe (replace cap). 
Refrigerate the capped syringe and send it to the laboratory as soon as possible.
311
M eningococcal M eningitis
Results
Isolation of N e ise r ia  m eningitid is, a fastidious organism, is expensive, and difficult. It 
requires excellent techniques for specimen collection and handling and expensive media 
and antisera.
Initial specimens in an outbreak or for singly occurring isolates of N. m en ing it is  should be 
serotyped and an antibiogram performed to ensure appropriate treatment.
Trans Isolate medium (TI) is stable. If properly stored at temperature (4°C) it can be kept 
for up to two years after preparation. In the refrigerator, the liquid phase turns gelatinous 
but reliquifies at room temperature. Unused TI bottles should be kept tightly sealed. If 
there is any colour change (yellowing or clouding of the liquid medium) or drying or 
shrinkage of the agar slant, the medium should not be used.
R e f e r e n c e
■ Weekly Epidemiological Record N 38, September 2000 (http://www.who.int/wer/pdf/2000/wer7538.pdf)
■ W H O  R e g io n a l  Office for A frica  S ta n d a rd  O p e ra t in g  P ro c e d u r e s  for E n h a n c e d  M e n in g it is  Su rve illa n ce  in 
Africa, August 2009
■ Con tro l o f  e p id e m ic  m e n in g o c o c c a l  d ise a se .  WHO Practical Guidelines, 2nd Edition. WHO/EMC/BAC/98.3
■ La b o ra to ry  M e th o d s  for the D ia g n o s i s  o f  M e n in g it is  C a u s e d  b y  N e is se r ia  m eningitid is, S t r e p to c o c c u s  
p n e u m o n ia e  a n d  H a e m o p h ilu s  influenza. WHO document WHO/CDS/EDC/99.7 WHO, Geneva
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Mental Illness (Epilepsy)
B a c k g r o u n d _______________________________________________________________________________________
■ Epilepsy is defined as the recurrence of, at least, two epileptic seizures with sudden occurrence of abnormal 
signs which could be: motor, tonic, sensitive, sensorial, neuro-vegetative, or psycho-behavioral. These 
symptoms could or could not be associated to a loss of conscience. It can appear at any age.
■ Epilepsy is the most common result of brain cells disturbance that lead to excessive nerve-cell discharges. 
According to the disturbance on some or many groups of cells, seizures could be partial or generalized.
■ Seizures with tonic-clonic muscle movements are named convulsion or fit or attack. Convulsion can appear at 
any age; all convulsions are not systematically epilepsy.
■ Epilepsy is frequent in the Region and its prevalence rate range from 2.2 to 58 per 1000. Studies from five 
sub-Saharan African countries showed an incidence ranging from 64 to 156 per 100,000 person/year.
■ This higher incidence may be a consequence of many risk factors which are related with predisposing factors 
such as poor perinatal care, head trauma, consanguinity.
■ Many etiological factors are related with communicable diseases (malaria, tuberculosis, meningitis, 
neurocysticerocisis and HIV), non-communicable diseases (high blood pressure, diabetes, alcoholism and 
illicit drug use), poorer medical facilities, poorer general health and a lower standard of living. 
Misunderstanding linked to cultural beliefs, sigma and exclusion do not facilitate appropriate care.
■ Epilepsy substantially increases mortality risk, particularly in conditions of later detection due to lack of well 
trained health workers to diagnose and treat neurological disorders.
■ Death and injury occur primarily due to status epilepticus (especially in the case of abrupt medication 
withdrawal), burns and drowning.
■ It has been estimated that in developing countries, up to 80% of people with epilepsy are not receiving 
treatment, or are often not even identified. While the etiological diagnosis of the epilepsies may be more 
difficult in developing countries, due to limited investigative resources, many can be diagnosed on the basis 
of simple clinical and epidemiological knowledge.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l _______________________________________________________________________________
■ Early detection and immediate intervention to prevent morbidity and mortality rates associated with epilepsy
■ Register and monitor epilepsy cases
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__________________ Mental Illness (Epilepsy)
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case: Any person with one epileptic seizure
Suspected new case: Report only the first diagnostic of the case in the health centre 
Confirmed case:
Any person with recurrence of, at least, two epileptic seizures. A positive response to treatment with any AED 
strengthens the hypothesis of a confirmed case. Epileptic seizures can last for 30 seconds to 3 minutes. When 
they are intricate without a pause, they can lead to status epilepticus.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
Suspected cases
■ All health personnel should check for early signs of epilepsy. Diagnosis should include good interviews 
(describing as precisely as possible the seizure type) and clinical examination.
■ Once diagnosed, search for underlying and associated causes. Check for abnormal increases on number 
of cases and propose appropriate environmental measures if needed.
Confirmed cases
■ Immediate treatment should be ensured starting with low doses of any anti epileptic drug then increasing
progressively until an effective steady state. In case of poor seizure control management strategies must
be: increase the dose or try an alternative drug, refer to an upper level health structure.
■ Referral to higher level health structure should be done if seizures continue regardless of pharmacological 
treatment or if first seizure occurs in an adult aged 30 and above.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
All cases: Information and education measures on epilepsy and risk factors at community level
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Person: Analyse sex and age distribution (by age group from 6 years onwards)
Time: Graph quarterly cases
Place: Plot the distribution by area of residence
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Mental Illness (Epilepsy)
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
■ Blood glucose (random capillary blood, and venous blood sugar), electrolytes to 
exclude other conditions such as diabetes, kidney pathology.
■ Exclude other conditions such as Cerebral Malaria, meningitis, toxoplasmosis; 
cerebro calcifications follow tuberculosis (tuberculoma), parasitic diseases and 
others by conducting appropriate medical investigations.
Specimen
Blood, and cerebro-spinal fluid
When to collect the 
specimen Glucose -  During the emergency admission of the patient (random blood glucose) 
Confirmed subsequently (fasting blood glucose)
How to prepare, store, 
and transport the 
specimen Use universal precautions to minimize exposure to sharps and any body fluid
Results Results are always available within 1 to 3 hours from arrival in the laboratory
R e f e r e n c e s :
■ WHO, Epilepsy in the WHO African Region: Bridging the Gap, WHO Regional Office for Africa, Congo, 2004
■ WHO, Epilepsy: a manual for medical and clinical officers in Africa, WHO, Geneva 2002
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Neonatal tetanus
B a c k g r o u n d _______________________________________________________________________________________
■ A neuromuscular toxin-mediated illness caused by the anaerobic spore-forming soil bacterium Clostridium 
tetani. The disease is transmitted when spores enter open wounds (injections, cutting the umbilical cord) or 
breaks in the skin.
■ While tetanus may occur in adults, infection primarily affects newborns. Neonatal tetanus has decreased 
dramatically in countries with improved maternal tetanus immunization rates. As a result, tetanus is targeted 
for elimination in many African countries.
■ Incubation period is 3 to 21 days, with an average of approximately 6 days.
■ Risk factors: Unclean cord care practices during delivery for neonates. Lack of antibody protection in
incompletely immunized mothers.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
■ Detect cases of neonatal tetanus immediately to confirm the case and prevent additional cases by immunizing 
at least pregnant women in area around the confirmed case.
■ Identify high risk areas and target tetanus toxoid campaigns to women of childbearing age.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n ________________________________________________________________________
Suspected case:
Any newborn with a normal ability to suck and cry during the first two days of life, and who, between the 3rd and
28th day of age, cannot suck normally, and becomes stiff or has convulsions or both.
Confirm ed case:
No laboratory confirmation recommended.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
■ Report case-based information immediately to the next level.
■ Conduct an investigation to determine the risk for transmission.
■ Treat and manage the case according to national recommendations, usually with supportive care and, if
feasible, in intensive care. No routine isolation precautions are needed.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a case is confirmed through investigation:
■ Immunize the mother and other pregnant women in the same locality as the case with at least 2 doses of
tetanus toxoid.
■ Conduct a supplemental immunization activity for women of childbearing age in the locality.
■ Improve routine vaccine coverage through EPI and maternal immunization program activities.
■ Educate birth attendants and women of childbearing age on the need for clean cord cutting and care.
Increase the number of trained birth attendants.
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Neonatal tetanus
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths monthly. Target should reflect elimination target for each district.
Place: Plot location of case households and location of birth attendants.
Person: Count monthly cases and deaths. Analyze each case of NNT by cord care practices.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Laboratory confirmation is not required.
R e f e r e n c e
■ Field manual for neonatal tetanus elimination. Geneva, World Health Organization. WHO/V&B/99.14
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N ew  AID S Cases
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
■ AIDS is an infection of human lymphocytes (types of white blood cells) and other organs. It is caused by a 
retrovirus, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Sexual intercourse, needle injections, transfusions, trans­
placental or trans-vaginal routes, breast milk or other direct contact with infected human body fluids transmits 
the virus from human to human.
■ Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) results in late-stage HIV infection and immuno-suppression, 
with reduced numbers and function to T-lymphocytes. Primary HIV-related organ involvement and a variety of 
opportunistic infections result in death unless the growth of the virus is stopped by drugs that can kill the virus 
(antiretroviral therapy). When HIV infection progresses to illness, the symptoms are usually due to the failure 
of the immune system to resist other infectious diseases called opportunistic infections (OI). These include 
tuberculosis, bacterial pneumonia or sepsis, oro-pharyngeal candidiasis, chronic diarrhoea, chronic skin 
infections, recurrent herpes zoster, and others.
■ Twenty-four million Africans, close to one in ten adults between the ages of 15 and 49 years of age, are living 
with HIV/AIDS. The impact of the epidemic is already measurable in greatly increased adult and child 
morbidity and mortality. HIV/AIDS is now the leading cause of adult mortality in the African Region.
■ Incubation period is approximately 1 to 3 months from the time of infection to the time that antibodies can be 
detected in a laboratory process. The time from HIV infection to the onset of AIDS is generally 7 to 9 years.
■ Risk factors: populations at high risk of acquiring HIV are commercial sex workers with or without other 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs). Some STIs may increase HIV transmission. Others at risk include 
intravenous drug users (IDU), recipients of unscreened blood products and neonates born to HIV-infected 
mothers.
■ Tuberculosis, visceral leishmaniasis, trypanosomiasis, and other subacute or chronic bacterial, parasitic, and 
viral infections may cause similar syndromes.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
■ Monitor the impact of HIV/AIDS interventions in trends of incidence and prevalence of HIV infections, AIDS 
and STIs through sentinel sites, surveys and special studies (according to guidelines for second generation 
surveillance of HIV/AIDS).
■ Estimate the burden of HIV/AIDS in the district using available information from HIV sentinel populations so 
that each new AIDS case is counted.
■ Monitor local STI epidemiology as possible cofactor for HIV transmission.
■ Monitor local opportunistic infection epidemiology, including TB.
■ Improve percentage of suspected HIV/AIDS cases confirmed via serology.
■ Improve HIV/AIDS screening.
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N ew  AID S Cases
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
WHO/AFRO recommends that countries use either Bangui or Abidjan HIV/AIDSR case definitions. A positive 
ELISA for confirming HIV and a rapid test for confirming the positive results are sufficient for an epidemiologic 
case definition for HIV infection.
P u b l i c  h e a l t h  a c t i o n s
■ Monitor local STI and opportunistic infections, including TB, as possible cofactor for HIV.
■ Improve percentage of suspected HIV/AIDS cases confirmed via serology.
■ Monitor use of condoms by commercial sex workers.
■ Provide voluntary counselling and testing services at district and sub-district levels.
■ Treatment of individual cases with antiretroviral therapy is not yet widely available in most African countries. 
Rapid diagnosis and treatment of AIDS-related opportunistic infection (OI) may prolong life expectancy but 
this has not been widely evaluated in developing countries.
■ Promote condom use, especially among high-risk individuals.
■ Treat STIs, especially syphilis, chancroid diseases, and other ulcerative processes.
■ Mobilize non-paid blood donors and promote appropriate use of blood.
■ Promote good infection control practices within health facilities in the district.
■ Educate patients and their sexual partners to refrain from donating blood, tissues, semen or breast milk.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a ____________________________________________________________________
Time: Count new AIDS cases and report monthly. Analyze by number of cases confirmed with serology. At the 
end of the year, calculate the total number of cases and include trends for HIV sero-surveillance, STI 
surveillance and results of any special studies (socio-behavioural studies, drug sensitivity to antimicrobial 
agents, and so on).
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N ew  AID S Cases
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Adults and children 18 months or older:
HIV infection is diagnosed based on:
■ Positive HIV antibody testing (rapid or laboratory- based enzyme immunoassay). This 
is confirmed by a second HIV antibody test (rapid or laboratory-based enzyme 
immunoassay) relying on different antigens or of different operating characteristics. 
AND/OR
■ Positive virological test for HIV or its components (HIV-RNA or HIV-DNA or 
ultrasensitive HIV p24 antigen) confirmed by a second virological test obtained from a 
separate determination.
Children younger than 18 months:
HIV infection is diagnosed based on positive virological test for HIV or its components 
(HIV-RNA or HIV-DNA or ultrasensitive HIV p24 antigen) confirmed by a second 
virological test obtained from a separate determination taken more than four weeks after 
birth.
Positive HIV antibody testing is not recommended for definitive or confirmatory diagnosis 
of HIV infection in children until 18 months of age.
Specimen
Serum
When to collect the specimen Obtain specimens according to national HIV/AIDS program strategy for clinical or 
epidemiological sampling.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
Use universal precautions to minimize exposure to sharps and any body fluid.
ELISA: Collect 10 ml of venous blood.
■ Let clot retract for 30 to 60 minutes at room temperature or centrifuge to separate 
serum from red blood cells.
■ Aseptically pour off serum into sterile, screw capped tubes.
■ Store serum at 4°C.
■ Transport serum samples using appropriate packaging to prevent breakage or 
leakage.
Results
HIV testing is highly regulated with strict controls on release of information. Results are 
usually available within one week from arrival in the laboratory.
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N ew  AID S CasesReference
■ Guidelines for Sexually Transmitted Infections Surveillance. Geneva. UNAIDS and World Health Organization. 
WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/99.3. UNAIDS/99.33E
■ WHO Case definitions of HIV for surveillance and revised clinical staging and immunological classification of 
HIV-Related disease in adults and children
■ WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
■ Guidelines for Second Generation HIV Surveillance, WHO and UNAIDS, 2000 WHO/CDC/CSR/EDC/2000.5
■ Consultation on technical and operational recommendations for clinical laboratory testing harmonization and 
standardization, Jan 2008, WHO, CDC
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Noma
B a c k g r o u n d _______________________________________________________________________________________
■ Noma (cancrum oris, stomatitis gangrenosa) is an opportunistic bacterial infection affecting children 1-4 years 
characterized by quickly spreading orofacial gangrene, evolving from a gingival inflammation.
■ Noma results from complex interactions between risk factors such as poor sanitation, malnutrition, recurrent 
illnesses, and compromised immunity. Diseases that commonly precede noma include measles, malaria, 
severe diarrhea, and necrotizing ulcerative gingivitis.
■ Noma occurs worldwide, but is most common in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1998, WHO estimated that worldwide 
140 000 children contract noma each year, and 79% of them die from the disease and associated 
complications.
■ In Africa the highest prevalence of Noma occurs in countries bordering the Sahara desert, where a recent 
report estimates an annual incidence of 25,000. However, Noma can occur wherever there is extreme 
poverty.
■ Early detection and treatment with antibiotics is key to preventing severe disfigurement or death. In the acute 
stage, death can be prevented with high doses of penicillin; however disfigurement can only be treated with 
costly surgery.
■ Prevention should focus on education and awareness of the disease, improved nutrition and household 
hygiene, promotion of exclusive breastfeeding in the first 3-6 months of life, access to prenatal care, and 
immunizations against common childhood diseases.
■ Clinical features include soreness of the mouth, pronounced halitosis (bad smelling breath), fetid taste, 
tenderness of the lip or cheek, cervical lymphadenopathy, a foul-smelling purulent oral discharge, and a blue- 
black discoloration of the skin and swelling in the affected area.
■ Health workers should recognize risk factors for Noma:
o Severe growth failure in first 6 months of lifeo Evidence of malnutrition and poor dietary habitso Persistent diarrheao Oral ulcers in children from high risk areas o Prominent bad smelling breath
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
■ Early detection and treatment of cases
■ Identification of high risk communities and families
■ Estimation of disease incidence and identification of risk factors
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Noma
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected new case:
Any child with a mouth ulcer and other warning signs such as; malnutrition, poor hygiene, recent illness from; 
measles, persistent diarrhoea, or malaria should be regarded as a potential noma case.
Confirmed new case:
Any person with a gangrenous disease which starts as gingival ulceration and spreads rapidly through the 
tissues of the mouth and face, destroying the soft and hard tissues.
R e c o m m e n d e d  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  a c t i o n
When a suspected case is detected:
■ Treat the case with nationally recommended antibiotic
■ Conduct health promotion activities in the community for:
o Awareness of Noma among the community and in the household 
o Improved environmental sanitation and personal hygiene 
o Separation of livestock from areas where humans live 
o Exclusive breast feeding for the first 6 months of life 
o Improved nutrition and food preparation techniques
■ Increase vaccination coverage in the district
■ Improve sources of drinking water in at-risk communities
■ Train public health personnel on early recognition of oral lesions that can lead to Noma
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a ________________________________________________________________
Time: Monitor number of cases detected in time for treatment and use of standardized treatment. Monitor
cases over time to estimate burden of disease and identify trends.
Place: Plot the location of case households and analyze the distribution.
Person: Analyze the distribution of cases by age and other demographic factors.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.
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NomaReference
■ Enwonwu, C. (2006). Noma--the ulcer o f extreme poverty. New England Journal of Medicine, The 354(3): 
221-224
■ Enwonwu, C., W. Falkler, et al. (2006). Noma (cancrum oris). The Lancet 368(9530): 147-156
■ Fieger, A., K. Marck, et al. (2003). An estimation o f the incidence o f noma in north-west Nigeria. Tropical 
medicine & international health 8(5): 402-407
■ Enwonwu, C. O. (1995). Noma: a neglected scourge o f children in sub-Saharan Africa. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 73(4): 541-545
■ Enwonwu, C. O., W. A. Falkler, et al. (1999). Pathogenesis o f cancrum oris (noma): confounding interactions 
of malnutrition with infection. The American journal of tropical medicine and hygiene 60(2): 223-232
324
O nchocerciasis
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Filarial infection of the skin and eye caused by Onchocerca volvulus transmitted by the bite of female 
Simulium black flies.
• Nearly all of the world’s estimated 18 million infected persons (of whom more than 250 000 are blind) live 
within 26 African countries. Onchocerciasis is the second leading infectious cause of blindness worldwide. It 
causes debilitating skin problems, leading to significant decreases in productivity in areas where it is endemic. 
Entire villages have relocated away from the fertile lands near rivers where black flies breed.
• Incubation period is years to decades since repeated infection is necessary for disease manifestations.
Clinical illness is unusual in children even in endemic areas.
• Other filaria (for example, Loa loa and Mansonella) and other chronic skin and eye disease can produce 
similar clinical findings.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Early detection with goal of reducing the recurrence of transmission of the parasite in areas where it has been 
eradicated (zones covered by the Onchocerciasis Program).
• Conduct periodic surveillance in sentinel villages: screen using diethylcarbamzaine (DEC); in case of a 
positive reaction to DEC, confirm with a microscopic examination of a skin biopsy from each suspected case.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case: In an endemic area, any person with fibrous nodules in subcutaneous tissues.
Confirm ed case: A suspected case that is laboratory confirmed by presence of one or more of the following: 
microfilariae in skin snips, adult worms in excised nodules, or typical ocular manifestations (such as slit-lamp 
observations of microfilariae in the cornea, the anterior chamber, or the vitreous body).
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a suspected case is detected:
• Report the case according to national guidelines
• Collect specimen for confirming the case
• Investigate the case to determine the cause of the case
• Treat the case according to national guidelines
325
O nchocerciasis
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a case is confirmed:
• Conduct a migration investigation to identify the origins of infection and initiate control activities.
• Carry out vector control activities according to OCP guidelines.
• Conduct periodic mass treatment with ivermectin in areas with endemic onchocerciasis during the last 10 
years.
• Conduct active case finding via population-based surveys and skin snips.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases quarterly
Place: Plot distribution of patients’ household and workplaces 
Person: Count quarterly cases and analyze age distribution
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Microscopy
Laboratory criteria for confirmation: One or more of the following:
• presence of microfilariae in skin snips taken from the iliac crest
• presence of adult worms in excised nodules
presence of typical ocular manifestations, such as slit-lamp observations of microfilariae 
in the cornea, the anterior chamber, or the vitreous body.
Specimen Skin snips from:
• Nodule fluids
• Iliac crests
• Scapula area
When to collect
Take snips and nodule fluids from suspected cases Ihour after administration of Diethyl 
carbomazine.
How to prepare, store, and transport 
the specimen
Put the sample in a general container. Add a few drops of normal saline. Close it tightly 
before transporting it to the laboratory. Transported at ambient temperature.
Results
Result should be ready within 1 day.
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O nchocerciasis
R e f e r e n c e
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards. Second edition. WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
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Plague
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Zoonotic systemic bacterial infection caused by Yersinia pestis (plague bacillus) usually transmitted to 
humans by rodents and their fleas.
• Main disease forms: bubonic, pneumonic, and septicaemic; large-scale epidemics may occur in urban or rural 
settings.
• Incubation period is 1 to 7 days.
• Case fatality rate (CFR) may exceed 50-60% in untreated bubonic plague and approaches 100% in untreated 
pneumonic or septicaemic plague, but is usually <1% with appropriate treatment.
• Risk factor: rural residence. Exposure to infected populations of wild or domesticated rodents and their fleas.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Detect outbreaks of plague promptly. Verify aetiology of all suspected non-outbreak-related cases and the first 
5 to 10 outbreak-related cases.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case:
Any person with sudden onset of fever, chills, headache, severe malaise, prostration and very painful swelling of 
lymph nodes, or cough with blood stained sputum, chest pain, and difficulty in breathing.
Confirm ed case:
Suspected case confirmed by isolation of Yersinia pestis from blood or aspiration of buboes, or epidemiologic link 
to confirmed cases or outbreak.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
• Report case-based information to the next level.
• Collect specimen for confirming the case.
• Investigate the case.
• Treat the patient with streptomycin, gentamicin or chloramphenicol, and administer chemoprophylaxis of close
contacts with tetracycline for seven days from time of last exposure.
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PlagueRespond to action threshold
If the suspected case is confirmed:
• Isolate patients and contacts of pneumonic plague with precautions against airborne spread (wear masks, for 
example) until at least after 48 hours of appropriate antibiotic therapy.
• Mobilize community to enable rapid case detection and treatment, and to recognize mass rodent die-off as a
sign of possible impending epidemic.
• Identify high risk population groups through person, place, and time analysis.
• Reduce sporadic and outbreak-related cases via improved control or rodent populations (remove trash, food
sources, and rat harbourages) and protect against fleas with insect repellent on skin and clothing and 
environmental flea control (especially in homes and seaports and airports).
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph monthly trends in cases and deaths. Construct epidemic curve for outbreak cases.
Place: Plot the location of case households.
Person: Immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths for routine surveillance. Count weekly cases
and deaths for outbreaks. Analyze age distribution and assess risk factors to improve control of 
sporadic disease and outbreaks.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Isolation of Yersinia pestis from bubo aspirate or from culture of blood, CSF or sputum. 
Identification of antibodies to the Y. pestis F1 antigen from serum.
Specimen
Aspirate of buboes, blood, CSF, sputum, tracheal washes or autopsy materials for culture 
Blood for serological tests
When to collect the 
specimen Collect specimen from the first suspected plague case. If more than one suspected case, collect until specimens have been collected on 5 to 10 suspected cases before the 
administration of antibiotics. With buboes, a small amount of sterile saline (1-2 ml) may 
be injected into the bubo to obtain an adequate specimen.
If antibiotics have been started, plague can be confirmed by seroconversion (4-fold or 
greater rise in titer) to the F1 antigen by passive haemaglutination using pared sera. 
Serum should be drawn within 5 days of onset then again after 2-3 weeks.
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Plague
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
• Specimens should be collected using aseptic techniques. Materials for culture should 
be sent to the laboratory in Cary Blair transport media or frozen (preferably with dry 
ice (frozen CO2). Unpreserved specimens should reach the laboratory the same day.
• Liquid specimens (aspirates) should be absorbed with a sterile cotton swab and 
placed into Cary-Blair transport medium. Refrigerate.
• If transport will require 24 or more hours and Cary Blair transport is not available, 
freeze the specimen and transport it frozen with cool packs.
Results
Cultures should only be sent to a laboratory with known plague diagnostic capabilities or 
to a WHO Collaborating Centre for Plague.
Plague culture results will take a minimum of 3 to 5 working days from reception in the 
laboratory.
Antibiotic treatment should be initiated before culture results are obtained.
Plague patients seroconvert to the F1 Y. pestis antigen 7-10 days after onset.
R e f e r e n c e
• Plague Manual: Epidemiology, Distribution, Surveillance and Control/ Manuel de la Peste: Epidémiologie, 
Répartition, Surveillance et Lutte. WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/99.2
• Laboratory Manual o f Plague Diagnostic tests. CDC/WHO publication, 2000, Atlanta, GA
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Poliom yelitis (Acute flaccid paralysis)
B a c k g r o u n d _______________________________________________________________________________________
• Poliovirus (genus Enterovirus) serotypes 1, 2, and 3 are transmitted from person-to-person via faecal-oral 
spread.
• Incubation period is 7 to 14 days for paralytic cases and the range is approximately 3 to 35 days. The virus 
may be shed for several years by immuno-compromised persons.
• Infection is usually asymptomatic, but may cause a febrile syndrome with or without meningitis. In less than 
5% of infections paralysis results, often of a single leg.
• Polio infection occurs almost exclusively among children. Infection may occur with any of 3 serotypes of 
Poliovirus. Immunity is serotype-specific and lifelong.
• Paralytic polio, though not fatal, has devastating social and economic consequences among affected 
individuals.
• The Polio Eradication Program has nearly halted ongoing wild-type polio transmission worldwide through use 
of oral poliovirus (OPV) vaccine. Globally, poliovirus type 2 appears to have been eliminated. Serotypes 1 and 
3 polioviruses still circulate in several African countries, and surveillance is not yet adequate to assure 
eradication in many countries.
• Areas with low vaccine coverage may allow ongoing wild-type transmission.
• Other neurological illnesses may cause AFP, for example, Guillain-Barre syndrome and transverse myelitis.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Immediate case-based reporting of all poliomyelitis cases. Weekly summary reporting of cases for routine 
surveillance and outbreaks.
• Detect cases of acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) and obtain laboratory confirmation of the aetiology of all 
suspected AFP cases. Obtain two or more stool specimens within 14 days of the onset of paralysis for viral 
isolation.
• Surveillance for AFP is used to capture all true cases of paralytic poliomyelitis. Target for surveillance 
performance to provide certification of polio eradications is 1 case of AFP per year per 100 000 population 
aged less than 15 years.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case:
Any child under 15 years of age with acute flaccid paralysis or any person with paralytic illness at any age in 
whom the clinician suspects poliomyelitis.
Confirm ed case: A suspected case with virus isolation in stool.
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R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
• Report the suspected case immediately according to the national polio eradication program guidelines.
• Conduct a case-based investigation. Include a vaccination history for the patient.
• Collect two stool specimens. Collect the first one when the case is investigated. Collect the second one from
the same patient 24 to 48 hours later. See laboratory guidelines for information on how to prepare, store and 
transport the specimen.
• Obtain virological data from reference laboratory to confirm wild-type poliomyelitis or VAPP.
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a case is confirmed:
• If wild polio virus is isolated from stool specimen, refer to national polio eradication program guidelines for 
recommended response actions. The national level will decide which actions to take. They may include the 
following:o Specify reasons for non-vaccination of each unvaccinated case and address the identified 
deficiencies.o Immediately conduct “mopping-up” vaccination campaign around the vicinity of the case.o Conduct surveys to identify areas of low OPV coverage during routine EPI activities, and improve 
routine vaccine coverage of OPV and other EPI antigens. o Lead supplemental vaccination campaigns during National Immunization Days (NIDs) or Sub­
National Immunization Days (SNIDs). Focus supplemental vaccination activities in areas of low 
vaccine coverage during EPI. Consider use of house-to-house vaccination teams in selected 
areas.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph monthly cases (which should be zero to very few cases per area per year), or weekly 
cases during an outbreak. Evaluate the percent of suspected cases reported within 48 hours and 
the percentage with adequate laboratory evaluation.
Place: Plot location of case households. Investigate the circumstances of poliovirus transmission in each 
case thoroughly. Examine the possibility of other potential areas of transmission.
Person: Count monthly routine and outbreak-related cases. Analyze age distribution. Assess risk factors
for low vaccine coverage.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
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Specimen
Stool
Note: If no specimen is collected, re-evaluate patient after 60 days to confirm clinical 
diagnosis o f polio (AFP).
When to collect the 
specimen Collect a sample from every suspected AFP case.Collect the first specimen when the case is investigated.
Collect a second specimen on the same patient 24 to 48 hours later.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
• Place stool in clean, leak-proof container and label clearly.
• Immediately place in refrigerator or cold box not used for storing vaccines or other
medicines.
• Transport specimens so they will arrive at designated polio laboratory within 72 hours 
of collection.
When there is a delay, and specimen will not be transported within 72 hours, freeze 
specimen at -20°C or colder. Then transport frozen specimen with dry ice or cold packs 
also frozen at -20°C or colder.
Results
Confirmed results are usually available within 21 after receipt of specimen by the 
laboratory.
If wild or vaccine derived polio virus is detected, the national program will plan 
appropriate response actions
R e f e r e n c e
• Field Guide for Supplementary Activities Aimed at Achieving Polio Eradication. World Health Organization
• WHO global action plan for laboratory containment o f wild polio viruses. WHO/V&B/99.32, Geneva, 1999
• Manual for the virological investigation o f polio, WHO/ EPI/GEN/9l.01, Geneva, 2004
• Supplement to the Manual for the virological investigation o f Polio. WHO/EPI 200l
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B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Rabies is a zoonotic disease (a disease that is transmitted to humans from animals) that is caused by a virus. 
Rabies infects domestic and wild animals, and is spread to people through close contact with infected saliva 
(via bites or scratches).
• The rabies virus infects the central nervous system, causing disease in the brain and, eventually, death. Early 
symptoms in people include: fever, headache, and general weakness or discomfort. As the disease 
progresses, symptoms include; insomnia, anxiety, confusion, slight or partial paralysis, excitation, 
hallucinations, increase in saliva, difficulty swallowing, and fear of water.
• In unvaccinated humans, rabies is almost always fatal if post-exposure prophylaxis is not administered before 
the onset of severe symptoms. Death usually occurs within days of the onset of neurological symptoms.
• Dogs are the main carrier of rabies in Africa and are responsible for most (approximately 97%) of the human 
rabies deaths worldwide.
• WHO estimates approximately 55,000 human deaths worldwide due to rabies each year; in Africa the annual 
death toll is 24,000.
• People most at risk of rabies live in rural areas, and children are at highest risk of dog rabies. About 30% to 
60% of the victims of dog bites (the primary mode of virus transmission) are children less than 15 years of 
age. Children often play with animals and are less likely to report bites or scratches.
• Control of rabies in dog populations and access to human rabies post exposure prophylaxis can substantially 
reduce the burden of rabies in human populations.
• Rapid and accurate laboratory diagnosis of rabies in humans and other animals is essential for timely 
administration of post-exposure prophylaxis. Within a few hours, a diagnostic laboratory can determine 
whether or not an animal is rabid and inform the responsible medical personnel.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l_______________________________________________________
• Detect and respond promptly and appropriately to cases and outbreaks of rabies
• Identify high-risk areas
• Estimation of disease burden
• Immediate reporting of cases and routine monthly summary reports
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected
A person with one or more of the following: headache, neck pain, nausea, fever, fear of water, anxiety, agitation, 
abnormal tingling sensations or pain at the wound site, when contact with a rabid animal is suspected.
Confirm ed
A suspected case that is laboratory confirmed
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R e c o m m e n d e d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  A c t i o n
For a single case:
• Post exposure prophylaxis to prevent rabies
• Isolate patient if rabies develops to prevent infection of others
• Immunize contacts if patient develops rabies
• Vaccinate local dogs and cats to prevent outbreaks
General preventive measures:
• Promote public awareness of rabies
• Target immunization campaign for domestic or wild animals in high-risk areas
• Maintain active surveillance of rabies in animals
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Plot cases monthly
Place: Plot the location of case households and animal exposures
Person: Analyze distribution of cases by age, exposing animal, and circumstances of infection. Assess risk 
factors to improve control of cases
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Detection of rabies viral antigens by direct fluorescent antibody (FA) in clinical 
specimens, preferably brain tissue (collected post mortem)
• Detection by FA on skin or corneal smear (collected ante mortem)
• FA positive after inoculation or brain tissue, saliva or CSF in cell culture, in mice
or in suckling mice
• Detectable rabies-neutralizing antibody titre in the CSF of an unvaccinated 
person
• Identification of viral antigens by PCR on fixed tissue collected post modern or in 
a clinical specimen (brain tissue or skin, cornea or saliva)
• Isolation of rabies virus from clinical specimens and confirmation of rabies viral
antigens by direct fluorescent antibody testing
Specimen
• Brain tissue (collected post mortem)
• Skin biopsy (usually from the neck)
• corneal
• Saliva
• CSF
• Head of suspected rabid animal (dogs)
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When to collect the specimen When a person is bitten by a pet that appears sick or by a wild animal, the biggest 
concern is rabies. No test can determine whether the rabies virus has been transmitted 
to the person immediately after the bite. So the animal is evaluated to determine whether 
the person requires treatment. A wild animal that has bitten a person is killed if possible, 
so that its brain can be examined.
If a person who has been bitten by an animal becomes increasingly confused and 
agitated or paralyzed, the diagnosis is probably rabies. At this point, tests can detect the 
rabies virus.
Post mortem: within 4-6hrs after death of patient, as soon as the suspected animal dies 
or is killed.
How to prepare, store, and transport the specimen Safety precautions in handling rabies virus should be taken to avoid infection.
Remove the head of the suspected animal, wrap head completely such that no blood is 
oozing out. Where possible, request a veterinarian to assist in the collection and 
preservation of the specimen.
Sample should be sent to Reference Lab for Rabies virus.
Results
The treatment should never await the results of laboratory diagnosis. A laboratory 
diagnosis may be delayed for a variety of reasons. Results can be obtained from the 
reference lab within 1-2days.
R e f e r e n c e
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
• Laboratory techniques in rabies, Fourth Edition. WHO, edited by F.-X. Meslin and all
• World Health Organization, Rabies Fact Sheet http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs099/en/
• Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). National Surveillance for Human Rabies. CSTE 
position statement 09-ID-70. Atlanta: CSTE; June 2009. Available from: http://www.cste.org
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Human Rabies Prevention —  United States, 2008: 
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. MMWR 2008; 57(RR03):1-26, 28. 
Available from: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
• Bleck TP, Rupprecht CE. Chapter 160 -  Rhabdoviruses. In: Mandell GL, Bennett JE, Dolin R, editors. 
Principles and Practice o f Infectious Diseases, 6th edition. Philadelphia: Churchill Livingstone; 2005
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Rift V alley Fever (RVF)Background
• Rift Valley Fever (RVF) is a viral disease that affects mainly animals and occasionally humans. The virus is a 
member of the Phlebovirus genus, one of the five genera in the family Bunyaviridae. The disease is frequently 
reported following heavy rainfall and floods. It was first isolated in Rift Valley Province of Kenya in 1930. The 
disease was reported in Kenya after the El Nino flooding of 1997/98 and more recently in 2006 to 2007. In 
2007 and 2010, Tanzania and South Africa respectively were also affected. Other outbreaks have previously 
been reported in Somalia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
• RVF is mainly transmitted from animals (sheep, cattle, goats, camels) to humans through close contact with 
infected animals (such as handling meat and body fluids and consumption of raw milk). During established 
RVF outbreaks in animals humans can also get infected through bites of infected mosquitoes and other biting 
insects.
• The incubation period of RVF varies from 2 to 6 days. The clinical symptoms include an influenza-like illness, 
with sudden onset of fever, headache, myalgia and backache. These symptoms usually last from 4 to 7 days. 
Most of the infected people recover on their own. However a small proportion (about 1%) get complications 
such as vomiting blood, nose bleeding and passing bloody stool. Other severe types of the disease are eye 
disease and meningo-encephalitis.
• Management of RVF in humans is mainly supportive as there is no definitive treatment for RVF. Early 
detection and management of the disease is important. Human control of RVF is through control of the 
disease in animals through a sustained vaccination program and limiting human-animal contact. Use of 
insecticide treated nets and mosquito repellants can also reduce infections in human. In addition to human 
suffering and death, RVF has far reaching economic implications to the Livestock industry. In outbreak 
settings, the disease manifestation includes non-hemorrhagic febrile syndromes, and laboratory testing 
should be considered among persons with milder symptoms suggestive of viral illness.
• Immediate Notification to WHO is formally required by IHR (Annex ).
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
Detect, confirm aetiology and respond to outbreaks promptly of all cases of suspected VHF.
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S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n _______________________________________________________________________
Suspected case:
Early disease :
• Acute febrile illness (axillary temperature >37.5 °C or oral temperature of >38.0°C) of more than 48 hours 
duration that does not respond to antibiotic or antimalarial therapy, and is associated with: o Direct contact with sick or dead animal or its products
AND / OR:o Recent travel (during last week) to, or living in an area where, after heavy rains, livestock die or
abort, and where RVF virus activity is suspected/confirmed
AND / OR:o Abrupt onset of any 1 or more of the following: exhaustion, backache, muscle pains, headache 
(often severe), discomfort when exposed to light, and nausea/vomiting
AND / OR:o Nausea/vomiting, diarrhoea OR abdominal pain with 1 or more of the following:
■ Severe pallor (or Hb < 8 gm/dL)
■ Low platelets (thrombocytopenia) as evidence by presence of small skin and mucous 
membrane haemorrhages (petechiae) (or platelet count < 100x109 / dL)
■ Evidence of kidney failure (edema, reduced urine output) (or creatinine > 150 mol/L)
AND / OR:
■ Evidence of bleeding into skin, bleeding from puncture wounds, from mucous membranes or 
nose, from gastrointestinal tract and unnatural bleeding from vagina
AND / OR:
■ Clinical jaundice (3-fold increase above normal of transaminases)
Late stages of diseases or complications (2-3 weeks after onset
• Patients who have experienced, in the preceding month a flu-like illness, with clinical criteria, who
additionally develop the following:o CNS manifestations which resemble meningo-encephalitis AND/OR: o Unexplained visual loss OR:o Unexplained death following sudden onset of acute flu-like illness with haemorrhage, meningo-
ecephalitis, or visual loss during the preceding month
Confirmed case
Any patient who, after clinical screening, is positive for anti-RVF IgM ELISA antibodies (typically appear from 
fourth to sixth day after onset of symptoms) or tests positive on Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (RT-PCR).
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R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Enhance the usual standard precautions throughout the health care setting.
• Treat and manage the patient with supportive care.
• Collect specimen safely to confirm the case.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is confirmed:
• Mobilize the community for early detection and care.
• Conduct community education about the confirmed case, how the disease is transmitted, and how to prevent 
contact with tissues of infected animals and avoid mosquito bites.
• Provide information about prevention in the home and when to seek care.
• Provide supportive treatment to all cases identified.
• Request additional help from national levels as needed.
• Collaborate with the animal health specialists to search and document cases among animals as well.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths monthly. Construct an epidemic curve during the outbreak.
Place: Plot location of case households and work sites using precise mapping.
Person: Immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths. During the outbreak, count and report
cases and deaths. Analyze age and sex distribution. Assess risk factors immediately and 
consider request for assistance to improve outbreak control.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test Acute RVF can be diagnosed using several different methods. Serological tests such as 
ELISA may confirm the presence of specific IgM antibodies to the virus. The virus itself 
may be detected in blood during the early phase of illness or in post-mortem tissue using a 
variety of techniques including, antigen detection tests by ELISA, RT-PCR, virus 
propagation (in cell cultures), Immunohistochemistry in formalin-fixed tissues.
ELISA IgG can be used for retrospective diagnostic.
Same test can be used for animal diagnosis
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Specimen ELISA (serology)
• Whole blood
• Serum or plasma
• Whole blood or clot
• Tissues (fresh frozen)
RT-PCR -  Virus isolation
• Blood
• Serum/plasma
• Liver biopsy from fatal cases 
Pathology
• Tissue biopsy from fatal cases
Identical specimen can be collected from animal
When to collect the specimen Collect specimen from the first suspected case.
If more than one suspected case, collect until specimens have been collected from 5 to10 
suspected cases.
How to prepare, store, and transport the specimen
Laboratory workers are at risk. Samples taken from suspected human cases of RVF for 
diagnosis should be handled by trained staff and processed in suitably equipped 
laboratories.
ELISA/PCR/ISOLATION
• Preparation and storage (freeze of refrigerate/as cold as possible)
• Shipping : frozen on dry ice or ice packs or both
Note: if  dry ice or ice packs are not available, sample may be shipped at room temperature 
and still provide valid results in most cases.
Immunohistochemistry:
• Preparation and storage :Fix in formalin (can be stored up to 6 wks)
• Shipping: Room temperature (do not freeze).
Same shipping conditions for animal specimens
Results Diagnostic services for RVF are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are usually 
required for RVF diagnostic services. Contact the appropriate National authority or WHO. 
Contact national Veterinary Services for animal diagnostic.
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R e f e r e n c e
• WHO/EMC Infection control for VHF in the African health care setting, WHO, 1998
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
• Fact sheet N°207 Revised September 2007
• Infection Control for VHF in the African Health Care Setting /CDC (Annexes 11-12)
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Severe Acute R espiratory Infections (SARIs)Background
• Severe acute respiratory infections (SARIs) are a significant cause of infectious disease morbidity and 
mortality in Africa. The mortality rates are particularly high among infants, children and the elderly.
• An improved understanding of the epidemiology and seasonality of SARIs in Africa is essential for optimizing 
public health strategies for their prevention and control (e.g., vaccines and antivirals for prophylaxis and 
treatment, infection control).
• The threat of SARIs due to novel organisms that have epidemic or pandemic potential warrants special 
precautions and preparedness. Respiratory disease events that may constitute a public health emergency of 
international concern1 include severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS); human influenza caused by a 
new subtype, including human episodes of avian influenza; pneumonic plague; and novel agents that can 
cause large-scale SARI outbreaks with high morbidity and mortality.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l s
• To detect, in a timely manner, unusually severe morbidity and mortality caused by both known and unknown
respiratory pathogens that have the potential for large scale epidemics or pandemics.
• To characterize and monitor trends in illnesses and deaths attributable to SARIs.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Severe acute respiratory infection (persons > 5 years old)
Any severely ill person presenting with manifestations of acute lower respiratory infection with:
• Sudden onset of fever (>38°C) AND
• Cough or sore throat AND
• Shortness of breath, or difficulty breathing
• With or without Clinical or radiographic findings of pneumonia 
OR
Any person who died of an unexplained respiratory illness.
R e s p o n d  t o  a  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case of an epidemic- or pandemic-prone acute respiratory disease is suspected. OR If there is 
an unusual event (deaths, outbreak) of severe acute respiratory infection:
• Atypical cases of influenza-like illness (ILI) or severe acute respiratory infection (SARI).
• Two or more persons presenting with a SARI or who died from a SARI are detected with onset of illness in a
two-week period and in the same geographical area and/or are epidemiologically linked.
• Health-care workers with only occupational exposure risks develop SARI after providing care to patients with 
SARI.
• Persons who have contact with birds/animals present with SARI.
• Any rumor of clusters of severe acute respiratory infections or of atypical respiratory infections.
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Respond to a suspected case of an epidemic- or pandemic-prone acute respiratory disease or to an
unusual event of severe acute respiratory infections:
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Practice infection control precautions for an acute respiratory disease with epidemic/pandemic potential4
(e.g., Standard plus Contact plus Droplet Precautions) immediately and enhance Standard Precautions 
throughout the health care setting.
• Treat and manage the patient according to national guidelines.
• Collect and transport laboratory specimens from case-patient and from symptomatic contacts and arrange 
for laboratory testing.
• Review clinical history and exposure history during 7days before disease onset.
• Identify and follow-up close contacts of case-patient.
• Conduct active searches for additional cases.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Estimate incubation period; describe transmission patterns.
Person: Characterize the illness in terms of clinical presentation, the spectrum of disease, the proportion of 
cases requiring hospitalization, clinical outcomes, case fatality ratio, attack rates by 
age/occupation/blood relation.
Place: Describe risk factors, possible exposures. Ascertain whether any evidence exists that the virus may 
have increased its ability to cause human disease or improved its transmissibility.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.
R e f e r e n c e s
• International Health Regulations, IHR (2005)
• Technical Guidelines for Integrated Disease Surveillance in the African Region. WHO - AFRO May 2002
• WHO guidelines for investigation o f human cases o f avian influenza A(H5N1), January 2007
• WHO interim guidelines on infection prevention and control of epidemic- and pandemic-prone acute 
respiratory diseases in health care, June 2007
• WHO guidelines for the collection of human specimens for laboratory diagnosis of avian influenza infection, 
12 January 2005
• Collecting, preserving and shipping specimens for the diagnosis of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection. 
Guide for field operations, October 2006
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Severe Acute R espiratory Syndrom e (SARS)Background
• Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was first recognized as a global threat in 2003 when international 
spread resulted in 8,098 SARS cases in 26 countries, with 774 deaths.
• Nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV was a striking feature of the SARS outbreak.
• The majority of the cases were adults. The case fatality ratio of SARS is estimated to range from 0% to more
than 50% depending on the age group affected and reporting centre, with a crude global CFR of 
approximately 9.6%.
• The mean incubation period is 5 days, with the range of 2-10 days. Patients initially develop influenza-like 
prodromal symptoms including fever, malaise, myalgia, headache and rigors. Cough (initially dry), dyspnoea 
and diarrhoea may be present in the first week but more commonly reported in the second week of illness. 
Severe cases develop rapidly progressing respiratory distress. Up to 70% of the patients develop diarrhoea.
• Disease transmission occurs mainly during the second week of illness.
• The SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) which causes SARS is believed to be an animal virus that crossed the
species barrier to humans recently.
• In the inter-epidemic period, all countries must remain vigilant for the recurrence of SARS and maintain their 
ability to detect and respond to the possible re-emergence of SARS.
• Immediate Notification to WHO is formally required by IHR (Annex 2, IHR).
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l s
• Early detection and investigation of individuals with clinically apparent SARS-CoV.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case o f SARS is an individual with:
1. A history of fever, or documented fever > 38 °C AND
2. One or more symptoms of lower respiratory tract illness (cough, difficulty breathing, 
shortness of breath) AND
3. Radiographic evidence of lung infiltrates consistent with pneumonia or ARDS or autopsy findings consistent 
with the pathology of pneumonia or ARDS without an identifiable cause AND
4. No alternative diagnosis can fully explain the illness.
Confirm ed case o f SARS: An individual who tests positive for SARS-CoV infection by the WHO recommended 
testing procedures.
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R e s p o n d  t o  s u s p e c t e d  c a s e
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Practice infection control precautions for an acute respiratory disease with epidemic/pandemic potential
immediately and enhance Standard Precautions throughout the health care setting.
• Treat and manage the patient according to national guidelines.
• Collect and transport laboratory specimens from case-patient and from symptomatic contacts and arrange for 
laboratory testing.
• Review clinical history and exposure history during 2-10 days before disease onset.
• Identify and follow-up close contacts of case-patient.
• Conduct active searches for additional cases.
• Expedite the diagnosis.(WHO will assist in the investigation o f SARS alerts as appropriate, including 
facilitating access to laboratory services)
R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
Response to SARS alert is same as response to suspected case (see above).
SARS ALERT:
1) An individual with clinical evidence of SARS AND with an epidemiological risk factor for SARS-CoV infection 
in the 10 days before the onset of symptoms OR
2) Two or more health-care workers with clinical evidence of SARS in the same health-care unit and with onset 
of illness in the same 10-day period OR
3 Three or more persons (health-care workers and/or patients and/or visitors) with clinical evidence of SARS 
with onset of illness in the same 10-day period and epidemiologically linked to a health-care facility.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths daily/weekly/monthly. Construct an epidemic curve during the outbreak.
Place: Plot locations of case households and work sites using precise mapping.
Person: Immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths. During the outbreak, count and report cases and 
deaths. Analyze age and sex distribution. Assess risk factors immediately.
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L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Confirmed positive PCR for SARS virus:
• At least 2 different clinical specimens (e.g. nasopharyngeal and stool) OR
• The same clinical specimen collected on 2 or more days during the course of the 
illness (e.g. 2 or more naspharyngeal aspirates) OR
• 2 different assays or repeat PCR using the original clinical sample on each occasion 
of testing
Seronconversion by ELISA or IFA:
• Negative antibody test on acute serum followed by positive antibody test on 
convalescent serum OR
• Four-fold or greater rise in antibody titre between acute and convalescent phase sera 
tested in parallel.
Virus isolation:
Isolation in cell culture of SARS-Cov from any specimen; plus PCR confirmation using a
validated method
Specimen
Nasopharyngeal wash/aspirate specimen of choice for respiratory viruses.
Nasopharyngeal swabs or oropharyngeal swabs
Stool
Serum
When to collect
The respiratory tract specimen can be collected at any time, but are best taken during the 
acute phase of illness.
The time collection of paired blood samples is very important:
• Collect an acute illness sample at first contact with the patient at days 7, 14, 28 and 
90 after onset where possible.
• Collect blood on discharge if collection of a convalescent sample is unlikely.
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How to prepare, 
store, and transport • SARS specimens should be handled according to appropriate biosafety practices in order to avoid laboratory-related infections and spread of disease to close contacts.
• Clinical samples from patients should be collected by trained personnel.
Nasopharyngeal wash/aspirate: have the patient sit with the head titled slightly backward. 
Instil 1.5 ml non-bacteriostatic sterile saline (Ph 7.0) into one nostril. Flush a plastic 
catheter or tubing (e.g. mucus trap tubing) with 2-3 ml of saline. Insert the tubing into the 
nostril parallel to the palate. Aspirate nasopharyngeal secretions. Repeat for the other 
nostril. Collect aspirates in sterile vial or mucus trap. Remove tubings and discard in 
plastic bag.
Nasopharyngeal or oropharyngeal swabs: use only sterile Dacron or rayon swab with 
plastic shafts. Place each swab immediately in a tube containing Virus Transport Media 
(VTM).
Serum collection: Collect 5-10 ml of whole blood in a serum separator tube. Allow blood 
to clot.
Respiratory / stool / blood/serum specimens: Refrigerate immediately (4°C). If 
transport/shipping will be international or will occur > 5 days after collection of last 
specimen, freeze the specimens at -  20 °C (serum), -20/-70 °C (respiratory specimens) 
for planned shipping with dry ice if available.
Fixed tissues (formalin fixed) from all major organs. Store and ship fixed tissue at room 
temperature.
Results
Diagnostic services for SARS are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are 
usually required for SARS diagnostic services. Contact the appropriate National authority 
or WHO. If there is a high level of suspicion, WHO will support countries to contact a 
reference laboratory if necessary.
R e f e r e n c e
• WHO Guidelines for the Global Surveillance o f SARS, Updated Recommendations, October 2004
• WHO Interim Guidelines, Infection Prevention and Control o f Epidemic- and Pandemic-Prone Acute 
Respiratory Diseases in Health Care, June 2007. WHO/CDS/EPR/2007.6
• Use of laboratory methods for SARS diagnosis, WHO
• WHO Biosafety guidelines for handling of SARS specimens
• A practical Guide for SARS laboratories: from samples collection to shipment. WHO, 29 Dec 2003
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Severe Pneum onia in Children under 5 years o f age
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Infection of the lower airways caused by bacteria or viruses transmitted person-to-person via aerosolized 
respiratory droplet spread. The main bacterial causes of pneumonia among children are Streptococcus 
pneumoniae (the pneumococcus) and Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib).
• Acute respiratory infections (ARIs) and pneumonia represent the number one cause of mortality among 
children less than 5 years of age.
• Incubation period is usually less than 7 days, depending on the aetiology.
• WHO and UNICEF recommend use of Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) strategy to reduce 
morbidity and mortality attributable to childhood pneumonia. Early antimicrobial therapy has been shown to 
reduce mortality.
• Resistance of the pneumococcus and Hib to beta-lactams (for example, ampicillin), sulfonamides (for 
example, trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole) and other antimicrobials is increasing.
• Viruses such as respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) may also cause ARI and pneumonia.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Early identification of pneumonia cases and epidemics using clinical definitions.
• Monitor antimicrobial resistance routinely and during outbreaks.
• Reducing the proportion of severe pneumonia cases compared to non-severe pneumonia cases to monitor
quality of interventions.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Clinical case definition (IMCI) for pneumonia:
A child presenting with cough or difficult breathing and:
• 50 or more breaths per minute for infant age 2 months up to 1 year
• 40 or more breaths per minute for young child 1 year up to 5 years
(Note: A young infant age 0 up to 2 months with cough and fast breathing is classified in IMCI as 
“serious bacterial infection” and is referred for further evaluation.)
Clinical case definition (IMCI) for severe pneumonia:
A child presenting with cough or difficult breathing and any general danger sign, or chest indrawing or stridor in a 
calm child. General danger signs for children 2 months to 5 years are: unable to drink or breast feed, vomits 
everything, convulsions, lethargy, or unconsciousness.
Confirmed case:
Radiographic or laboratory confirmation of pneumonia will not be feasible in most districts.
348
Severe Pneumonia in Children under 5 years of age
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If you observe that the number of cases or deaths is increasing over a period of time:
• Report the problem to the next level.
• Investigate the cause for the increase and identify the problem.
• Make sure that cases are managed according to IMCI guidelines.
• Treat cases appropriately with recommended antimicrobial drugs.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If the number of case or deaths increases to two times the number usually seen during a similar period in 
the past:
• Assess health worker practices of IMCI guidelines for assessing, classifying and treating children with 
pneumonia and severe pneumonia.
• Identify high risk populations through analysis of person, place and time.
• Conduct community education about when to seek care for pneumonia.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Conduct month-to-month analysis for unexpected or unusual increases. Graph cases and deaths by
month. Construct epidemic curve for outbreak cases. Plot month-to-month data and compare to 
previous periods.
Place: Plot location of case households.
Person: Count monthly pneumonia and severe pneumonia cases. Count pneumonia deaths. Analyze age
distribution.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.
R e f e r e n c e
• Integrated Management o f Childhood Illnesses. World Health Organization. WHO/CDR/95.14.1
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Sexually transmitted infections
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Infections of the human genito-urinary and reproductive systems transmitted via human sexual contact 
(sexually transmitted disease, STIs). The most common causes of male urethral discharge are a) the 
gonococcus Neisseria gonorrhoea and b) Chlamydia trachomatis. The most common causes of male and 
female genital ulcer are c) syphilis (Treponema pallidum), d) herpes simplex virus (HSV1 or 2) and e) 
chancroid (Haemophilus ducreyi).
• STIs are endemic in most countries of the world, including countries in Africa. Multiple simultaneous STIs are 
common (for example, gonorrhoea plus Chlamydia). STIs may be most highly prevalent in areas where HIV 
occurs and may facilitate HIV transmission. STIs may be primary or from repeated attacks of urethral 
discharge.
• STIs are a leading cause of abortion and stillbirth, prematurity, and congenital infections. They may lead to 
pelvic inflammatory disease (PID), a major cause of decreased fertility.
• Incubation periods for gonorrhoea are 2 to 7 days; Chlamydia 7 to 14 days (or longer); syphilis, 10 days to 12 
weeks (usually around 3 weeks), and chancroid, 3 to 14 days.
• STIs may be more commonly diagnosed in men, in whom clinical evidence of infection may be more readily 
apparent.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Early detection and treatment of STI reduces transmission rates. Active efforts to diagnose latent syphilis may 
prevent significant disability.
• Improve early and effective treatment of STIs using simple algorithms based on syndromic diagnosis for index 
cases and partners.
• Carry out laboratory-based anti-microbial sensitivity monitoring and modify treatment guidelines accordingly at 
the national level.
• Compare surveillance data for both STIs and HIV/AIDS since STIs may reflect co-presence of HIV.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n ________________________________________________________________________
Genital ulcer syndrome (non-vesicular):
Suspected case: Any male with an ulcer on the penis, scrotum, or rectum, with or without inguinal adenopathy, or 
any female with ulcer on labia, vagina, or rectum, with or without inguinal adenopathy.
Confirmed case: Any suspected case confirmed by a laboratory method.
Urethral discharge syndrome:
Suspected case: Any male with urethral discharge with or without dysuria.
Confirmed case: Urethral discharge syndrome: A suspected case confirmed by a laboratory method (for example 
Gram stain showing intracellular Gram-negative diplococci).
350
_______________ Sexually transmitted infections
P u b l i c  h e a l t h  a c t i o n
• Conduct active case finding for specific target groups.
• Conduct primary prevention activities such as promotion of safer sexual behaviours and provision of 
condoms.
• Assess use of algorithms for detection and treatment of STIs. And improve health worker practice with 
algorithms.
• Include STI prevention and care services in maternal and child health, and family planning services.
• Target acceptable and effective STI prevention and care services to populations identified as vulnerable 
to STI transmission.
• Promote early STI health seeking behaviour.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a ____________________________
Time: Graph cases each quarter.
Place: No recommendation for analysis of place.
Person: Count quarterly cases and analyze age distribution.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.
R e f e r e n c e
• Guidelines for Sexually Transmitted Infections Surveillance. Geneva. UNAIDS and World Health Organization. 
WHO/CDS/CSR/EDC/99.3. UNAIDS/99.33E
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Sm allpox (Variola)Background
• Smallpox is an acute contagious disease caused by variola virus, a member of the orthopoxvirus family. 
Other members of the genus include cowpox, camelpox, and monkeypox. Monkeypox virus has caused the 
most serious recent human poxvirus infections.
• Smallpox killed as many as 30% of those infected. In 1967, when WHO launched an intensified plan to 
eradicate smallpox, the disease threatened 60% of the world's population and killed every fourth patient.
• The global eradication of smallpox was certified by a commission of eminent scientists in December 1979 
and subsequently endorsed by the World Health Assembly in 1980.
• Smallpox had two main forms: variola major and variola minor. The disease followed a milder course in 
variola minor, which had a case-fatality rate of less than 1 per cent. The fatality rate of variola major was 
around 30%. There are two rare forms of smallpox: haemorrhagic and malignant. In the former, invariably 
fatal, the rash was accompanied by haemorrhage into the mucous membranes and the skin. Malignant 
smallpox was characterized by lesions that did not develop to the pustular stage but remained soft and flat.
It was almost invariably fatal.
• The incubation period of smallpox is usually 12-14 days (range 7-17) during which there is no evidence of 
viral shedding. During this period, the person looks and feels healthy and cannot infect others.
• The incubation period is followed by the sudden onset of influenza-like symptoms. Two to three days later, 
the temperature falls and the patient feels somewhat better, at which time the characteristic rash appears, 
first on the face, hands and forearms and then after a few days progressing to the trunk. Lesions also 
develop in the mucous membranes of the nose and mouth, and ulcerate very soon after their formation, 
releasing large amounts of virus into the mouth and throat. The centrifugal distribution of lesions more 
prominent on the face and extremities than on the trunk, is a distinctive diagnostic feature of smallpox and 
gives the trained eye cause to suspect the disease. Lesions progress from macules to papules to vesicles 
to pustules. All lesions in a given area progress together through these stages. From 8 to 14 days after the 
onset of symptoms, the pustules form scabs which leave depressed depigmented scars upon healing.
• Varicella (chickenpox) can be distinguished from smallpox by its much more superficial lesions, their 
presence more on the trunk than on the face and extremities, and by the development of successive crops 
of lesions in the same area.
• Smallpox is transmitted from person to person by infected aerosols and air droplets spread in face-to-face 
contact with an infected person after fever has begun, especially if symptoms include coughing. The 
disease can also be transmitted by contaminated clothes and bedding, though the risk of infection from this 
source is much lower.
• The frequency of infection is highest after face-to-face contact with a patient after fever has begun and 
during the first week of rash, when the virus is released via the respiratory tract.
• In the absence of immunity induced by vaccination, humans appear to be universally susceptible to infection 
with the smallpox virus.
• Vaccine administered up to 4 days after exposure to the virus, and before the rash appears, provides 
protective immunity and can prevent infection or ameliorate the severity of the disease.
• Immediate Notification to WHO is formally required by IHR (2005).
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S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• To detect and immediately respond to any suspected case of smallpox.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
o o
Suspected case: An illness with acute onset of fever >38.3 C (101 F) followed by a rash characterized by 
vesicles or firm pustules in the same stage of development without other apparent cause.
Probable case: A case that meets the clinical case definition, is not laboratory confirmed, but has an 
epidemiological link to a confirmed or probable case.
Confirm ed case: A clinically compatible case that is laboratory confirmed.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Implement airborne infection control precautions.
• Treat and manage the patient with supportive care.
• Collect specimen safely to confirm the case.
• Implement contact tracing and contact management.
• Conduct active surveillance to identify additional cases.
• Notify WHO.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is confirmed:
• Maintain strict infection control measures practices throughout the duration of the outbreak.
• Mobilize the community for early detection and care.
• Conduct community education about the confirmed case, how the disease is transmitted, and how to 
implement infection control in the home care setting and during funerals.
• Conduct active searches for additional cases.
• Request additional help from national and international levels.
• Establish isolation ward to handle additional cases that may be admitted to the health facility.
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A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths daily/weekly/monthly. Construct an epidemic curve.
Place: Map location of case households.
Person: Immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths. During the outbreak, count and report cases 
and deaths. Analyze age and sex distribution. Assess risk factors immediately.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test Isolation of smallpox (Variola) virus from a clinical specimen 
Or
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assay identification of Variola DNA in a clinical specimen 
Note: Level C or D laboratories only
Specimen Biopsy specimens*
Scabs*
Vesicular fluid*
Lesion skin (roof)*
Pustule material*
Blood samples
Note: blood samples from person where severe, dense rash may be difficult to draw as the 
skin may slough off. A central line may be needed for access in cases where a peripheral 
blood draw is difficult.
* preferred specimens for diagnosis of acute illness during rash phase
W hen to collect A suspected case of smallpox is a public health and medical emergency. Collect samples 
from every suspected case at available times to achieve specimen types recommended.
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H ow to
prepare, store, 
and transport
Typical practices associated with collection of patient specimens are appropriate for 
collection of orthopoxvirus lesions as well. These include wearing personal protective 
equipment, including gloves and sanitizing the site prior to collection. If alcohol is used to 
prepare the lesion for collection it is important to allow the lesion to dry before it is 
collected.
Biopsy specimens:
Aseptically place two to four portions of tissue into a sterile, leakproof, freezable container. 
Storage -20 °C to - 70 °C. Transport ~6h at 4 °C.
Note: package non-formalin lesion biopsy for shipping on dry ice, leave formalin fixed 
biopsy at room temperature. Do not freeze formalin fixed biopsy sample.
Scabs:
Aseptically place scrapings/material into a sterile, leakproof, freezable container. Storage - 
20 °C to - 70 °C. Transport ~6h at 4 °C.
Vesicular fluid:
Collect fluid from separate lesions onto separate sterile swabs. Be sure to include cellular 
material from the base of each respective vesicule. Storage -20 °C to - 70 °C. Transport 
~6h at 4 °C.
Draw 10 cc of blood into a plastic marble-topped tube, or a plastic yellow-topped serum 
separator tube.
Note: approval must be obtained prior to the shipment o f potential smallpox patient clinical 
specimens to a Reference laboratory.
Results Diagnostic services for smallpox are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are 
usually required for smallpox diagnostic services. Contact the appropriate National 
authority or WHO.
R e f e r e n c e
•  WHO Fact Sheet, Smallpox. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/smallpox
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Trachoma
B a c k g r o u n d _______________________________________________________________________________________
• Trachoma is the leading cause of preventable blindness worldwide. It is caused by infection with Chlamydia 
trachomatis bacteria, and is both treatable and preventable.
• Infections often begin during infancy or childhood and can become chronic. If left untreated, the infection
eventually causes the eyelid to turn inwards, which in turn causes the eyelashes to rub on the eyeball,
resulting in intense pain and scarring of the front of the eye. This ultimately leads to irreversible blindness,
typically between 30 and 40 years of age.
• Trachoma is easily spread through direct personal contact, shared towels and cloths, and flies that have come 
in contact with the eyes or nose of an infected person.
• WHO estimates that approximately 6 million cases of blindness due to trachoma and 11 million cases of
trichiasis occur worldwide each year. Prevalence of active disease in children varies from 10-40% in some
African countries.
• The infection primarily affects young children, with blindness occurring later in life. Females are three times 
more likely than males to suffer from trichiasis, the in-turning of the eyelashes that can lead to blindness. 
People are most at risk for trachoma infection in areas where there is poor sanitation, lack of latrines, poor 
sources of clean water, and the presence of flies.
• Primary interventions advocated for preventing trachoma infection include improved sanitation, reduction of fly 
breeding sites and increased facial cleanliness (with clean water) among children at risk of disease. The 
scaring and visual change for trachoma can be reversed by a simple surgical procedure performed at village 
level which reverses the in-turned eyelashes.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Prevention of blindness by early detection
• Identification of high risk areas and epidemiologic trends
• Estimation of disease burden
• Monitoring of control programs
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case:
Any patient with red sticky eyes who complains of pain and itchiness of the eyes.
Confirm ed case:
Any patient with red sticky eyes who complains of pain and itchiness of the eyes where examination of the eyes 
confirms one of the stages of Trachoma infection according to the WHO Simplified Trachoma Grading System. 
(See reference below).
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R e c o m m e n d e d  p u b l i c  h e a l t h  a c t i o n
The World Health Organization has developed a series of interventions to control trachoma known by the acronym 
SAFE: Surgery, Antibiotics, Facial cleanliness, and Environmental improvement.
Effective Trachoma control has four main components:
• Eye lid surgery for those at immediate risk of blindness
• Antibiotics to treat individual cases and to reduce infection in a community
• The promotion of facial cleanliness and hygiene to reduce transmission
• Environmental improvements such as provision of water and household sanitation
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Monitor epidemiologic trends over time.
Place: Plot the location of case households and analyze the distribution. 
Person: Analyze the distribution of cases by age and other demographic factors.
L a b  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Routine laboratory confirmation for surveillance is not required.
Diagnostic test Detection of specific antigen. Nucleic acid tests and tissue culture techniques. 
Occasionally, in epithelial cells in Giemsa or iodine stained smears by direct microscopy.
Specimen
Collection of conjunctival scrapings
When to collect the specimen
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
After anaesthetizing the conjonctiva with anesthetic eye drops, blot away any discharge 
and using a spatula with a thin blunt end, scrape the whole of the conjuctiva. Spread the 
specimen evenly on a slide. As soon as the preparation is air-dry, fix it with methanol for 2­
3 minutes if the preparation is to be Giemsa stained.
Results Outside of specialist laboratories, most ocular infection is diagnosed clinically (see annex 8 
on the recommended case definition for the confirmed case) or immunologically.
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R e f e r e n c e
• WHO Trachoma Page
http://www.who.int/topics/trachoma/en/
• World Health Organization. Trachoma control: A guide for program managers. 
Geneva: World Health Organization, 2006.
http://www.who.int/blindness/publications/tcm%20who_pbd_get_06_1 .pdf
• World Health Organization. Achieving Community Support for Trachoma Control. 
Geneva: World Health Organization, 1993. 
http://www.who.int/blindness/achieving_en.pdf
• World Health Organization. Primary Health Care Level Management of trachoma. 
Geneva: World Health Organization, 1993. 
http://www.who.int/blindness/publications/trachoma_english.pdf
• World Health Organization. Trachoma epidemiologic survey protocol.
Geneva: World Health Organization, 1993.
http://www.who.int/blindness/prevalence_protocol_trachoma_english.pdf
• CDC Trachoma
http://www.cdc.gov/healthvwater/hygiene/disease/trachoma.html
• The Carter Center
http://www.cartercenter.org/health/trachoma/index.html
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B a c k g r o u n d _______________________________________________________________________________________
• Trypanosomiasis is an infection of blood, lymphatics and central nervous system. In Africa it is caused by the
protozoan Trypanosoma burcei rhodesiense and T. b. gambiense, which are transmitted by the bit of infected 
Glossina (tsetse) flies.
• Trypanosomiasis is endemic in over 30 African countries in West, Central and East Africa. It is highly
epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and other areas of civil conflict, where 80% of some
village populations may be infected. Cattle are the major reservoir of Trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense, and 
humans are the major reservoir for T. b. gambiense.
• Incubation period is usually days to weeks with T. b. rhodesiense, and months to years with T. b. gambiense 
infections. Without treatment, both forms are usually fatal.
• Trypanosomiasis control strategies include human and cattle population surveys to treat infected persons and 
diminish cattle reservoirs, and tsetse fly habitat control (for example, removal of bushes and tall grasses near 
villages, and use of residual insecticides).
• Tuberculosis, malaria, bacterial meningitis, HIV/AIDS, and other central nervous system or systemic infections 
can produce similar clinical findings.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Increase percentage of cases confirmed by laboratory methods.
• Use population-based surveys and serologic screening for active case finding in endemic areas.
• Conduct human and cattle screening in trypanosomiasis-free areas.
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case:
Early stage: a painful chancre originating as a papule and then evolving into a nodule at the primary fly 
bite site. There may be fever, intense headache, insomnia, painless lymphadenopathy, anaemia, local 
oedema and rash.
Late stage: cachexia, somnolence, and central nervous system signs.
Confirm ed case:
A suspected case confirmed by card agglutination trypanosomal test (CATT) or by isolation of 
trypanosomes in blood lymph nodes or cerebrospinal fluid.
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R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If you observe that the number of cases or deaths is increasing over a period of time:
• Report the problem according to national guidelines.
• Treat any individual suspected and confirmed cases with appropriate therapy in closely monitored setting.
• Collect specimen for laboratory confirmation.
• Investigate cause of increasing number of cases to identify problems with prevention activities.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If the number of cases or deaths increases to two times the number usually seen in a similar period in the 
past:
• Assess prevention activities in the area around the cases and take action to improve them as indicated.
• Conduct active case finding activities if it is an endemic area.
• Conduct vector control activities specified by national guidelines.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph quarterly cases.
Place: Plot the distribution of case households.
Person: Count monthly cases, and analyze age distribution.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Presumptive:
Serological: card agglutination trypanosomiasis test (CATT)
Confirmation:
Parasitological: detection (microscopy) of trypanosomes in blood, lymph nodes 
aspirates or CSF
Specimen
Whole blood 
Lymph nodes aspirates 
Cerebrospinal fluid
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When to collect the 
specimen Suspects from endemic places with fever.
Any patient with fever and may have come into contact with tsetse flies.
How to prepare, store, 
and transport the 
specimen
For slides:
Put the slides in a slide box and close properly. Store at room temperature in a dust­
free place. In case there is no slide box, the slides can be wrapped in soft tissue paper 
(filter papers, serviettes, toilet paper, etc.)
For blood in anticoagulant bottles, refer to reference lab.
Results
Results should be available the same day.
R e f e r e n c e
• Control and Surveillance o f African Trypanosomiasis. Report of a WHO Expert Committee, Geneva, World 
Health Organization, 1998 (WHO Technical Report Series, No. 881)
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
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B a c k g r o u n d _______________________________________________________________________________________
• Infection of the lungs and other organs usually caused by Mycobacterium tuberculosis transmitted person-to- 
person by droplet infection through coughing, sneezing or spitting. Clinically, the pulmonary form of the 
disease is more common than the extra-pulmonary form. The cardinal symptoms of pulmonary TB are chronic 
cough, weight loss, fever, loss of appetite and night sweats.
• Tuberculosis (TB) is a leading cause of infectious illness and death worldwide with over 8 million new cases 
and 3 million deaths per year. In African countries, approximately 1.6 million of the new cases and over 600 
000 cases occur each year. It is also estimated that between 30 and 50% of all new TB cases detected are 
infected with HIV and 40% of all AIDS deaths are due to TB. Those who are at highest risk of dying from TB 
include people with HIV/AIDS, malnutrition and other immuno-compromising conditions, the very young, and 
the very old.
• The global HIV pandemic has been a major cause of increasing TB cases, especially in African countries.
• Incubation period is approximately 1 to 3 months.
• WHO recommends the Directly Observed Therapy, Short-course (DOTS) strategy to maximize compliance 
and treatment efficacy and to reduce development of drug-resistant strains. The DOTS strategy has been 
implemented by at least 40 of 46 Member States in the African Region. Varying degrees of success have 
been achieved in controlling TB where resources and motivation for diagnosis, treatment, and patient follow 
up are adequate.
• Clinically, bacterial pneumonia, malaria, trypanosomiasis, HIV/AIDS and a variety of other bacterial, parasitic, 
and viral infections may cause similar syndromes of fever, cough, fatigue, and weight loss, or may themselves 
precipitate active TB in an already infected individual. Abdominal or other extra-pulmonary sites of infection 
may occur after ingestion of un-pasteurized cow’s milk (M. bovis).
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Early detection of persons with infectious lung disease to improve chances of clinical improvement and 
reduce transmission of TB.
• Improve percentage of TB cases confirmed by microscopy.
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S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case:
Any person with a cough of 3 weeks or more.
Confirm ed case:
Smear-positive pulmonary TB: a) a suspected patient with at least 2 sputum specimens positive for acid-fast 
bacilli (AFB), or b) one sputum specimen positive for AFB by microscopy and radiographic abnormalities 
consistent with active PTB as determined by the treating medical officer, or c) one positive sputum smear by 
microscopy and one sputum specimen positive on culture for AFB.
Smear negative PTB: a patient who fulfils all the following criteria: a) two sets taken at least 2 weeks apart of at 
least two sputum specimens negative for AFB on microscopy, radiographic abnormalities consistent with PTB 
and a lack of clinical response despite one week of a broad spectrum antibiotic, a decision by a physician to 
treat with a full course of anti-TB chemotherapy, or b) a patient who fulfils all the following criteria: severely ill, 
at least two sputum specimens negative for AFB by microscopy, radiographic abnormalities consistent with 
extensive pulmonary TB (interstitial and miliary), a decision by a physician to treat with a full course of anti-TB 
chemotherapy, or c) a patient whose initial sputum smears were negative, who had sputum sent for culture 
initially, and whose subsequent sputum culture result is positive.
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If you observe that the number of cases or deaths is increasing over a period of time:
• Report problem to the next level, or according to national guidelines.
• Treat individual cases with direct observation (DOTS) including a treatment supporter.
• Where feasible, isolate persons using respiratory infection control practices, especially if multi-drug resistant 
TB is suspected.
• Investigate cause of increase, including performance of DOTS program in your area.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If the number of cases or deaths increases to two times the number usually seen in a similar period in the 
past:
• Assess health worker performance with detection and treatment of smear-positive PTB and improve practices 
as needed.
• Assess DOTS program and take action to make identified improvements.
• Conduct drug susceptibility tests to establish patterns of resistance.
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A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths monthly.
Place: Plot distribution of case households and workplaces.
Person: Count monthly cases and deaths. Analyze age and sex distribution quarterly.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Microscopy: Presence of acid fast bacillus (AFB) in Ziehl Neelsen (ZN) stained smears 
Culture and identification
Drug susceptibility test : Anti-tuberculosis drug resistance occurs when a strain of 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis isolate is resistant to one or more antimicrobial agents as 
evidenced by internationally recommended methods for susceptibility tests)
MDR =Resistance to Isoniazid and Rifampicin;
X-DR= Resistance to Isoniazid and Rifampicin (MDR); plus additional resistance to a 
fluoroquinolone and a second-line injectable agent
Specimen
Deep-chest sputum 
Aspirates
When to collect the 
specimen Collect sputum (not saliva) for direct smear microscopy and examine at least two 
stained specimens taken on different days.
How to prepare, store, 
and transport the 
specimen
Smear should be examined at health facility where the specimen is taken.
TB cultures should be packaged in leak proof containers, wrapped in cotton wool. 
Transport in waterproof container to reference lab.
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Results
TB microscopy is read daily. Quantification of observed mycobacterium are reported 
using various reporting methods. Refer to the criteria used by the examining laboratory.
Culture : after 6-8 weeks
Anti-tuberculosis drug resistance :The national reference laboratory should be linked to 
an Supranational reference laboratory by strain exchange to ensure quality control
R e f e r e n c e
Treatment o f Tuberculosis: Guidelines for National Programs. WHO/TB/97.230
Policy Statement o f Prevention Therapy Against TB in People Living with HIV, WHO/TB/98.255
Laboratory Services in Tuberculosis Control, Parts I, II and III. WHO publications WHO/TB/98.258
Guidelines to surveillance of drug resistance in tuberculosis 4 ed. WHO/HTM/TB/2009.422
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Typhoid FeverBackground
• Typhoid fever is a bacterial disease, caused by Salmonella typhi. Symptoms usually develop 1-3 weeks after 
exposure, and may be mild or severe. They include high fever, malaise, headache, constipation or diarrhoea, 
rose-coloured spots on the chest, and enlarged spleen and liver. Healthy carrier state may follow acute 
illness.
• Typhoid fever remains a serious public health problem throughout the world, with an estimated 16-33 million 
cases and 500 000 to 600 000 deaths annually. In the last outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
between 27 September 2004 and early January 2005, no less than 42 564 cases of typhoid fever were 
reported, including 214 deaths and 696 cases of peritonitis and intestinal perforations.
• In virtually all endemic areas, the incidence of typhoid fever is highest in children from 5-19 years old. The 
disease is almost exclusively transmitted by food and water contaminated by the faeces and urine of patients 
and carriers.
• Polluted water is the most common source of typhoid transmission. In addition, shellfish taken from sewage- 
contaminated beds, vegetables fertilized with night-soil and eaten raw, contaminated milk and milk products 
have been shown to be a source of infection.
• Typhoid fever has been virtually eliminated in most areas of the industrialized world with the advent of proper 
sanitary facilities. Most cases in developed countries are imported from endemic countries.
• People can transmit the disease as long as the bacteria remain in their body; most people are infectious prior 
to and during the first week of convalescence, but 10% of untreated patients will discharge bacteria for up to 3 
months.
• Typhoid fever can be treated with antibiotics. However, resistance to common antimicrobials is widespread. 
Healthy carriers should be excluded from handling food.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Detect Typhoid Fever sporadic cases and outbreaks promptly, and seek laboratory verification
• Identify areas/population at high risk in order to improve prevention of the disease by taking hygienic 
measures
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n s
Suspected case: Any person with gradual onset of persistent fever >38°C of 3 or more days duration with no 
other identified cause and additional symptoms that may include malaise, headache, abdominal pain, 
constipation or diarrhea, joint pain, chills or cough. Intestinal perforation and neurologic disturbances are 
known complications of untreated typhoid fever.
C onfirm ed case: Suspected case confirmed by isolation of Salmonella typhi from blood, bone marrow, bowel 
fluid or stool.
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Typhoid Fever
R e s p o n d  t o  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If Typhoid fever cases are suspected:
• Arrange for laboratory testing of stool specimens or rectal swabs of suspected cases, especially in situations 
where food- or waterborne transmission is suspected.
• Report and investigate all suspected outbreaks of typhoid. Search for case/carrier that is the source of 
infection and for the vehicle (water or food) through which infection is being transmitted.
• Treat typhoid fever patients with antibiotics. Severe cases should be provided supportive measures such as
oral or intravenous hydration, the use of antipyretics, and appropriate nutrition.
R e s p o n d  t o  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If Typhoid Fever cases are confirmed
• Identify areas/populations at high risk to identify source(s) and mode(s) of transmission in order to prevent 
and control the disease.
• Conduct health education programmes on hygiene with simple messages on safe water, safe food handling 
practices, hygiene and hand washing.
• Support provision of clean water and proper sanitation to affected population(s). Chlorinate suspected water 
supplies. All drinking water should be chlorinated or boiled before use.
• More than 90% of patients can be managed at home with oral antibiotics, reliable care and close medical 
follow-up for complications or failure to respond to therapy. Patients with persistent vomiting, severe diarrhoea 
and abdominal distension may require hospitalization and parenteral antibiotic therapy.
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Graph cases and deaths weekly. Construct an epidemic curve during outbreaks.
Place: Plot location of case households with precise mapping.
Person: Report immediate case-based information for cases and deaths. Report summary totals monthly.
During outbreak, count cases and deaths weekly. Analyze by age 
prevention of outbreaks.
Assess risk factors to improve
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Culture:
Isolation of salmonella spp. from stool or blood of a patient 
The WIDAL Test should not be used for diagnostic purpose
Specimen
Blood
Stool
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Typhoid Fever
When to collect
Collected samples preferably before antibiotics are administrated
How to prepare, store, and 
transport 5-10 ml of blood distributed in a blood culture bottle.Stool in stool container
Store specimens at 4-8 C or ambient temperature away from heat and direct 
sunlight.
Results
Blood culture 4 days to 2 weeks 
Stool 3-4 days.
R e f e r e n c e
• The Diagnosis, Treatment and Prevention o f Typhoid Fever, WHO/V&B/03.07
• Weekly Epidemiological Record; N° 1, 2005, 80, 1-8; http//www.who.int/wer
• WHO Recommended Surveillance Standards WHO/CDS/CSR/ISR/99.2
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W est Nile FeverBackground
• West Nile Fever is a febrile illness resulting from a mosquito-borne arbovirus in the Flavivirudae family. It is
a zoonotic disease transmitted from birds to humans and other animals. Serological evidence suggests that 
the infection is present throughout practically the entire African continent. West Nile Fever most likely 
emerged in Africa and is now found world-wide. Outbreaks occur in humans, birds and horses.
• Most cases are mild and may not come to the attention of the health system. Patients seeking health care
usually present with flu-like symptoms such as fever, headache and body aches. Occasionally patients 
present with a skin rash on the neck, trunk, arms or legs.
• People of all ages and conditions may be affected. However, those who are above age 50 years or who
have had an organ transplant are at increased risk of severe illness.
• Very severe cases include signs of encephalitis, meningo-encephalitis or meningitis. Symptoms include 
high fever, headache, neck stiffness, stupor, tremors, convulsions, flaccid paralysis and coma.
• The case fatality rate in patients with neurological involvement ranges from 4% to 14% and as high as 29% 
in elderly patients.
• West Nile Fever can be prevented by avoiding mosquito bites especially at dusk when mosquitoes are most 
active. Insect repellents, wearing long sleeves and trousers, staying indoors and draining breeding sites like 
pools of standing water can reduce exposure to mosquitoes.
• Confirmation of West Nile Fever in patients with clinical symptoms requires laboratory confirmation of 
specific IgM antibodies in cerebrospinal fluid and serum specimens.
• Because there is no specific treatment for West Nile Fever, patients with severe disease are usually 
hospitalized for supportive treatment and nursing care.
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l
• Identify risk factors for infection and determine high-risk populations for targeted prevention activities
• Identify geographic areas for targeted prevention and control activities
• Identify most severe cases for referral to hospitalized care
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case:
A hospitalized case o f encephalitis due to unknown cause 
Confirmed case:
Confirmation o f West Nile Fever is through laboratory diagnostics to identify WNV-specific IgM
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W est Nile Fever
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is suspected:
• Report case-based information immediately to the appropriate levels.
• Treat and manage the patient with supportive care.
• Collect specimen safely to confirm the case.
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case is confirmed:
• Treat and manage the patient with supportive care
• Mobilise the community through education in order to promote adoption of behaviours that reduce disease
risk such as protection against mosquito bites and reduction of mosquito breeding sites
• Conduct community education on how WNV is transmitted and on how to prevent being infected
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Construct an epidemic curve during the outbreak.
Place: Plot location of case residence and worksite.
Person: Immediate case-based reporting of cases and deaths. During an outbreak, count and report
cases and deaths. Analyze age and sex distribution. Assess risk factors immediately and
consider request for assistance to improve outbreak control.
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
Presence of IgM antibodies against West Nile Fever
Specimen
For ELISA:
Whole blood, serum or plasma 
For PCR:
Whole blood or blood clot, serum/plasma or tissue
For immunohisto-chemistry: Skin or tissue specimens from fatal cases.
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W est Nile Fever
When to collect the 
specimen Collect specimen from the first suspected case.
If more than one suspected case, collect until specimens have been collected from 5 
to10 suspected cases.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
HANDLE AND TRANSPORT SPECIMENS FROM SUSPECTED VHF PATIENTS 
WITH EXTREME CAUTION. WEAR PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND USE BARRIER 
PRECAUTIONS.
For ELISA or PCR:
• Refrigerate serum or clot
• Freeze (-20C or colder) tissue specimens for virus isolation
For Immunohistochemistry:
• Fix skin snip specimen in formalin. Specimen can be stored up to 6 weeks. The 
specimen is not infectious once it is in formalin.
Store at room temperature. Formalin-fixed specimens may be transported at room 
temperature.
Results
Diagnostic services for VHF are not routinely available. Advance arrangements are 
usually required for VHF diagnostic services. Contact the appropriate National authority 
or WHO.
R e f e r e n c e
• Global Alert and Response; West Nile Fever epidemic updates 
http://www.who.int/csr/don/archive/disease/west nile fever/en/
• Pedro N. A and Boris Szyfres. Zoonoses and Communicable Diseases Common to Man and Animals. Third 
edition, Volume II. Chlamydioses, Rickettsioses and Viroses, Part II: Viroses Pages 372-376. Pan American 
Health Organization, WHO
• Epidemic/Epizootic West Nile Virus in the United States: Guidelines for Surveillance, Prevention and 
Control. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/resources/wnv-guidelines-aug-2003.pdf
• Infection Control for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers in the African Health Care Setting WHO/EMC/ESR/98.2
• Evans, A.S. (ed). Viral Infections o f Humans; Epidemiology and Control. 1989. Plenum Medical Book 
Company, New York
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Y ellow  fever
B a c k g r o u n d ______________________________________________________________________________________
• Acute viral hemorrhagic disease caused by a flavivirus transmitted human-to-human via the domestic species 
of Aedes mosquitoes (Urban epidemics) or to humans from primate reservoir via a forest mosquito species 
(Sylvatic cycle).
• Large scale outbreaks occur every 3 to 10 years in villages or cities in the absence of large scale 
immunisation. Sporadic cases can occur regularly in endemic areas. Resurgence of disease in Africa since 
mid-1980s. True incidence far exceeds reported cases.
• Incubation period 3 to 6 days after the bite from an infected mosquito. About 15% of infections progress to 
fever and jaundice.
• While only the minority of cases are severe, case fatality rate may be 25% to 50% among patients with 
syndrome of haemorrhage, jaundice, and renal disease.
• Risk factor: sporadic cases often linked to occupation or village location near woods or where monkeys are 
numerous. Also non-vaccinated persons.
• International reporting to WHO required within 24 hours.
• Viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHF) and other parasitic, viral, or bacterial diseases such as malaria, Dengue
Chikungunya, leptospirosis, hepatitis A-E, Epstein-Barr virus, West Nile, Q fever, anthrax, rickettsial diseases, 
etc, and toxic exposures may mimic yellow fever.
• Infection and disease can be prevented by vaccination. With a vaccine efficacy > 95% and duration of
immunity of at least 10 years.________________________________________________________________
S u r v e i l l a n c e  g o a l________________________________________________________________________________
• Seek confirmation of yellow fever and rule out other possible etiologies of fever with jaundice
• Provide information in order to adopt appropriate control measures
• Identify populations at risk of yellow fever
• Monitor the epidemiology of the disease and the impact of control measures
• Support operational research and innovation
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Y ellow  fever
S t a n d a r d  c a s e  d e f i n i t i o n
Suspected case:
Any person with acute onset of fever, with jaundice appearing within 14 days of onset of the first symptoms.
Probable case:
A suspected case
AND
One of the following
• Epidemiological link to a confirmed case or an outbreak
• Positive post-mortem liver histopathology
Confirmed case:
A probable case
AND
One of the following
• Detection of YF-specific* IgM
• Detection of four-fold increase in YF IgM and/or IgG antibody titres between acute and convalescent serum
samples
• Detection of YFV-specific* neutralizing antibodies
*YF-specific means that antibody tests (such as IgM or neutralizing antibody) for other prevalent flavivirus are negative. 
This testing should include at least IgM for Dengue and West Nile and may include other flavivirus depending on local 
epidemiology.
OR
One of the following
• Detection of YF virus genome in blood or other organs by PCR
• Detection of yellow fever antigen in blood, liver or other organs by immunoassays
• Isolation of the yellow fever virus
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Y ellow  fever
R e s p o n d  to  a l e r t  t h r e s h o l d
If a single case or cluster is suspected or probable:
• Fill out notification form, including clinical information, case based forms, check vaccination status and travel 
history
• Take blood specimen for laboratory confirmation. You may obtain convalescent specimen from patient(s)
• Diagnose and treat patient(s) with supportive care
• Notify immediately to the next level. In the case of probable case inform nearby health units
• Strengthen surveillance (apply the community case definition i.e. fever and jaundice)
• Initiate a preliminary field investigation if cluster of cases with fever and jaundice. Obtain information to 
determine probable site of infection. Determine vaccination coverage of the community and start planning for 
vaccination (in case of a cluster)
• Strengthen routine yellow fever immunization
R e s p o n d  to  a c t i o n  t h r e s h o l d
In addition to alert threshold response If a single case is confirmed:
• Continue / complete epidemiological investigation including screening for vaccination status
• Initiate entomological investigation if indicated
• Determine vaccination coverage in affected area (routine EPI, recent outbreak responses or preventive 
campaigns)
• Initiate social mobilization for interventions selected
• Continue risk communication and action to reduce risk including vector control if indicated
• Initiate vaccination in affected villages, district or town/city based on epidemiological findings
• Notify to WHO through Central Authorities using IHR decision instrument
• Continue to strengthen routine yellow fever immunization, especially for hard-to-reach areas
A n a l y z e  a n d  i n t e r p r e t  d a t a
Time: Generate Weekly Graphs of cases and deaths.
During outbreaks, construct epidemic curves (to monitor daily then weekly trends).
Place: Plot location of case households and occupation with precise mapping.
Person: Report immediate case-based information for cases and deaths. Report summary totals weekly.
During outbreak, count cases and deaths daily as they occur, then weekly when the epidemic 
matures or ends. Analyze by person variables (age, sex, occupation...). Assess risk factors to 
improve prevention of sporadic outbreaks.
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Y ellow  fever
L a b o r a t o r y  c o n f i r m a t i o n
Diagnostic test
1. ELISA for the presence of yellow fever Specific IgM and IgG antibodies.
2. Exclusion of Dengue, West Nile virus and other locally prevalent flavivirus will be 
necessary for the confirmation of yellow fever.
3. PCR, YF specific seroneutralization, virus isolation or histopathology
Specimen
Serum in the acute and convalescent phases of the illness; 
In the event of death, postmortem liver specimen
When to collect the 
specimen Within 14 days of onset of first symptomsCollect specimen from at least the first to 10th suspected cases of yellow fever. Collect 
specimen from last cases (based on epidemic curves) to decide on the end of the 
epidemic.
How to prepare, 
store, and transport 
the specimen
• Collect 10 ml of venous blood from adults, 1-5 ml from children, in a capillary tube, 
microtainer, or if necessary in a standard glass test tube.
• Separate blood cells from serum:o Let clot retract for 30 to 60 minutes at room temperature. Centrifuge at 2000 
rpm for 10-20 minutes and pour off serum into a clean glass tube. o If no centrifuge, put sample in refrigerator overnight (4 to 6 hours) until clot 
retracts. Pour off serum the next morning. o If no centrifuge and no refrigerator, let blood sit at an angle for at least 60 
minutes (without shaking or being driven in a vehicle. Pour off serum into a 
clean tube.
• Store serum at 4°C.
Transport serum samples using appropriate packaging to prevent breaking or leaks during 
transport. Avoid glass tubes for shipment and transport if possible.
The specimen should arrive at the laboratory within 3 days of being collected.
Avoid shaking of specimen before serum has been collected.
To prevent bacterial overgrowth, ensure that the serum is poured into a clean glass test 
tube. The test tube does not need to be sterile -  just clean.
Transport the serum in an EPI hand vaccine carrier at 4°C-8°C to prevent bacterial 
overgrowth (up to 7 days). If not refrigerated, serum stored in a clean tube will be good for 
at least 3 days.
Results
Laboratory results should be received within 7 days of reception of the specimen in the 
laboratory.
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Yellow fever
R e f e r e n c e
• District g u id e lin e s  for y e llo w  fe ve r su rve illance. WHO 1998 WHO/GPVI/EPI/98.09
• Yellow Fever. 1998. WHO/EPI/Gen/98.11
• Recommendation of Expert Meeting on Yellow Fever Surveillance and Response in Africa. Brazzaville, Congo, 
from 13 to 15 October 2010
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Annexes to Section 9
The following annexes are examples o f program specific forms. Some forms are for documenting initial findings while others are designed for in-depth investigation. Refer to your country’s national surveillance program for the appropriate forms.
ANNEX 9A AEFI - investigation form
ANNEX 9B Acute flaccid paralysis - case investigation form
ANNEX 9C Cholera - case-based investigation form
ANNEX 9D Guinea worm - case investigation form
ANNEX 9E Maternal death - reporting form
ANNEX 9F Measles - case investigation form
ANNEX 9G Neonatal tetanus - case investigation form
ANNEX 9H Tuberculosis - MDR and XDR TB - case-based reporting form
ANNEX 9I Viral hemorrhagic fever - case report form
ANNEX 9J VHF - case investigation form
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ANNEX 9A Adverse event following immunization - investigation form
AEFI Investigation
An adverse event following immunization (AEFIs) is a medical incident that takes place after an immunization, 
causes concern and is believed to be caused by the immunization. Programmes providing immunization 
services should include a system for AEFI detection and reporting, investigation and management, data 
analysis, corrective action, relevant communication and evaluation of the system. The ultimate goal of an 
investigation is to determine whether the vaccine or immunization process is responsible for the reported 
event(s) or to find another cause and correct it if possible, and reassure the public.
Further resources:
http://www.who.int/immunization_safety/aefi/en/
http://www.who.int/immunization safety/aefi/managing AEFIs/en/index6.html 
http://www.who.int/immunization/documents/792.pdf
Be prepared (Steps to take before an event occurs)
• Read the resource documents on reporting, management and investigation of AEFIs.
• Develop standards: case definitions for reportable AEFIs, use of reporting forms and investigation 
procedures.
• Designate and train staff to conduct an AEFI investigation using the investigation form.
• Train staff on how to collect specimens.
• Establish procedure, criteria and designated person for notifying WHO and UNICEF (if UN­
supplied vaccine) or other relevant party depending on procurement mechanism.
• Establish a National Technical Advisory Committee with representation from major medical 
organizations.
• Identify a spokesperson for public communications.
Receiving a report
• Ensure immediate reporting of most serious events and rapid attention to reports received.
• Verify the information in the report and classify and assess the AEFI using established case 
definitions. Decide whether it needs further investigating.
• If investigation is warranted, travel to the location of the AEFI, or delegate responsibility to another 
trained person.
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3. Investigate and collect data
• Ask about the patient
• Ask about the vaccine and other drugs potentially received
• Ask about other vaccines
• Ask about immunization services
• Observe the service in action
• Ask about cases in unvaccinated persons
• Establish a more specific case definition if needed
• Formulate a hypothesis as to what caused the AEFI
Collect specimens if appropriate:
• from the patient
• the vaccine (and diluent if applicable)
• the syringes and needles
4. Dispatch specimens to appropriate testing facility (laboratory, regulatory authority, etc...)
5. Analyze the data
• Review epidemiological, clinical, and laboratory findings
• Summarize and report findings
6. Take action
• Communicate with health staff
• Communicate findings and action to the parents and public
• Correct problem (based on the cause) by improving training, supervision, and/or distribution of 
vaccines/injection equipment
• Replace vaccines if indicated
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A N N E X  9 B A c u t e  f l a c c i d  p a r a l y s i s  -  c a s e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  c a s e  f o r m
Officia l Use 
Only
/
Epid Number:
(completed by district team) 
/
Year Onset Case Number Received:
ID E N T IF IC A T IO N
D istric t:
Nearest Health 
Facility to Village:
P rov ince :____
Village/
Neighbourhood:
Town/
City:
A ddress:
Name(s) of patient: M o th e rIF a th e r:
Sex: □ 1 = Male, 2 = Female Date o f b irth : or Age: years months
(If DOB is unknown)
N O T IF IC A T IO N /IN V E S T IG A T IO N
Notified b y :________________________
/ /
Date Notified: Date Investigated:
H O S P IT A L IZ A T IO N
Admitted to hospital? □  1= Y, 2= N  Date o f admission
Medical record number:_________
Facility Address:
C L IN IC A L  H IS TO R Y  
QuestionFever at Onset of paralysis 
Paralysis progresses <= 3 days Flaccid & sudden paralysis Asymmetrical
Please use the fo llow ing key, 1=Yes, 2=No, 9=Unknown.
Answer
L A
LL
S ite  o f  pa ra lys is  
RA 
RL
Onset o f paralysis:
I I
A F T E R  IN V E S T IG A T IO N , W AS IT  TRUE AFP? D 1= Y, 2= N
If “No,” then the rest of the form does not need to be completed. Mark “6” for Final Classification.
V A C C IN A T IO N  H IS TO R Y
T o ta l D oses o f  P o lio : □  99=Inconnu
Birth I I
4t
I f  >4, last dose I
SPECIM EN C O LLE C T E R  DE SELLES
Date 1s Stool: I I Date 2nd Stool:
Date Sent to
National lab: /
/ /
I I
I I
I I
st I I I I1
nd I I I2
I I I
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STO O L SPECIM EN RESULTS:
/  /
Condition o f Stool: l _ l  1=Adequate, 2= Not Adequate 
/  /  /  /Date received by national Lab Date results sent by lab to district Date results receive by district
/  /  /  /Date isolate sent by national Lab to regional lab Date differentiation result sent by regional lab Date differentiation result received by district
Primary Isolation P1 P2 P3 NP-Ent W1 W2 W3 V1 V2 V3 NP-Ent
Results:
F O L LO W  UP E X A M IN A T IO N
Date o f fo llow  up examination:______ /_ : □
L A
LL
RA
RL
Findings at Follow-up
1= Residual paralysis 3= Lost to follow-up 
2= No residual paralysis 4= Death before follow-up
Residual Paralysis?
F IN A L  C LA S S IF IC A T IO N  OF TH E CASE: □ 1 = C o n firm e d , 2 = C o m p a tib le , 3= D isca rd e d  6=Pas P F A
IN V E S T IG A T O R
Name: ___________ Title:
Unit: Address: Phone:
/
382
ANNEX 9C Cholera - case-based investigation form
Cholera Case Investigation Form
Area : Patient and clinical laboratory related information
Variables/Questions Answers
1 Detection day (dd/mm/yyyy)
2 Detection place (Health facility or Community)
3 Patient identification number (yyyy-week- CCC-PPP-DDD-Reporting site-nnn)
4 Patient surname or last name
5 Patient first name(s)
6 Age (years)
7 Sex (F/M)
8 Number of people in same household
9 Patient's residential Address
10 Village/Town
11 Neighborhood
12 District
13 Province
14 Country
15 Date of onset (first symptoms) (dd/mm/yyyy)
16 Clinical signs and Symptoms
17 Was patient exposed to any known risk factor for this disease? (Yes/No)
18
If yes, specify risk factor(s): Water used by 
the patient for drinking : (list by type, e.g. tap 
water, Borehole, unprotected well, protected 
well, River, dam, lake, pond)
19 Number of doses of cholera Vaccine
20 Date last dose was administered
21 Laboratory related information: at least first and last cases
22 Vibrio ch o le ra e  identified in stools?
23 Drugs to which the vibrio strain is sensitive
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24 Drugs to which the vibrio strain is resistant
25 Outcome (Died, Survived, Unknown)
26
Final Classification (Not a case, Suspect, 
Probable, Confirmed by Lab, Confirmed by 
epidemiological link, Pending)
27 Other Notes and Observations
28 Date latest update of this record (dd/mm/yyyy)Area: Risk factor search  (Information to  be obtained from the w ater and sanitation group of the  investigation team)
Variables/Questions Answers
Mapping Potential Hazards
i Potential vibrio vehicles: drinking water
2 Drinking water source 1
3 Drinking water source 2
4 Drinking water source 3
5 Drinking water source 4
6
Potential vibrio vehicles: non drinking water
7 Non drinking water source 1
8 Non drinking water source 2
9 Non drinking water source 3
10 Non drinking water source 4
11 Potential vibrio vehicles: Food items
12 Food items 1
13 Food items 2
14 Food items 3
15 Food items 4
Food items 5
17 Food items 6
18 Food items 7
19 Food items 8
20 Bacteriology lab findings
21 Drinking water found infected by vibrio
22 Non drinking water found infected by vibrio
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23 Food items found infected by vibrio
24
Looking out for Exposure to the 
identified hazards
25
Water used by the patient for drinking : (list by 
type, e.g. tap water, Borehole, unprotected 
well, protected well, river, dam, lake, pond):
26
Within 3 days prior to the onset of the disease 
did the patient drink from
27 Water source 2 (Yes/No)
28 Water source 3 (Yes/No)
29 Water source 4 (Yes/No)
30 Water source 5 (Yes/No)
31
Within 3 days prior to the onset of the disease 
did the patient eat
32 Food item 1 (Yes/No)
33 Food item 2 (Yes/No)
34 Food item 3 (Yes/No)
35 Food item 4 (Yes/No)
36 Food item 5 (Yes/No)
37
Within 3 days prior to the onset of the disease 
did the patient attend any
38 funerals (Yes/No)
39 other social event (Yes/No)
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[Country Name]
ANNEX 9D Guinea worm - case investigation form
GUINEA WORM ERADICATION PROGRAMME CASE INVESTIGATION FORM FOR GUINEA WORM DISEASE
Epid No:.
C O U -R  E G-D I  S-Y R-C A  S E To be com pleted in triplicate
I. Reporting/Investigation Information
R e p o rtin g  V illa g e :_ Zone: D is tr ic t:
D a te  Case R eported : (d d /m m /y y y y )  /_ _ _ /___________  R e p o rte d  b y : _______________________P ositio n :
D a te  Case In ve stig a ted : /  /_______  In ve s tig a te d  b y : __________________________ P o s itio n :_______
R egion :
II. Patient Information and Place of Residence
N am e: 
A g e :__ Sex:
R es id e n t A ddress: V illa g e :_
A re a /S u b  D is tr ic t :_________
Setting: U rb a n /R u ra l______
_______________ Father's N a m e /L a n d lo rd 's  Nam e:_
_O ccupa tion :____________________E th n ic ity ______
Zone:
D is tr ic t:
L a n d  M a rks :
_R egion:_
P lace o f  res idence is  same as th e  re p o rt in g  v illa g e : Y E S /N O  R esidence s ince w h e n (in  m o n th s ):___________
(Please f i l l  B O X  " I I I .  P lace stayed in  th e  las t 10-14 m o n th s  . . . . "  I f  th e  n u m b e r o f  m o n th s  stayed in  th is  b o x  w as less th a n  10 .)
III. Place stayed in the last 10-14 months i f  not the same as above.
V illa g e :_
D is tr ic t:_
Zone: A re a /S u b  D is tr ic t:
R eg ion : C oun try :_
IV. Travel History of patient in the last 10-14 months
D a te  F ro m : D a te  To: V illa g e : Sub D is tr ic t D is tr ic t: R eg ion :
P oss ib le  w a te r sources th a t the  p a tie n t m ig h t have con tam ina ted  w ith  lo c a tio n  d e ta ils  and GPS: 
N a m e  L a titu d e  L o n g itu d e  T yp e S ource C h e ck  b o x  i f  T reated
w ith  A b a te  and D ate
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GUINEA WORM ERADICATION PROGRAMME CASE INVESTIGATION FORM FOR GUINEA WORM DISEASE
E pid  N o:____ -_____ -____ -_ _-______
C O U -R  E  G-D I  S-Y R -C  A  S E  To be com pleted in triplicate
 □  _
 □  _
V. Sign and symptom
W h a t w as th e  f i r s t  s ig n /s y m p to m  b e fo re  the  em ergence o f  w o rm ?  B lis te r /Itc h in g /S w e llin g /O th e rs : S p e c ify___________________
E m ergence  o f  g u in ea  w o rm : Y E S /N O  N o  o f  W o rm s :________  Is  th is  the  f i r s t  gu in ea  w o rm  em erged th is  year? Y E S /N O
D a te  o f  th e  F irs t gu in ea  w o rm  em erged: _ _ _ /_ _ _ /_________ W as the  case de tected b e fo re  w o rm  em erged? Y E S /N O
VII. Case Containment Measures and Guinea-worm registry
R e ce ive d  any h e a lth  education : Y E S /N O  P a tie n t en tered any w a te r source: Y E S /N O
P lace M anaged: C C C /H o m e /H e a lth  C e n te rs /H o sp ita l
N a m e  o f  H e a lth  F a c il ity /H e a lth  C e n te r/O th e r C enters i f  p a tie n t w as h o s p ita liz e d :________________________________________
A d m is s io n  Date: _ _ _ /_ _ _ _ /_________  ' D isch a rg e d  Date: _ _ _ /_ _ _ _ /_______
S N .N O . L o c a tio n  o f  w o rm  D a te  w o rm  detected D a te  o f  g u in e a -w o rm  D a te  c o n firm e d  D a te  o f  g u in e a -w o rm  R e g u la r E x tra c te d
em ergence b y  superv isor: co m p le te ly  e xp e lle d  ba ndag ing
VIII. Specimen Handling
W as a specim en (w o rm ) saved and  preserved  in  a lcoh o l?  Y E S /N O  I f  N O  W H Y ?
D a te  sent to  R eg ion : ___________________________ R ece ived  B y :  D a te  R ece ived  b y :_____________________________
_ / /_ _ / /_ _ / /_
_ / /_ _ / /_
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
/
/
/
/
/
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GUINEA WORM ERADICATION PROGRAMME CASE INVESTIGATION FORM FOR GUINEA WORM DISEASE
E pid  N o:____ -_____ -____ ___________
C O U -R  E  G-D I  S-Y R -C  A  S E  To be com pleted in triplicate
D a te  sent to  N a t io n a l:_________________________ R ece ived  B y : ___________________________D a te  R ece ived  b y :_______________
For National Secretariat Only:
D id  y o u  send i t  fo r  c o n firm a tio n ?  Y e s /N o  D a te  s e n t:_________________________________ Sent T o :____________________________
D a te  R e s u lt R ece ived_________________________
R esult:
IX. Other Information
U se  o f  c lo th  f i lte r :  Y E S /N O  F requ ency o f  cha ng ing  f i lte rs  1 -ra re ly ; 2 -som etim es; 3 -a lw a ys; 4 -n e ve r
R em arks:
Person who completed this form :
NAME POSITION CELL PHONE NO SIGNATURE
Disease Control or Surveillance Officer:
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ANNEX 9E Maternal death - reporting form
Maternal Death Reporting Form
The form must be completed for all deaths, including abortions and ectopic gestation related deaths, in pregnant 
women or within 42 days after termination o f pregnancy irrespective o f duration or site o f pregnancy
Questions / Variables Answers
1 Country
2 District
3 Reporting Site
4
How many of such maternal deaths occurred cumulatively this year at this 
site?
5 Date this maternal death occurred (day/month/year)
6 Maternal death locality (Village or Town)
7
Record's unique identifier (year-Country code-District-site-maternal death 
rank)
8
Maternal death place (Community, health facility, district hospital, referral 
hospital or private hospital, on the way to health facility or hospital)
9 Age (in years) of the deceased
10 Gravida: how many times was the decease pregnant?
11
Parity: how many times did the late deliver a baby of 22 weeks/500g or 
more?
12
Time of death (specify "During pregnancy, At delivery, during delivery, 
during the immediate post partum period, or long after delivery")
13 If abortion: was it spontaneous or induced?
Maternal death history and risk factors
14
Was the deceased receiving any antenatal care? (Yes/No)
Did she have Malaria? (Yes or No)
15 Did she have Hypertension? (Yes or No)
16 Did she have Anaemia? (Yes or No)
17 Did she have Abnormal Lie? (Yes or No)
18 Did she undergo any Previous Caesarean Section? (Yes or No)
19 What was her HIV Status? (choose "HIV+; HIV-; or Unknown HIV status")Delivery, puerperium and neonatal information
20 How long (hours) was the duration of labor
21
What type of delivery was it? (choose one from "1=Vaginal non assisted 
delivery, 2= vaginal-assisted delivery (Vacuum/forceps), or 3=Caesarean 
section"
22 What was the baby status at birth? (Alive or Stillborn)
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Maternal Death Reporting Form
The form must be completed for all deaths, including abortions and ectopic gestation related deaths, in pregnant 
women or within 42 days after termination o f pregnancy irrespective o f duration or site o f pregnancy
Questions / Variables Answers
23
In case the baby was born alive, is he/she still alive or died within 28 days 
after his/her birth? (choose 1=Still alive, 2=neonatal death, 3=died beyond 
28 days of age)
24
Was the deceased referred to any health facility or hospital? (Yes/No/Don't 
know)
25 If yes, how long did it take to get there? (hours)
26
Did the deceased receive any medical care or obstetrical/surgical 
interventions for what led to her death? (Yes/No/Don't know)
27
If yes, specify where and the treatment received*
28 Primary cause of the Maternal Death
29 Secondary cause of the Maternal Death
30
Analysis and Interpretation of the information collected so far (investigator's 
opinion on this death)
31
Remarks
32 Maternal death notification date (day/month/year)
33 Investigator (Title, name and function)
* Treatment received
I.V. Fluids; Plasma; Blood Transfusion; Antibiotics; Ocytocin; Anti-seizure drugs; Oxygen; Anti-malarial; 
Other medical treatment; Surgery; Manual removal of placenta; Manual intra uterin aspiration; Curettage, 
laporotomy, hysterctomy, intsrumental delivery (Forceps;Vacuum), Caesarian section, anetshesia ( general, 
spinal, epidural , local)
Definitions
Gravida: The number of times the woman was pregnant-
Parity: Number of times the woman delivered a baby of 22 weeks/500g or more, whether alive or dead
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ANNEX 9F Measles - case investigation form
MEASLES CASE INVESTIGATION FORM
Variable/Description Value/Answer
Country
ID number
Reporting district
Province of report
Reporting health facility
Disease/Condition Measles
Date received form at national level (day/month/year)
Name(s) of patient
Date of birth (day/month/year)
Age in years
Age in months
Patient’s residence: village/neighborhood
Town/City
Urban/Rural
District of Residence
Province
Sex (M/F)
Date seen at health facility (day/month/year)
Date health facility notified district (day/month/year)
Date of onset (day/month/year)
Number of vaccine doses
Date of last vaccination (day/month/year)
Blank variable #1
Blank variable #2
In-patient or Out-patient?
Outcome (1=Alive; 2=Dead; 3=Unknown)
Final classification (1=Lab Confirmed; 2=Confirmed by Epidemiological 
linkage; 3=Compatible; 4=Discarded (IgM negative); 5= Pending 
(Suspected with specimen lab results pending)
Date sent form to district (day/month/year)
Date received form at district (dd/mm/yyyy)
Date specimen collection (dd/mm/yyyy)
Date specimen sent to Lab (dd/mm/yyyy)
Specimen source
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MEASLES CASE INVESTIGATION FORM
Variable/Description Value/Answer
Specify
Date lab received specimen (dd/mm/yyyy)
Specimen condition [1=adequate (good); 2=not adequate (not good)]
Measles IgM (1=positive; 2=negative; S=indeterminate; 4=pending)
Rubella IgM (1=positive; 2=negative; S=indeterminate; 4=pending)
Other lab results
Date lab sent results to district (dd/mm/yyyy)
Date district received lab results (dd/mm/yyyy)
Name, title and function of reporting officer
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ANNEX 9G Neonatal tetanus - case investigation form
Officia l Use Epid N u m b e r:______ -______ -______ -______  Received
Only (completed by district team) Province District Year Onset Case Number at N a t io n a l_______ /_______/
ID E N T IF IC A T IO N
District: Province:
Nearest Health Village/ Town/
Facility to Village: Neighbourhood: City:
A ddress:
Name(s) of patient: M o th e r:
Sex: 1_1 1 = Male, 2 = Female Father:
N O T IF IC A T IO N /IN V E S T IG A T IO N
Notified Date Date Case
by: Notified: i  i Investigated: / /
M O TH E R 'S  V A C C IN A T IO N  H ISTO R Y Please use the fo llow ing key, 1=Y, 2=N, 9=U, where
applicable.
Question Answer 1st / /  4th /
M other vaccinated w ith  TT? 2nd / /  5th /
Have card? 3rd /  /  I f  >5, last
Number o f  doses: dose / /
Vaccination status o f  mother prior to delivery? * *
“ *1 =  u p -to -d a te , 2 =  n o t u p -to -da te , 9= u n k n o w n
B IR T H  OF IN F A N T
Date o f birth: /  / Please use the fo llow ing key, 1=Y, 2=N, 9=U, where applicable.
Questions Questions
M other received antenatal care? Location o f  birth: * * *
H ow  many prenatal visits? I f  b irth  in institution, name o f  institution:
Attended by  a trained TBA/m idw ife? Cut cord w ith a sterile blade?
I f  attended by  a trained TB A /m idw ife , give name Cord treated w ith anything?
Attended by  doctor/nurse? Describe treatment o f  cord: Where?
* * *  1=Hospital, 2=Health centre, 3=Home, trained attendant, 4=Home, untrained attendant, 5=Home, no attendant, 9=Unknown
IN IT IA L  C L IN IC A L  H IS T O R Y  Please use the fo llow ing key, 1=Y, 2=N, 9=U, where applicable.
Was baby normal at birth? Spasms or Convulsions?
Norm al cry and suck during firs t 2 days? Complications?
Stopped sucking after 2 days? D id  the baby die?
Arched back? Age at death: Days
Stiffness? Age o f  onset in  days: Days ( 99=Unknown)
Onset o f symptoms: i  i
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T R E A T M E N T
Date o f admission
Medical record number: 
Facility Address:
Questions
Seen in  OPD? 
Admitted?
Answer 1=y, 2=n, 9=u
C O M M E N TS :
RESPONSE Please use the follow ing key, 1=Y, 2=N, 9=U, where applicable.
Date o f response: _Questions
Mother given protective dose of TT within 3 months of report? 
Supplemental immunization within same locality as the case?
Details o f response:_________________________
Answer
F IN A L  C LA S S IF IC A T IO N  OF TH E CASE: Neonatal Tetanus: □ 1=Yes, 2=No, 9=Unknown
IN V E S T IG A T O R
Nam e:___________
U n it:____________
Phone:
Title:
Address:
i i
i i
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ANNEX 9H Tuberculosis - MDR and XDR TB - case-based reporting form
Case based Multi-Drug R esistant and Extensively Drug R esistant Tuberculosis Report Form
Country: Year:
Quarter: Month: Drug Susceptibility Test Results (S=sensitive; R=Resistant; I=intermediate; U=unknown
Case 
unique 
Identifier 
(Detection 
year- 
Country 
code­
Number in 
Tb 
Register)
Sex
(F/
M)
Age
(Year
s)
Date of 
Diagnosi 
s
(dd/mm/y
yyy)
Type of 
Notificat 
ion
(MDR- 
TB* or 
XDR-
TB**)
TB Site
(Pulmona 
ry or 
extra 
Pulmonar 
y)
Type 
of TB 
Case
(New 
/Relap 
se 
/After 
default 
/After 
failure 
of first 
treatm 
ent 
/After 
failure 
of re- 
treatm 
ent 
/Transf 
er in 
/Other)
Patient
Treatm
ent
Status
(On
treatme 
nt /Not 
on
treatme 
nt /Don't 
Know)
HIV
Status
(positiv
e
/n eg ativ
e
/U n kn o
wn)
H R E Z S
T
h
A
m
K
m
C
m
Cf
x
Of
x
Lf
x
Mf
x
Gf
x
Gf
x
Pt
o
Et
o
C
s
PA
S
Other
(Speci
fy)
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* Multi-drug Resistant TB = Resistance to at least Isoniazid and Rifampicin
“ Extensively Drug Resistant TB = MDR-TB plus: Resistance to any fluoroquinolone such as Ciprofloxacin, Oxfloxacin, etc, and Resistance to at least one of the three second line injectable anti-TB drugs (Capreomycin, Kanamycin 
and Amikacin).
First-line drugs: H = Isoniazid R = Rifampicin E = Ethambutol Z = Pyrazinamide S = Streptomycin Th = Thioacetazone
Second-line drugs: Am=Amikacin Km=Kanamycin Cm=Capreomycin Cfx=Ciprofloxacin Ofx=Ofloxacin Lfx=Levofloxacin Mfx=Moxifloxacin Gfx=Gatifloxacin Pto=Protionamide Eto=Ethionamide Cs=Cycloserine PAS=P- 
aminosalicylic acid
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ANNEX 9I Viral hemorrhagic fever - c a se  reporting form
IDSR Viral Hemorrhagic Fever C ase Report Form
Variables / Questions Answers
i Detection day (dd/mm/yyyy)
2 Detection place (Health facility or Community)
S Patient identification number (yyyy-week-CCC-PPP-DDD- Reporting site-nnn)
4 Patient surname or last name
5 Patient first name(s)
6 Age (years)
7 Sex (F/M)
s Number of people in same household
9 Number of other contacts
io Patient's residential address
i i Village/Town
i2 Neighborhood
iS District
i4 Province
i5 Country
i6 Date of first symptoms onset (dd/mm/yyyy)
i7 Observed Symptoms and Clinical signs
is Was patient exposed to any known risk factor for this disease? (Yes/No)
i9 If yes, specify risk factor(s)
20 Lab results
2i
Final Classification (Not a case, Suspect, Probable, 
Confirmed by Lab, Confirmed by epidemiological link, 
Pending)
22 Outcome (Died, Survived, Unknown)
2S End of latest contact followed-up (dd/mm/yyyy)
24 Other Notes and Observations
25 Date latest update of this record (dd/mm/yyyy)
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ANNEX SJ Viral hemorrhagic fever -  case investigation form
Date of detection of the case / /__
This Case was notified by (tick o f f  the right answer and specified)
□ Mobile team, # _________________ □ Health Centre
□ Hospital ____________  □ Others:
Form filled  by (first name and surname) _____________
Information given by (first name and surname) _____________
Family link  w ith  the patient _____________
ID Case
Date of reception: / /Country:
Identity of the patient
First name:_______________________  Surname__________________________  Nickname
For the babies, son/daughter o f (name o f father)________________________________________
B irth  date: Age (years)_____ Sex □ M  □ F
Permanent address: Head o f Household (first name and surname)_________________________
Village/Suburb_______________  Country______________ GPS la t______________long
N ationality:______________________  Ethnic group______________________
Profession o f the patient (tick o f f  the right answer)
□ Health staff, details:
Name o f health care facility__________Service__________________ qualification___
□ M iner □ House wife □ Hunter/trading game meat □ Children
□ Pupil/ Student □ Farmers □ Others_______________________
Status of the patient
Status o f the patient at detection □ Alive □ Death I f  dead, please specify date o f death: ___/___/___
Place o f death: □ Community, name village __________________  Country________________
□ Hospital, name and service ______________________ Country________________
Place o f the funerals, name village: ________________________  Country________________
History of the disease
D ate o f  onset o f  symptoms: /  /
Nam e o f  the village where the pa tien t g o t ill 
Did the patient travel during illness :
I f  Yes, indicate the places and the country: 
Village __________________
□ Yes
Country_ 
□ No □ D N K
D id the patient have fever? □ Yes
Health Centers _____________________  Country_______
Health Centers _____________________  Country_______
□ No □ DNK. I f  yes, date o f onset fo r the fever: ___/___/___
Does o r  d id  th e  p a tie n t have th e  follow ing sym ptom s (tick o f f  when apply)Headache: □ Yes □ No □ DNK Skin Rash □ Yes □ No □ DNKVomiting/Nausea □ Yes □ No □ DNK Bleeding from injection sites □ Yes □ No □ DNKAnorexia/Loss of Appetite □ Yes □ No □ DNK Bleeding gums □ Yes □ No □ DNKDiarrhoea □ Yes □ No □ DNK Bleeding into eyes (red eyes) □ Yes □ No □ DNKIntense Fatigue □ Yes □ No □ DNK Black or bloody stool □ Yes □ No □ DNKAbdominal Pain □ Yes □ No □ DNK Blood in vomits □ Yes □ No □ DNKMuscle or Joint Pain □ Yes □ No □ DNK Bleeding from nose □ Yes □ No □ DNKDifficulty swallowing □ Yes □ No □ DNK Bleeding from vagina □ Yes □ No □ DNKDifficulty breathing □ Yes □ No □ DNK Hiccoughs □ Yes □ No □ DNK
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ID Case
Date of reception: / /Country:
Exposition Risks
Was the patient hospitalized or did he visit anyone in  the hospital anytime in  the three weeks before becoming ill?D
□Yes □ No □ DNK; I f  Yes, where_____________ between (dates) /  /  and / /
D id the patient have visit/consult a trad ition a l healer during the three weeks before becoming i l l  or during illness?
□ Yes □ No □ DNK; I f  Yes, name o f the traditional healer___________ V illage_________ Country______
When and where did the contact take place? Place ___________ date: __/___/_
D id the patient receive traditional medicine? □ Yes □ No □ DNK; I f  Yes, explain which kind:
D id the patient attend funera l ceremonies during anytime in the three weeks before becoming ill?  □ Yes
□ DNK;
D id the patient trave l anytime in the three weeks before becoming ill?D YesD No □ D N K
I f  Yes, where__________________________ between (dates) and
D id the patient have a contact w ith  a known suspect case anytime in  the three weeks before becoming ill?
□ Yes □ No □ DNK; I f  Yes, Surname
□ No
_First name ID Case
During the contact, the suspect case was □ Alive □ Dead date o f death ___/___/___
Date o f last contact w ith  the suspect case / /
D id the patient have contact w ith  a w ild  animal (non-human primate or others), that was found dead or sick in the 
bush, or animal behaving abnormally anytime in  the three weeks before the illness?
□ YesD No □ DNK; I f  Yes, kind o f animal Location date / /
Has a sample been collected? □ Yes □ No □ DNK; i f  yes, date / /
□ Blood sampling □ Urine □ Saliva □ Skin Biopsy
Was the patient sent to a hospital? □ Yes □ No
Was the patient admitted in  the isolation ward? □ Yes □ No
I f  yes, name o f Hospital________________ No. de hospital_____ Hospitalization date 
_____________Member o f fam ily helping the patient:_____Date of discharge / / OR Date of death___/_
Update on the Hospital in form ation ID  Case:
Reception date : ___/___/___ Country : _
Name and Surname _____________________
Laboratory
A  specimen was collected □ before the death □ after the death
Date sample ___/___/___ Date results ___/___/___ ID  Lab _________________
Sample □ blood □ blood w ith  anti-coagulants □ skin biopsy □ cardiac function □ other:
Results PCR □ pos □ neg □ N A
Antigen detection □ pos □ neg □ N A  date
Antibodies IgM  □ pos □ neg □ N A  date
Antibodies IgG □ pos □ neg □ N A
ImmunoHistochemistry □ pos □ neg □ N A
date _/___/_
_/___/_
/___ 
date 
date
Outcome (verified 4 weeks after the onset o f symptoms)
□ Alive □ Dead; i f  dead, date o f death / /
Case Classification
□ Alert Case □ Suspect □ Probable □ Confirmed □ Not a case
/
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